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Deze studie werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door het Greijdanus-Kruithof Fonds  
en de Stichting Afbouw Kampen. 
 
  
You should be patient 
with the unsolved matters in your heart 
and try to love the questions themselves, 
like closed chambers, 
and books that are written  
in a very strange language. 
The point is: to live everything. 
If you live the questions,  
you will gradually, 
without noticing, 
one strange day 
live into the answer. 
 
Rainer Maria Rilke, 




The windows of his room looked out into the garden, and our garden was a 
shady one, with old trees in it which were coming into bud. The first birds of 
spring were fluttering in the branches, chirruping and singing at the windows. 
And looking at them and admiring them, he began suddenly begging their 
forgiveness: ‘Birds of heaven, happy birds, forgive me, for I have sinned 
against you.’ None of us could understand that at the time, but he shed tears of 
joy. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘there was such a glory of God all about me: birds, trees, 
meadows, sky; only I lived in shame and dishonoured it all and did not notice 
the beauty and glory. 
 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky,  
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O Lord, open Thou our lips… 
 
Having finished this study, I am thankful in many ways. In the first place, I am 
thankful for the subject of my thesis and the persons I have been able to study. 
Herman Bavinck and John Milbank, different as they are in style, have both 
been great sources of wisdom and thought who will influence me for the rest 
of my life. Furthermore, the theme of participation connected me with the 
wisdom of the Fathers of the church and evoked my appreciation for the 
Platonic-Christian Catholic tradition. Thus a new world has been opened for 
me, for which I will always be grateful.  
Although I usually relish the task of writing (especially in Dutch), the scope 
of the study demanded by a dissertation, and the complexity, vastness and 
inherent mystery of my main questions often made me hesitant to write at all. 
This was a new experience for me. However, if even ‘the relation between God 
and the world’, around which this study revolves, does not cause a human 
being to hesitate, then what does?   
I thank Barend Kamphuis for giving me the opportunity and the space for 
this study, as well as his ongoing support and his answering of my many 
questions. His open-minded and stimulating attitude gave me the courage to 
go frankly on paths not often treaded by theologians in our own Reformed 
tradition. I am also very grateful for having been introduced to Hans Boersma. 
Both standing in the Reformed tradition, we share the intuition that in the 
Catholic tradition and particularly in its ‘sacramentality’ lies something of 
deep and abiding value for Reformed theology. Moreover, this study has been 
improved greatly by his sharp and thorough comments on earlier drafts.  
Kampen Theological University has been an oasis for study and reflection 
upon the themes of this study. In the past years, it seems to have realized 
anew what great minds, and what a great tradition it houses. Although not 
everyone will have realized that a highly ‘catholicizing’ thinker was working in 
their midst, I hope that the results and the ‘sphere’ of this study will add to the 
intellectual and spiritual climate that characterise the practice of Reformed 
theology in Kampen.  
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I thank many people whose company has supported me a lot, not only by 
discussing themes and parts of my dissertation, but also by their friendliness, 
their simply ‘being there’, and last but not least their ‘gezelligheid’. I will 
mention some of them (but definitely not all!) here. I thank my good and 
friendly colleagues in Kampen and particularly the different PhD students and 
Post-Docs with whom I have been privileged to work. Particularly I wish to 
mention Lammert Kamphuis, with whom I was able to work closely and 
discuss numerous insights, and with whom I have shared in joy and in 
suffering. I also mention James Eglinton, whose coming to Kampen has been a 
joy and blessing for me personally, but also for the Kampen University in 
general. I also thank these (and other) persons for sharing their many jokes 
with me: a huge source of inspiration. 
The research group in Systematic Theology shared between Kampen and 
Apeldoorn has been a stimulating and instructive context for learning how to 
do theology at a high academic level. The same can be said of the NOSTER 
seminar on Dogmatics, Ethics and Philosophy of Religion. I cherish the many 
seminars and Master Classes I have attended. Quite simply, I had a great time 
in participating in this group.  
This dissertation could not have been completed without the hospitality 
and the quiet and spiritual working environment provided by the Dominican 
monastery in Zwolle. For quite some years I have been able to study and write 
there at the library. Thank you, brothers and sisters, for allowing me to be in 
your midst! I hope and trust that finishing my dissertation will not mean the 
end of our relationship. The support by the people of Spectrum has also been 
very important, and particularly I mention Dick Mostert and Helen Catsburg. 
Their vision, and their attentive presence, which I think is as ‘therapeutic’ as it 
is ‘theological’, kept me aware of the life that this academic project breathes. 
The years I have been working on this project have also been the years 
that my wife Annelie and I became the parents of two boys, Kees and Joris. I 
am grateful that Annelie and the boys are there, in good and in bad days. May 
we learn together to grow in sharing and living the joy of God, day by day.  
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1.1 ‘Who are we to you?’  
 
In the intense theological and metaphysical film The Tree of Life (Terrence 
Malick, 2011), a whispered voice-over poses a number of questions to God: 
‘How did you come to me? In what shape? Who are we to you?’ Characters in 
the film ask these questions, both existential and ontological, in the context of 
the stories about their broken lives. Where does God ‘come into’ our lives and 
into this whole world? In what way do we connect with the divine? The film 
‘answers’ these questions by showing images of the boiling, erupting, shining, 
flowering process of evolution – a rendering of the film’s motto: ‘Where were 
you when I laid the earth’s foundation?’ (Job 38:4), which was considered too 
grotesque by some reviewers – but also by telling the story of a family with its 
glorious and tragic moments, a story of failing parenthood and 
incomprehensible reconciliation.  
Where then does the relation between God and our fragile human lives 
‘begin’ and where is the source or the foundation of this relation to be found? 
Or, on a larger scale, how can we consider the relation between God and the 
world? With such questions, a serious moment of silence is appropriate, also 
at the beginning of this study. Where do we begin? Do I start with the 
computer I am using to type these words, the books on my desk, the room I am 
sitting in? Or do I have to look away, into the sky, to the birds, or to the flowers 
and the trees? Is it perhaps better to plunge into history, the history of 
Christianity, of civilisation, of the whole world? I can also read the bible on this 
matter, or study different philosophical conceptions, or observe and try to 
interpret what I see through a microscope or a telescope (assuming, of course, 
that I would understand anything of what I see).  
If I want to be theologically correct, the answer should be perhaps that I 
have to look to Jesus Christ, or more correctly, that I have to enter into a 
personal relationship with Christ, that ‘union with Christ’ is the source and 
apex of all that can be said about God and the world. But then, who is Christ 
and how can I connect with him? Do I have to know who the ‘historical Jesus’ 
was, or do I simply have to be a member of the Church, the body of Christ? And 
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what do Christ and the Kingdom of God have to do with ‘normal life’, with 
creation itself, with the story of every human being, let alone with every 
animal, plant or rock? Or we might ask another question: Is it primarily my 
mind that does the job of ‘entering’ that relationship with God, or is it my 
complete bodily existence – and what do I even mean when I use such an 
expression?     
There is no end to such questioning, and inevitably one will realise that 
these questions are in the end impossible to answer, since the relation being 
investigated is always already there, realised far before and beyond our 
inquiry into it. We are not in charge so as to untangle the story that we are 
woven into. We simply have to live our lives and repeatedly and carefully ask 
our questions to ‘live into the answer’, as Rilke expresses it in his poem. We 
have to be patient. This study intends to contribute to this ‘history of asking’ 
into the relation between God and the world. It does so by interpreting the 
works of two theologians, John Milbank and Herman Bavinck, and analysing, 
comparing and evaluating their conceptions of this relation. The central 
concept that will be examined in this discussion is that of participation. Why 
this concept is so important in this study and why these two theologians have 
been chosen for this purpose will be explained in this introductory chapter.  
 
 
1.2 Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition  
 
1.2.1 Cambridge, Amsterdam, Kampen  
‘The relation between God and the world’: the subject of the present study is 
as big as that, and this study therefore intends to dive into what it sees as the 
mother of all questions. A clear focus is therefore necessary; indeed, it is not 
without a clear occasion and a defined space to move in that the question of 
the relation between God and the world is being investigated here. In 
attempting to shed some light on the relation between God and the world, I 
have chosen to set up a conversation between two different theological 
traditions that conceptualise this relation. The first tradition is known as 
Radical Orthodoxy, a recent British and North American theological 
phenomenon, represented here by John Milbank (1952-). The second is 
Reformed theology, represented here by the neo-Calvinist theologian Herman 
Bavinck (1854-1921). The immediate cause for this study is the reappearance 
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on the theological agenda of the concept of participation of the created in the 
divine, as it was proposed by Radical Orthodoxy in the late 1990s. Ever since, 
this concept has fascinated many junior and senior theologians, and it is the 
fascination for this concept that has prompted this study. Standing myself in 
the Reformed tradition, I am particularly interested in the conversation 
between Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed tradition and in what the two 
‘traditions’ can offer each other. This study represents an attempt to 
contribute to this conversation and to deepen it.  
In Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, James K. A. Smith ‘maps’ Radical 
Orthodoxy, offering, as he calls it, a guide for the perplexed.1 He begins his 
book by sketching the wider theological map in which Radical Orthodoxy is 
situated, with a number of ‘capitals’ representing important theological 
traditions. The two cities that Smith mostly travels between in his work are 
Cambridge and Amsterdam: Cambridge, because it was in a sense the home of 
Radical Orthodoxy in 1999, and Amsterdam, because that is where the origins 
of Smith’s Reformed standpoint are located, specifically at the Free University 
where Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd forged their Reformed 
theology and philosophy, respectively. The present study modestly weaves 
another small city into the network of theological capitals: Kampen, The 
Netherlands, where this study is written. Herman Bavinck was born and 
raised in Kampen, taught at his churches’ Theological School there and also 
wrote his Reformed Dogmatics in Kampen.2  
 
1.2.2 Radical Orthodoxy 
In 1999, the theologians John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock 
launched a new series of books entitled Radical Orthodoxy. The first volume, 
Radical Orthodoxy: a new theology, started with a firm and programmatic 
                                                          
1 J.K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 
25 ff.  
2 As ‘capitals’ in Bavinck’s own life, we should add Leiden, where he received his own 
theological education, as well as Amsterdam, where he finally accepted an 
appointment at the Free University. If Bavinck is primarily considered a ‘Neo-
Calvinist’, as someone working completely in line with Abraham Kuyper, it could be 
argued that he should simply be mentioned as a representative of ‘Amsterdam’ on 
Smith’s map. Nonetheless, Bavinck showed such an independent theological approach 
and was so reluctant to being ‘absorbed’ by Kuyper that his own situatedness in 
Kampen deserves attention. For more biographical details about Bavinck, see 3.1.1.     
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introduction, proclaiming the implosion of secularism and stating that 
theology should reclaim the world ‘by situating its concerns and activities 
within a theological framework’.3 The authors asserted that a purely 
immanent approach to finite beings does not safeguard their worldliness, as is 
often thought to be the case, but causes them to slide into nothingness. 
Instead, the introduction proposed a theological perspective on the world 
identified as the ‘participation’ of the human in the divine, not as a new 
concept, but as a way of thinking that was considered to be developed by Plato 
and then reworked in the Christian tradition. This concept of participation 
was said to guarantee that no territory of the world can be considered 
independent of God, while at the same time allowing the finite its own 
integrity.4 In the essays that followed, several authors discussed problems and 
challenges of secular culture from a theological standpoint, paying particular 
attention to the liturgical life of the church.  
To many established players in the theological field, the statements in 
Radical Orthodoxy were hard to digest. Radical Orthodoxy (RO) soon became 
one of the most talked about phenomena in the theological world (at least in 
North America and Western Europe) and was often the subject of heated 
debate.5 The voice of the RO-authors was often experienced as overly 
pedantic, or even militant and aggressive. Anyone who reads the introduction 
in the Radical Orthodoxy volume can see why. But to me and other younger 
theologians coming from the Reformed tradition, the focus on participation 
and the way the authors developed this theme along with their criticism on 
                                                          
3 J. Milbank et al. (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: a new theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 
1.  
4 Milbank et al., Radical Orthodoxy, 3.  
5 See e.g. Fergus Kerr’s telling remark on the back cover of Introducing Radical 
Orthodoxy: ‘Radical Orthodoxy, like it or hate it (and many do!), is the only interesting 
phenomenon on the British theological scene.’ Telling was also the appearance 
(probably in Cambridge circles, shortly after the publication of Radical Orthodoxy) of 
‘Twenty-Four Theses’ boldly promoting RO, and the ‘Twenty More Theses’ that 
consisted of a hilarious critique of the former. L.P. Hemming spoke of a ‘respectful 
rudeness’ in the discussions between RO and its interlocutors, in L.P. Hemming (ed.), 
Radical orthodoxy? – A Catholic Enquiry (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 4. A more 
aggressive stance was taken by D. Hedley, who drew attention to the ‘non-dialogical 
character of RO’ and suggested that John Milbank’s ‘authoritarian and anti-liberal’ 
narrative is almost fascist: ‘Radical Orthodoxy and Apocalyptic Difference: Cambridge 
Platonism, and Milbank’s Romantic Christian Cabbala’ in W.J. Hankey and D. Hedley 
(eds.), Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 99-115.     
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secular society was a very welcome and promising sound. On the one hand, it 
resonated with important motifs in our own specific, neo-Calvinist tradition 
(see further below), but on the other hand, it also articulated a lost sense of 
mystery we had been longing for. For me personally it also touched upon a 
poetical and metaphysical theological level that was almost completely absent 
from my own ecclesial tradition.  
To some extent, RO started as a ‘Cambridge movement’, since most of the 
contributors to the Radical Orthodoxy volume were working in Cambridge at 
the time when the book was published. RO seemed also to be bound strictly to 
specific ecclesial traditions: all of the contributors were Anglicans ‘of a High 
Church persuasion’ or Roman Catholics.6 Although there were complaints that 
RO was not open to dialogue with others, in the following years  several books 
appeared containing critical discussions with RO theologians, and RO became 
a theological orientation with an increasingly ecumenical face.7 Meanwhile, 
many commentators kept asking: What exactly is RO? Is it a group, a 
movement, or can we even call it a theological ‘school’? In a discussion with 
James Smith, Graham Ward pointed out that RO is to be seen as a shared 
‘theological sensibility’ instead of a clearly demarcated theological school or 
movement.8 Likewise, Catherine Pickstock described RO as a ‘loose tendency’ 
instead of an exclusive movement.9 Mild and open as these descriptions may 
be, they also make it almost impossible to study such a phenomenon. For who 
is in and who is out? Many contemporary theologians could in fact count as RO 
                                                          
6 Milbank et al., Radical Orthodoxy, ‘Acknowledgements’.  
7 There was a friendly debate with representatives of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Radical Orthodoxy? – A Catholic Enquiry, a thorough conversation with representatives 
of the Reformed tradition in J.K.A. Smith and  J.H. Olthuis (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy and 
the Reformed Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), as well as with Eastern 
Orthodox theologians in A. Pabst and C. Schneider (eds.), Encounter Between Eastern 
Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). John Milbank thought of 
RO as ‘an ecumenical theology that can speak to several different Christian 
communities’ of which he considered James Smith’s evangelical-Dooyeweerdian 
reception a good example, Smith, Introducing, 12. R.E. Webber has pointed out that 
there is a young generation of evangelicals who feel attracted to the thought of RO, 
concomitant with new attention for topics like tradition, embodiment and the Church, 
R.E. Webber, The Younger Evangelicals (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2002), 72-82. 
8 Ward, ‘In the Economy of the Divine: A Response to James K.A. Smith’, PNEUMA: 
Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies 25 (2003), 117; Smith, Introducing, 63-70.  




theologians if they are read with a degree of flexibility. The relative vagueness 
of RO renders it impossible to analyse it properly. The same maxim that 
applies in so many areas of reality applies also here: if it is everything, it is 
nothing.  
In this study, RO will therefore be represented by its major voice, John 
Milbank. The choice of authors could have been extended to include also 
Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, or other contributors to the RO-series, 
but John Milbank’s work is already so full of conceptualisations of the relation 
between God and the world and so rich in sources and images shaping these 
conceptualisations that a limitation to his work alone will not be harmful but 
rather fruitful for a proper discussion between RO and the Reformed 
Tradition. Furthermore, in Milbank’s work we do not receive a distorted or 
one-sided image of RO; on the contrary, he represents the pre-eminent voice 
of RO.  
This study comes at a time when the storm around RO has abated. The 
series of books has come to an end, and the three main RO players Milbank, 
Ward and Pickstock are working on their own theological programmes, in 
different places. This does not mean, however, that the post-secular 
theological sensibility they shared has disappeared with the series.10 It is also 
important to note that it did not start with the series. Prior to 1999, the central 
themes of RO were already present in the works of Milbank, Ward and 
Pickstock, as well as in the works of several other more or less like-minded 
theologians who themselves did not necessarily write in the series.11 For 
example, Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory, Ward’s Barth, Derrida and the 
Language of Theology and Pickstock’s After Writing had been published before 
                                                          
10 Some of the ‘spirit of RO’ is particularly present at the University of Nottingham, in 
the Centre of Theology and Philosophy, of which John Milbank is the Director. Book 
series like Veritas, Interventions and Illuminations, stemming from the centre, convey 
the intentions of RO, theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/publications.  
11 Theological tendencies that are mentioned as being similar to RO are e.g. found in 
the Yale School, in the work of Stanley Hauerwas, Rowan Williams, Fergus Kerr, 
Nicholas Lash, David Burrell and Peter Ochs. The similarity lies in the post-secular 
intention of these theological tendencies, as well as their engaging in ‘social political 
and critical theory and metaphysics, on the basis of tradition-based reasoning’, G. 
Ward, ‘In the Economy of the Divine’, 115-116. Smith, Introducing, 41.  
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the name RO was launched, but are regarded by several commentators as 
being of great importance in discussions of RO.12   
 
1.2.3 Conversation with the Reformed tradition 
In the early 2000s, several discussions were organised with RO. One of these 
took place with North American representatives of the Reformed Tradition. In 
2003, a conference was held at Calvin College (Grand Rapids, USA) involving 
both Reformed and RO theologians, which culminated in the publication of 
Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition.13 From the Reformed side, 
there was both recognition and criticism of RO, and while some attendees felt 
attracted to some notion of participation, others had their theological 
reservations. Important points in RO that were recognised and valued were, 
first, RO’s refusal of an autonomous, secular realm – resonating with Abraham 
Kuyper’s famous dictum that ‘there is not a single square inch of the entire 
creation about which Jesus Christ does not cry out, ‘This is mine!’’ – and, 
second, its affirmation of the fundamental goodness of creation, which opens 
up all realms of culture as places of transcendence.14 Earlier, James K.A. Smith 
had already suggested that John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (often 
regarded as the first sketch of a RO-theology) echoed what could be heard 
almost a century ago in the Reformed theology of Abraham Kuyper, 
particularly as it was unfolded in the thought of Herman Dooyeweerd. He 
added, however, that some important questions still lingered.15  
First, several authors have questioned whether RO really does honour the 
physicality and materiality of created life, contending that RO considers 
embodiment as a means to ascend to the divine life, as a ladder that can be 
discarded once we have access to the beatific vision. Does RO really have a 
correct view on creation, the fall and incarnation?16 Second, several Reformed 
                                                          
12 Smith, Introducing, 34. Cf. J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular 
Reason. Second Edition (First edition 1990) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); G. Ward, Barth, 
Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); C. Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). 
13 J.K.A. Smith, J.H. Olthuis (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic), 2005.  
14 Smith and Olthuis (eds), Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 18, 280.  
15 Smith, Introducing, 26.  
16 See particularly the articles of J.K.A. Smith, 61-72, and A.D. Chaplin, 89-106.  
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authors expressed concerns about the concept of participation, which some 
attempted to overcome by stressing the Reformed concept of the covenant. 
For example, one such critic stated that while participation is focussed on 
‘overcoming estrangement’ between God and man, covenantal theology is 
directed towards the ‘meeting of a stranger’.17 Participation appears thus to 
blur the boundary between Creator and creation, while the Reformed 
tradition has always insisted firmly on this boundary as necessary for 
maintaining the integrity of creation.18 Third, the Reformed tradition was 
defended against what was considered an all too swift dismissal by RO 
authors, with Reformed theologians simply denying that the Reformed 
tradition already worked within a secular paradigm. John Duns Scotus, who 
has been a key figure in the tradition of Reformed Orthodoxy, was defended 
against the serious charges levelled against him by RO theologians who tended 
to see him as one of the ‘inventors’ of secular knowledge.19 Special attention 
was also paid to the sacramental character of John Calvin’s theology, whose 
work was said to resemble the analogical worldview promoted by RO. It was 
noted, for example, that Calvin stresses our union with Christ in the Lord’s 
Supper, in which God mediates himself to us and lifts us up into his life.20  
The major point of concern from a Reformed standpoint was RO’s view on 
the relation between the Creator and creation. Is it necessary to see the 
created world as in a way ‘participating’ in the divine life? Some Reformed 
theologians welcomed this view and even recognised it in their own tradition, 
but to what extent is participation actually compatible with Reformed 
theology? Does created life not have its own integrity? In his afterword to 
Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, James H. Olthuis summarised 
the discussion by pointing out that RO and the Reformed Tradition share the 
same intentions but differ on how to achieve them. What they share is the 
desire ‘to keep God and creation in intimate connection, while honouring their 
difference’.21 While the Reformed Tradition is concerned that RO’s pre-
                                                          
17 M.S. Horton, Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 107-132.  
18 The latter was mentioned especially in the chapters on politics, from a Kuyperian-
Dooyeweerdian standpoint. L. Zuidervaart, Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed 
Tradition, 135-149 and J. Chaplin, 151-182.   
19 R. Sweetman, Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 73-87.  
20 L. Smit, Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 205-227. Similar comments 
were made by N.R. Kerr, 229-242.   
21 J.H. Olthuis, Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 284. 
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occupation with God and creation in terms of participation and analogy will 
lead to the downplaying of their respective integrity, RO is concerned that the 
Reformed tradition allows too great a distance between God and creation and 
thus creates room for the secular.  
 
 
1.2.4 Herman Bavinck 
The present study intends to take a significant next step in this conversation 
and attempts to address these questions again. It focuses on the concept of 
participation, and highlights a theologian who as yet has not been introduced 
to the discussion but may deepen the conversation between RO and the 
Reformed tradition. This is the Dutch Reformed theologian Herman Bavinck. 
Although Bavinck is firmly rooted in the Reformed tradition, he is known for 
his openness towards other traditions and other strands of thought. His four-
volume magnum opus, the Reformed Dogmatics, particularly demonstrates his 
ability to connect broad discussions of different traditions of theology and 
philosophy with his contemporary culture. The word that perhaps best 
characterises Bavinck’s theology is catholicity, since, as G.C. Berkouwer once 
noted, ‘he was always looking for paths beyond strict antithesis, even the most 
difficult possible footpaths to follow, along which one could meet’, thereby 
suggesting that Bavinck’s work has a mediating quality.22  
Furthermore, there are certain elements in Bavinck’s theology that qualify 
him as a particularly interesting conversation partner for RO. Just like RO, 
Bavinck stresses the need for a theological view of the world, and even 
considers religion as the very source of civilisation, as the basis of life in the 
family, state and society. This view is theologically motivated since, according 
to Bavinck, God and the world are sharply distinguished, but at the same time 
stand in the closest connection to each other.23 The indispensability of the 
                                                          
22 G.C. Berkouwer, quoting G. Wurth, in Zoeken en vinden (Kampen: Kok, 1989), 41. 
Berkouwer gives his chapter on Bavinck the title ‘catholicity’. The word ‘catholicity’ 
occurs most famously in the title of Bavinck’s published speech De Katholiciteit van 
Christendom en Kerk (Kampen: Kok, 1968), in which he stresses the universality of 
God’s work in contrast with the sectarian and separatist tendencies he notices in his 
own church denomination. 
23 H. Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1909), 1-2. Interestingly, Bavinck continues this article by stressing the importance of 
the Reformation for this view, because there the image of God was not considered as a 
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theological for the affairs of this world is equally important for RO as it is for 
Bavinck. 
Moreover, there is an almost unnoticed sense of participation in Bavinck’s 
work, which connects him even more with RO. This has been noted by Barend 
Kamphuis, who emphasised that for Bavinck the incarnation of the Word of 
God is ‘the central fact of the entire history of the world’.24 The incarnation is 
not a separate fact in salvation history, but is rooted in the trinitarian being of 
God, presupposed and prepared in creation, and anticipated in the history of 
revelation. In the words of Bavinck: ‘Revelation, after all, is based on the same 
idea as the incarnation: on the communicability of God, both in his being to the 
Son (generation) and outside his being (creation).’25 Kamphuis considers this 
‘communicability of God’ to be Bavinck’s most important and original 
contribution in his treatment of the incarnation: God can communicate himself 
to creatures, while still remaining himself. In this connection, Bavinck speaks 
of communion with God through Christ as a mystical union: ‘It is so close that 
it transforms humans in the divine image and makes them participants in the 
divine nature.’26 The notion of God’s communicability in Bavinck’s work is also 
mentioned by Gerrit Riemer as the key feature by which he may be connected 
to the theme of participation, as it occurs in the work of Milbank.27  
So where does this ‘participatory’ language in Bavinck’s thought stem 
from? Does Bavinck consider the relation between God and the world 
generally within the framework of participation? In what ways does his 
outlook resemble John Milbank’s, and in what ways does it differ? In clarifying 
how Bavinck describes the relation between God and the world and in 
                                                                                                                                                   
supernatural addition but as an integral part of the nature of man – over against the 
mechanical ‘Roman’ view as he calls it.     
24 B. Kamphuis, ‘Chalcedon in Kampen’, Theologia Reformata 48 (2005), 29. He refers 
to H. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics vol. III (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 274.  
25 ‘Chalcedon in Kampen’, 31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics III, 281.  
26 ‘Chalcedon in Kampen’, 31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics III, 304. On the concept of 
‘mystical union with Christ’ in Bavinck, cf. H. Burger, Being in Christ (Eugene: Wipf & 
Stock, 2008), 101-108; H. Burger, ‘Een eeuwigdurende verbondenheid: Bavincks 
concept van de unio mystica’, in G. Harinck and G. Neven (eds.), Ontmoetingen met 
Herman Bavinck (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006), 265-286, and R.N. Gleason, The 
Centrality of the Unio Mystica in the Theology of Herman Bavinck. (Th.D. Thesis, 
Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, 2001).   
27 G. Riemer, betoverdewereld: over de theologische reactie van John Milbank op de dood 
van het realisme (Master thesis, Kampen Theological University, 2006), 56.  
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analysing how his description can be called ‘participatory’, this study hopes to 
develop the conversation between RO and the Reformed tradition. One of the 
most important elements that needs to emerge more clearly is whether or not 
participation does or can have a place in a Reformed perspective.  
 
1.2.5 Main tasks 
In sum, this study intends to enter the vast and mysterious question of the 
relation between God and the world. It approaches this question from the 
viewpoint of the concept of participation as it was proposed by RO and as it is 
particularly substantiated in the work of John Milbank. This viewpoint is then 
contrasted and brought into conversation with the work of Herman Bavinck, a 
Dutch Reformed theologian. In the case of Milbank, this study tries to clarify in 
his work what the concept of participation exactly implies for the relation 
between God and the world. In the case of Bavinck, this study attempts to 
obtain from his work as complete a picture as possible of the relation between 
God and the world, and to analyse whether or not this picture is deserving of 
the label of ‘participation’. By interpreting, analysing and evaluating the works 
of John Milbank and Herman Bavinck, and putting their concepts in the 
perspective of the concept of participation, the present study hopes to clarify 






1.3.1 Ontological questions 
The shared goal of RO and the Reformed tradition can be articulated, in the 
words of James Olthuis, as the desire ‘to keep God and creation in intimate 
connection, while honouring their difference’. How then do Milbank and 
Bavinck perceive the relationship between God and creation, and how are 
their perspectives ‘participatory’? What do they share, and where do they 
differ? These questions will of course largely direct the attention of this study 
to the doctrine of God and Creation, but it will also be necessary to consider 
Christology, Soteriology, Ecclesiology and even the Prolegomena of theology 
or the question ‘what is theology?’  
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The theme of the relation between God and the world, but particularly the 
focus on the concept of participation which is the pivotal concept of this study, 
significantly moves the subject of this study onto the field ontology. If we 
speak about the relation between God and creation, we involve ourselves in 
ontological questions, whether we like it or not. For example, what account do 
we have of the being of God and the being of creation, and how are they 
related? Do we envisage one ontology in which God and created beings have 
their well-ordered places, or is God’s being utterly different from ours? Should 
God-talk be univocal, equivocal or analogical? And if it is analogical, what 
exactly does this imply? In analysing how RO and Bavinck envision the 
relation between God and the world, this study seeks to clarify how they 
envision being and how they relate it to God’s being. Stated otherwise, the 
present study attempts to clarify the ‘theological ontology’ of RO and Bavinck. 
Ontology, and even the more ‘contaminated’ word metaphysics, can be 
said to have made their way back onto the theological agenda, concurring with 
a renewed interest in the Trinity. The common criticism on metaphysics 
charges that it abstracts from sensible, lived reality to enter a highly 
speculative and equally rationalistic domain. Metaphysics is considered to 
bracket out all particular details of beings to seek the most general, static and 
empty reality, called ‘being’. This idea of being has been the subject of heavy 
criticism, and there was a time when theologians considered it necessary to 
remove metaphysics from theology altogether.28 However, although they are 
conscious of the criticism of metaphysics and onto-theology, some theologians 
are beginning to underline the necessity of metaphysics for theology again, 
                                                          
28 The most famous criticism of mingling metaphysics with theology in the twentieth 
century came from Martin Heidegger, who wrote that for the metaphysical God ‘man 
can neither fall on his knees in awe, nor can he play music or dance before this god.’ 
He continues: ‘The god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god 
as causa sui, is thus closer to the divine God’ or is ‘more open to Him’, M. Heidegger, 
Identity and Difference (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 72. Philosophically, this 
direction has been followed by Jacques Derrida, and in a more theological guise by 
John D. Caputo and Jean-Luc Marion. It is not a coincidence that the new focus is on 
liturgy, prayer, worship and desire for God, without wanting to capture anything of a 
stable identity of ‘God’. In Caputo’s work this is called the ‘messianic’, ‘a waiting 
without a horizon of determinate expectation’, whereas Marion focuses on the ‘iconic’ 
that escapes the idolising gaze. J.D. Caputo, The Prayers and tears of Jacques Derrida: 
Religion without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 134-139 and 




interestingly with the same desire for liveliness which they in fact share with 
anti-metaphysical theologians: ‘without metaphysics theology tends to 
become boring, unimaginative, and ultimately uninspiring.’29 Theological 
metaphysics, a ‘trinitarian ontology’ or even the famously scorned analogia 
entis can be considered as ways to connect the being of God with creaturely 
beings in an interplay of intimacy and distance which transcends a self-
enclosed materialistic world.30  
It is an altogether reasonable endeavour to analyse RO’s theological 
ontology, since the search for such an ontology lies at the very heart of its 
project. Yet is it also reasonable to look for a theological ontology in Bavinck, 
or in any theologian from the Reformed tradition? It has been asserted that 
the Reformed tradition with its criticism on all scholastic speculation did away 
with metaphysics, and that the Reformation simply went back to some kind of 
‘biblical teaching’ that was free from all philosophy. Or, at least, it has been 
claimed that the early Reformers did away with such speculation, only for that 
speculation to sneak back in again with the use of Aristotelian philosophy 
during what is now referred to as the period of Orthodoxy.31  
                                                          
29 J. R. Betz, ‘The Beauty of the Metaphysical Imagination’, in C. Cunningham and P.M. 
Candler Jr. (eds.), Belief and Metaphysics (London: SCM Press, 2007), 44. 
30 Cf. the collection of essays Belief and Metaphysics. Hans Burger mentions in this 
current thinkers like Gerhard Ebeling, Colin Gunton, Eberhard Jüngel, John Milbank, 
Christoph Schwöbel, Miroslav Volf and John Zizioulas, Being in Christ, 6-7. Also 
Maarten Wisse observes from the 1990s onwards ‘a new interest in metaphysical 
ways of thinking our world experience from an explicitly religious perspective’. M. 
Wisse, Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate and 
Contemporary Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 2.  
31 This is perhaps the most shallow, popular version of more serious theological 
standpoints throughout the last two centuries. For example, within the neo-orthodox 
strand of thought it has been contended that there was a healthy biblical and 
christocentric focus in the period of the Reformation which was soon clouded by a 
rigid predestinarian system (cf. among others for this claim the works of T.F. 
Torrance, e.g. Conflict and Agreement in the Church, Vol. I (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1959), 91-93.). This contrast can also be viewed as favouring a ‘Lutheran’ or ‘German 
Reformed’ standpoint, which focuses on soteriology and considers it to be in 
opposition to the ‘central dogma of predestination’ in the Calvinist line (cf. the works 
of H. Heppe, E. Bizer and H.E. Weber.). Other ways of opposing the Reformation with 
the period of Orthodoxy stress the scholastic, rationalistic character of Reformed 
Orthodoxy and even envision this within a scheme of ‘Hebrew’ vs. ‘Greek’ thinking (cf. 
S. van der Linde, “Het ‘Griekse’ denken in kerk, theologie en geloofspraktijk: een eerste 
inleiding’ in Theologia Reformata 28 (1985), 248-268. Considering in particular a 
resurgence of metaphysics in the Reformed Tradition, Brian G. Armstrong famously 
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This line of thought has recently suffered serious challenges, particularly 
in the work of Richard A. Muller. In the first place, Muller connects the 
Reformers and their later successors to a greater degree than had commonly 
been done, and, secondly, he places the Reformers – especially John Calvin – 
more in the context of their own time and against their medieval theological 
background.32 According to Muller, Reformed Orthodoxy is a ‘doctrinal 
development resting on a fairly diverse theological heritage’, and he 
emphasises that the Reformation stands within the broad tradition of Western 
theology, not only in discontinuity but also in continuity with the patristic and 
medieval heritage, thereby implying that its theology was involved in 
metaphysical thought as well.33 Muller concludes from a thorough reading of 
the sources that the Reformed tradition was ‘highly eclectic’ on the level of 
metaphysics. It used late medieval traditions that followed Augustinian, 
Thomistic, Scotistic or nominalistic lines of thought, which commonly used 
Aristotelian language, structures and contents. The Reformers blended 
different, at times even contradicting traditions, because they had no 
commitment to any prior school of thought.34  
                                                                                                                                                   
asserted that Reformed Orthodoxy, in contrast with the Reformers, ‘had a pronounced 
interest in metaphysical matters, in abstract, speculative thought, particularly with 
reference to the doctrine of God’, B. G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut heresy 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 32. An overview of the discussion 
about continuity and discontinuity between ‘Calvin and the Calvinists’ can be found in 
R.A. Muller, After Calvin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 63-80, and R.T. te 
Velde, Paths Beyond Tracing Out (Delft: Eburon, 2010), 18-42.  
32 See e.g. his four-volume Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2003), The unaccomodated Calvin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) on Calvin and his time and the aforementioned After Calvin on the ‘Calvin and 
the Calvinists’-issue.  
33 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics I, 45. Similar claims can be found in 
After Calvin, 63-80.  
34 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics III, 108. Interestingly, John Milbank 
asserts in Radical Orthodoxy and The Reformed Tradition that ‘Calvin’s humanist and 
practical theology is one that is implicitly in search of a metaphysics’ (35), which 
should at best have been a ‘realist, analogical and participatory’ one, but since, 
tragically, mainly a Suarezian metaphysics was available, the Reformed tradition 
became acquainted with univocal and nominalist currents. Although more nuanced 
views on Calvin’s metaphysical embeddedness are available, the question if Scotism 
and its univocalism really became ‘the’ ontological standard for Reformed Orthodoxy 
is an interesting one, on which the discussion is still developing. Antonie Vos seems to 
defend such a position, whereas Richard Muller counters it. A. Vos, ‘Scholasticism and 
Reformation’ in Asselt, W.J. van and Dekker, E. (eds.) Reformation and Scholasticism: 
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Whether or not participation can at least have a place in the Reformed 
tradition is a question which in turn presupposes the question whether the 
Reformed tradition is in any way invested in metaphysics. As we will see, 
Herman Bavinck’s work makes a major plea for metaphysics in theology. It 
will be necessary, however, to consider more carefully what exactly this 
metaphysical content looks like, and whether or not it tends to a participatory 
metaphysics. The question might also be framed as follows: in which 
metaphysical current (or perhaps currents) within the Reformed tradition 
does Herman Bavinck stand?  
 
1.3.2 Difference in systematic degree 
Even if there is enough reason to interpret both Milbank and Bavinck through 
an ontological lens, a number of methodological difficulties remain that would 
seem to plead against the setting up of such a conversation between them. At 
least on the face of the way they present themselves, their theologies are very 
unlike. One of the striking ways in which postmodern theologies differ from 
modern ones, is their unsystematic and essayistic presentation. This is related 
to a different view on knowledge, which within a modern outlook is 
considered more as a ‘building’: first one has to find a secure foundation, and 
then it is possible to raise a structure of knowledge on this foundation. In a 
postmodern perspective the priority has been shifted from knowledge to 
language, or ‘signs’. The knowledge we gain has a more scattered character 
and is not placed in an ordered system. We do not move neatly from A to B 
and then to C, but we see the different signs as a chaotic whole and can 
eclectically pick one of the signs, but do not dare to say if this particular sign is 
arbitrarily connected to the other ones in a necessary caused chain.  
This difference is clearly visible in the works of Bavinck and Milbank. 
Milbank explicitly explains how his work is composed: ‘The fragmentary, and 
not the systematic character of the literary pile should be explicitly 
foregrounded’. Further on in the same sentence he admits that he purposely 
‘exhibits and offers a ruin’.35 The systematisation in Milbank’s work is thus 
                                                                                                                                                   
An Ecumenical Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 117; and R. Muller, ‘Not 
Scotist: understandings of being, univocity, and analogy in early-modern Reformed 
thought’, Reformation and Renaissance Review 14 (2012), 127-150. 
35 J. Milbank, TheFuture of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2009), 175-176. 
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more of an ad hoc-character and loose. This is not to imply, however, that 
Bavinck’s theology is typically modern and firmly systematised. He admittedly 
did write a Dogmatics in four neat volumes that look impressively systematic 
when they are placed in order on a shelf or when we look at the table of 
contents. His Dogmatics is clearly structured in loci along the traditional 
Reformed order, beginning with Revelation, God and Creation, all the way to 
the Church and Eschatology.36 Bavinck, however, sees at once much more 
unity and much more plurality in theology than this ‘system’ allows for: ‘The 
different dogmas are not isolated propositions, but constitute a unity. Actually 
there is only one dogma, one that is rooted in Scripture and that has branched 
out and divided in a wide range of particular dogmas’, referring to the triune 
God who communicates himself to creation, for which Bavinck uses his 
beloved ‘organic’ language.37 As we will see more often in this study, when 
Bavinck uses a distinction that superficially seems neat and clear, it is usually 
undergirded by a much more fundamental theological viewpoint that 
suspends clearly defined distinctions.  
In terms of the ‘building’-analogy, this means that the conversation 
between Bavinck and Milbank has the character of a comparison between a 
‘building’ and a ‘ruin’.38 However, if properly interpreted, it is clear that 
Bavinck’s ‘building’ is aware of its own constructed status, and thus constantly 
                                                          
36 Although the exact interpretation of this order might have changed impressively, 
this way of ordering the content of dogmatics has in fact been in use from John of 
Damascus onwards, found its most famous expression in Peter Lombard’s Sentences 
and was, with some changes, also used by Reformed theologians. Cf. R. Reeling 
Brouwer, Grondvormen van theologische systematiek (Vught: Skandalon, 2009), 112-
113. 
37 RD I, 94 (GD1, 71). In the first book of his Dogmatics, Bavinck states that this unity 
lies in the fact that God is the origin and destination of theology: ‘It takes its point of 
departure in God and views all creatures only in relation to him. But proceeding from 
God, it descends to his works, in order through them again to ascend to and end in 
him’, RD I, 112 (GD1, 89). 
38 The comparison between dogmatic works and buildings was made in witty fashion 
by Luco van den Brom in his inaugural lecture at the University of Utrecht. For 
example, he compares Barth’s Church Dogmatics with an office complex, Pannenberg’s 
and Jenson’s works with more modest but still impressive mansions, and the Dutch 
theologian G.C. Berkouwer’s Dogmatische Studien with a ‘bungalowpark’ (who is 
therefore, according to van den Brom, the most ‘postmodern’, since he refuses a 
system). L. van den Brom, Theoloog als jongleur: positionering van de christelijke 
geloofsleer, Utrechtse theologische reeks, 50 (Utrecht: Faculteit godgeleerdheid, 
2006), 13-14.    
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relativises its systematization. At the same time, Milbank’s ‘ruin’ is constantly 
on its way to a systematisation that should not be overestimated and yet 
makes it possible to speak in more general terms of his position than the chaos 
of the ‘literary pile’ would initially suggest.  
 
1.3.3 Difference in time 
A conversation between Bavinck and Milbank also faces the ‘problem of time’, 
since they are separated by the greater part of the twentieth century. Bavinck 
tried to engage Reformed theology with the problems and challenges that 
arose in the nineteenth century, while Milbank leans on developments in late 
twentieth-century theology and philosophy, especially postmodernism, and 
also engages with typical questions of the early twenty-first century, such as 
the return of religion in the public sphere and religious violence. The two 
world wars of the twentieth century, and the violent rise and fall of 
totalitarian and utterly modern regimes gave a new perspective on modernity 
that is common sense to RO, but was still hidden for Bavinck.  
Furthermore, Bavinck’s theological work, being conducted over a century 
ago, does not involve several important philosophical developments which 
took place in the twentieth century and are considered to be important points 
of concern for contemporary theology, especially when it comes to questions 
about ontology in theological discourse. It is important to be aware that 
Bavinck preceded these developments, and not to criticise him ahead of time 
for failing to deal with them.39 
In the first place, Bavinck worked during a time in which idealism and 
empiricism were still the two main streams of philosophical thought and were 
deemed the only ways of looking at the world scientifically. Bavinck is not yet 
familiar with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, although he does show signs 
                                                          
39 Since the main question of this study has an ontological character, the matter of the 
‘difference in time’ between Bavinck and Milbank is not discussed here along 
theological-historical lines, for example by identifying Bavinck as ‘pre-Barthian’ and 
Milbank as responding to post-Barthian neo-orthodoxy, thereby emphasising Barth’s 
place as the pivotal point in twentieth-century theology. Since Barthian theology 
purposely remained ‘purely theological’ it did not affect the metaphysical layers this 
study is interested in and is therefore not of substantial importance for the intended 
conversation.   
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of a weariness vis-à-vis the dichotomies of late nineteenth-century philosophy 
and searches for a way to move beyond them.40  
Secondly, and even more importantly, Bavinck worked before what we 
have come to call the ‘death of metaphysics’. In the wake of Heidegger and 
Derrida, there has been a serious tendency to ‘free’ theology from the 
language of being, with all its associations of staticness, essentialism, 
hierarchy and even violence.41 This does not mean that Bavinck used 
metaphysical language without any hesitation; rather, he was aware that the 
mingling of theology with metaphysics had been subject to severe criticism, in 
his time especially from the school of Albrecht Ritschl.42 However, Bavinck 
invoked metaphysics as a useful and even necessary register for theology 
against the Neo-Kantian and Positivist trends of his age.  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Bavinck was active before the so-
called ‘linguistic’ or ‘hermeneutical’ turn, which his theology seems not to 
anticipate in any way. In the twentieth century, due to thinkers like 
Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger, as well as (post-)structuralist theorists, 
language earned an important status in philosophy and theology. No longer 
was language seen in a purely instrumental way, simply as a tool used by the 
mind to represent reality, but instead it was considered as being itself 
constitutive and even having creative power. We do not simply ‘use’ our 
language, we are ‘in’ language and perhaps shaped or even commanded by it 
to a greater degree than we ourselves realise. Although, as we shall see, this 
development is very important in Milbank’s work, the question of language 
and hermeneutics is almost invisible in Bavinck. We simply cannot compare 




                                                          
40 Like many contemporaries, Bavinck deplored the fact that both idealism (or 
‘rationalism’) and empiricism had not been able to give a proper account of the 
relationship between subject and object: ‘Does not the whole of modern philosophy, in 
its Cartesian as well in its Baconian expression, need revision? Are there not other and 
better principles of science, principles that protect us from materialism as well as 
idealism?’ RD I, 222 (GD1, 195). 
41 Cf. 1.3.1.  
42 See e.g. RD I, 168-170 (GD1, 142-145) and H. Bavinck, ‘De theologie van Albrecht 
Ritschl’, Theologische Studiën 6 (1888), 369-403.  
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1.3.4 Fusing horizons 
As such, time represents a hermeneutical problem since it complicates a fair 
comparison between two thinkers up to the point where they appear to speak 
of completely different things or even live in different worlds. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the period of time that separates them, they both still participate in a 
similar theological debate. Both Bavinck and Milbank criticise an all too easy 
adaptation of theology to the claims of modernity, although they have no 
desire simply to retrieve a pre-modern theology. Time and again Bavinck 
welcomes ‘great elements of truth’ in modern theology when he faces the 
challenges of his day, without surrendering himself to the anti-theological 
worldviews underlying it. In just the same way, John Milbank depicts the 
renaissance, humanism and the Enlightenment not simply as deteriorations, 
but as half-hearted theological developments. What Bavinck and Milbank 
share is a vision of an ‘alternative modernity’: modernity in a theological 
framework.   
Furthermore, following the thought of Gadamer, we can consider distance 
in time not as a problem, but as a constitutive factor for understanding. It is 
not the intention of this study to overcome the particular, time-bound 
character of the works of Bavinck and Milbank to achieve a comparison in 
what Anthony Thiselton calls ‘an abstract, timeless, conceptually pure 
doctrinal domain’.43 Since we perceive an old text as something strange, as 
something ‘other’, Gadamer encourages us not to cover up this strangeness, 
but to unfold it.44 However, hermeneutics is not only a question of laying bare 
the historic differences between text and reader, but is also a discovery of the 
familiarity between them. According to Gadamer, this ‘play between 
strangeness and familiarity’ is even the ‘true place of hermeneutics’. The 
                                                          
43 Cf. A.C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 
62-63.  
44 H.G. Gadamer, Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und Methode. Gesammelte Werke, Band 1 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 311. In discussing the positive use of prejudices, 
Gadamer even mentions that we have to ‘stir them up’ (‘reizen’): ‘Ein Vorurteil 
gleichsam vor sich zu bringen, kann nicht gelingen, solange dies Vorurteil beständig 
und unbemerkt im Spiele ist, sondern nur dann, wenn es sozusagen gereizt wird.’ 
Wahrheit und Methode, 304. This ‘reizen’ is in fact what we did in 1.3.1-1.3.3.   
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strangeness lies in the distance in time, while familiarity is given with 
belonging to one and the same tradition.45  
The notion of tradition, not as an obstacle for understanding, but as a 
creative and even necessary factor for understanding has been widely 
acknowledged in theology. Alister McGrath, for example, writes favourably of 
tradition as the ‘corporate memory of the community’, whether it be scientific, 
philosophical or religious, stressing that particularly Christian faith does not 
come into existence in a conceptual vacuum, ‘but is both generated and 
informed by a corporate tradition’ which is called the community of faith.46 It 
is therefore noteworthy that Bavinck and Milbank invest heavily in linking 
their theology with tradition. They both intend to work in continuity with the 
patristic and medieval theological tradition, and therefore hope to develop a 
theology that is deserving of the name ‘catholic’. Despite all the differences in 
language, conceptual preferences and theological and philosophical context, 
they both work within the larger horizon of the Christian tradition and tap the 
same, shared sources. For this reason, we have good reason to hope that they 
also share in the same questions.  
As McGrath writes, ‘the present is able to empathize with, and even to 
selectively appropriate, the past’. He stresses the community as bearer of the 
tradition, and notes that people standing within the same community tradition 
‘detect a resonance of values, language and concepts with the past’ (italics 
mine). In the same way, even though RO and the Reformed tradition were 
considered as two different traditions, James K. A. Smith in his work asserted 
that RO ‘resonates’ with important concerns of the Reformed tradition and 
that John Milbank’s work ‘echoed’ the works of Kuyper and Dooyeweerd.47 
This seems simply to be the way engagement with past theologies works 
hermeneutically: something new ‘resonates’ with something old, or ‘echoes’ it. 
It is, as Gadamer has it, a play between strangeness and familiarity.  
                                                          
45 ‘Sie spielt zwischen Fremdheit und Vertrautheit, die die Überlieferung für uns hat, 
zwischen der historisch gemeinten, abständigen Gegenständlichkeit und der 
Zugehörigkeit zu einer Tradition. In diesem Zwischen ist der wahre Ort der 
Hermeneutik.’ (italics Gadamer’s), Wahrheit und Methode, 300.  
46 A.E. McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine (Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 177-
178. This is what Gadamer calls our ‘historically effected consciousness’ 
(‘wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein’), Wahrheit und Methode, 307.  
47 Smith and Olthuis (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 18; Smith, 
Introducing, 26; and this study, 1.2.3.  
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Gadamer furthermore sees in hermeneutics a logic of question and 
answer: texts can be considered as ‘answers to a question’. This does not mean 
that we only have to reconstruct the ‘original question’ of the text, but that we 
also discover that the text is asking us a question.48 According to Gadamer, no 
assertion is possible that cannot be understood as an answer to a question. 
Both text and reader are interwoven in the same questions, a form of 
dialectics which Gadamer understands as the reciprocity of a conversation. 
This is why hermeneutics for him has the form of a conversation, and the last 
section of Truth and Method is devoted to speech. Accordingly, the present 
study is intended as a conversation between two strands of thought, separated 
in time and even in intention, but nonetheless both standing within the same 
Christian tradition. The bodies of texts from both Bavinck and Milbank are 
considered as ‘answers to a question’, namely: ‘How can we keep God and 
creation in intimate connection with each other, while honouring their 
difference?’ This study wants to listen carefully to the way each of them 
answers this question as well as the way they ask it, and finally to allow them 
to interrogate each other, as it were, in a conversation.  
 
1.3.5 Belongingness and critical distance   
When this study compares Milbank with Bavinck, it does not simply dismiss 
Bavinck’s way of viewing things because his conceptual tools appear outdated. 
Instead, his voice is taken seriously as an authority, as a ‘classic’ within the 
same Christian tradition. The notion of the ‘classic’ was famously introduced 
into the field of systematic theology by David Tracy. He understands the 
systematic theologian’s main task to be the interpretation of the religious 
classics of a culture. Classics, as Tracy describes them, are recognised as 
expressions of the human spirit that ‘so disclose a compelling truth about our 
lives that we cannot deny them some kind of normative status’.49 A classic 
‘surprises, provokes, challenges, shocks and eventually transforms us’, it 
‘upsets conventional opinions and expands the sense of the possible’. The 
classic is characterised by an ‘excess of meaning’ and is therefore constantly 
newly appropriated and interpreted. In this way, the works of both Bavinck 
and Milbank can be read as ‘classics’.  
                                                          
48 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 375-384.  
49 D. Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 
(London: SCM Press, 1981), 108.  
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Bavinck, as well as Abraham Kuyper, in a sense re-invented orthodox 
reformed theology and gave it a renewed voice in modern culture. No longer 
was ‘calvinism’ something purely for small groups of the culturally irrelevant 
pious, but it became something culturally, academically and even politically 
appealing. Today the attention for and the appropriations of his work are not 
diminishing, but even growing in number.  
In the case of Milbank, we are of course dealing with a body of work that is 
young and even still developing, which does not render it altogether suitable 
to the label of a ‘classic’. However, the enormous impact of his work as well as 
its Wirkungsgeschichte, the ongoing history of reception and critical 
interpretation of it which is itself already impressive in scope, gives it 
something of the status and ‘functions’ that Tracy describes as characteristics 
of classics. There is something in his work that ‘struck a chord’, as testified by  
the positive and perhaps even more so by the dozens of critical and even 
hostile reactions. By now, many of the things Milbank wrote in his Theology 
and Social Theory that were found to be subversive by his readers in the early 
1990s are considered common sense among theologians today. This at the 
very least adds to the classic character of his work, which is, again according 
to Tracy, constituted by the degree to which ‘its memory haunts us’ (where 
the question remains open as to whether this ‘haunting’ is considered a 
positive or a negative characteristic).50 Bavinck’s and Milbank’s texts are in 
this study thus both read as ‘classics’. I do not intend to bind them by my own 
methodological device, but hope to create room for their creative force to be 
unleashed.  
Therefore, this study follows the lead of Gadamer’s hermeneutics with its 
focus on ‘belongingness’. Gadamer’s approach in the end aims at overcoming 
the estrangement between reader and text and tries to find some kind of 
harmony. Since artistic interpretation functions as the main framework for his 
approach, Gadamer (following Heidegger) focuses on the shared ‘event of 
being’ which the work of art reveals and in which the interpreter shares. This 
study intends to remain largely loyal to this approach. It believes in the 
importance of ‘faithful attendance to’ and therefore also ‘involvement in’ the 
traditions under study, and refuses to allow a guiding principle, method or 
                                                          
50 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 108. 
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scheme to decide what is going to be found.51 It therefore understands its task 
mainly to be, in the words of David Tracy, ‘to enter into a disciplined and 
responsive conversation with the subject matter – the responses and, above 
all, the fundamental questions – of the tradition’.52  
As such, however, there does not seem to be much space for critical 
distance between the text and the interpreter. How is it still possible to 
criticise a text? This question about the lack of critical distance in Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics was raised by Jürgen Habermas and, to a lesser degree, also by 
Paul Ricoeur. This study hopes to achieve a good balance between the aspects 
of both proximity and critical distance, since, together with Ricoeur, I regard 
the task of the interpreter to be not only understanding (verstehen, the 
hermeneutical task), but also explanation (erklären, the critical task).53  
The proximity is guaranteed by giving each of the theologians treated in 
this study a chapter of their own (chapters 3 and 4) dedicated to listening 
carefully to their own texts, with all their concepts, nuances and internal 
tensions, concerning the relation between God and the world. Their own 
voices will therefore be central in these chapters. The critical distance, 
however, will also already be present there, through other scholars’ 
interpretations of and discussions with Bavinck and Milbank. Moreover, since 
participation is the central concept in this study, the third and fourth chapters 
will be preceded by a separate chapter on participation (chapter 2): what is 
participation, what did it mean in the theological tradition and what does it 
imply for the relation between God and the world? As such, this study 
attempts at least to ‘objectify’ the discussion about participation in this second 
chapter, which also functions as the backdrop to an analysis for positioning 
Bavinck and Milbank in the ‘participatory spectrum’ (chapter 5). It is in this 
last chapter that the real conversation between Bavinck and Milbank will take 
                                                          
51 These terms are derived from David Tracy, who articulates this approach by writing 
that ‘religion, like art, discloses new resources of meaning and truth to anyone willing 
to risk allowing that disclosure to “happen”. It will happen, the systematic-as-
hermeneutical theologians believe, by faithful attendance to, and thereby involvement 
in and interpretation of, the truth-disclosure of genuinely new possibilities for human 
life in any classical religious tradition of taste, tact and common (communal) sense’. 
Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 67.    
52 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 100. 
53 P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 71-88.  
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place. In what way can their theologies be called ‘participatory’? What 
questions do their theologies pose to each other? At the end, this conversation 
will render clues for the extent to which the concept of participation is or 
should be at home in Reformed theology.  
To arrive at an evaluation of Bavinck’s and Milbank’s positions on the 
relation between God and the world and the participatory character of their 
conceptions, this study uses three ways to achieve critical distance towards 
their respective works. First, in chapter 2, participation will be given 
conceptual clarification. This sets a ‘standard’ for analysing in what sense their 
conceptions fit in or depart from the participatory tradition. Second, in the 
chapters on Bavinck and Milbank (i.e., chapters 3 and 4), fundamental 
discussions with and interpretations of their works will be described. Finally, 
with the chapter on participation as a backdrop, Bavinck and Milbank will be 
allowed to ‘interrogate’ each other in chapter 5. 
Critical distance by analysis is not, however, the ultimate goal this study 
serves. Its encompassing context is to enter more deeply into the mystery with 
which it starts: the relation between God and the world. In this way, the 
present study is undertaken in the conviction that theological positions have 
to be assessed, but that in the end it is not the individual theologian, but rather 
time or tradition (not to mention God) that judges. This study is therefore 







2.1 Participatory family resemblances 
 
The subject matter of this study is the relation between God and the world, a 
subject which is as large a subject matter as can be. The immediate cause that 
prompted this study however, was the particular plea of RO to consider this 
relation specifically in terms of participation. Before we consider how 
Bavinck’s conception of God and the world relates to participation and what 
the notion of participation concretely means in Milbank’s theology, it is helpful 
to gain some understanding of what participation really is. This means that the 
present study will attempt to some degree to define participation from the 
history of this concept in philosophy and theology and to identify what its 
implications are for the relation between God and the world. As such we will 
gain a better understanding of what we are talking about by the time we move 
on to the actual analysis of Bavinck and Milbank. 
To talk about ‘definition’ and to presume that we can get a picture of what 
participation ‘exactly is’, however, is to be naively optimistic about the clarity 
of language. What we can do in this chapter is to shed some light on the 
history and theological implications of the concept, but we cannot clearly 
define participation. It would be particularly misleading if this study were only 
to look for the word participatio or its Greek origin methexis and their 
derivations, and to see what they imply in their context, since ‘the meaning of 
the concept of participation for systematic theology is by far greater than the 
actual use of the word participation suggests’, as H. R. Schlette rightly 
observes.1 In his study on participation in patristic theology, F. Normann 
similarly points to the metaphorical character of the concept which thereby 
renders it impossible to fixate its meaning.2  
Although it would be hard to distinguish strictly between ‘metaphor’ and 
‘concept’ anywhere, I in this study support the idea that participation does not 
have a fixed meaning. To investigate what participation implies is not only to 
                                                          
1 H.R. Schlette, ‘Teilhabe’ in H. Fries (ed.), Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe. Vol. 
2 (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1963), 640.  




look for a word with its meaning, but also to look for a family of words, 
concepts and images. It is to look for what Wittgenstein called ‘a complicated 
network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail’.3 This chapter does not therefore 
intend to abstract the word participation with its supposed ‘meaning’, but will 
attempt to retrieve a particular participatory language about God and the 
world, which can to a great extent be called the Christian-Platonic language 
about God and the world. It is hoped that this awareness clarifies why it is 
impossible to give a clear-cut definition of participation. Nevertheless, even if 
the concept of participation is not clearly definable, in what follows we will list 
some of its important characteristics and give a presentation of its ‘family’. 4   
The project of this chapter is a precarious hermeneutical undertaking, 
since it involves more than a thousand years of theological and philosophical 
history on a subject that is often not even clearly visible at the immediate 
surface of theological texts. In contrast with the later chapters on Bavinck and 
Milbank, the present chapter relies more heavily on guidance from experts in 
the field and makes greater use of secondary literature. Of course ‘experts’ too 
can be one-sided, and, moreover, the particular choice of experts will be 
largely determinative for the outcome. The experts who have been selected for 
this chapter at least all share this general view, namely that a fruitful 
conversation has taken place between Christianity and Platonism which 
proved highly influential for Christian reasoning on the relation between God 
and the world. Accordingly there was a ‘Christian Platonic synthesis’ that still 
exists today in the Christian East and that in the West remained the main 
conceptual framework in Christianity for more than a thousand years. Even 
after the medieval period the Platonic tradition does not appear to have died, 
but was constantly revived, albeit in a more hidden and marginal way than it 
was in the first millennium. This Christian Platonic tradition is the context in 
                                                          
3 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958), 32 (remark 66).  
4 The complaint of the ‘vagueness’ of the concept can often be heard, which, according 
to John Wippel, is a complaint that accompanied participation from the very outset: 
‘there has been considerable difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory definition or even 
description of participation since the days when such notion came to be developed in 
Greek philosophy’. J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From 
Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2000), 96.   
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which the concept of participation is at home, and will therefore form the 
focus of the present chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Historical-conceptual survey 
 
2.2.1 Plato 
Any overview of the development of the concept of participation in the history 
of philosophy and theology must start with Plato. Not that Christian 
theologians who used the language of participation thought of themselves as 
pupils of Plato: they saw themselves as pupils of Christ, and intended to speak 
faithfully to the meaning of Scripture. However, Plato’s work is the starting 
point of participatory thinking which left deep traces of its influence on 
Christian theology. Plato created an ontology which connected this world and 
its endless becoming with a world of eternal changeless being, the world of 
Ideas. In this way, Plato seemed to create a dualistic ontology: there is a 
phenomenal world of ‘shadows’, over against the real world of the Ideas, 
which are only mediated by the soul.  
However, it can well be contended that Plato’s main concern is the 
relation, the ‘traffic’, between the Ideas and the particulars.5 There is a 
participation (methexis) of the image in its original. The present world, which 
is a world of constant becoming, consists of imperfect images of the eternal 
Ideas, and by means of their ability to depict, to make manifest, these images 
imperfectly participate in that which the originals contain in the fullness of 
their own being. Although in his work Plato describes something like a 
separate world of Ideas over against our phenomenal world, this is mainly to 
emphasise that everything is grounded in and derives its particularity from an 
                                                          
5 The most (in)famous example of dualistic imagery in Plato is of course the myth of 
the cave in the Republic, Book VII, 514a-520a. However, Andrew Louth interprets this 
story as an instruction of contemplation for those who are in love with reality rather 
than the establishment of a second world aside from the one we know. Andrew Louth, 
The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), 5-6. The references to Plato in this study are to the Loeb Classical 
Library, 12 vols. Greek text and English translation (London: Heinemann, 1914-1952). 
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Absolute. In every particular thing, therefore, there is some sort of 
manifestation or parousia of the Idea.6  
The manifestations of an Idea are not separate from the Idea, but instead 
depend on it in everything, and there are all kinds of words that indicate a 
required constant ‘return to’ the original which is in fact stirred by the 
manifestations themselves. There is, for example, the language of ‘seeing’: a 
carpenter who makes a device does not, after a first failed attempt in which he 
broke his product, have the broken version in mind, but he ‘looks at’ the eidos 
of the device which will be embodied in it when the product is successfully 
made (which in this case renders the Idea also highly teleological).7 There is 
also the language of ‘ascension’, most famously in the Symposion. It is the love 
for particular beautiful bodies that directs us upward to Beauty as such, 
leading us to contemplate the essence of Beauty. As in the Republic, if we have 
come to see the Idea, we will never be completely satisfied with its lower 
manifestations and constantly feel somewhat ‘homesick’ since we have beheld 
their perfection.8 In this conception, Plato does not simply place the Ideas in 
strict opposition to this world, but he wants to emphasise that this world 
already participates in them, and that it is a matter of concentration, 
purification and contemplation to reach for ‘the real thing’, since ‘all other 
things are beautiful through a participation of it’, as Diotima says in her 
discourse on Beauty.9  
Plato thus does not provide a scheme of separation between the highest 
and the particular beings, but rather of grades and levels of participation, 
involving a movement of eros towards the highest.10 This can perhaps be seen 
most clearly in his account of knowledge: to know is not to gain something 
that comes from outside; if you want to have it, you have to be ‘in it’, to 
participate in it. Socrates emphasises that knowledge has the character of 
remembering and that knowledge of the virtues is in fact impossible without 
being a virtuous person yourself: to know virtue is to participate in it to some 
                                                          
6 Normann, Teilhabe, 39. Cf. E. v. Ivánka, Plato Christianus: Übernahme und 
Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), 30-
32.  
7 Plato, Cratylus, 389. 
8 Plato, Symposion, 210a – 211b. Republic, Book VII, 520a. 
9 Plato, Symposion, 211b. 
10 Plato, Symposion, 212. 
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extent.11 In Plato’s conception ‘only like can know like’, and knowledge 
therefore always has the character of a form of attunement to that which is to 
some extent already there but can be enjoyed and participated in more fully – 
hence the soul is always longing for more, longing to return to full reality.12 
Eros and desire are therefore characteristics of Platonic thought throughout 
its reception history. Thinking itself is an erotic activity. All these examples 
give rise to the thought that Plato’s conception can be read as a story not of an 
aversion towards everyday reality and a love for a higher world of Ideas, but 
of a love for reality since it participates in Reality, which can be sought 
through intensification, concentration and purification.  
For later Christian interpretations of Plato, however, there were basically 
two possible ontological readings of his work: either this world exists 
primarily as a ‘fall’ from the original, true being, which we constantly have to 
seek by means of the eternal soul, leaving behind the contamination of matter, 
or else it exists primarily as ‘grace’, as a constant gift from an absolute source 
whose traces we are put onto, but which nonetheless shines in everything that 
participates in it, albeit in a lesser degree. One hardly needs to explain that the 
latter interpretation was the most suitable as a context for Christian speaking 
about creation, although the ‘threat’ of the first interpretation, which in 
Christian terms equates creation and fall, definitely lurked beneath the 
surface. If we speak of a threat, however, it should be noted that both readings 
of Plato actually contain a threat to Christian theology: the first threat is that 
of ‘dualism’, the second of ‘monism’. Both ways of reading Plato were present 
in the reception of his thought in later traditions. 
                                                          
11 This is most systematically so in Plato’s Meno. See e.g. the end of the dialogue, 99e-
100a. Cf. P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? Transl. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard university Press, 2002), 42-50; Louth, Origins, 1-3.  
12 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 90b-d: ‘When a man has cultivated in himself the love of 
knowledge and true thinking (…), then such a man, if he comes to touch upon the 
truth, will find it absolutely necessary to enjoy that truth entirely, at least in so far as 
human nature is capable of participating in immortality.’ He who assimilates his 
thinking to the eternal things ‘renders himself like the object which he contemplates, 
in conformity with its original nature’ and in so doing he attains ‘the perfect 
fulfillment of life which the gods have proposed to humans’. Translation adopted from 
J. A. McGuckin, ‘The Strategic Adaptation of Deification in the Cappadocians’ in M.J. 
Christensen and J. A. Wittung (eds.), Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and 
Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2007), 101.  
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2.2.2 Neoplatonism  
Plato’s thoughts underwent a long history of reception as they first passed 
through Aristotelian criticism and later through innumerable adaptations and 
alterations in the periods of so-called Middle- and Neoplatonism. These 
developments proved to have had great impact on the Christian conception of 
the divine and of the relation between God and the world. One of the 
distinctive features of the Neoplatonic conception of the divine is that it is 
utterly productive, as it can be found in Plotinus: ‘When anything else comes 
to perfection we see that it produces, and does not endure to remain by itself, 
but makes something else. (…) Fire warms, snow cools, and drugs act on 
something else in a way corresponding to their own nature.’ Doing this, they 
all imitate the First Principle, which cannot ‘remain in itself as if it grudged to 
give of itself or was impotent’.13 This world exists in a procession from and 
return to the superabundant overflowing One, which is, if we compare it to 
Plato’s thought, even beyond the Ideas, beyond being itself. Everything desires 
to return to the One, to the fullness of being from which it proceeds. The most 
important thing that can be said of the One is thus that it produces, it brings 
forth, or, as David Bradshaw has it, ‘the first Good must engender something 
which, though not identical to it, is in some way an image or extension of its 
being.’14  
The One, however, had to remain unchanged in this process – otherwise it 
would not be the One. This posed a major difficulty for Plotinus. That the One 
is ultimately productive is just as important as that it does not undergo 
change.15 Plotinus tried to solve this conundrum with a double account of the 
concept of energeia: there is an activity that belongs to the substance (energeia 
tes ousias) and one that goes out from substance (ek tes ousias). For example, 
there is in fire a heat that constitutes the substance of fire, and a heat that goes 
out and heats but by which the fire does not change as fire. Likewise, the sun 
                                                          
13 Plotinus, Enneads V.4.1, 26-36. Quotations from Plotinus are taken from Plotinus, 
Enneads. Loeb Classical Library, 7 vols. Greek text and English translation by A. H. 
Armstrong. (London: Heinemann, 1966-1988).  
14 D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75; Cf. A. Louth, The Origins of the 
Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys. 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 38. 
15 Cf. Enneads VI.9.3: ‘Generative of all, the Unity is none of all; neither thing nor 
quality nor quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not at rest…’ 
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does not change or become less sun because of its shining.16 These two modes 
of energeia, one internal and one external, constitute what is called the two-act 
model in Plotinus, which has been of great importance in the philosophical 
and theological tradition.  
Central to a Neoplatonic view on participation is the idea of emanation 
from and return to the One (proodos and epistrophe), also known as the exitus-
reditus scheme: The One overflows into Intellect (nous), Intellect into Soul and 
Soul into embodied life. This is a movement from unity to diversity, which is 
again drawn back to unity. Aside from the image of the sun with its rays, 
Plotinus often uses the image of the circle, the One being the centre of the 
circle which contains everything that can emanate from it.17  
From a modern point of view, Aristotelian or Neoplatonic views on the 
divine are often labelled as ‘static’, or are said to be ‘bereft of life’. Certainly, all 
the movements that belong to life as we experience it are usually crossed out 
as far as the divine is concerned, but one wonders how ‘static’ this really 
renders the divine. In Aristotle, the divine is famously said to be without 
motion (akinetos); however, energeia is still the pre-eminent word for 
denoting what God is. Aristotle purged energeia not only of kinesis, but also of 
dynamis (potentiality), which renders the divine being as pure act, as a state of 
complete fulfilment.18 Therefore, the divine is something ultimately 
proceeding and giving, but itself without change.  
An interesting word that can be used for the divine is therefore ‘silence’, as 
it is found for example in Proclus. Every plurality of the world is not simply 
eliminated, but ‘folded up’ within the One. He calls it the achievement of 
silence: ‘There must be before the Word the silence that supports the Word. 
(…) It is a word of the silence before the intelligibles; but when the intelligibles 
are silenced, it is silence.’ From a created view, the divine life can be seen as a 
form of silence, but it is the silence that is ‘between the notes’, the 
uncomprehended source in which the music shares.19 
Although the One seems to be far away as a remote source, the ‘higher’ can 
pre-eminently be found ‘inward’. To return to the One it is necessary to turn 
inward into oneself where the divine can be encountered through a process of 
                                                          
16 Plotinus, Enneads V.4.2, 27-39; Cf. Bradshaw, Aristotle, 76. 
17 Plotinus, Enneads, e.g. V.1, VI.8.  
18 Bradshaw, Aristotle, 24-44. 
19 Bradshaw, Aristotle, 149-150.  
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ascension. Therefore, knowledge of the ultimate is in Neoplatonism bound up 
with self-knowledge.20  
From Plotinus on, different currents can be traced. The first is that of 
theurgical Platonism, as in the pagan philosophers Iamblichus and Proclus, but 
also in the Eastern Christian tradition.21 Here religious life is basically 
considered as participation in the divine energeiai, through ritual and prayer. 
It is a very active conception of connecting with God (or the gods), and 
therefore not primarily contemplative. A major characteristic of this current 
was the distinction between ousia and energeia in God. Human beings can 
participate in the latter, but not in the former. God’s energeiai are known and 
named, whereas his ousia has no nam 
e and is only known through the energeiai. In the Cappadocian Fathers, the 
energeiai are in fact the names of God: they manifest the ousia, but they do not 
constitute it. These self-manifestations, as Bradshaw observes, ‘are God as He 
is capable of being apprehended by us’.22 There is therefore a decisive 
distinction between God as he is unknown, uncommunicated and 
unparticipated (i.e., God’s ousia) and God as he is known, communicated and 
participated (i.e., God’s energeiai). In this way, human beings or creation in 
general can be said to ‘participate in God’ without participating in the divine 
ousia itself, which remains mysterious.   
Applied in a Christian context, this conceptuality is able to articulate 
beautifully the practice and experience of the church as ‘co-working’ with God: 
through prayer and liturgy and through the act of loving, we really enter into 
the divine workings. For example, applied to the theme of love, the concept of 
divine energeiai gives a theological rationale to hymns like ubi caritas et amor, 
deus ibi est, and can be considered to follow the johanneic line that ‘God is 
love, and the man that dwells in love, dwells in God’.23 
Another strand of interpretation was followed in the West. A 
groundbreaking innovation took place in an anonymous commentary on 
                                                          
20 Cf. Louth, Origins, 40.  
21 In this current of thought we find the Cappadocian Fathers, Maximus Confessor, 
John of Damascus and Gregory Palamas. It was, however, also already present in Philo, 
Iamblichus and Athanasius.   
22 Bradshaw, Aristotle, 169. 
23 1 John 4:16.  
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Plato’s Parmenides.24 The commentator makes a distinction between pure 
being (to einai) and derivative being (to on). The One is neither being, nor 
substance, nor is it a form of energeia, but it is to energein katharon, ‘pure act’, 
which is ‘not fixed in relation to something’.25 The commentator distinguishes 
between being in the infinitive and as participle, pure being and derivative 
being, the former being simply pure activity, without any specification of a 
subject performing the action. This conception has exercised a strong 
influence in Christian thinking on the participation of creation in the divine, 
and as we will see later on it can be found in Marius Victorinus, Boethius, and, 
last but not least, in Thomas Aquinas’ use of esse.  
 
2.2.3 Church Fathers 
Although Tertullian asked rhetorically what ‘Athens’ has to do with 
‘Jerusalem’,26 Platonic thought was commonly considered a suitable 
framework for thinking through the implications of the Jewish-Christian faith. 
It is important to realise that our modern conceptions about the 
‘philosophical’ and the ‘theological’ (or the ‘religious’) and their ‘relations’ do 
not fit the classical context. Platonism in itself was highly religious, and, as 
Pierre Hadot has emphasised, it was itself foremost a form of religious 
practice. 27  Platonism involved a religious zeal and a guidance of the soul that 
was not rejected, but rather ‘filled’ in the Christian framework. 
The waters in which patristic theology moved were those of participation. 
As Friedrich Normann writes in his study on participation in the patristic era: 
‘Participation in God is the preferred, most suitable framework in which fit the 
manifold images and analogies that depict the mystery of the union of God and 
man’.28 He points, for example, to the concept that is widely in use from 
Ireneaus on, the ‘wonderful exchange’ of the Incarnation, as it was famously 
                                                          
24 Pierre Hadot identified this commentator as Porphyry. For a discussion of this 
commentary, see P. Hadot, ‘Dieu comme acte d’être dans je néoplatonisme: A propos 
des théories d’É. Gilson sur la métaphysique de l’Exode’ in P. Vignaux, Dieu et l’être: 
Exégèses d’Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20,11-24 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1978), 57-
63.   
25 Bradshaw, Aristotle, 103, 107.  
26 Tertullian, On Prescription against Heretics, VII. A. Roberts, J. Donaldsons (eds.), The 
Ante-Nicene Fathers. vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Reprint 1978). 
27 This is Hadot’s argument throughout What is Ancient Philosophy?   
28 Normann, Teilhabe, 304.  
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put: ‘God became man, that man might become God’.29 The fathers did not 
refrain from speaking openly about theosis as humanity’s goal. This was not 
intended as a surrender of our creaturely status, but rather as an affirmation 
of the glorious goal for which man is created, namely being the image of God, 
which is given its full realisation in the Incarnation.  
There were, however, also some important ways in which the Christian 
tradition distanced itself radically from Platonism. The first point of departure 
for the Christian tradition was the concept of creatio ex nihilo. In Platonism, 
the soul clearly belonged to the divine realm, whereas the body was material 
and earthly. In a Christian framework, however, it was particularly Athanasius 
who emphasised the kinship of the soul with the body as it is given in its 
createdness. In Athanasius’ thought – and here he fully agreed with his 
opponent Arius – there is no intermediate zone between God and the world. A 
gap thus separates Origen and Athanasius: both developed ‘mystical 
theologies’ and both found it appropriate to speak of the divinisation of 
human beings, but Origen’s way is a divinisation of the soul through 
contemplation, whereas Athanasius’ approach is conformity with the image of 
God, provided by the Word who condescended to our fallen state in the 
Incarnation.30  
Creatio ex nihilo leaves creation in a position of utter humility and 
dependence, since it is always waiting for God to allow the knowledge of 
himself to be shared with creation. If Neoplatonism is said to have a negative 
theology, then the orthodox Christian reception of Neoplatonism is even more 
negative, since the soul is no longer the vehicle to connect with the divine. 
Creatio ex nihilo means that there is simply a gulf between God and the world, 
between the uncreated self-subsistent and that which is created out of nothing 
by the will of God. This world is not an extension of God’s being.  
In Platonism, E. von Ivánka notes, the idea of creation is impossible. It is 
impossible to think of something that is not ‘God’ but is also not an ‘anti-God’ 
or a ‘fall from God’.31 The notion of the created is unthinkable for the Platonic 
mind. In patristic thought the pantheistic as well as the dualistic implications 
                                                          
29 Normann points to this way of speaking in e.g. Irenaeus, Athanasius, the 
Cappadocians and Cyril of Alexandria.  
30 Cf. Louth, Origins, 75-80. 
31 E. von Ivánka, Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus 
durch die Väter (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), 87-88.  
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of Neoplatonism were countered: the world is not there because it has to be 
there in a necessary movement of descent from and ascent to the divine, but 
because God willed it. The notion of participation combined with the doctrine 
of creation out of nothing implies dependence. As Peter Leithart writes 
concerning participation in the work of Athanasius: ‘Creation is by 
participation because it is dependent for its life, stability and existence on 
power and energy that is not inherent in the creation itself.’32  
However, creation denotes not only ‘distance’, it denotes also a mysterious 
glory that is being communicated. Gregory of Nyssa writes that God created 
spiritual beings in order that others might join him in enjoying his richness, 
and that they might be filled with his goodness and desire increasingly to 
partake in it. How moving, spatial and temporal things come forth from God is, 
however, incomprehensible – and von Ivánka notes how clearly Gregory 
breaks with Plotinus here, who considered the rendering transparent of this 
‘coming forth’ to be the very task of philosophy.33 The susceptibility of the 
gracious communication of the divine is the very core of what it is to be 
created, but such a notion still does not render this communication 
perspicuous. 
A second point that must be mentioned on which the Christian tradition 
distanced itself from Platonism is the Trinity. In the Christian tradition, God is 
not purely oneness over against the plurality of the world. In comparing 
Pseudo-Dionysius with Plotinus, Vladimir Lossky stresses the fact that 
Dionysius’ conception of God is even beyond the apophaticism of Plotinus. For 
Plotinus, the divine is characterised by oneness, but for Dionysius, speaking in 
a Trinitarian mode, ‘God is neither one, nor unity’. In the Trinitarian 
conception even the oneness of God is transcended and the word 
‘incomprehensibility’ is the best word to define what God is to us.34 Christian 
orthodoxy has maintained the mystery at the heart of the Godhead without 
giving in to the tendency to reduce the Three to the One, or the One to the 
Three. ‘The one and the many both go back to the heart of who God is’, as Hans 
                                                          
32 P. Leithart, Athanasius (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 66. 
33 Von Ivánka, Plato Christianus, 177.  
34 V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke & 
Co, 1973), 29-31.  
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Boersma summarises this position.35 The combination of this view of God with 
the idea that God created the world out of nothing produced a much more 
positive view on matter than Platonism allowed. Through the notions of 
creatio ex nihilo and the confession of the Trinity, Christian theology was able 
to overcome the Scylla of monism as well as the Charybdis of dualism which 
both lurked beneath the surface in Platonism.  
Creation and Trinity render the world more mysterious, as a product of 
grace, and they render God more incomprehensible than in Neoplatonism. 
According to Gregory of Nyssa, we only know the spiritual and immaterial by 
its workings in the sensible, material world.36 We therefore recognise God as 
being active in the material, and we know that he is distinct from matter, but 
we do not know what his very being is – a view that implies the 
aforementioned distinction between divine energies and ousia. We give his 
workings all kinds of names, like wisdom, goodness, power or eternity, but 
these names do not signify God in his being. God is ineffable, and therefore not 
simply good, but beyond goodness – or even: not God, but ‘beyond God’, since 
‘God’ is also a name or concept. Encountering God, therefore, is entering the 
‘night’ or the ‘cloud of unknowing’ as it was famously expressed in an 
anonymous writing from the late Middle Ages.37 The soul must be satisfied by 
knowing that God is, and that God is distinct from all that is thinkable, and 
must therefore honour the ineffable with silence. The difference between God 
and the world in this framework is impressive.  
Such a negative theology, however, is not without knowledge of its own 
kind. The soul, in its turn towards God, loves God and in this love it already 
participates in God, since ‘God is love’. Gregory’s mystical theology is therefore 
strongly committed to the Platonic axiom that ‘like can only be known by like’. 
In the act of loving God, you become more what God is: love.38 Participation in 
                                                          
35 H. Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 34.  
36 Cf. Gregory’s In Hexaemeron, 9-10. H. R. Drobner (ed.), Gregorii Nysseni in 
Hexaemeron. Opera Exegetica in Genesim, Pars I. Gregorii Nysseni Opera Vol. IV, Pars I 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 18-21.  
37 The Cloud of Unknowing and other works. Transl. A. C. Spearing (London: Penguin 
Books, 2001). 
38 For Gregory’s insistence on God’s utter unknowability on the one hand and our 
‘knowing by desire’ on the other, see particularly his Homilies on the Song of Songs. 
Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Song of Songs. Transl. R. A. Norris Jr (Atlanta: Society 
of Biblical Literature, 2012).   
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the divine is for Gregory not that human nature is simply a ‘decreased 
divinity’, but that it is fundamentally open for gracious communication of 
God’s being, or, as von Ivánka writes, finite being is itself nothing but the 
openness for this communication, from which it can turn away, or by which it 
can allow itself to be completely determined. The positions of creature and 
creator in this participatory relationship can therefore be characterised as 
‘loving-striving’ on the one hand, and ‘giving-gracing’ on the other.39  
In the third place – and it becomes more and more evident here that these 
motifs are not isolated, but deeply connected – there is the Christian notion of 
the incarnation. In Christ God became man, he ‘came to his own’. In order to 
see what ‘incarnation’ does with ‘participation’ we will take as our example a 
larger discussion on the way these motifs function in the work of Augustine, 
which leads us to a consideration of what the specific Christian ‘grammar’ did 
with the notion of participation.  
 
2.2.4 Augustine  
The most famous and probably the most intensely debated example of 
Platonic influence and participatory content in patristic theology is Augustine. 
The interpretations of his work vary from ‘deeply Plotinian’ to ‘a complete 
break with Neoplatonism’, but many interpreters interestingly seem to hold 
on to both of these theses, which locate Augustine in the same sphere that this 
study considers the patres commonly to be moving in: on the one hand 
participation is the world in which his theology moves, while on the other 
hand he fundamentally breaks with some typically Platonic notions.  
If we simply start at the very beginning of the Confessiones, Augustine’s 
famous line that ‘you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until 
it rests in you’ already witnesses of his kinship with Platonism: the soul longs 
for God, to return to the One who unites all that is dispersed in our earthly 
lives. In Book seven of the Confessiones Augustine describes something like an 
ontological conversion through the writings of the Platonists, who taught him 
that everything that is comes from God, and thus that everything that is, is 
good.40 It is, however, the stumbling-block of the incarnation that he does not 
                                                          
39 Von Ivánka, Plato Christianus, 176-177.  
40 Augustine, Confessiones book VII, in particular IX,13-XII,18. Augustine tells the story 
here in phrases taken from the first chapter of the Gospel of John. For the references 
to the Confessiones, De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei, see P. Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-
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find in their works and which he still dislikes. Augustine still had to learn the 
humility and weakness of Jesus Christ, he tells us. The highest goodness and 
truth is not to be found if we strive superhumanly above ourselves, but if we 
enter in the lowly way of Jesus, through dust, humility, the cross and death. 
The Platonists, according to Augustine, ‘see the fatherland at a distance, and 
yet do not embrace the way to get there’, as John Cavadini paraphrases him on 
the basis of a reading of De Civitate Dei.41  
In De Trinitate we can discern something like an exitus-reditus scheme, 
which allows us to see this work as reflecting the movement of the human soul 
on its way from and to the triune God. In the first seven books Augustine tries 
to understand what God has revealed about his triune being in Scripture. After 
that, he develops the path of the soul towards God, which begins in its 
discernment of God as ‘truth’.42 This realisation does not yield an easy 
pathway back to God, but at least instigates a yearning for God, a longing for 
the homeland, knowing that a gulf lies in-between. The crux is that man is 
made in the image of God (or ‘after’ the image of God, as Augustine 
emphasises43), which image will always strive to return to its archetype and 
find in itself traces of and analogies with its Trinitarian archetype. This return 
to the archetype is by no means an easy thing, which Augustine emphasises by 
discussing the root of sin which can be discerned in the fall of Adam and Eve. 
Again, he does not offer an easy path of contemplation that simply moves 
inward into the soul, where it will obviously find the divine.  
When it comes to participation, Augustine makes an important distinction 
here between knowledge (scientia) and wisdom (sapientia). The mind is 
concerned with two ‘worlds’, one of contemplation of the eternal, 
unchangeable things, which is the realm of wisdom, and the other directed to 
the ‘changeable and corporeal things, without which this life does not go on’, 
which is the realm of knowledge. It thus seems that Augustine separates the 
divine from the earthly, and thus breaks with a real participatory paradigm. 
However, in that same context, he is completely clear about the fact that 
scientia and the changeable world are not the end of man: ‘whatever we do 
                                                                                                                                                   
Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. First Series, vol. 1-3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1878. Reprint 1978). 
41 J. C. Cavadini, ‘Trinity and Apologetics in the Theology of St. Augustine’, Modern 
Theology 29 (2013), 61.   
42 Augustine, De Trinitate VIII.2.3.  
43 De Trinitate VII.6.12.  
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rationally in the using of temporal things, we may do it with the contemplation 
of attaining eternal things, passing through the former, but cleaving to the 
latter.’44 A lot of what Augustine is saying in this respect is summed up in his 
rendering of Job 28:28: ‘Behold, piety is wisdom (sapientia), and to abstain 
from evil is knowledge (scientia)’. Of course, the only real thing that is our true 
end is piety and wisdom, but the realm we live in now is the realm of evil. If we 
want to attain the highest, eternal goods – which are definitely ours to attain – 
we have to fight the battle against sin, which is humbly fought in the temporal 
world, with the humble means of knowledge.45  
It is not a surprise then that Augustine goes on to discuss the Incarnation 
of the Word: in him are contained both sapientia and scientia (‘as the apostle 
says: ‘in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge’’). What 
Christ did among us are ‘temporal things’, so we attain to him through 
knowledge. However, passing through this scientia (or ‘faith’, as it is called in 
the same context) we reach sapientia as well: ‘we stretch through knowledge 
to wisdom; yet we do not withdraw from one and the same Christ’. Simply put, 
eternity is not reached by diving into the soul and being lifted up towards the 
divine, but is only reached through the Mediator.46 As in the Confessiones, it is 
emphatically again the way of humility that must be followed in order to attain 
the highest, and in this Augustine follows a logic that can be found on almost 
every page of the New Testament and that we recognised as the primary 
patristic point of departure from a purely Plotinian framework of ascent. The 
Incarnation signifies ‘humility’ as well as ‘rest’, because, as he says to the 
Platonists in De Civitate Dei, in order for them to rest in the truth, ‘it is 
lowliness that is requisite’.47  
Our participation in the divine does not follow a route of contemplative 
escape from the earthly, but passes through a participation in the example of 
God in Jesus Christ. Participating in his words and works we will be 
transformed more and more into the Image of God. We cannot do without the 
Mediator and without mediation of bodily works, because this is precisely the 
                                                          
44 De Trinitate XII.12.19. 
45 De Trinitate XII.14.22. 
46 De Trinitate XIII.19.24. 
47 De Civitate Dei X.29.  
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place where God has chosen to reveal himself.48 The human soul is the imago 
trinitatis, but in its fallen state it has to be instructed through the senses to be 
again what it is meant to be.49  
                                                          
48 See e.g. De Trinitate XIV.17.23: ‘He, then, who is day by day renewed by making 
progress in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and true holiness, transfers 
his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things 
intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual; and diligently perseveres in bridling 
and lessening his desire for the former, and in binding himself by love to the latter.’ 
Interestingly, this sounds like a Christian retelling of Diotima’s speech on Beauty in 
Plato’s Symposium. For the need of the Mediator/mediation in participating in the 
divine, see De Trinitate XIII.19.24: ‘And those distinguished philosophers of the 
heathen who have been able to understand and discern the invisible things of God by 
those things which are made, have yet, as is said of them, ‘held down the truth in 
iniquity’; because they philosophized without a Mediator, that is, without the man 
Christ, (…) placed as they were in these lowest things, they could not but seek some 
media through which they might attain to those lofty things which they had 
understood.’ This is exactly parallel to Augustine’s own story in Confessiones VII in 
which he also ‘saw the light’ through the Platonic writings, but did not succeed to 
‘remain’ in it, because he still lacked the right mediation (through the Incarnation) 
which trained him in the true Christian way of humility and love. See also John C. 
Cavadini, ‘The Quest for Truth in Augustine’s De Trinitate’, Theological Studies 58 
(1997), 440.  
49 This reading of Augustine’s De Trinitate partly corresponds with, but on important 
points also contradicts, Maarten Wisse’s impressive reading in his Trinitarian 
Theology beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology 
(London: T&T Clark, 2011). I think Wisse correctly criticises interpretations of 
Augustine that too easily adopt Augustine’s text for a ‘social trinitarian’ program or an 
incarnational theology. Unfortunately, however, Wisse strictly opposes two 
theological realms that in patristic theology belong together. On the one hand Wisse 
identifies (twentieth-century) theologies that speculatively presuppose a union of the 
human with the divine which is, according to these theologies, simply manifested in 
Christ – and these are what Wisse therefore calls ‘christologies of manifestation’ (RO 
being his pre-eminent example here). These theologies of ‘intellectual speculation’ are 
in Wisse’s typology opposed to a different kind of theology that is full of ‘fear and 
trembling’ for God, a realm in which ‘knowing God is no intellectual achievement’ but 
is ‘the eschatological destiny of the pure of heart, paving their way with humility and 
putting their trust in Christ’ (147). It is, in short, the seriousness of sin that is 
emphasised in this latter theological ‘world’. As may be observed in my reading of De 
Trinitate, I recognise both these ‘worlds’ in Augustine’s work, but – and this is where I 
differ from Wisse – not as a non-participatory ontology versus a participatory one, but 
as one ‘Christian participatory’ picture. Particularly within a Christian framework, 
participation is totally a matter of humility, of the reality of sin, of suffering with 
Christ, and is highly respectful of God’s incomprehensible being. We therefore do not 
adopt from Wisse his contrast between Augustine and participation. In order to 
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2.2.5 The double sign of the Incarnation 
In the above we described a part of Augustine’s work in greater detail in order 
to give an example of what Louth aptly calls an ‘unresolved tension’ among the 
fathers: on the one hand they think fully within a Platonic framework in which 
the soul’s search for God is an ascent to God, with the soul itself properly 
belonging with God, and on the other hand there is the logic of the Incarnation, 
a descent which gives man the possibility of union with God which is not 
simply open to him by nature. Louth continues: ‘And yet man is made in the 
image of God, and so these movements of ascent and descent cross one 
another and remain – as a fact of experience – in unresolved tension.’50 If, 
therefore, we summarise the patristic view on participation, we would have to 
say that it is an ascent of the soul through the descent of the incarnate Word.  
But what is the role of sin in all this? Is the incarnation God’s ‘reaction’ to 
sin, his method of ‘reparation’? Although much modern theology has strongly 
protested against such a view, this divine ‘motif’ of the incarnation is too 
obviously present in the patristic writings – not to mention Scripture itself – to 
be denied. At the same time, this is not the whole story. The incarnation of the 
Word is not seen apart from the original created nature of human beings. 
Therefore, incarnation is more than just a method of repair, but it is the gift to 
humanity of what is human, namely union with the divine, which is nothing 
less than what man was made for.  
That this implies more than simply ‘reparation’ appears, for example, in 
Athanasius’ classic on the incarnation of the Word. There he writes about 
human beings that, although ‘they were by nature subject to corruption, the 
grace of their union with the Word made them capable of escaping from the 
natural law, provided that they retained the beauty of innocence with which 
they were created.’51 There was still something ‘instable’ in man, although he 
was created as ‘sharing the nature of the Word’.52 The incarnation stands in 
Athanasius’ work not on its own, but is placed in a story of God’s ongoing 
‘unfolding’ towards human beings, even if they turn away from him so 
                                                                                                                                                   
sustain this opposition, one has to downplay the clearly participatory framework and 
content of De Trinitate.  
50 Louth, Origins, xiv.  
51 Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word, 4. In P. Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Second Series, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1891. Reprint 1978). 
52 Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word, 4. 
56 
 
decidedly and work steadfastly on their ‘dehumanisation’. The incarnation of 
the Word therefore does not stand under the sign of sin alone. It in fact stands 
under the double sign of death and resurrection, the latter ‘putting an end to 
corruption’ and therefore finally giving the stability of sharing in God’s life 
that man originally lacked. Accordingly, it would seem that a patristic view on 
the incarnation serves the double goal of reparation and elevation, or, in their 
own terms, ‘deification’. 
Although this survey does not enter deeply into specific Trinitarian or 
Christological details, we might briefly mention that much of what we tend to 
see nowadays as ‘different things’ was considered as one in the patristic age. 
The Incarnation, Christ’s suffering and his death on the cross were considered 
as one kenotic movement, so for example a pure ‘theology of the cross’ is not 
to be found in the period under consideration.53 Moreover, the Incarnation – 
or, as we should rather say, the kenotic incarnational movement – was not 
considered independently  of man’s purpose as the image of God. Man is not 
crossed out, but fulfilled in Christ: in him, God gave man what man was 
destined to be. Creation and salvation were therefore not considered as two 
altogether different things.  
What did the specifically Christian grammar in the end do with the idea of 
participation? As we saw, Christian worship and theology contained several 
critical concepts that seriously altered pagan views of the relation between 
God and the world. We saw in the first place how creatio ex nihilo and, in the 
second place, the concept of the Trinity distinguished Christianity radically 
from a typical Platonic worldview. In the third place, and most extensively 
with respect to Augustine, we reflected on the role of the Incarnation. The 
Christian focus on the Incarnation provided a form of union with God that did 
not attempt to get away from matter through the ‘highway of the soul’, but 
passed through a deeply embodied spirituality, through humility and 
suffering. Concomitant with these ideas was a strong notion of sin, interpreted 
as privatio boni: it is the absence of the good, which amounts to saying that it 
is the absence of being. The idea of sin and the centrality of the fall therefore 
                                                          
53 Cf. G.C. Berkouwer, Het werk van Christus. Dogmatische studien (Kampen: Kok, 
1953), 32: ‘[The Church] saw historically the unity of incarnation and cross. (…) The 
incarnation is not an independent phase on the way of salvation, which is then 




do not put a melancholic gloss on creation itself; instead, they emphasise the 
qualification of creation which God gives in Genesis 1, that it was ‘very good’. 
However, the specifically Christian grammar did not function as a set of 
critical concepts against a participatory ontology. It was simply written into a 
participatory ontology, and filled and deepened it. There was no conflict 
between ‘biblical’, ‘soteriological’ concepts of Christ on the one hand, and 
‘cosmological’, ‘philosophical’ ones on the other, but the two merged into one 
cosmological-christological discourse.54  
When it comes to participation, or its sister concept of deification, the 
conception of man as imago dei has been far more important for the 
development of Christian participatory thought than, for example, a single 
‘disturbing’ text in the New Testament that speaks boldly about our ‘partaking 
in the divine nature’.55 The idea that man is created in the image of God fits 
well within a Platonic scheme of archetype and image, and was therefore 
commonly interpreted along these lines. The image longs for its perfection, its 
fulfilling, which is the archetype, but finds itself bound in sin, and stands 
before a breach. Only through conformity with God incarnate will we be able 
to find the way to our true origin and end. Man’s creation in the image of God 
and Christ’s restoration of this image after the fall provide a basic narrative 
which fully opens up patristic theology to Platonic conceptuality, and at the 
same time cuts the early fathers off from the most basic assumptions of 
Platonism.  
 
                                                          
54 Cf. J. R. Lyman, Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, 
Eusebius and Athanasius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 160.  
55 2 Peter 1:4. ‘The term theosis itself is not explicitly advanced by scriptural 
authority’,  J.A. McGuckin in Partakers in the Divine Nature, 96. For a very precise 
interpretation of the phrase theias koinonoi phusis and its context, cf. S. Hafemann, 
‘“Divine Nature” in 2. Pet. 1,4 within its Eschatological Context’, Biblica 94 (2013), 80-
99. Hafeman argues that phusis must here be defined as ‘God’s dynamic character as 
expressed in the attitudes and/or actions that it brings forth or produces’. For 
‘partaking in the divine nature’ as a relevant notion in both Eastern and Western 
theology, see P. M. Collins, Partaking in Divine Nature: Deification and Communion 
(London: T&T Clark, 2010). Collins also observes that 2 Pet. 1:4 ‘does not evoke much 
interest’ among the early Christian writers, and that the notion of deification was 
embedded in a much wider account of Scriptural reasoning. Instead, he argues that, if 
one needs to point to a ‘proof-text’ for the doctrine of deification, it would rather be 
Psalm 82:6, read through its adoption in John 10:31-36. Partaking in Divine Nature, 
32-48.   
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2.2.6 Thomas Aquinas 
Within a survey that had to be kept short for the present purposes, Augustine 
already received a relatively great amount of attention. However, also Thomas 
Aquinas’ view on participation demands a separate and larger section. 
Participation is a major theme in Thomas’ works , but still needed to be 
highlighted anew in more recent scholarship.56 In the middle of the twentieth 
century, Cornelio Fabro and Louis-Bertrand Geiger gave particular attention 
to the theme in Aquinas’ metaphysics, and more recently John Wippel and 
Rudi te Velde have attempted to advance these older readings of the 
participation theme. All of them consider that there are in Aquinas’ 
metaphysics both an Aristotelian current and a Platonic one which stand in 
tension with each other, although Aquinas attempted to synthesise the two 
and was more or less successful in this endeavour. The theme of participation 
belongs to his ‘Platonic side’ and is clearly important throughout his work, but 
one wonders whether he really did succeed in fitting it into the Aristotelian 
content of his thought – although this is not the immediate focus of this study. 
Thomas is in fact the consummation of the participatory tradition since he 
seems on the one hand in his Aristotelianism to open up a more ‘this-worldly 
perspective’ than was traditionally the case, but on the other hand merges this 
perspective with a participatory Platonism. If one considers this attempt to be 
successful, then Thomas is the master of participation, but if one interprets his 
work as being unsatisfactory in this respect, he can also be seen as the one 
who actually destroyed participatory theology.  
If we attempt to get at the meaning of participation in Thomas’ work, we 
find – more than in the works of his Christian Platonic predecessors – 
something like a search for conceptual clarification of the term. Participation 
literally means partem capere, Thomas says: something takes a part of 
something else. We speak of participation when ‘something receives in 
particular fashion that which belongs to another universally’ – a phrase that 
                                                          
56 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 140: ‘It is as if Aristotle’s verdict on participation as no 
more than an idle word without a precise meaning has, for centuries, prevented the 
Thomistic school from arriving at a positive assessment of what Thomas intends to 
express by Participation’; Cf. J. Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on 
Human Participation in Eternal Law (Washington: The Catholic University of America 




speaks the language of the Platonic tradition.57 Thomas gives this definition in 
his commentary on Boethius’ De Hebdomadibus, in which he attempts to take 
up and develop the participation theme as it functions in Boethius’ thought. 
Thomas takes over the Boethian distinction between that which is (quod est) 
and being itself (esse ipsum), in which the former is said to participate in the 
latter.  
Thomas then distinguishes three kinds of participation: the first takes 
place in relations of species, genus and individual. An individual participates 
in the genus ‘but does not possess the intelligible content of the genus in all its 
amplitude and extension’.58 For example, Socrates participates in the species 
‘man’, but he by no means exhausts ‘man’, nor is he identical with the common 
nature which the species express. The second kind of participation takes place 
in relations of subject and accident and of matter and form. The receiving 
principle participates in the received form. There is a receiving subject which 
receives a perfection, the combination of which makes it a composition. For 
example, a statue consists of matter which has been constructed in some form; 
the statue would not be this statue if its matter did not participate in this 
specific shape. The third kind of participation, however, is the most relevant 
when it comes to the creature’s participation in God: according to Thomas, an 
effect can be said to participate in its cause, especially when the effect is not 
equal to the power of its cause. The effect participates in diminished fashion in 
the power of the cause, just like for example illuminated air participates in the 
light of the sun which is fully realised in the sun itself.  
If we want to form an idea of the way Thomas deals with the relation 
between created being and the being of God, it is in the first place important to 
note that creatures are for him compositions of essentia and esse, while this 
distinction does not apply when we want to talk about God: his essence is his 
existence, and Thomas therefore calls God ipsum esse subsistens.59 Whereas a 
creature exists of both act and potency, God is pure act, and this is precisely 
the character esse therefore has: the act of existing or supreme actuality. In 
contrast to creatures, in God there is nothing unrealised, no hint of potency. 
                                                          
57 R. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 
11; Wippel, Metaphysical thought, 96.  
58 Te Velde, Participation, 12; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 97.  
59 ST1, q3. a4; ST1, q4. a2; ST1, q13. a11. References to Thomas’ Summa Theologiae are 
taken from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols. 
rev. ed. 1920 (Westminster, Md: Christian Classics, 1981 (reprint)). 
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Thus Thomas’ account of esse is very close to the account of God we already 
encountered in the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, which 
interpreted the One as to energein katharon and made an important 
distinction between to einai and to on, with the latter participating in the 
former. It is particularly through Boethius that this current of thought 
influenced Thomas’ participatory thought.60   
Thomas agrees with the Platonic Christian tradition that God’s creating 
exists in his communicatio boni: God does not want to keep his goodness to 
himself, but wants others to share in it.61 This renders any goodness (and also 
being) of creatures completely participatory, dependent. They receive what 
they are ab alio. Although Thomas distinguishes sharply between creator and 
creature, he does not oppose them as simply two ‘beings’, the one as the 
highest being and the other a lower or lesser being. God is Being itself, and 
creation participates in Being to a lesser degree. The concept of participation 
thus does not seem to articulate an arrogance in speaking about the status of 
creation, but emphasises, on the contrary, the humbleness of creatures in 
relation to God’s fullness. What they are is not themselves, but belongs 
originally and ultimately to God.  
However, more than the thinkers in the Neoplatonic framework, Thomas is 
concerned about goodness as something essentially and intrinsically 
belonging to creatures. According to Te Velde, Aquinas keeps the Aristotelian 
aspect (i.e., the intrinsic immanent goodness) and the Platonic aspect (i.e., the 
transcendent goodness) together in a synthesis which focuses on the ‘likeness’ 
(similitudo) to God in which we are created, which is something which we 
have of ourselves and which also has its origin in divine goodness. 
Accordingly, in his De Veritate Thomas gives a twofold answer to the question 
why things are said to be good: in the first place, they are good because of ‘an 
immanent form given to them as a likeness of the highest good’, and 
furthermore ‘because of the first goodness as exemplary and effective 
principle of all created goodness’.62  
                                                          
60 For this line of reasoning, see 2.2.2; For its reception history in Scholastic theology, 
see Bradshaw, Aristotle, 114-118.  
61 See 2.2.2; Te Velde, Participation, 23; Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius’ famous maxim: ‘Bonum 
est diffusivum sui’. 
62 Te Velde, Participation, 26.    
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Although the participatory relation between God and creation has the 
character of a cause (in the sense of an ‘origin’) and an effect, the relation also 
bears a distinctive mark of teleology. The cause in which the effect dimly 
participates is also the final cause, which influences the effect. Something is 
good because it is directed towards the ultimate good, which is God. The 
absoluteness from which we derive our particularity is not only a source but 
also an end: we are from it and we tend towards it, through attraction and 
desire. 
If then for Thomas creation participates to a lesser degree in ‘to be’ (esse), 
what does this imply for the relation between God and creation? At times it 
seems as if Thomas simply contends that creatures participate in esse 
subsistens, that is, ‘in God’. However, Thomas makes a distinction between esse 
subsistens and esse commune, where the latter is the esse in which every 
particular being participates.63 If he did not make this distinction, he would 
favour pantheism, as he himself thinks, since the existence (esse) of any 
particular being would literally be a part of God, which is definitely not what 
Thomas has in mind. When Thomas distinguishes these two, the most 
important distinction is that nothing can be added to self-subsisting esse, 
whereas esse commune is neutral with respect to addition. Esse commune does 
not subsist apart from the individual existents in which it is received.64  
Thomas does not, however, strictly separate the two, since then the whole 
conception of creation participating in the divine esse would disappear. John 
Wippel points to the fact that the theme of participating in esse belongs to the 
third kind of participation distinguished by Thomas, that of an effect in its 
cause. To participate in something is to be caused by something else. The 
discovery of individual beings as participating in esse commune refers to their 
caused character by the unparticipated source, esse subsistens. As Wippel 
observes: ‘Once this is established, one can speak of them as actually 
participating in esse subsistens as well’.65 Something can participate in a 
                                                          
63 Esse commune is something different from ens commune (which would be easier to 
understand if we relate Thomas to the einai-to on distinction). Thomas in fact makes 
the classical distinction even more subtle (and more difficult). Although esse commune 
and esse subsistens are not the same, there simply is a divine ‘ring’ to the word esse 
which the word ens does not have. Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 111-112.  
64 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 112, 116.  
65 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 117. This way of reasoning sounds very much like 
Thomas’ way of reasoning in the famous ‘five ways’ (ST1 q2, a3): A certain effect 
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perfection which transcends the effect totally, but in which the effect is still 
said to participate.   
To understand Thomas’ view on participation it is also important to grasp 
something of his insistence on analogy as the word that characterises the way 
creation is ‘linked’ with the divine. Already by his time the term analogy had a 
long reception history as it developed from a theory of ‘proportion between 
numbers’ to a metaphysical term expressing ontological similitudes between 
diverse kinds of being.66 Thomas develops the theme of analogy, confronted 
with the question as to how the names and attributes we use for God relate to 
God’s very being.67 There are two ways of speaking about God that he 
disapproves of, namely univocal and equivocal discourse. Univocal discourse 
claims that our words like goodness or wisdom denote exactly the same thing 
when they are predicated of God as when they are predicated of created 
beings. Equivocal discourse, on the other hand, claims that we have no idea 
what it means to predicate, for example, ‘goodness’ of God. In equivocal 
discourse our human terms are completely emptied of their meaning when 
applied to God, since God is so transcendent and unknowable. Although 
Thomas seems to have more sympathy for the latter than the former option, 
he chooses a third way, which in a sense lies in-between these two ways of 
speaking about God although it in fact also encompasses them both.68  
In the first place, it is quite something for Thomas to contend that God can 
be named at all, that is, that there are names – we would say ‘words’ or 
‘properties’ – that genuinely express something about God, because the 
unknowability of the divine essence occupies a position in the very foreground 
of his thought. Therefore, words referring to God primarily express the 
distance between the creature and the creator, rather than their likeness. 
                                                                                                                                                   
makes us move to its cause, which makes us move again to the cause of this cause, a 
chain of reasoning that can only stop at the ultimately uncaused cause, which is God. 
Likewise, the chain of participation cannot simply stop at esse commune, since it too is 
participated esse.  
66 T. J. White, ‘Introduction: The Analogia Entis Controversy and its Contemporary 
Significance’ in T.J. White, (ed)., The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the 
Wisdom of God? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 4.  
67 The discussion can be found in ST1, q13. 
68 Thomas strictly disapproves of univocity in 1 q13 a5 (‘impossibile est aliquid 
praedicari de Deo et creatures univoce’). Although he also says that predications of 
God are at least not purely equivocal (sed ned etiam pure aequivoce), he still goes on 
to reject this position as strongly as univocal predication.  
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Anything that Thomas contends about the analogy between God and creatures 
is thus embedded firmly in a context of ‘negative theology’ – that is, it 
expresses more God’s transcendence than his closeness to creatures, for ‘what 
he is not is clearer to us than what he is’.69  
Naming God is naming the perfections that are contained in him and flow 
from him into creation. It is, however, out of the question for this knowledge 
to be adequate, since it is knowing God ‘as the excelling principle of whose 
form the effect falls short’.70 In sum, ‘whatever is said of God and creatures, is 
said according to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of 
things pre-exist eminently’.71 Knowing God is knowing a source that is so 
abundant and excelling that knowing it rather has the character of not-
knowing than knowing. Strangely God is maximally knowable, since he is pure 
act without any admixture of potentiality, but ‘what is supremely knowable in 
itself may not be knowable to a particular intellect on account of the excess of 
the intelligible object above the intellect.’72 There is an excess of meaning in 
God which makes him both utterly knowable and utterly beyond knowability, 
so that according to Thomas the principle of our knowledge is wonder.73 
Thomas’ analogical view on the relation between the divine and the created, 
                                                          
69 ST1 q1, a9. Cf. R. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa 
Theologiae (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006), 72-77.  
70 ST1, q13, a2. Although it is not so that Thomas strictly spreaking ‘taught’ what was 
later called the ‘analogy of being’, his account of analogy and his broader view on the 
relation between the world and God have given rise to discussions of this theme. A 
theologian who heavily (and correctly) emphasised the distance between creator and 
creature that is implied in the analogia entis was Erich Przywara. He described 
analogy (from a much broader group of sources than Thomas alone) as “Beziehung’ 
die in dem masse als ‘echte’ Beziehung sich kundtut, als sie das grundlegende 
‘Anderssein’ Gottes gegenüber dem Geschöpflichen ausdrückt’, so it is ‘Analogie als 
Beziehung gegenseitigen Andersseins’, E. Przywara, Analogia entis: Metaphysik I. 
Prinzip (München: Kösel & Pustet, 1932), 95. Przywara intends to interpret the 
analogia entis in a way that is faithful to the way it was articulated at the fourth 
Lateran Council: inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin 
inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda (Analogia entis, 97). Przywara emphasised the 
greater dissimilarity which surrounds any similarity. Cf. J. Palakeel, The use of analogy 
in theological discourse: An Investigation in Ecumenical Perspective (Rome: Gregorian 
University Press, 1995), 104-105. Cf. also the accurate analyses of Przywara’s account 
of the analogia entis and Karl Barth’s famous critique in T.J. White, (ed.), The Analogy 
of Being.  
71 ST1, q13, a5. 
72 ST1, q12, a1 
73 See Kerr, After Aquinas, 78.  
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with its double aspect of excess and negativity, once again shows how 
humbling the effect of participation is for any view of the created. Thomas’ 
work testifies in a significant way that participatory thought does not lift up 
the created world to the level of uncreated being, but renders creation fully 
dependent on the mystery that is at the heart of what creation is: its divine 
source and end.74  
 
2.2.7 Participatory traces in the Reformed tradition: Calvin and Edwards 
For the purposes of the present study, Thomas Aquinas will function as 
roughly an endpoint in the history of participation. This is, however, only 
partly justified. In Thomas’ work the participatory current, which he received 
from the Christian-Platonic tradition, already had to share the place of honour 
with Aristotelian concepts. To put it otherwise, since Aristotle was simply the 
philosopher for Thomas, it can be conceded that Plato was in fact succeeded by 
Aristotle as the court-philosopher of theology (although this is a matter of 
debate). In 2.2.6 above we saw how these different conceptualities created a 
tension in Thomas’ thought and in his position on participation. However, 
participatory thought did not completely vanish and leave the theological 
scene after him.  
For all interpreters it is clear that at least something radically changed in 
the late Middle Ages, articulated by new ways of thinking that often bear 
                                                          
74 Thomas’ conception of analogy as a theologically correct account of the way this 
world is related to God is in fact a conceptualisation of something that was already 
firmly rooted in the tradition. The following beautiful and famous passage from 
Augustine’s Confessiones, for example, is in fact a more poetic expression of what 
Thomas conceptualises:  
‘But what is it that I love in loving you? Not corporeal beauty, nor the splendour of 
time, nor the radiance of the light, so pleasant to our eyes, nor the sweet melodies of 
songs of all kinds, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not 
manna and honey, not limbs pleasant to the embracements of flesh. I love not these 
things when I love my God; and yet I love a certain kind of light, and sound, and 
fragrance, and food, and embracement in loving my God, who is the light, sound, 
fragrance, food, and embracement of my inner man - where that light shines unto my 
soul which no place can contain, where that sounds which time snatches not away, 
where there is a fragrance which no breeze disperses, where there is a food which no 
eating can diminish, and where that clings which no satiety can sunder. This is what I 
love, when I love my God.’ Confessions, X, 6. The three ways implied here are in fact 
negation, analogy and ‘pointing to the source and end’, which in Thomas as well as 
Augustine belong deeply together. 
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names like Scotism (after the theologian John Duns Scotus), or voluntarism or 
nominalism, which tore apart the Christian-Platonic tradition and therefore 
put an end to participatory thought as the main way to view the relation 
between God and the world. Although these developments had so many facets 
that they cannot simply be reduced to one clear interpretation, the differences 
between medieval and early modern thought are striking. For example, 
considering the experience of time, Charles Taylor observes that time in the 
medieval period time was considered as ‘a moving image of eternity’, a 
conception which articulates an ultimately participatory outlook, but that this 
conception as a main framework of interpreting the world has been lost in our 
‘horizontal flow of secular time’.75 Although participatory ontology became 
increasingly marginal, it did not, however, leave the scene altogether. For this 
study, it is particularly interesting what became of it in the Reformed 
tradition.   
Following Richard Muller, this study sees continuity rather than 
discontinuity between medieval theology and the Reformed tradition in 
metaphysical matters. Reformed theologians attempted to articulate their 
faith in the language and conceptions that were academically available in their 
time. Since the late-Medieval landscape in metaphysics was rather dispersed, 
the Reformed theologians picked up these different currents of thought in an 
eclectic way. Muller argues that ‘protestant theologians and philosophers 
were aware of the trajectories of thought that flowed out of the later Middle 
Ages into the Renaissance and Reformation eras – whether the  Thomistic, 
Scotistic, or the nominalistic lines of argument’.76 Since the protestant thinkers 
were not bounded to one particular school, they could just blend different 
perspectives from earlier protestant sources, as well as from different classical 
and medieval sources.  
There did, however, seem to be a Scotistic preference among the 
mainstream of Protestant theologians. The very influential metaphysical work 
of Francisco Suárez, the Disputationes Metaphysicae, was received among 
protestants as a standard text on metaphysics, a fact which represents an 
important development when it comes to participatory ontology. Suárez 
followed Duns Scotus in maintaining a univocal conception of being, 
                                                          
75 C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 54-59.  
76 R. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol 3, The Divine Essence and 
Attributes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 108.   
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pertaining to both God and creation, and thus broke with the tradition’s 
analogia entis whose way of speaking about God and creation belonged to the 
participatory conception. Suárez explicitly rejected the idea of participation 
because he departed from the Thomistic-Platonic assumption that God 
contains the exemplars of finite being, which therefore derive their being from 
God by participation.77 Although Suárez’ framework was far from uncontested, 
it became highly influential among Protestant Scholastic theologians, who 
therefore largely departed from participatory thinking.78  
This does not mean that Christian Platonism and participatory thought 
simply disappeared. Several Protestant thinkers were consciously or 
unconsciously deeply influenced by participatory currents of thought. These 
currents existed and remained as influential fragments of the ‘ruin’ of the 
participatory tradition. In the present discussion, two different, influential 
Protestant thinkers will serve as examples of participatory thought in the 
Reformed tradition: John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards. 
Although Calvin does not offer anything like a ‘doctrine’ of participation, 
participation in the divine is a very important theme in his work. This is what 
Todd Billings has convincingly argued in his Calvin, Participation and the Gift. 
To be sure, a metaphysical-speculative development of the theme is not to be 
expected in Calvin’s work, but the theme of communion with God through 
Christ in terms of participation is clearly important for him, ‘largely because it 
                                                          
77 A concise description of the movement from Thomism to Scotism (or the use of 
Thomist terms with Scotistic content) can be found in J.L. Marion, ‘The Idea of God’ in 
D. Garber and M. Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century 
Philosophy. Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 265-268.  
78 In a later article, Muller pushes his own argument in a somewhat different direction: 
against a current of interpretation that views Reformed Scholasticism as ‘mainly 
Scotist’, he emphasises the deeply Thomist, analogical metaphysical accounts of a host 
of Reformed Scholastics. As in his Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Muller 
mentions particularly Zanchi, Keckermann, Maccovius and Burgersdijk as the more 
‘Platonizing Protestants’. Instead of advancing his usual view of ‘Reformed 
metaphysical eclecticism’ (which, nevertheless, does remain standing), he argues here 
for an emphasis amongst the Reformed Scholastics against univocity and in fact tries 
to move them away from pure Scotism. R. Muller, ‘Not Scotist: understandings of 
being, univocity, and analogy in early-modern Reformed thought’, Reformation and 
Renaissance Review 14 (2012), 127-150. This does, however, sound like a major shift 
from Muller’s earlier view that ‘Scotus, the nominalists after him, and virtually all of 
the formulators of Protestant theology denied the Thomist analogia entis and declared 
that no proportion exists between the finite and the infinite.’ Muller, Post-Reformation 
Reformed Dogmatics, vol 1, 234.  
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is a biblical and patristic category’, Billings comments.79 Like the present 
study, Billings adopts an approach of searching for a participatory ‘language-
family’ in which participation takes its place among other similar words like 
‘union’, ‘engrafting’ and ‘adoption’, which all indicate what it means to be ‘in 
Christ’.80 This picture of Calvin’s metaphysics fits within the kind of picture 
Muller gives of the protestant thinkers after Calvin: he does not adhere to one 
clear principle or school, but draws freely on a variety of schools and 
traditions, whatever ‘he feels will strengthen his biblical account of the loci of 
doctrine’.81 Therefore, Calvin is eclectic when it comes to his choice of 
metaphysical sources.  
From Irenaeus, Calvin adopts the language of Christ as the second Adam, 
who fulfils and restores creation in uniting human beings to God. 
Furthermore, Calvin leans heavily on Cyril of Alexandria who applies 
christology to a ‘eucharistic theology’ with a strong emphasis on the 
vivification which is transmitted to us in the Lord’s Supper.82 The union 
between Christ and believers tends in Calvin to the language of a ‘mystical 
union’, which has even led interpreters to compare Calvin and Bernard of 
Clairvaux, although the erotic character of that union, which is explicit and 
central in Bernard, is absent in Calvin.83 Even the term ‘deification’ is not too 
much for Calvin when it comes to his description of the intimacy of God’s 
indwelling in human beings through Christ. It should be noted, however, that 
all mystical language takes its place within his soteriological framework. 
Deification is therefore an appropriate term for Calvin’s theology of union, ‘if 
understood as a soteriology that affirms the unity of humanity and divinity, 
such that redemption involves the transformation of believers to be 
incorporated into the Triune life of God, while remaining creatures’, as Billings 
carefully remarks.84  
                                                          
79 J.T. Billings, Calvin, Participation and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with 
Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 18. 
80 Billings, Calvin, 19.  
81 Billings, Calvin, 38. 
82 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV, 17, 9. References to and quotations 
from the Institutes refer to J. T. McNeill (ed.) and F. L. Battles (transl.), Calvin: 
Institutes of the Christian Religion (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960).  
83 Cf. particularly his account of the union with Christ in the Lord’s Supper, Institutes, 
IV, 17. 
84 Billings, Calvin, 54.  
68 
 
Similarly, Julie Canlis argues for a reading of Calvin’s work as a ‘spiritual 
theology of ascent’. Leaning heavily on Irenaeus, Calvin emphasises how the 
believer, through Christ, is ‘drawn into the triune relations’. Calvin stood in the 
participatory tradition in a particular way. He was far from uncritical about 
tendencies that have been described above as fundamentally belonging to this 
tradition. He criticised Augustine, for example, who placed eros for God, as an 
active love of the believer, at the centre of what it is to be a Christian. Calvin 
rather focused on the believer’s passivity in this process – that is, he focused 
not on our desire for God, but on God’s love toward us as it is poured out in 
our hearts by the Spirit (and any Eastern notion of ‘synergy’ is therefore taboo 
in Calvin).85 He does not agree with the tradition that understands the relation 
between God and man in terms of ‘like returning to like’, but conceives of 
participation as ‘bringing unlike to participate in unlike’.86 Therefore, Canlis 
does not see Calvin’s view on participation as being grounded in an 
‘anthropological endowment’, but as based on ‘the freedom of God and his 
desire for communion as expressed in the person of Jesus Christ’.87  
Although it is clear that Calvin uses language and themes that belong to the 
participatory Christian-Platonic tradition, he uses these themes ambiguously. 
Participatory language may be at the heart of what he is saying, but Calvin 
does not have a participatory ontology. Although he thinks that participation 
in God is the ‘natural state’ of human beings, after the fall ‘God does not appear 
as a loving, gracious God except by divine revelation’. Apart from revelation, 
God appears as a judge and a tyrant.88 God can shine forth his goodness as 
much as he wants, but he does not reach us, blinded as we are by sin. In Calvin 
it seems to be that the overt participatory themes he uses simply stand in 
tension with his overall non-participatory ontology.  
                                                          
85 Calvin, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5:5, in J. Calvin, Commentaries on 
St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (Altenmünster: Jazzybee Verlag, 2012). 
86 J. Canlis, Calvin’s Ladder: A Spiritual Theology of Ascent and Ascension (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2010), 30. 
87 Canlis, Calvin’s Ladder, 49. Although she makes perfectly clear where Calvin breaks 
with the Christian Platonic tradition, Canlis mistakenly considers Calvin’s emphasis on 
the passiveness of human beings in the work of grace simply as ‘the’ Christian 
narrative when she states: ‘In the Christian narrative, the human drama is less a 
matter of “like returning to like” than an act of salvation, of grace bringing unlike to 
participate in unlike’ (30). The opposition between ‘grace’ and the human being 
actively longing for God may in fact be less clear than she presupposes.   
88 Billings, Calvin, 149n22.  
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The American theologian Jonathan Edwards represents an altogether 
different example in terms of the influence of participatory thought in the 
Reformed tradition. He of course lived much later than Calvin and in a 
different context, used other sources and had his own set of questions to 
confront. Edwards saw Protestant orthodoxy confronted with Enlightenment 
rationalism, and for his response he appropriated much of the Platonic 
tradition of participation. Instead of grounding philosophy on doubt and 
atomistic individualism, Edwards focused on the heart which senses the 
harmonious unity of nature and experience. Underlying his metaphysical 
thought is an aesthetic vision of reality and the idea of ‘excellency’. ‘Being’, he 
writes, ‘is nothing else but proportion’. Reality consists of a ‘web of relations 
constituted by “the consent of being to being.”’89 Edwards had a very dynamic 
view on being, which was closely connected to his dynamic, Trinitarian view 
on the nature of God.  
Edwards does not refrain from calling the world an ‘emanation from God’ 
and describes God as ‘Being in General’, ‘the Being of Beings’ or even ‘the sum 
of all being’. God’s nature, according to Edwards, can perhaps best be 
characterised as ‘beauty’. Therefore it must ‘appear, shine forth, manifest and 
communicate itself.’90 Although God is absolutely perfect, he nonetheless 
enlarges himself through communication. There is something here like a 
Neoplatonic idea of exitus and reditus that undergirds much of Edwards’ 
metaphysical thought. God created the world in order to express his divine 
excellency which could be known and admired. Not the happiness of 
humanity, but ‘the diffusion of God’s excellent fullness’ is the ultimate goal of 
creation.91 In keeping the being of God and the world closely together, 
Edwards was clearly inspired by Platonic currents of thought.  
When he argues that Edwards’ theology contains an account of 
‘divinization’, Michael McClymond is aware that several protestant thinkers 
                                                          
89 J. Edwards, ‘Personal Narrative’ in G. S. Claghorn (ed), The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards. Vol. 16. Letters and Personal Writings. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998), 791-799.  Cf. E. Brooks Holifield, ‘Edwards as theologian’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Jonathan Edwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 145.  
90 Edwards, ‘Dissertation on the End for which God created the World’, in The Works of 
President Edwards. Vol. 2 (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1869), 212-213. Cf. 
S. H. Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards. Expanded Edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 172. 
91 Brooks Holifield, ‘Edwards as theologian’, 149.  
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were worried about Edwards’ (apparent) insistence on the continuity 
between creator and creature. When he defends the view that Edwards’ 
teaching on justification has strong parallels in the Orthodox doctrine of 
divinisation, however, he emphasises the claim of A. N. Williams that 
‘deification focuses not on humanity, but on the God who invites humanity to 
share divine life’.92 This ‘theocentric’ emphasis is also reflected in Edwards’ 
work and seems to be a marker for the Orthodox-Catholic character of his 
view on human participation in the divine life.93   
If we try to understand how the Platonic content of their thought came to 
Calvin and Edwards, it would seem that in Calvin his Platonism – which is 
closely related to his participatory and sacramental outlook – exists as a 
fragmented inheritance of the Christian-Platonic past, whereas in Edwards 
this past was much more forgotten or openly despised. As many 
commentators observe, Edwards had inherited his Platonic preference from 
the Cambridge Platonists, a group of philosophers who led a revival of Platonic 
thought in post-Enlightenment Britain.94 In both Calvin and Edwards, we seem 
to have protestant thinkers who dealt eclectically with metaphysical issues, 
but were clearly influenced by the Christian-Platonic participatory tradition. 
 
2.2.8 Conclusions 
It is difficult, of course, to draw general conclusions from a survey of the 
tradition which shows so many differences. In this respect Hans Boersma is 
entirely correct when he refers to the participatory current described above 
                                                          
92 M. J. McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization: Jonathan Edwards, Gregory Palamas 
and the Theological Uses of Neoplatonism’ in P. Helm and O. D. Crisp (eds.), Jonathan 
Edwards: Philosophical Theologian (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 141; referring to A. N. 
Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 36. 
93 Cf. an interesting parallel in the work of the Sufi mystic Jalal al-Din Rumi who 
comments on the mystical expression ‘I am God’: ‘Some people think this is a great 
pretension, but ‘I am God’ is in fact a great humility. Those who say, instead, ‘I am a 
servant of God’ believe that two exist, themselves and God. But those who say, ‘I am 
God’ have become nothing and have cast themselves to the winds. They say, ‘I am God’ 
meaning, ‘I am not, God is all. There is no existence but God. I have lost all separation. I 
am nothing.’ In this the humility is greater.’ A.J. Arberry (transl.), Discourses of Rumi 
(Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2006), 83.   
 
94 Cf. Lee, Philosophical Theology, 11-13; McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 142-
144; Brooks Holifield, ‘Edwards as Theologian’, 145.  
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as the ‘Platonist-Christian synthesis’.95 The immense differences between 
Plato and Thomas are easily discernible, and yet we can speak of a synthesis, 
of a shared understanding of the world and its relation with the divine, even 
considering that this synthesis involves a fusion of Christians and pagans, a 
blend of Eastern and Western outlooks, to mention only some of the widely 
diverging trajectories involved. 
In its most general sense, participation means ‘receiving a share in 
something’, a something that is bigger and more perfect than that which is 
shared by the participant. From Plato and later Platonism we receive a picture 
of participation that is vast, and has many different colours and vocabularies. 
This world is conceived as necessarily receiving its existence from an 
Absolute, which is the source and end of all that is. Particulars derive their 
existence from this ultimate reality, and in fact ‘are real’ insofar as they 
participate in this reality. What we call reality is therefore what it is, because it 
receives a share in Reality. Accordingly we can say that any participant has a 
real, but derived and partial possession of what it participates in.  
However, more important than the attempt at definition is the 
presentation of the semantic family in which the notion of participation 
figures. More than a concept with fixed meaning supposed by the user, 
participation is a member of a language-family. The goal of the current chapter 
was to realise a presentation of this family, by noticing, for example, its 
kinship with concepts like deification, analogy and privatio boni. The 
participatory family speaks with its own vocabulary, in which specific words 
and metaphors play their role. Words and expressions like ‘the sun with its 
rays’ and ‘like is only known by like’, the important epistemological role 
attributed to eros and desire, an exitus-reditus scheme, the divine as an 
‘abundance’ or ‘fountain’ of life and being are all examples of language that 
point to participatory thought. In what follows, we will identify the most 
important systematic implications. 
A common characteristic of participatory thought is indeed the role of eros 
and desire. Since this world exists in an embodiment of the divine Ideas, there 
is an eros, a deep desire to return to the source of everything that is. As we 
saw, especially in a Christian context, this desire is not directed against the 
material world, but has the character of a mystical ascent of intensification, 
                                                          
95 Boersma, Heavenly Participation, esp. 33-39. 
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concentration and purification. The created hears a constant call from the 
Father of all things to dwell in him and to receive from him all that makes life 
what it is: goodness, truth, beauty. Therefore, the human heart is restless until 
it rests in him, as Augustine wrote. Connected with this idea of desire is that 
participatory thought always contains some version of the movement of exitus 
and reditus. All things come forth from God and find their goal in him. This 
world therefore stands in a movement from and to God, which gives it 
something dynamic rather than static.  
Participation implies a particular language about the divine as well as the 
status of creation. What does it say about God? What strikes us in the survey 
above is that the conception of God is usually one of productivity and activity. 
From Plotinus to Thomas, the divine is entirely outward-directed, generous 
and an inexhaustible source of activity. God is anything but ‘static’ - although 
from our created point of view any description of the divine being can only be 
achieved by crossing out temporal and spatial categories (categories of 
‘movement’), and therefore stands in a negative modus. The divine, however, 
remains the incomprehensible source in which everything else shares.  
What this implies for creation is that the world cannot be simply conceived 
of as an ‘extra’, something that is somehow ‘added’ to the divine being. For if 
God sums up and contains all being and is called an infinite, boundless ‘sea of 
being’, how could anything be added to this divine being? God therefore 
cannot be said to ‘relate’ to this world, but is ‘an act, not fixed in relation to 
something’ as the Commentator on the Parmenides already had it. This is 
echoed in Thomas’ contention that ‘in God there is no real relation to 
creatures’, but that it is the other way around alone: all creatures are ordered 
to him, and thus ‘really related to God Himself’.96 This is an important notion 
for our study, which addresses simply the ‘relation between God and the 
world’. The participatory tradition qualifies this relation by emphasising that 
it is only real in the creature, and therefore asymmetrical and non-mutual. Any 
account of creation in the period under discussion must have some notion of 
participation, since it is unthinkable for there to be any being that does not 
derive from God’s being.  
It is striking how ‘theocentric’ all descriptions of the world are in this 
tradition. If we want to ‘define’ the world within a participatory framework, 
                                                          
96 ST1, q13, a7. 
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we just end up making a vague allusion to the divine being in which it shares. 
To state it somewhat abruptly, there is not God and the world as two ‘beings’ 
which can (or cannot) ‘relate’, but there is just God sharing his being with 
something other, which nonetheless owes its existence to its relatedness to 
God. In this tradition, human beings can be characterised as fundamentally 
open to the graceful communication of God’s being, since finite being is itself 
the openness for this communication from which it can turn away, or to which 
it can humbly turn itself to be filled with joy, goodness and life, or, in short, 
with being.  
Although this would seem to lead to a quite ‘optimistic’ conception of the 
continuous relation between the participant and that which is participated, 
the reception history of the notion of participation has shown itself to be 
rather ‘negative’ about this relation. Although the divine ousia is necessarily 
manifested by its energies, our participation in these energies by no means 
brings us into the realm of divine ousia. One thing that emerges very clearly 
from the survey of participation in this chapter is the fact that the difference 
between the created and the creator is at the forefront of the concept. From an 
earthly perspective, there is nothing but humble reverence for the divine. This 
reverence and humility does not decrease, but only increases if we discern our 
earthly existence as workings of the divine. The maxim for the fathers, which 
still functions in Thomas Aquinas, is that we can say about God what he is not 
rather than what he is, although we confess that anything that we are and that 
we call life and being is a participation in the divine workings.  
We live because we live in the rays of the sun – and therefore we are 
children of the light – but there is no way we can ever literally be ‘in’ the sun, 
let alone that we can in some way ‘be the sun’.97 The concept of participation 
does not imply that creation elevates itself to literally a small part of the divine 
being. Although this seems to be implied by the very word participation 
(‘taking a part of the cake’), this is, however, not what the theological tradition 
meant by it, at least as long as it chose for the path of analogy as Thomas did, 
                                                          
97 It has to be noted that language can become slippery here. Jonathan Edwards, for 
example, did call human beings sharing in the divine life ‘little suns, partaking of the 
nature of the fountain of the fountain of their light’. Edwards, ‘Religious Affections’ in J. 
E. Smith (ed.), The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1959), 200-201. We should be careful, however, not to over-interpret poetic 




and not for univocity in speaking about the created and the divine. What the 
Christian tradition expressed with participation never results in a mode of 
self-exaltation of the created, but remains exclusively in a mode of divine 
glorification.  
Participation is not about human beings sharing in something that elevates 
them to a super-human level in which they can boast, but it focuses on the 
divine being in which creation humbly and joyfully shares. The language of 
participation necessarily calls for the language of ‘receiving’ and ‘sharing’ 
something ‘given’, and therefore the language of grace and humility, as well as 
a deep connection between humanity and all created beings.  
On the basis of this chapter it can therefore be posited that the concept of 
participation is qualified in ways that keep it from an identification of the 
divine with the created. One such qualification is the ousia-energeiai 
distinction which functions particularly in the context of Eastern theological 
discourse on deification, but there is also the distinction between God as being 
in the infinitive (to einai, to energein katharon, or esse) and created being as 
derivative being, as participle (to on, ens). Such a conceptuality has it both 
ways. God is ultimately knowable and ultimately unknown because of the 
abundance of being, that is, the unbounded activity that so surpasses our 
capacity of knowing and being that it cannot be apprehended. And yet, on our 
part there is only ‘being’ and ‘knowing’, inasmuch as we participate in this 
ungraspable esse.   
Participation was the ontological water of  patristic theology. However, the 
‘Christian grammar’ distinguished participation in a Christian context from a 
pagan Platonic outlook. In the first place, creatio ex nihilo places the soul, with 
the body, in the created rather than the divine sphere. It emphasises the gulf 
between creator and creature. The world is not there as a necessary fall from 
the divine, but it is actively willed by God. Nonetheless, this world exists as a 
mysterious communication of divine glory. Second, there is the conception of 
the Trinity. In Christian conceptuality God is not primarily characterised by 
‘oneness’ as in Plotinus, but is even beyond ‘oneness’, so that God’s being is 
ultimately apophatic. God is an incomprehensible harmony who nonetheless 
invites us to share in his life. In the third place, the doctrine of the Incarnation 
offers a way of communion with the divine that pictures a path that differs 
strictly from Platonism. On this point we follow the analysis of Andrew Louth, 
who has argued that patristic theology must be seen as standing in an 
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unresolved tension of ascent and descent. The ascent lies in the high goal for 
which man is created, namely being the image of God. The descent focuses on 
the path of humility through our conformity with the way of Christ. The divine 
life is not found through an escape from embodied life into the soul, but by 
going deeply through that embodied life. In the fallen state this also involves 
passing through pain, fighting against sin and taking up one’s cross. 
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Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) was the son of a pastor of the conservative 
Reformed Dutch Secession (Afscheiding; 1834) churches, the Christelijke 
Gereformeerde Kerken.1 After one year of studying theology at the 
denominational Theological School in Kampen, Bavinck made the remarkable 
choice to continue his theological education at the liberal theological faculty at 
Leiden. It was not that Bavinck wanted to leave his inherited ecclesial context 
behind, but he sought a more academic approach to theology and clearly his 
bright mind was hungry for more than the Kampen School could offer. After he 
completed his studies with a doctor’s degree, he served as pastor to a 
Reformed church for less than two years, before being called by the churches 
he served to teach theology in Kampen. There he wrote the first edition of his 
most famous work, the four-volume Gereformeerde dogmatiek (Reformed 
Dogmatics).  
Already during his time as a student in Leiden, Bavinck felt greatly 
attracted by the writings and activities of Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper’s Free 
University in Amsterdam in particular offered an at once orthodox Reformed 
and academic atmosphere which was very appealing to Bavinck. When 
Kuyper’s Doleantie (1886) churches and Bavinck’s own Secession churches 
united to form the Dutch Reformed Churches in 1892, it was Bavinck’s 
heartfelt wish that the Kampen Theological School and the theological faculty 
of the Free University would merge. When this did not happen, he accepted an 
appointment as professor of theology at the Free University, a decision he 
made after quite some years of initial reluctance. He left the small and quiet 
city of Kampen, where he had lived and worked for so many years, and moved 
to Amsterdam, a city that clearly resonated with Bavinck’s cultural and 
intellectual inclinations. At the same time, this move meant a break with the 
                                                          
1 For more biographical information, see R.H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn 
tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966); V. Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: W. ten 
Have, 1921). A recent English biography is R. Gleason, Herman Bavinck, Pastor, 
Churchman, Statesman, Theologian (Philippsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publications, 2010).  
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brothers and sisters of the humble and faithful Secessionist environment for 
whom Bavinck still felt a great love. On the personal level Bavinck was often 
torn between intellectually and culturally engaged contexts – in which he 
clearly flourished – and the humble, pious and even ‘mystical’ side of his 
character that never left him. The cities of Amsterdam and Kampen can be 
given symbolic meaning within the context of Bavinck’s life: he combined both 
the intellectual and cultural grandeur of ‘Amsterdam’, and the piety of 
‘Kampen’ – an integration but also a tension in his character that in fact 
colours all of his work.2  
In these Amsterdam years, Bavinck became politically active in Kuyper’s 
Anti-Revolutionary Party, as chair of the party and member of the Senate. 
Interestingly, in his research and publications he moved away from doctrinal 
theology to the fields of philosophy, pedagogy and education. Bavinck was 
apparently quite serious in his repeated insistence on the ‘catholicity’ of the 
Christian faith, which meant for him that it was a culturally and politically 
engaging force.3   
 
3.1.2 Reading Bavinck  
Reading Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics is not very difficult for someone who is 
familiar with the Reformed theological tradition. One immediately recognises 
the arrangement of the topics, and similarly Scripture occupies a very 
prominently place throughout his reasoning. Furthermore, one encounters 
distinctly Reformed emphases on grace, faith, the covenant and the like. The 
Reformed Dogmatics is a work that presents itself as standing in the tradition 
of Reformed orthodoxy. Bavinck’s use of language is also generally quite clear. 
However, there are some intricacies to his work that in fact make it very 
difficult to interpret.  
First, in the lengthy expositions we find in Bavinck, in which he outlines 
the various existing views on the subject matter in question, it is often difficult 
to discern his own voice in the discussion. The way he represents the opinions 
of others, even those with whom he obviously disagrees, always belies a deep 
sympathy which may cause the reader to wonder to what extent Bavinck 
                                                          
2 Although in the following the critique on the so-called ‘two Bavincks hypothesis’ (a 
‘modern’ versus an ‘orthodox’ one) will be supported, it is still relevant to draw 
attention to this tension in Bavinck. 
3 Cf. Bavinck, Katholiciteit.  
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actually agreed with the author under discussion. When reading Bavinck, one 
often wonders: ‘Whose voice is this?’ In Bavinck’s idiom, even the most 
obvious heresies sound tempting. He himself makes no secret of this, as he 
often confesses that ‘there lies a great and deep truth’ in this or that view – 
even if in the end it is not his own. The synthesising character of Bavinck’s 
mind makes it hard to ascertain what does and does not belong to the thread 
of his theology.   
Secondly, words that clearly belong to any interpretation of Bavinck are 
‘tension’ and ‘ambiguity’. That Bavinck’s work did not in a straightforward and 
secure manner lead the way to the Reformed future (like Kuyper’s work was 
commonly perceived to do), was already clear to his contemporaries.4 Later 
authoritative commentaries, most eminently the work of Jan Veenhof, only 
confirmed the idea of the great ‘tensions’ in Bavinck’s work, as that between 
‘the general’ and ‘the special’ when it comes to divine revelation.5 In what 
follows we will often observe how Bavinck on the face of it appears to make a 
clear-cut division, which at several other moments appears nevertheless to be 
undermined by a more ‘diffusing’ theological perspective. This habit renders 
Bavinck’s work extremely rich and interesting to interpret, but at the same 
time also very difficult.    
This study mainly relies on the revised edition of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek, which has been translated into English (so that for the sake of 
convenience, references will be given to both the Dutch and English texts). In 
                                                          
4 Cf. particularly Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck.   
5 J. Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie: De openbarings- en Schriftbeschouwing van 
Herman Bavinck in vergelijking met die der ethische theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten en 
Schipperheijn, 1968), e.g. 406-416. The always searching, tension-filled character of 
his views even gave rise to rumours that Bavinck at the end of his life moved away 
from an orthodox Reformed standpoint, particularly considering his view on 
Scripture. Hepp already denied this (albeit in a mode of averting disturbance), but did 
give an impressing picture of the matters that troubled Bavinck’s mind in his later 
years, Dr. Herman Bavinck, 319-335. These rumours, which have never really been 
substantiated, are probably mainly fed by the misguided supposition that having a 
searching, intellectual and mystically inclined mind is irreconcilable with being 
‘orthodox Reformed’. Cf. on this question G. Harinck et al. (eds.), ‘Als Bavinck nu maar 
eens kleur bekende’: Aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak-Netelenbos, het 
Schriftgezag en de situatie van de Gereformeerde Kerken (november 1919) 




this work we find a mature and extensive version of Bavinck’s relevant views. 
Although a case can be made for historical developments in his thought and 
perhaps even for discontinuities between different phases in his life, the 
present study sees Bavinck developing and growing along a for the most part 
continuous theological line. Even the so-called turn ‘away from theology’ in his 
later career, for example, is no coincidence and clearly fits his ‘catholic’ 
theological vision which was already present from the beginning.  
 
3.1.3 Theological and philosophical context  
In terms of the influences on Bavinck’s thought, it is interesting to note how 
several contrasting sources are adopted and fused together in what in him still 
sounds as a single harmonising voice. A first observation we can make is that 
Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics is not as ‘typically Reformed’ as the name 
suggests. It is consciously rooted in the catholic, that is, patristic and medieval 
theological tradition. There are quotations from many Church Fathers, 
although Augustine appears to be the voice that is most commonly present 
and decisive. There is also extensive agreement with the scholastic writings of 
Peter Lombard, Bonaventure and, most prominently, Thomas Aquinas. 
Bavinck’s broad, catholic Christian context has probably been the most 
overlooked and least valued aspect of his work, since interpreters tend to 
place him exclusively between the two poles of Reformed orthodoxy and 
Modernism. The present focus on participation, however, will rather 
emphasise his rootedness in the Christian tradition and therefore observe 
how he (often implicitly) is embedded in the Christian Platonic participatory 
tradition. 
Secondly, one finds in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics a strong emphasis on 
Reformed theology, with a clear preference for Calvin. This applies not only in 
terms of the references, but is also a matter of mindset and atmosphere. 
Bavinck’s work is never ‘pietistic’, but it still breathes the Reformed mindset 
with its sensitivity for the holiness of God and the sinfulness of the human 
race. Aside from the works of the Reformers, Bavinck builds also on the 
theological oeuvre of later Reformed orthodoxy. His Dogmatics even adopts 
most of the distinctions which evolved in Reformed theology during this 
period, such as the distinction between theologia archetypa and ektypa, as we 
will discuss it later on in this chapter. Therefore, superficially read his work 
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has the character of a typical work from Reformed orthodoxy. Nevertheless, 
the contents have a different, much more modern flavour.  
This flavour, in the third place, is due to Bavinck’s constant conversation 
with modern and Romantic philosophy and theology. As George Harinck has 
noted: ‘Kuyper and Bavinck used their modern schooling to accommodate 
Reformed theology to their age.’6 It is the atmosphere of the nineteenth 
century that one breathes in Bavinck’s work, and it witnesses a constant 
struggle to reach an understanding with the cultural climate of his days. 
Philosophically, Bavinck is often found to be in discussion with Kant and 
Hegel, but then particularly with the way their thought had been adopted in 
contemporary theology. Some currents are clearly denounced, while others 
linger in some way in his own thought. Ritschl and his anti-metaphysical 
school, for example, are quite clearly refuted by Bavinck. Although 
Schleiermacher is also heavily criticised, he still does seem to have impressed 
a more enduring stamp on Bavinck’s thought.7 In general, Bavinck is very open 
to the historicising climate of the nineteenth century, that is, the view which 
holds ideas not to have ‘fallen from the sky’, but to have evolved and 
developed through time.8  
It has already been noted that Bavinck’s work contains great and 
important tensions. To a large degree, these tensions can be summarised as a 
constant interaction between a ‘modern’ and a ‘pre-modern’ inclination. 
Bavinck on the one hand moves within the dichotomising forces of modernity, 
as is evident, for example, from his heavy reliance on the distinction between 
subject and object. On the other hand, and more importantly, he employs a 
harmonising and unifying theological vision. It has often been observed how 
important in this context the language of ‘the organic’ is for Bavinck, as it was 
                                                          
6 G. Harinck, ‘Why Was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?’ in J. Bowlin 
(ed.), The Kuyper Center Review vol 2: Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 35. Kuyper had also studied theology in Leiden, quite some years 
before Bavinck arrived there.   
7 Nowhere does this appear more emphatically than in The Philosophy of Revelation, in 
which an extreme theological and philosophical (epistemological) importance is 
attached to the notion of ‘self-consciousness’, H. Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation 
(York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), 53-82.    
8 For a broad overview of the way Bavinck and Kuyper were influenced by German 
idealistic philosophy and theology, with a focus on the transition from ‘mechanical’, 
natural scientific modes of explanation towards a historical, dynamic and therefore 
‘organic’ approach, see Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 250-268 
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also for Kuyper. James Eglinton has headed Bavinck scholarship in the right 
direction by pointing out that this is not a purely Romantic or Hegelian 
‘aberration’ from orthodox theology, but that it must be considered within the 
framework of his orthodox Trinitarian way of thinking.9 The Romantic flavour 
of Bavinck’s harmonising and unifying vision is connected with his rather ‘pre-
modern’, traditional Trinitarian view. In the course of this study it will become 
evident that there are even more traditional, catholic currents in Bavinck.  
 
 
3.2 The divine movement of knowing 
 
In order to keep as close as possible to Bavinck’s own voice, the discussion of 
his views below will follow the arrangement of topics that he himself 
approved: the order of the Reformed Dogmatics. This order is not uncontested, 
also not by Bavinck himself, but it still is a suitable way to see how his view of 
the relation between God and the world unfolds. This chapter will attempt to 
examine in particular how Bavinck’s expositions relate to the theme and 
tradition of participation, although this aspect will as such be made more 
explicit in chapter five, in the context also of the views of John Milbank. The 
following begins with Bavinck’s prolegomena. What are, according to Bavinck, 
the basic elements of theology? What makes theology what it is?  
 
3.2.1 Metaphysical necessities (1): Knowledge and truth 
According to Bavinck, Dogmatics can be defined as the ‘scientific system of the 
knowledge of God’.10 He purposely chooses for ‘knowledge of God’ as the core 
of theology, over against the majority of theologians in his time who opted for 
                                                          
9 This study therefore supports Eglinton’s criticism on the ‘two Bavincks hypothesis’. 
This is the view, most notoriously expressed by J. Veenhof, that the main tension in 
Bavinck is the one between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘modern’ Bavinck. Eglinton 
convincingly argues that there is only ‘one’, that is, a ‘trinitarian’ Bavinck. The 
Romantic metaphors do not add to an ostensibly ‘modern, unorthodox’ Bavinck, but, 
since Romanticism was itself a thorough critique on Enlightenment rationality, these 
metaphors function in a traditional theological framework that is in fact older and 
more integrating than the modern one. J.P. Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a 
New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T&T Clark, 2012). 
 
10 RD1, 38 (GD1, 13). 
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a definition centred around religious feeling, the faith of the Church or ethics 
as the core of theology. All these theologians worked more or less within the 
Kantian scheme in which knowledge was strictly separated from faith, a 
distinction that Bavinck was not prepared to admit.  
His appeal for knowledge to be understood as the keyword in theology 
goes hand in hand with a plea for metaphysics, which similarly went against 
the intuitions of many of his theological contemporaries. Theology is a science, 
says Bavinck, because it is interested not simply in describing ‘what is’, but in 
describing ‘what has to be considered as truth’. What theology aims at is ‘not 
the real, but the ideal, the logical, the necessary’.11 When theology does this, it 
‘immediately returns to God, and becomes again in the strict sense theology’, 
Bavinck writes in the first edition of his Dogmatics.12 Like any science, 
theology lives on knowledge and truth, which is given with the thoughts of 
God as he communicates them in nature and history.13 In theology, we deal 
with God himself who speaks, who communicates, who reveals his thoughts. 
The knowledge that dogmatics aims at ‘can only be a transcript of the 
knowledge God has revealed concerning himself in his Word’.14  
This does not mean, according to Bavinck, that dogmatics simply repeats 
the Bible: it is not a ‘biblical theology’ that halts at the words of Scripture, but 
‘it absorbs its content rationally in its conscience’. Dogmatics must ‘rationally 
reproduce the content of revelation that relates to the knowledge of God.’15 It 
is no coincidence then that Bavinck considers it to be the task of the 
theologian to ‘think God’s thoughts after him’.16 There is something like a 
Platonic original which has to be reflected and embodied in theology.17 The 
                                                          
11 RD1, 37 (GD1, 12). As purely idealistic as this may sound, we will nonetheless see 
that Idealism is not at all the position Bavinck assumes.  
12 This sentence can only be found in the first edition of GD1, 8. In the second and later 
editions, Bavinck says less emphatically that theology aiming at truth again ‘returns to 
the old view of theology’, RD1, 37 (GD1, 13).   
13 A more extensive interpretation of Bavinck’s view on theology dealing with 
knowledge and its relation to the other sciences can be found in W. Huttinga, ‘Marie 
Antoinette or Mystical Depth?: Herman Bavinck on Theology as Queen of the Sciences’ 
in J. Eglinton and G. Harinck (eds.), Neo-Calvinism and the French Revolution (London: 
T&T Clark, 2014, forthcoming). 
14 RD1, 42 (GD1, 18). 
15 RD1, 45 (GD1, 21). 
16 RD1, 44 (GD1, 21). 
17 As to Bavinck’s apparent love for a Christian Platonic epistemology, R. H. Bremmer 
interestingly points to the importance of the revival of Thomism in his days. Alongside 
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thinking and the knowledge involved in theology is a ‘thinking after’, it is a 
search to ‘follow’ and lacks all autonomy.18 Interestingly, in this ‘thinking 
after’, theology is not set apart from the other sciences, since all knowledge 
indeed depends on the communication of God’s thoughts: without God, there 
is no knowledge. In fact, ‘knowledge’ in Bavinck’s theology has the same sound 
as ‘salvation’. Knowledge of God is not a first step which in the second place 
brings salvation, but it is itself salvation: ‘Truth as such has value. Knowledge 
as such is a good. To know God in the face of Christ (…) not only results in 
blessedness, but is as such blessedness and eternal life.’19  
 
3.2.2 Metaphysical necessities (2): Unity 
                                                                                                                                                   
his own intensive readings of Aquinas, Bavinck was influenced deeply by Die 
Erkenntnistheorie des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, a German translation of an Italian 
book by the neo-Thomist P. M. Liberatore. In this book, Liberatore points to the 
importance of Plato and Augustine for Thomas’ conception. According to Liberatore’s 
reading, Augustine cleansed Plato’s theory of the Ideas of its mistakes and considered 
human knowing as ‘a participation of the very Ideas subsisting in the divine Spirit’. 
Although Augustine was still unclear about the way in which this participation took 
place, Thomas Aquinas provided clarity. Aside from Liberatore, Bavinck in his 
understanding of Platonic thinking relies heavily on Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit. 
Bremmer mentions Kleutgen as one of the promoters of neo-Thomism in Germany. 
Bremmer, Herman Bavinck, 328-331.  
18 To ‘think after’ is a literal translation of the Dutch word ‘nadenken’, which usually 
simply means ‘thinking’, but which is taken very literally when Bavinck uses it in 
connection with the thoughts of God. Every denken is ‘na-denken’ – every thinking is 
‘thinking after’, which emphasises thinking in the framework of a Platonic original that 
is imitated. Cf. also RD1, 521 (GD1, 488): ‘We can only reflect on that which has been 
preconceived and comes to our consciousness through the world.’ Literally, Bavinck 
states that we can only ‘think after’ what has been ‘thought before’ us, so we in fact 
‘imitate’ God’s thinking humanly. The context here is that there must be ‘being’ before 
or outside our thinking, which Bavinck emphasises against the ‘speculative method’.  
19 RD1, 53 (GD1, 31). Cf. Huttinga, ‘Marie Antoinette’. A pivotal statement from 
Scripture is for Bavinck ‘this is eternal life, that they may know you’, John 17:3. 
However, further on in his Dogmatics when he discusses ‘the seat of religion’, Bavinck 
does seem to establish a dichotomy between knowledge and salvation: ‘The aim of 
science is knowledge; in religion it is comfort, peace, salvation’, RD1, 257 (GD1, 230). 
Yet in the end, Bavinck is here in fact trying to explain that religion does not aim for 
knowledge separated from the other human faculties, namely the emotions and will. 
Accordingly, ‘knowledge’ is here discussed as a human faculty, distinguished from the 
‘knowledge of God’ which permeates the mind, heart and soul. In other words, we can 
say that Bavinck distinguishes ‘secular knowledge’ from ‘theological knowledge’, the 
latter of which he deems much more encompassing.  
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Not only should theology ‘think after’ the thoughts of God, but it should also 
trace their unity. According to Bavinck, dogmatics does not consider the 
different dogmas as isolated propositions, but should search for their unity. 
‘Actually’, says Bavinck using his beloved organic language, ‘there is only one 
dogma, one that is rooted in Scripture and that has branched out and divided 
in a wide range of particular dogmas’. Bavinck boldly states: ‘There is only one 
dogma’ – a saying that makes one curious to know what that might actually be 
called.  
The unity of theology and, in the end, of all knowledge, is found in God: 
‘For if the knowledge of God has been revealed by himself in his Word, it 
cannot contain contradictorily elements or be in conflict with what is known 
of God from nature and history. God’s thoughts cannot be opposed to one 
another and thus necessarily form an organic unity.’20 If there is to be truth, it 
has to be one and simple, in short, it has to be in God. God relates to the world 
as unity to plurality.  
However, according to Bavinck this is not a strict contrast, but a relation of 
giving and recollecting: ‘Every creature as such exists by, and hence, for God. 
Science exists also for God’s sake and finds its final goal in his glory. 
Specifically, this then is true of theology; in a special sense it is from God and 
by God, and hence for God as well.’21 This is why Bavinck claims that theology 
should not be expelled from the university, as some propose, but can instead 
be rightly called ‘the queen of sciences’. Bavinck sees a divine movement in 
things, from God to God, that is, from oneness to diversity and back to unity. 
Creation is always searching for this unity and truth, and in particular the 
human mind will not rest until it has found it. This element may appropriately 
be qualified as the metaphysical depth of Bavinck’s theology. A creature is 
only a creature because of something outside of it, because of something that 
is not the creature, but is nonetheless its sole source, ground and purpose. We 
find the creature in this movement and can only understand it in this 
movement.22  
The dynamic between unity and difference also plays an important role in 
Bavinck’s treatment of the organisation of dogmatics. Bavinck repeats that ‘the 
content of dogmatics is the knowledge of God as he has revealed it in Christ 
                                                          
20 RD1, 44 (GD1, 21). 
21 RD1, 53 (GD1, 31). 
22 Cf. again the more extensive analysis in Huttinga, ‘Marie Antoinette’.  
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though his Word’. The question for Bavinck is: Should we favour a purely 
theological approach in arranging the different topics, taking the trinity as our 
main framework, or should we take a historical approach which does justice to 
the development of revelation through history? In his own solution, Bavinck 
tries to combine these two aspects, which may be called the ‘theological and 
the historical’ aspects of theology, as well as ‘unity and plurality’ or even 
‘being and becoming’. Bavinck says that a trinitarian scheme for ordering the 
dogmatic content is quite appealing: ‘It commends itself by its purely 
theological character: God is beginning and end, alpha and omega. Nature and 
history are both subsumed under him. All things are from God and unto God. 
The Trinitarian scheme guards against a barren uniformity and guarantees 
life, development, process.’23  
However, Bavinck identifies the great danger of this approach in the 
possibility of ‘speculative misuse’, when history is sacrificed to the system and 
the development of this world is incorporated into the Trinitarian life of God. 
The problem is, in fact, that being and becoming come to be blurred. Bavinck 
refers to the works of John Scotus Erigena, Böhme, Baader, Schelling and 
Hegel to show where such an approach goes wrong.24 In general, as we will 
see more often, Bavinck is suspicious of Neoplatonic and Romantic 
conceptions of the relation between God and the world, which he calls 
‘pantheistic’. Therefore, Bavinck favours an order that he calls theological and 
‘historical-genetic’: ‘It too takes its point of departing in God and views all 
creatures only in relation to him. But proceeding from God, it descends to his 
works, in order through them again to ascend to and end in him.’25  
The main advantage of this approach, according to Bavinck, is that God is 
not pulled down into the process of history and that history itself is treated 
                                                          
23 RD1, (GD1, 89). 
24 For the same kind of criticism, see RD1, 167 (GD1, 142), where Bavinck discusses 
conceptions that give ‘becoming’ a place in God. The problem of the connection 
between God and the world ‘is solved by seeking the ground of the world in the nature 
of God and by the idea that theogony, the trinitarian process in God, is more or less 
equated with or at least paralleled by cosmogony. God himself comes to the full 
development of his being only in and through the cosmic process.’ Cf. for a discussion 
of Bavinck’s critique on Hegel: J. Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That Is the Question: 
Locating the Actualistic in Bavinck’s Ontology’, J. Bowlin (ed.) The Kuyper Center 
Review. Vol 2: Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 105-
125. 
25 RD1, 112 (GD1, 89). 
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more properly. Simply stated, God and his works are more clearly 
distinguished. However, this does not conflict with the fact that dogmatics 
‘describes for us God, always God, from beginning to end – God in his being, 
God in his creation, God against sin, God in Christ, God (…) guiding the whole 
of creation back to the objective he decreed for it: the glory of his name.’ In 
fact, theology is one great exposition on God – in everything. This 
characteristic of Bavinck’s thought will resonate throughout his entire view on 
theology and its relation to the theme of participation.  
By way of conclusion, we can remark that Bavinck already early on in his 
prolegomena gives important clues for what he deems to be important for the 
relation between God and the world. In other words, his prolegomena are in 
themselves already fully theological. He emphasizes that to think is always ‘to 
think after’, to follow the track of God in history and to stand in the movement 
‘from God to God’. There is also a great stress on unity, but not at the cost of 
the plurality and the dynamics in which this world gives itself. In the following 
these themes will be broadened and deepened by way of an examination of 
Bavinck’s theological principia.  
 
3.2.3 God’s being and our knowing 
We have already encountered a number of basic principles of Bavinck’s 
theology, but in this subsection we will see more clearly how they work. 
Bavinck assumes that ‘knowledge of God’ is the core of dogmatics. But how 
does this knowledge work? How do we acquire this knowledge, how does it 
come to us? Bavinck discusses these questions within the framework of what 
he calls the three principia of theology. The greater part of his prolegomena is 
cast in the mould of the three theological principia he distinguishes: 
principium essendi (God), principium cognoscendi externum (Christ, Scripture) 
and principium cognoscendi internum (the Holy Spirit, or ‘faith’).  
Bavinck derives the use of these principia mainly from his reading of 
different Reformed orthodox sources, although they did not attribute the same 
epistemological value to these principles as he does. As Henk van den Belt has 
argued, Bavinck ‘interprets the Reformed tradition from the perspective of 
modernity (…) to deal with the object- subject dichotomy’. Bavinck invests in a 
distinction that already lay hidden beneath the surface in the Reformed 
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tradition, but was not as evident as he claims it to have been.26 And although 
Bavinck presents the principia as a clear-cut division, there is in reality a 
considerable fluidity between them in his work, so that the division is much 
more complicated than it seems to be at first sight. This section will 
demonstrate how Bavinck, beneath the seemingly clear division of his 
principia, struggles with the dichotomies between ‘unity and plurality’ and 
‘inside and outside’.  
The principium essendi of theology is God, or, to add an important remark, 
God as he is in himself. The principium cognoscendi of theology is ‘God’s 
revelation’, so that God makes a move outside himself. In this movement, this 
making known, he is absolutely ‘free, self-conscious and true’. Although 
Bavinck stresses that this making known differs from the way one human 
being makes himself known to another, he points to what he considers an 
important analogy with man: ‘A man must reveal himself, manifest himself by 
appearance, word, and act, so that we can somewhat learn to know him.’27 
Significantly, Bavinck refers here to 1 Corinthians 2, according to which the 
spirit alone can know a person’s thoughts, just like the Spirit alone knows the 
‘deep things of God’. Bavinck uses this verse to point to the analogy between 
‘depth’ in people and the ‘depths’ in God, the indwelling thoughts that 
somehow must ‘go outside’ if we want to know anything about them. There is 
an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ with respect to God, just as there is with human 
beings.  
It is clear that Bavinck, like Reformed orthodoxy, stresses the importance 
of the distinction between God’s knowledge of himself (theologia archetypa) 
and our knowledge of God (theologia ectypa), and that in parallel to the 
distinction between the principium essendi and the principium cognoscendi.28 
We are not God and we have no direct access to the thoughts of God, so that 
we are dependent on revelation, on God granting us (limited) knowledge of 
                                                          
26 Van den Belt gives an extensive clarification of Bavinck’s use of the principia, and 
shows how Bavinck pushes them in his own direction. Van den Belt also refers to 
older clarifications of the terms in van der Walt, Heideman, Bremmer and Veenhof. H. 
van den Belt, Autopistia. The Self-Convincing Authority of Scripture in Reformed 
Theology (PhD Thesis, Leiden 2006), 257-273.  
27 RD1, 212 (GD1, 183). ‘Appearance, word and act’ will appear to be analogous with 
the three ways in revelation: theophany, prophecy and miracle.  
28 Cf. H. Bavinck, De wetenschap der h. godgeleerdheid (Kampen: Zalsman, 1883), 29; 
Van den Belt, Autopistia, 259.  
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himself. However, the means by which this knowledge comes (where Bavinck 
mentions Scripture and the Church) are no more than instrumental, and, ‘in a 
sense, incidental and provisional’. They are incidental, because they stand in 
the larger movement ‘from God, to God’: ‘The object of God’s self-revelation 
accordingly, is to introduce his knowledge into the human consciousness and 
through it again to set the stage for the glorification of God himself’.29 Or in 
even stronger terms Bavinck writes: ‘God reveals himself for his own sake’, so 
that also in the realm of the principium cognoscendi, we are dealing with the 
principium essendi all along. We ‘find’ our knowing and we ‘encounter’ our 
own being in the journey from God to God.30 The principium essendi and the 
principium cognoscendi (or: ‘God’s being’ and ‘our knowing’) are therefore not 
as strictly separated from each other as the distinction would seem to imply.31  
 
3.2.4 Outside and inside 
According to Bavinck, the final goal of God’s self-revelation is that God be 
glorified. In attaining this goal it is necessary that his revelation does not ‘end 
outside of, before, or in proximity of human beings but must reach into human 
beings themselves.’32 It cannot only be external, but must also be internal. This 
is where the distinction between the principium cognoscendi externum and 
internum comes to the fore. Bavinck draws a movement from inside of God to 
outside of God, towards human beings, but then not only outside of but also 
into human beings. If the movement were to stay outside of human beings, it 
would not be finished and would not reach its final goal, the glorification of 
God. Here we see basically the same idea we encountered in the former 
                                                          
29 RD1, 213 (GD1, 184).  
30 RD1, 346 (GD1, 318), discussing ‘special revelation’: ‘The final goal again is God 
himself, for he can never come to an end in creation but can only rest in himself. God 
reveals himself for his own sake: to delight in the glorification of his own attributes. 
But on the journey toward this final end we do after all encounter the creature, 
particularly the human being, who serves as instrument to bring to manifestation the 
glory of God’s name before the eyes of God.’  
31 This ‘spirit of Bavinck’ which always seeks to harmonise what it first separates is 
clearly felt and rejected by S.P. van der Walt in Die Wijsbegeerte van Herman Bavinck 
(Potchefstroom: Pro Rege Pers Beperk, 1953), 152-173. Van der Walt would have 
preferred a ‘strictly philosophical’ approach in Bavinck’s epistemology (by which he 
means a ‘Calvinist philosophical approach’), cleansed from theological motifs, which 
have their place ‘in their own sphere’. His criticism, therefore, has a strong 
‘Dooyeweerdian’ sound to it in the notion of ‘sphere sovereignty’.  
32 RD1, 213 (GD1, 184).  
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section: the thoughts of God have to enter history and humanity in order to 
permeate everything and bring it back to its glorifying goal.33  
Although three principia can be distinguished, they are, however, 
‘essentially one’, ‘rooted in the Trinitarian being of God. It is the Father, who, 
through the Son as Logos, imparts himself to his creatures in the Spirit’.34 The 
three principia are intimately linked with the Trinity, and can therefore be 
called ‘triune principia’. This means that Bavinck associates the internal self-
knowledge of God with the Father, the outward movement of revelation as an 
‘objective reality’ with the Son (or ‘the Word’) and the internalisation of this 
movement with the Holy Spirit.  
There is in Bavinck’s thought a great emphasis on the distinction as well as 
the relation between the objective and the subjective: ‘Science always consists 
in a logical relation between subject and object’.35 This is true for theology as 
well, and in fact Bavinck sees this relation as a theological truth – thereby 
reminding us that theology is for Bavinck the queen of the sciences. In 
choosing an epistemological position, Bavinck rejects rationalism (or 
idealism) and empiricism (or materialism) and favours realism.  
Interestingly, what Bavinck finds decisive is that realism most closely fits 
‘ordinary daily experience’, while rationalism subjects the objective world to 
the human mind and empiricism subjects human consciousness to the world 
outside. Bavinck takes his standpoint in ‘common sense’, and is eager not to let 
abstract philosophy rule over everyday life. In this context he quotes Aristotle: 
primum vivere, deinde philosophari. The human intellect is not able to produce 
the knowledge of things, says Bavinck: ‘The primary impetus therefore comes 
                                                          
33 This stress on the internal side of the knowledge of God is highly reminiscent of 
what C. van der Kooi points out in the work of John Calvin. In Calvin’s work, the self is 
still ‘porous’ in a premodern sense (to use a term from Charles Taylor) and revelation 
is therefore comparable to drops of water which cannot stay at the surface but have to 
penetrate the surface in order to bring fertility. Knowledge has to be ‘useful’ and must 
lead to adoration and an intimate relation with God and is therefore not meant for 
‘speculation’, in order to satisfy our curiosity. C. van der Kooi, Als in een Spiegel: God 
kennen volgens Calvijn en Barth (Kampen: Kok, 2002), 64-75, 113-117. 
34 RD1, 214 (GD1, 186). 
35 RD1, 214 (GD1, 186). The importance of stating the difference, but searching for the 
integration of subject and object, cannot be overemphasised in Bavinck. As will be 
observed further below, the difference is far more encompassing than merely a 
‘scientific principle’. For example, with Herbert Spencer, Bavinck holds also life itself 




from the sensible world. (…) But the moment the intellect is activated, it 
immediately and spontaneously works in its own way and according to its 
own nature.’36 Bavinck therefore accords ‘realism’ to the outside as well as the 
inside, without intending to subdue either one of them. As we will see at 
greater length below, the ultimate reason for this is the Logos which is at work 
in both of them.  
It is important for Bavinck not to ‘force things’, which he does consider to 
be happening in both rationalism and empiricism. There is in his thought a 
spirit of ‘fittingness’ which is altogether theologically motivated. Time and 
again Bavinck writes that subject and object, inside and outside, ‘organically 
correspond’. Discussing the relation between language, concepts and 
(objective) reality he writes: ‘It seems strange, even amazing’ that with our 
representations which we convert into concepts, which in turn are processed 
again along the laws of thought, we obtain results ‘that correspond to reality’. 
In entertaining concepts ‘we are not distancing ourselves from reality, but we 
increasingly approximate it.’ This conviction can, according to Bavinck, ‘rest 
only in the belief that it is the same Logos who created both the reality outside 
of us and the laws of thought within us and who produced an organic 
connection and correspondence between the two.’37 Bavinck thus uses the full 
implication of the term Logos, which means both ‘word’ and ‘thought’; it is the 
Word of God in creation, and it is ‘rationality’ in the order of things and in 
creatures. Bavinck is then quick to add that this correspondence is not 
identification: ‘the being of things as such, their existence, remains outside of 
us’, they ‘never enter into us’. However, referring to Thomas Aquinas Bavinck 
says that we see not by being in the sun, but by the light of the sun that shines 
                                                          
36 RD1, 225 (GD1, 198). 
37 RD1, 231 (GD1, 205). Cf. Bavinck’s extensive discussion of the relation between 
being and knowing in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing 17-18: ‘The organs of our 
perception are, because of a common origin, related to the elements of which the 
whole universe is constructed (…). In any of these (senses, wh) lives a specific energy, 
but an energy that corresponds with the different workings that radiate from the 
objective world to the senses.’ Particularly in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, Bavinck 
adopts an interesting discourse on ‘energies’ to speak of the relation between the 
divine and the created. Although the Logos is not yet explicitly mentioned in this 
context, it is the fundamental supposition also of this discourse, as becomes apparent 
later on: ‘The doctrine of the creation of all things by the Word of God is the 
explanation of all knowing (‘kennen en weten’), the supposition of the correspondence 
between subject and object’, 23.   
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upon us: ‘Reason in us is that divine light; it is not itself the divine logos, but it 
participates in it.’38 There is correspondence, but not identity, there is 
communication, but not emanation. Being and thinking correspond, but are 
not identical.39  
In sum, although Bavinck works within the framework of three distinct 
principia, he is also aware that they are in fact blurred. In the first place, the 
main distinction between the principium essendi and the principium 
cognoscendi is not as strict as it seems, since it is in fact ‘God’s being all along’, 
even in our knowledge of God. Our cognoscere is not equated with God’s esse, 
but it does participate in it, so that every movement in the realm of the 
knowing of God still depends on God’s very being.  
In the second place, although the Word is primarily associated with the 
externum and the Spirit with the internum, it is for Bavinck nonetheless the 
Logos that relates inside and outside. He associates the Logos not only with 
‘reality outside’, but also with ‘the laws of thought within us’, with ‘beauty in 
nature’ on the one hand, but also with the ‘response in the human sense of 
beauty’ on the other, so that the Logos seems to have an external as well as an 
internal side to it. According to Bavinck, ‘genuine religion can exist only in the 
complete harmony of the internal with the external revelation’.40 Thus, 
although the distinction between the three principia is simply assumed and 






Even though the foregoing had the character of ‘prolegomena’, for Bavinck 
there is in fact no single moment when we are ‘outside’ of the relation 
between God and the world. This is only reinforced when he moves the 
discussion on to revelation. In Reformed theology, the notion of revelation is a 
                                                          
38 RD1, 232 (GD1, 206).  
39 This is again also the point of Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 11-30.  
40 RD1, 279 (GD1, 253). The word ‘correspondence’, which is used in the English 
translation of the Dogmatics, is here replaced by ‘harmony’ for the simple reason that 
the latter more clearly reflects the Dutch word ‘harmonie’. There are, however, 
various places where Bavinck does use ‘correspondence’ or ‘correlation’ to express his 
view.   
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very important issue. ‘Revelation and Scripture’ is the usual couple that can be 
found at the beginning of an exposition of dogmatic content, and has often 
functioned as an epistemic foundation for that which follows. This is also the 
case in Bavinck’s Dogmatics. But the discourse of revelation renders for 
Bavinck far more than ‘the source of reliable information’ for the divine. The 
different conceptions and vocabularies Bavinck uses in reference to revelation 
develop into something theologically more encompassing than that. 
‘Revelation’ in fact becomes a name that denotes the all-embracing movement 
from God to God, as described earlier on in this chapter. Bavinck’s discourse 
on revelation opens up the theme that will be pivotal in this study, namely 
God’s communicability. This study is hardly the first to see the intricacies 
involved in Bavinck’s understanding of revelation. Jan Veenhof in particular 
devoted a lengthy study to this subtle topic in Bavinck.41  
 
3.3.1 What is revelation?  
‘If we are to know something about God, he must come forward out of his 
hiddenness, in some way make himself perceivable, and hence reveal 
himself.’42 This depiction of the state of affairs marks Bavinck’s conception of 
revelation. There is ‘hiddenness’ to God from our perspective, analogous to the 
unknown ‘hidden inside’ of another person, which has to be overcome if we 
want to know the other. In his conception of revelation, Bavinck is keen to 
avoid a collision between God and the world. God is the transcendent other, 
‘distinct from and elevated above the world’, but nevertheless also descending 
into the world and having communion with it. If there is to be union, there has 
to be distinction. Moreover, revelation is a ‘conscious, voluntary, intentional 
disclosure of God to human beings’.43 The divine power is not impersonal, but 
has consciousness and will, so that it can ‘intend’ things. Bavinck strictly 
distinguishes his view on revelation from any notion of ‘emanation’, which 
would involve an ‘involuntary translucency of God in his works’. Revelation is 
an act, which involves consciousness, freedom and will on God’s side.  
Bavinck sets apart his position especially vis-à-vis Romantic thinkers for 
whom revelation is simply everything or is identified with the whole of nature. 
For example, ‘according to Schelling in his first period, the entire world was 
                                                          
41 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie. 
42 RD1, 285-286 (GD1, 257). 
43 RD1, 286 (GD1, 257). 
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the self-revelation of God’, Bavinck critically writes.44 Similarly, Hegel taught 
that ‘God does not reveal himself to human beings by a passing event in time 
but in human beings themselves and achieves consciousness in them.’ Thus, if 
we allow ourselves the liberty of placing the opposing views in Bavinck’s 
mouth, we learn that revelation for him has the character of ‘a passing event in 
time’ and is primarily something that comes from the outside: it comes to us 
and not from within us. Moreover, God does not become himself in the process 
of revelation. God does not ‘become’ in any way at all. Although Bavinck 
greatly appreciated the historical mindset of the nineteenth century, he 
wanted to hold on to the distinction according to which becoming is 
something of this world, whereas being belongs primarily to God.45  
Bavinck is concerned that in this conception ‘the distinction between 
natural and supernatural revelation completely vanishes’,46 although he at the 
same time does not advocate a separation between the two. It is by no means 
the intention to seek a ‘harmonic unity’ that separates Bavinck from these 
thinkers, since we have already seen that this was an intention he harboured 
as well. What Bavinck fears in this current of thought is the danger of 
naturalism or monism, as he ultimately sees it coming to expression in 
reductionist materialists like Ernst Haeckel. Interestingly, pantheistic 
conceptions in which God and nature are more or less identified seem to 
collapse into atheistic worldviews: what makes them similar is their insistence 
on the unity of God and the world, without any notion of difference. There is 
only room for one ‘natural’ cause – regardless of whether or not this naturality 
has a supernatural tinge to it.47  
Yet how does Bavinck envision the relation between natural and 
supernatural? It is clear that he in principle assumes a strong 
supernaturalistic view on revelation: to believe in God who reveals himself is 
to believe literally in an order above the natural order. In other words, 
Bavinck’s insistence on the supernatural is analogous to his plea for 
                                                          
44 RD1, 292 (GD1, 264). 
45 Cf. J. Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That Is the Question: Locating the Actualistic in 
Bavinck’s Ontology’, J. Bowlin (ed.) The Kuyper Center Review. Vol 2: Revelation and 
Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 109-121. 
46 RD1, 293 (GD1, 265).  
47 In Bavinck’s work, this position is particularly challenged in his Stone Lectures as 




metaphysics in theology.48 However, it is also clear that Bavinck does not in 
any way imply a dualistic view on the world that distinguishes between the 
natural and the supernatural as if they represent two different realms. 
Although he does use the distinction between natural and supernatural, 
Bavinck is not at all content with it, especially since it so easily becomes a 
dualistic system in which faith and reason, the spiritual and the secular, the 
heavenly and the earthly, are completely separated from each other. 
Revelation, according to Bavinck, simply is ‘supernatural’, and creation is the 
first revelation of God. Hence, ‘all that is and happens is, in a real sense, a work 
of God.’ Furthermore, ‘the supernatural is not at odds with human nature, nor 
with the nature of creatures; it belongs, so to speak, to humanity’s essence.’49 
Bavinck’s tendency to demonstrate that the supernatural is the giving source 
of anything we call natural seems to deconstruct the notion of the ‘natural’; for 
if the supernatural is in fact the ‘nature’ of human beings, then what do we still 
mean by ‘nature’?  
However, to complicate things even further, in a paragraph dedicated to 
the subject of ‘revelation and nature’ which Bavinck included in the second 
edition of his Dogmatics, he appeals for a clear definition of the terms ‘natural’ 
and ‘supernatural’. He adopts a definition of nature from a philosophical 
dictionary, claiming that nature ‘generally denotes that which develops apart 
from any alien power or influence, solely in terms of its own internal forces 
and laws.’ Supernatural then is said to be ‘all that surpasses created things and 
does not have its cause in creatures but in the omnipotence of God’.50 It is, 
however, again not Bavinck’s intention to posit two separate realms in reality. 
In order to discard such a standpoint, Bavinck refers to the omnipresence of 
God, also in things that are called ‘natural’. He goes as far as to state that ‘all 
things reveal God to us’, since ‘everything is his deed. (…) He is present with 
his being in all things’ – statements which raise the question as to what was in 
fact so wrong about the aforementioned quote from Schelling.51 However, at 
                                                          
48 Quite explicitly and existentially Bavinck expresses this idea in RD1, 376 (GD1, 
346): ‘If there is no beyond, no God who is above nature, no supernatural order, then 
sin, darkness, and death have the last word. The revelation of Scripture makes known 
to us another world, a world of holiness and glory.’ 
49 RD1, 308 (GD1, 279).  
50 RD1, 356 (GD1, 325).  
51 Cf. Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap (Kampen: Kok, 1904) 80-84. For Bavinck’s 
broad view on revelation, cf. also Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie, 319.  
95 
 
this point Bavinck again quickly denounces any view that confuses the natural 
with the supernatural or claims that ‘revelation, inspiration, and miracle 
belong to the original capacity of human nature’. Instead, he asserts that the 
supernatural ‘from the beginning has been included by God in nature in the 
broader sense, i.e., in the divinely determined destiny of things, in the divine 
world plan.’ Only in this sense can Bavinck safely state that ‘miracles most 
certainly belong to nature’: They are ‘incorporated in the world-idea itself and 
serve the completion and perfecting of a fallen world’.52 
Bavinck wants to adhere to the distinction between supernatural and 
natural, albeit primarily with an apologetic goal: he does not want to leave the 
term nature to the ‘monists’ so as to misuse it as a purely immanent term, nor 
is he willing to allow a ‘Romantic’ confusion of nature and the supernatural, 
which then is given the name ‘geistleiblich’ or ‘divine-human’.53 Meanwhile, his 
readers are constantly pulled back and forth between the monistic pantheism 
and the dualistic deism he wants to avoid, without ever reaching a satisfying 
conceptual articulation of Bavinck’s own stance. Any time Bavinck in his work 
emphatically argues for a deep connection between the ‘general’ and the 
‘special’, he on the next page always realises that he must now emphasise that 
they are not, however, identical.  
Nowhere is this tension in Bavinck described better and more extensively 
than in Veenhof’s seminal work Revelatie en inspiratie. He correctly extends 
the tension in Bavinck between general and special revelation to a tension that 
also exists between creation and recreation (or creation and revelation, and 
even creation and incarnation), nature and grace, deism and pantheism.54 
Bavinck was so eager not to separate the created world from God’s salvific act 
in Jesus Christ that he frequently speaks in a mode that diffuses what is often 
called ‘nature’ and ‘grace’. While Veenhof is clearly disturbed about this 
tendency in Bavinck, in chapter 5 below we will consider whether this is really 
a disappointing element in Bavinck’s thought or rather actually one of its more 
                                                          
52 RD1, 373 (GD1, 344). Bavinck’s term ‘wereld-idee’ is here translated more literally 
as ‘world-idea’ instead of ‘design of the world’ which is used in RD1, because of the 
important and intended link with the Platonic ‘ideas’.    
53 Cf. the correct observation in Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 278: ‘When he uses 
the expression in question (supranatural, wh), he almost always means to oppose 
naturalism.’  
54 For Veenhof’s broad description of Bavinck’s view on revelation, see Revelatie en 
inspiratie, 250-415.  
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redeeming moments. In the end, Bavinck as always tries to harmonise the 
fronts he is battling against when he states that revelation ‘is a world by itself, 
distinct from nature, to be sure, but still made for it, akin to it, and intended 
for it.’ As with the relation between subject and object, it is once more 
‘correspondence’ all over again.  
 
3.3.2 General and special revelation 
Although Bavinck uses the traditional terms natural and supernatural, when it 
comes to revelation he prefers to work with another set of terms, namely 
general and special revelation, which has the more biblical sound of ‘the 
history of salvation’. The fact that Bavinck uses both the couplet natural-
supernatural as well as the couplet general-special is related to a double 
conceptuality which is closely related to his conception of the relation 
between God and the world in general. On the one hand, Bavinck works within 
an ontological discourse in the sphere of classical metaphysics, but on the 
other he is influenced by a more biblically oriented discourse of ‘salvation 
history’. The presence of this double discourse will be treated more 
thoroughly later on in this chapter. As is typical for Bavinck, these two 
discourses simply stand alongside each other, and it would be hard – if not 
impossible – to decide which one is decisive. One thing is sure, however. This 
parallel discourse does not make it any easier to come to a clear interpretation 
of Bavinck’s view on revelation,  as the following will testify.  
General revelation, according to Bavinck, refers to God’s ‘broad’ revelation 
in nature, whereas special revelation focuses on the narrower circles of Israel, 
Scripture and Jesus. This distinction is not analogous with the distinction 
between natural and supernatural: we already saw that God’s creation is 
ultimately his broad revelation and is as ‘supernatural’ as it is ‘general’. 
Likewise, we can point to Jesus’ life and conclude that it is full of ‘natural’ 
events which, nonetheless, belong to the ‘special revelation’ which forms his 
complete existence. The reason why Bavinck prefers this distinction is that it 
better safeguards revelation as a single work of God, therefore free of the 
‘Roman, dualistic’ separation between natural and supernatural.  
Nevertheless, in the aforementioned addition on ‘revelation and nature’ 
that we find in the second edition of his Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck 
confusingly does equate supernatural revelation with special revelation. The 
entire theme of this later paragraph is framed within the contrast between the 
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natural and supernatural again, whereas in the first edition of Bavinck’s work 
it had already been decided that ‘general’ and ‘special’ ought to replace 
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’. This later addition raises the question whether 
the distinction between natural and supernatural, rather than the distinction 
between general and special revelation, does not in fact constitute the central 
tension in Bavinck’s thought.  
As such, the relation between general and special is basically equivalent to 
the distinction between ‘less’ and ‘more’, or between ‘vaguer’ and ‘clearer’. For 
example, in general revelation it is God’s deity that comes to the fore, whereas 
in special revelation ‘it is the Triune God who ever clearly makes himself 
known in his personal distinctions’.55 In other words, through general 
revelation we can know that there is a God, and through special revelation we 
learn what this God is like. Again, nature and the supernatural are not 
contrasted with each other, since special revelation does not pull you out of 
nature and history, but makes you ‘see the revelation of God in nature much 
better and much more clearly than before’. Referring to Calvin, Bavinck speaks 
of the spectacles of Scripture, which alone allow us to ‘see God in everything 
and everything in God’. Therefore, Christians are fully ‘at home in the world’.56 
Christians, according to Bavinck, do not have a monopoly on the supernatural. 
God communicates himself to all in creation: ‘theophany, mantic and magic are 
the ways by which all revelation comes to human beings.’57 Special revelation 
does not overthrow this threefold order of revelation, but it builds on it and 
intensifies it.58 The special revelation familiar to the Christian does not stand 
over against general revelation, but it is ‘paganism’s fulfillment’ and the 
kingdom of heaven is deeply connected with the realm of nature. Time and 
again, Bavinck uses a vocabulary of ‘ground’, ‘beginning’ and ‘foundation’ 
when he discusses the realm of general revelation, and expressions like 
‘building on’ and ‘linking up with’ when he discusses its relation with special 
revelation. Special revelation is according to Bavinck more than creation, but it 
                                                          
55 RD1, 342 (GD1, 314). 
56 RD1, 321 (GD1, 293). 
57 RD1, 326 (GD1, 297). 
58 Bavinck’s stance is rather ambiguous, since he states on the one hand that ‘the 
divine descends so deeply into the human that the boundaries between special 
revelation and analogous phenomena are sometimes hard to draw’, RD1 343 (GD1, 
315), but on the other hand criticises those who ‘erase the boundaries between 
prophecy and divination, miracle and magic, inspiration and illumination’. 
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is not of a different kind, since it is the same God who reveals himself in 
creation and does not stop revealing himself.  
In sum, we can say that with general revelation Bavinck simply means 
‘creation’, which is as theological or ‘supernatural’ as it is general and ‘natural’, 
while special revelation usually simply denotes ‘revelation’. However, 
although Bavinck insists on the distinction between the two, his most 
important theological motive is their inherent unity: ‘General revelation 
maintains the unity of nature and grace, of the world and the kingdom of God, 
of the natural order and the moral order, of creation and re-creation (…), and 
in all these things the unity of the divine being.’59 It is one and the same God 
who communicates himself and, therefore, ‘general and special revelation 
interact with each other’.  
 
3.3.3 ‘The ongoing rapport between heaven and earth’ 
‘Revelation in Christianity is a history’, Bavinck writes when he moves from 
revelation to Scripture. Thus this act of God has a very transitory character. 
Still, it contains the ‘eternal thoughts’ of God for which the theologian must 
search, since eventually the goal of theology is, as we saw, to ‘think after God’. 
When he discusses the relation between revelation and Scripture, Bavinck 
once more offers us an interesting glimpse of his ontology and epistemology. 
First, there is ‘thought’. But for thought to be revealed, there has to be ‘word’. 
And for ‘word’ to be stable, there has to be ‘writing’. This is the route which 
the ‘inscripturation of the Word’ follows and in which, according to Bavinck, 
an ontological loss is inevitable: ‘Thought is richer than speech, and speech is 
richer than writing.’60  
It is clear then that Scripture is but a servant to revelation, and that it has a 
momentary, instrumental value. Bavinck links this theme immediately to the 
incarnation: just like the word became flesh, so it also became writing. And 
just like Christ is not the goal of revelation, so Scripture is not its goal either: 
‘The purpose of revelation is not Christ; Christ is the centre and the means; the 
purpose is that God will again dwell in his creatures and reveal his glory in the 
cosmos. (…) And to achieve this purpose the word of revelation passes into 
Scripture.’ We see then again the same movement we saw in 3.2 above: Just 
like our knowledge (of God and everything else), we ‘find’ Christ and Scripture 
                                                          
59 RD1, 322 (GD1, 294). 
60 RD1, 378 (GD1, 349).  
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on the way from God, to God. Not the things we encounter on this way – 
although they may be indispensable – but the movement itself is all-important.  
The process of inscripturation not only produces ontological loss, but 
there is also gain: it is necessary that this movement of revelation be allowed 
to do its work thoroughly. We already saw that revelation has an ‘outer’ side, 
but also needs an ‘inner’ side, since it has to enter into human beings, into 
nature, and into history to really complete the glorifying movement. In the 
same way, revelation has to become Scripture so that it can ‘enter the life of 
humankind’ and fully become its possession. Bavinck clearly associates 
Scripture with the objective and ‘finished’ part of revelation, leaving the 
effectuation and continuation of this work to the Spirit.  
This is not, however, the full picture, and once again an overly strict object-
subject scheme comes under tension. Bavinck makes the interesting remark 
about Scripture that ‘those who do not participate in its life cannot understand 
its meaning and point of view’. One has to ‘live in Scripture’ to understand it, 
and apart from the Church ‘Scripture is an enigma and an offense’.61 With this 
we once again see an important moment of necessary ‘inwardness’, even 
within the realm of the principium externum. Scripture is not a purely outward 
phenomenon, but one must live in it.62 Bavinck even calls Scripture ‘the 
eternally ongoing speech of God to us’, so that it is not just a book from the 
past, but it ‘binds us to the living Lord in the heavens.’63 According to Bavinck, 
Scripture seems to have ‘sacramental’ value: it is ‘the ongoing rapport 
between heaven and earth, between Christ and his Church’.64  
 
 
                                                          
61 RD1, 384 (GD1, 356). 
62 Further on, after he has articulated something from his very personal existential 
struggle with the acceptance of the authority of Scripture, Bavinck says that ‘those 
who do not want to eat before they understand the entire process by which food 
arrives at their table will starve to death. And those who do not want to believe the 
Word of God before they see all problems resolved will die of spiritual starvation’, RD1 
442 (GD1, 413). You have to be ‘in the process’ while grappling to understand it.  
63 Bavinck goes on to say: ‘It does not even have the intent to furnish us a historical 
story by the standard of reliability demanded in other realms of knowledge. Holy 
Scripture is a tendenz-book’. RD1, 384 (GD1, 356). And further on he remarks in the 
same vein: ‘The historical books are (…) not history in our sense of the word but 
prophecy’ RD1, 393 (GD1, 362).   
64 RD1, 385 (GD1, 357).  
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3.3.4 Scripture and God’s communicability 
Scripture thus stands in the larger movement of revelation as Bavinck 
discerns it. It is not a book that came falling down from heaven and has to be 
adopted as something alien to us, but again, in its ‘special’ revelatory character 
it is deeply connected with the ‘general’. Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture is 
thoroughly taken up within the Trinitarian movement of revelation, in the first 
place with the Logos: ‘All the revelations and words of God, both in the Old and 
the New Testament, have their ground, unity, and centre in him. (…) The word 
of God in nature, in Israel, in the NT, in Scripture may never even for a 
moment be separated and abstracted from him’.65 Scripture is in the second 
place associated with the Spirit: ‘the Spirit of God is immanent in everything 
that has been created. The immanence of God is the basis of all inspiration, 
including divine inspiration. Existence and life is conferred upon every 
creature from moment to moment by the inspiration of the Spirit.’66 Scripture 
is like a river that flows in the riverbed of God’s constant speaking of the 
world (Logos) and God’s constant breathing which gives things life and being 
(Spirit).  
The roles of the Son and the Spirit are not, however, the same. Bavinck 
associates the Son mainly with ‘revelation’ and the Spirit with ‘inspiration’, 
where the latter takes its place in a narrower circle. The resulting image 
begins to look as follows: the broadest circle of revelation is general 
revelation, which is narrowed down in special revelation (the Son) and 
narrowed down even further in inspiration (the Spirit). However, it is not 
Bavinck’s intention to give the Son an elite status and to make the Spirit even 
something for the upper class alone, since this would obviously clash with his 
intention to show the correspondence between the ‘general’ and ‘special’. 
Bavinck is simply concerned not to give any room for someone to evade the 
authority of Scripture due to the broadness of revelation outside of Scripture. 
Bavinck tries to safeguard the fact that ‘for the church of all ages, Scripture is 
the revelation, i.e., the only instrument by which the revelation of God in Christ 
can be known.’ He is anxious not to allow his broad framework of revelation to 
become an excuse to leave Scripture behind.  
Yet it is more than fear that prompts Bavinck to cling to Scripture. Those 
who deny that God speaks uniquely through Scripture in principle deny ‘that 
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God revealed himself to human beings by speaking, by thoughts, and by 
words. All of revelation in Scripture is one continuous proof, however, that 
God not only speaks to human beings metaphorically, by nature and history, 
facts and events, but also repeatedly comes down to them to convey his 
thoughts in human words and language.’ To adhere closely to Scripture is to 
adhere to the claim that God speaks and that it is in fact quite normal for him 
to do so and for us to receive his speech: it is not ‘unnatural for human beings 
to receive a word from God that they have to accept and obey in childlike 
faith’.67 They who disdain the divine character of Scripture deny the 
communicability of God and in fact deny the ‘naturality of the supernatural’.   
This idea of fittingness is also present in Bavinck’s much debated account 
of ‘organic inspiration’. Despite the fact that Bavinck devotes several pages to 
demonstrating that we have to battle against the hostility of our sinful hearts 
to accept the authority of Scripture, he also asserts, in quite another vein: ‘God 
never coerces anyone’.68 In becoming human as well as in inspiring Scripture, 
God does not ‘take human beings by surprise’. So ‘the Logos became flesh’ runs 
parallel to ‘the word became Scripture’, and both of these motifs are in line 
with all of God’s activity in the world.  
Bavinck must admit that Scripture invokes a rule of heteronomy in 
revelation. We have to humble ourselves if we want to accept its divine 
character. Bavinck connects this with the present, sinful state in which we find 
ourselves. This is not, however, our goal: ‘the duality of grace and nature, 
revelation and reason, authority and freedom, theology and philosophy, 
cannot last forever.’ Our goal is to serve God ‘in accordance with our natural 
inclination’. We must not, however, try to anticipate that ideal in this life, 
because it belongs to the future alone. They who do so ‘indicate a very 
dangerous line of thought. They all proceed from a confusion between the 
present dispensation and that of the hereafter.’69 In other words, a total 
naturality of the supernatural is something eschatological, when God will be 
‘all in all’. Now we walk by faith, not by sight, and there is a great need for 
authority. The need for this authority is, however, only felt when Scripture 
plays its role in the economy of the externum, the objective side of revelation, 
and when Bavinck plays this card without the usual ambiguity. He sounds 
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almost relieved when he ends his exposition on Scripture with the remark that 
Scripture is ‘only a means, not the goal’. 
 
3.3.5 God is only known by God 
Bavinck happily continues with the internal side of revelation: ‘when the 
economy of the Son, of objective revelation, is completed, that of the Spirit 
begins.’70 It should no longer come as a surprise, however, that this distinction 
is far from clear. If the principium externum has a significant element of 
inwardness, will the internum not also have an element of externality?  
There is indeed a factor in Bavinck’s work that deconstructs an all too 
obvious movement from ‘inside God’ to ‘outside of God’ and again to the 
‘inside of human beings’. This is the factor of God’s presence in all things, 
which we already mentioned above. If we know God, this knowing is not 
something ‘of our own’, but it is God knowing himself through our knowledge, 
since ‘God can be known only by God’. And so, when we enter the realm of the 
Spirit, which according to Bavinck is the realm of the internum and of the 
subject, we do not enter a godless playground of subjectivity: ‘The revelation 
of God in Christ does not ask for the support or approval of human beings. It 
posits and maintains itself in sublime majesty. (…) It itself conquers human 
hearts and makes itself irresistible.’ The gift of the Spirit is thus ‘revelation 
realising itself’, or God completing the movement of revelation in 
glorification.71 
‘Only the regenerate see the kingdom of God’, Bavinck writes at the outset 
of his exposition on faith.72 He articulates this insight not only in the 
                                                          
70 RD1, 505 (GD1, 471). 
71 This same theological movement underlies Bavinck’s famous reference to the 
phrase Deus dixit as the ground of all theology. It is of course far from obvious what 
Deus dixit as theological principle exactly implies. For Bavinck the Deus dixit-principle 
does not primarily have the authoritarian force of ‘God has spoken, and now you shall 
obey, whether you want to or not’, but rather moves us into the orbit of God’s 
speaking and being. Bavinck writes: ‘To the question: “Why do you believe?” 
Christians reply, “Because God has spoken, Deus dixit. They cannot indicate another, 
deeper ground. If you then ask them: “But why do you believe that God has spoken, 
say, in Scripture?” they can only answer that God so transformed them internally that 
they recognise Scripture as the word of God. But having said that, they said it all’, RD1, 
582 (GD1, 551). Believing is in this way interpreting yourself as standing in the flow of 
God’s speech, and there is nothing ‘behind’ that speech that you can refer to.   
72 RD1, 564 (GD1, 532). 
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paragraphs on the principium internum, when he moves consciously within 
the realm of faith, but also throughout his entire prolegomena. For example, 
when writing about science, Bavinck states that the true scientist should be a 
‘man of God’, meaning that he must be ‘as much as possible a normal human 
being’ and ‘that he not bring false presuppositions into his work’.73 Time and 
again, Bavinck interrupts his expositions on knowledge, truth, and their 
relationship with the principia of theology by playing the card of the ‘virtuous 
person’.74 ‘Only those who are born of water and Spirit can see the kingdom of 
God’, Bavinck writes, taking up John 3:5 in a passage where he contends that 
the theologian must assume a position within Christianity from the very outset 
if he wants to know its principles. To know goodness, you have to be good, to 
know truth, you have to be truthful – and consequently for Bavinck to be a 
theologian, you have to be ‘godly’. Again, this is a way of ‘internalising the 
external’, since what you are looking for externally already has to be inside of 
you, for otherwise you would never be able to recognise it at all. It is not 
Bavinck’s intention to install a principle of exclusivity here, as if ‘theology is 
for the re-born Christians only.’ Bavinck simply maintains a theocentric view 
in which ‘only God can know God’ is the leading principle, such that, if we want 
to know God, it has to be ‘God in us’ who enables us to do so.75  
According to Bavinck, the internal side of revelation (which bears the 
name of ‘faith’) is not there to cherish its insideness. It can only be understood 
in relation, or, to use Bavinck’s favoured word, in ‘correspondence’ with the 
external, objective world. Similarly, when he treated the principium externum 
and even earlier, that internal side of revelation had already been there. When 
Bavinck discusses the correspondence between subject and object through the 
Logos, he quotes Goethe, saying: ‘Wär nicht das Auge Sonnenhaft, wie könnten 
wir das Licht erblicken?’76 It follows that Bavinck does not intend to discuss 
                                                          
73 RD1, 43 (GD1, 19).  
74 The same tendency in Bavinck – although not in terms of the ‘virtuous person’ – is 
discussed in Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 391-399. Veenhof does not share what he 
calls Bavinck’s ‘optimism’ about the human possibility to be attuned to the divine. 
75 See e.g. RD1, 587 (GD1, 557), with reference to John 8:47: ‘Who is from God (ek tou 
theou) hears the words of God’. Bavinck writes there: ‘No one can speak about God 
except those who speak out of Him and through Him’ (I changed the translation ‘from 
Him’ to ‘out of Him’, in order to reflect more accurately the way Bavinck echoes this 
verse).  
76 RD1, 233 (GD1, 207).   
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‘the eye’ without ‘the light’, that is, he does not want to discuss the internum 
separate from the externum.  
Faith is not something for the elite alone: It is ‘not a new organ implanted 
in human beings, not a sixth sense, or a ‘superadded gift’. However much it 
disagrees with the ‘natural’ human, it is nevertheless completely natural, 
normal, and human.’77 Faith is not something that is available for analysis 
from all possible sides, since it exists in receiving, and the receiver is not 
something that exists without the received. Human beings ‘are related to the 
whole world. Physically, vegetatively, sensorily, intellectually, ethically, and 
religiously there is correspondence between them and the world; they are 
microcosmos’, they were made suited to this world, and the world to them. We 
constantly strive outwards to the world with which we are connected. We live 
from the truth which always comes from the outside and which we ‘grasp and 
absorb’.  
When this happens, when subject and object fully correspond, we in fact 
experience the ‘normal situation’, which Bavinck describes as ‘rest, joy, 
blessedness’. He continues in an altogether mystical vein: ‘In such situations 
the distance between us and the truth has vanished. The truth has found us, 
and we have found it. There is immediate contact.’78 Interestingly, Bavinck 
does not give the impression that he is speaking here about an eschatological 
reality, or at least he does not give the impression of describing a situation in 
which we do not already share to some extent. There seems to be a vision of 
unity with the truth in which we already share if we want to know anything of 
‘truth’ whatsoever.   
Finally, the overlapping between the external and internal side of 
revelation, or perhaps their ‘being-in-each-otherness’, reaches its most 
confusing moment when Bavinck speaks of the Logos at the place where he is 
officially discussing the Spirit. Although it ought to be the testimonium 
internum of the Holy Spirit that bears witness in us of the truth of ‘objective 
revelation’ (Scripture), Bavinck within the scope of his rule according to which 
‘God can be known only by God’ states that ‘it is the Logos himself who 
through our spirit bears witness to the Logos in the world.’79 And in the final 
pages of his discussion of the principium internum of theology he even denies 
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that it should be called ‘faith’, and rather insists on the phrase ratio christiana, 
that is, faith which seeks – and has found – understanding, or a Christian 
tradition which has absorbed Greek philosophy.80 When Bavinck discusses the 
Spirit, the subject and faith, we never have to wait long for the Logos, the 
object and knowledge to interrupt the discussion.  
It is no coincidence that he ends his prolegomena with what nearly 
amounts to a hymn on the knowledge of God: Knowledge ‘terminates in 
adoration’. The Christian confession ‘becomes a song of praise and 
thanksgiving. Of this kind, too, is the knowledge of God theology aims for. It is 
not just a knowing, much less a comprehending; it is better and more glorious 
than that: it is the knowledge which is life, “eternal life” (John 17:3)’.81  
 
 
3.4 God’s being and creation 
 
In this section we will turn our attention to Bavinck’s doctrine of God and 
creation. For Bavinck, this is in fact to enter the heart of the matter, according 
to his earlier announcement that theology is about God’s being all along. In 
fact, readers do not get the sense that they have now entered a completely 
new terrain. With all that has already been said about ‘knowing’, ‘truth’, ‘unity 
and difference’, and with Bavinck’s emphasis on the underlying movement 
from God to the world which again finds its goal in the glorification of God, it is 
crystal clear that we actually already entered the doctrine of God even before 
Bavinck formally discusses it. What follows nevertheless offers a brief 
overview of the way Bavinck envisions the relation between God and the 
world and how his view relates to the theme of participation.  
 
3.4.1 God is being 
For Bavinck, God’s communicability is the cornerstone of theology. Through 
God’s revelation, we have knowledge of him. But if we talk about ‘knowledge 
of God’, we have to face the fact that this knowledge is enshrouded in 
incomprehensibility. God’s unknowability is according to Bavinck the 
principle of all theology, so that the via negativa is the ultimate condition 
surrounding any positive knowledge. God does not reveal himself 
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exhaustively, Bavinck states, since if he were to communicate himself fully to 
his creatures, ‘they themselves would have to be divine.’82 But does this leave 
us with an unknown or even dark deus absconditus? This is not the impression 
he gives. There is in Bavinck’s thought the image of a ‘residue’ in God, but it 
has the character of an unknowable fullness that only compels us to 
reverence: ‘there remains in him an infinite fullness of power and life that is 
not revealed’.83 
God’s unknowability is not something we have to leave behind or fear, nor 
does it cause us to shrug our shoulders and quickly move on to the things we 
do know about God. Instead, God’s unknowability is the first and foremost 
part of our positive knowledge about God, so that every knowledge of God 
flows necessarily from a source of not-knowing. It is a mystery that God ‘can 
reveal himself and to some extent make himself known in created beings: 
eternity in time, immensity in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in 
change, being in becoming, the all, as it were, in that which is nothing.’84 There 
is a world of difference between infinity and endlessness, between 
omnipotence and the sum of all power, or, in short, between God and the 
world. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that this utterly 
incomprehensible God is the giving source of all that is.  
We give God many names, and do so rightly, Bavinck contends.85 Still, our 
names do not ‘touch’ God, for he is beyond naming, and all names are 
inadequate: God is both polynomos (many-named) and anonymos (without 
name). Quoting Augustine, Bavinck remarks: ‘You try to speak of him in some 
way? You find that he is everything’. We use many names, because we have 
many different needs: bread when we are hungry, water when we are thirsty, 
light when it is dark. With Augustine Bavinck says in this respect that ‘God 
becomes everything for you, for he is the whole of things that you love’.86 God 
is all of these things and none, so that God’s anonymity gives rise to the 
‘polynymity’ and vice versa. We must not withdraw from the world and its 
naming to find the real God, since this would leave us only with an abstract, 
empty concept, bereft of all life, but on the contrary, we have to plunge deeper 
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85 ‘Names’ is used here of course in the classical theological sense of ‘attributes’.   
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and deeper into all worldly phenomena to find at least a trace of the fullness 
and richness that is God’s being. The created world is the only place to find 
God, and it is by no means a hiding or retreating of God. God is real and true 
being, ‘the sum of all reality and perfection’, and everything that is owes its 
existence to God.87  
Our names for God are ‘but names’, they are metaphors, but this does not 
imply that they are useless or without truth, Bavinck contends. On the 
contrary, ‘real poetry is truth’: all language, figures and symbols presuppose a 
‘penetration of the visible by the invisible world.’88 Language is not simply 
used by God for revelation, but itself has a revelatory character. A metaphysics 
of language is the presupposition of the truthfulness of our names, since this 
world has been made capable of resonating the divine. Our names are capable 
of naming the spiritual, because they come forth out of the spiritual. For 
example, we do not simply call God ‘father’ after our earthly fathers, instead 
‘all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named after the Father’ (with 
reference to Ephesians 3:15). Bavinck again depicts the earthly as a movement 
from God to God, so that strictly speaking it is not we who name God: ‘It is God 
himself who (…) has put his splendid names in our mouth.’89  
When he discusses the different attributes of God, Bavinck adopts from the 
theological tradition the distinction between incommunicable and 
communicable attributes. The first group includes attributes like infinity and 
simplicity, which belong to God alone, while the second group contains 
attributes like goodness and wisdom, which are also known to created beings. 
Bavinck here in fact thus follows the via negativa and the via eminentiae, 
respectively. Bavinck is far from satisfied with this distinction, since it overly 
implies that God’s being is divided into two parts: God in himself and God in 
relation to creation. Yet a strict separation would be impossible. For example, 
how could we speak of God’s eternity if his works did not somehow reveal it to 
us? Incommunicable attributes are also communicated in creation, and 
likewise it must be pointed out that the positive attributes ‘pertain to God in a 
different way than they do to created beings’. Any positive knowledge about 
God has a core of incommunicability. But still, God ‘is himself all that in which 
creatures share: being and life and spirit, knowledge, holiness and 
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righteousness’.90 Furthermore, the incommunicability does not remove God 
from created being, since he is ‘the real, the true being, the fullness of being, 
the sum total of all reality and perfection’.91   
Although Bavinck is careful not to value some attributes over others, he 
gives a certain priority to God’s aseity and simplicity. He highly values 
harmony and unity: over against our world of differences, there is unity in 
God. All attributes are in God completely and simultaneously, so that the 
attributes should not be considered separate from his essence. In Bavinck’s 
thought there is only one being: God’s being. ‘All being is contained in him’. 
This is articulated in God’s aseitas. Only God has real, true being, and creation 
derives its being from this inexhaustible source. As a result, to emphasise 
God’s aseitas is the same as to state that ‘God is being’. In creating the world, 
God is not really moving outwards or doing something that is not already 
contained in his own being. This would involve change in God, or else that 
something could be added to the divine being, which is impossible. Bavinck in 
this sense follows the Neoplatonic line of thought, in which ‘every effect 
remains in the cause’. As we saw, our naming of God is not a pure movement 
of ‘ascending’, but it is a circular movement: ‘because everything comes from 
God, everything points to God’.92 For example, when God loves others, ‘he 
loves himself in them’; therefore, through creatures, God’s love returns to 
himself.93 The same applies to God’s will. To state that God ‘wills’ something 
would seem to imply that God lacks something, that he strives for something 
he does not yet possess. Again, this is impossible. God’s will is ‘a will that finds 
rest and enjoyment in what it has acquired’, it is ‘the love that embraces its 
object’. And what God wills is therefore nothing other than himself: ‘He wills 
creatures, not for something they are or that is in them, but for his own sake. 
                                                          
90 GD2, 106: ‘Zoo is God (…) dan ook zelf dat alles wat schepselen aan zijn en leven en 
geest, aan kennis, heiligheid en gerechtigheid deelachtig zijn.’ My own translation, 
particularly in the context of this study, is a bit more precise than what is found in 
RD2, 135. 
91 RD2, 123 (GD2, 93).  
92 RD2, 130 (GD2, 100). 
93 RD2, 211, 216 (GD2, 179, 183). The latter quotation is followed by a quote from 
Pseudo-Dionysius on God’s love which is said to be ‘an endless circle [traveling] 
through the Good, from the Good, in the Good, and to the Good, unerringly turning, 
ever on the same centre, ever in the same direction, always proceeding, always 
remaining, always being restored to itself’.  
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He remains his own goal. He never focuses on creatures as such, but through 
them he focuses on himself. Proceeding from himself, he returns to himself.’94  
 
3.4.2 Trinity and communicability 
Bavinck’s theology is thus shot through with Trinitarian thought, as we saw, 
for example, in his prolegomena which are unthinkable without the Trinity. 
Nonetheless, in the second part of the Dogmatics he follows the classical 
western path, which deals in the first place with God’s being and attributes, 
and then with the Trinity.95 This does not mean that the two chapters are not 
deeply connected in Bavinck’s thought. On the contrary, his contention that 
God’s being is not abstract but full of life is simply articulated more profoundly 
in his account of the Trinity. Even before he discusses the Trinity, he makes it 
abundantly clear that God’s being is not a bare unity over against the 
pluriformity of this world. His chapter on the Trinity plainly demonstrates 
that this has everything to do with the triune character of God’s being. In a 
sense, his account of the Trinity has nothing new to say about God’s being, but 
thoroughly explains what was already implied in all the passages about God as 
fullness of life and joy.96  
According to Bavinck, the Trinity is the heart of Christian theology and 
every heresy imaginable can in the end be traced back to ‘a departure from the 
doctrine of the Trinity’.97 Again, the discussion is framed within the question 
of communicability. Arius’ rejection of the divinity of the Son is for Bavinck a 
denial of the mystery that is the very heart of Christian theology: that God can 
communicate himself while remaining the same. God does not need 
intermediate beings to communicate himself to creation, as Greek dualistic 
conceptions indeed required. To counter this suggestion, Bavinck uses the 
ancient Christian notion of God’s fecundity. God’s Trinitarian being is a 
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96 A profound rendering of Bavinck’s doctrine of the Trinity and its implications for 
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plenitude of life, it is ‘capable of expansion, unfolding, and communication’. 
According to Bavinck there is even ‘production’ in the divine being, such that 
‘working’ and ‘bringing forth’ fully belong to God. But ‘apart from the Trinity 
even the act of creation becomes inconceivable. For if God can not 
communicate himself, he is a darkened light, a dry spring, unable to exert 
himself outward to communicate himself to creatures’.98  
Creating thus seems to have the character of a movement from ‘inside God’ 
to ‘outside of God’. Creating is a ‘going outward’ and implies a difference 
between something ad intra and something ad extra. This is not, however, an 
absolute difference. From Bavinck’s discussion of God’s being it can be 
concluded that there is no real ‘trespassing’ between God and the world. 
Although God and the world are not identical, from God’s point of view there is 
also no real ‘border’. In creating the world, God does not move out of his own 
being to create something over against himself: The world ‘does not exist 
apart from him or in opposition to him, but continues to rest in his spirit’.99 In 
Bavinck’s thought, ‘God’s being’ and ‘the world’ already imply each other, and 
this is deeply connected to the Trinity.  
The communication of the Father to the Son is for Bavinck the basis for the 
divine communication to creation. The processiones in God are not identical 
with the processiones in time, but the latter presuppose and require the 
former. There are different expressions in Bavinck’s work that articulate the 
connection as well as the distinction between the Son and the world (or 
human beings). The Son is archetypally what human beings are ectypally. We 
can be called sons of God because of the Son of God, and we can be called 
image of God because of Christ who is the true image of God. We are ‘by way of 
analogy’ what Christ is ‘in an absolute sense’. God communicates himself in an 
absolute sense to the Son, but ‘in a relative sense’ to creation.100 In many 
different ways Bavinck tries to articulate that the world is not identical with 
the Son, but still stands ‘in a peculiar relation’ to him. He criticises the 
Apologists for not adequately distinguishing between the generation of the 
Son and the creation of the world. In their thought he still perceives a Gnostic 
dualism between God and world, between spirit and matter. The danger in 
their thought is that God the Father becomes hidden and separated from the 
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world, and that the Son becomes the real creator, or the ‘cosmic idea’, so that 
the Father and the Son are respectively associated with ‘insideness’ and 
‘moving outwards’. The world in this conception, ‘if not anti-God, is 
nevertheless ungodly, God-less, devoid of deity’. To Bavinck, the world is not 
God, but the world is also not ‘not-God’.   
Although in Bavinck’s eyes the Son cannot be called the ‘cosmic idea’, he 
does admit that this conception contains an important truth. The world is not 
eternal, as some philosophers and theologians have suggested, but its ‘idea’ is 
eternally in God’s mind. Bavinck supposes a ‘world idea’ in God, not as a plan 
that is written at the beginning of time, but as something that stands in a close 
relationship with God’s eternal being and thus ‘encompasses in a single 
conception the end as well as the ways leading to it, the goal along with the 
means of reaching it’.101 Bavinck closely connects – or even identifies – this 
world idea with God’s counsel. The world idea is not identical with the Son, 
but it is nonetheless ‘in’ the Son. The Father ‘thinks’ the world idea, ‘but all 
that the Father is and has and thinks he imparts to and expresses in the Son.’ 
In him ‘the Father contemplates the idea of the world itself, not as though it 
were identical with the Son, but so that he envisions and meets it in the Son in 
whom his fullness dwells’.102 The world arises from the Son, is sustained by 
Him and rests in Him.  
To be sure, there is in Bavinck’s conception an ‘outside’ to God. The Son is 
not identical with the world, but contains as ‘full expression of the divine 
being’ also ‘all that will exist as creature outside the divine being.’ There is an 
‘outside’ to God, but there is no ‘over against’ God. As we already saw, Bavinck 
thinks of God and the world within the framework of an ‘outgoing’ and a 
‘returning’ to God. But this outgoing and returning does not imply ‘alienation’, 
a contrasting of God and world: ‘The creation does not exist as a result of a 
passage of the world from being in God to being outside of God (…). The world 
is certainly no anti-God; it has no independent existence, and remains in God 
as its ongoing immanent cause’.103 Nevertheless, any identification of God and 
the world should be rejected. The world is ‘not a part of, or emanation from, 
the being of God.’ It has ‘a being and existence of its own, one that is different 
and distinct from the essence of God’. According to Bavinck, God relates to the 
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world as eternity relates to time, and these simply are incommensurable 
magnitudes. To inquire into the relation between God and the world is to ask 
how eternity passes into time.104  
Pantheism, says Bavinck, tries to answer this question with an abundance 
of words and images, but Christian theology simply confesses its inability to 
understand their interconnectedness: ‘As living, thinking beings in time, we 
stand before the mystery of eternal uncreated being and marvel.’ 
Unparticipatory as this may seem, Bavinck still contends that the world ‘is 
sustained in all its parts by God’s omnipresent power, and time in all its 
moments is pervaded by the eternal being of our God. (…) Eternity is the 
immutable centre that sends out its rays to the entire circumference of time.’ 
In this image, God’s immutability and aseity as well as his communicability are 
articulated.105  
Up to now, all attention has been devoted to the communication of the 
Father to the Son in relation to God’s communication to the world. But where 
is the Spirit? It is clear that Bavinck’s account of the Trinity has a less 
spectacular role for the Spirit than for the Son, a fate which his theology shares 
with most of western orthodox theology. However, especially with respect to 
the central role of God’s communicability in Bavinck’s work, there are some 
important passages in the Reformed Dogmatics that stress the relevance of the 
Spirit. In the first place, Bavinck notes that the Father ‘possesses all things of 
himself’ and can thus be called the ‘fountain of deity’, whereas the Son and the 
Spirit possess the same being and attributes ‘by communication’, which is the 
basis for their communication towards creation.106 But what is particularly 
communicated through the Spirit? The central word that Bavinck uses in 
relation to the Spirit is ‘immanence’: the Spirit is ‘God as the immanent 
principle of life’.107  
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Bavinck admits that the economy of the Spirit therefore appears more 
‘vague’ to us, and suggests that this is why the theological constructions 
concerning the Holy Spirit have been less impressive than those concerning 
the Son. There is good reason for this vagueness: we ourselves live in the 
economy of the Holy Spirit. We do not tend to direct our prayers to the Spirit, 
as we do to the Father and the Son. This is not because he is less God, but 
‘because he is much more the author than the object of our prayer’. But as 
soon as the church begins to probe its own life and faith, it will ‘acknowledge 
with joy both the personality and the deity of the Holy Spirit’.108 Although we 
can be ‘in the Son’ as well as ‘in the Spirit’, Bavinck now and then juxtaposes 
Son and Spirit as ‘objective principle’ and ‘subjective principle’ of salvation. As 
with the Logos, the deity of the Spirit is necessary for the ‘genuine communion 
between God and humans’, since without God the Holy Spirit ‘God remains 
above and outside us and does not dwell in humanity as in his temple’.  
God’s communicability or ‘fecundity’ stands or falls with the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Without God’s communicability, that is, without the generation of 
the Son and the procession of the Spirit, there would be ‘a world separate 
from, outside of, and opposed to God’. Since God’s internal and external 
relations are so closely related, there is a great truth in the notion of the world 
showing the vestigia trinitatis, and we can even call man the imago trinitatis. 
As James Eglinton rightly observes, for Bavinck this does not result in a love 
for seeing ‘triads’ everywhere in the created world, but points to an inner 
dynamic in his worldview: that there is in God as well as the world ‘unity in 
diversity, diversity in unity’.109  
 
3.4.3 Will and being 
Although it can be concluded that this world owes its existence to God’s 
fecundity, that is not the whole story Bavinck wants to tell. In his perception, 
God is not simply an overflowing source from which creation ‘emanates’. He 
wants to preclude the idea that God is being ‘flowed out into his creatures’, 
since this would imply an identification of the world with God’s being.  
According to Bavinck, the doctrine of the Trinity keeps emanation and 
creation together. The world’s coming into existence does not imply that it is 
an extension or part of God, nor is it something over against God. Christian 
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theology knows both emanation and creation, but it should be noted that the 
former word is reserved for the communication within God’s being, and the 
latter for the communication ad extra – which two, as we saw, are nonetheless 
intimately connected to each other. According to Bavinck, theologians who did 
speak of emanation or participation did not mean that God flowed out into the 
world, but they only wanted to say that ‘God is ens per essentiam, and the 
creature ens per participationem. Creatures indeed have a being of their own, 
but this being has its efficient and exemplary cause in the being of God.’110 
The traditional Christian position on creation is that of a creatio ex nihilo. 
Bavinck takes a firm stance on this position, which, according to him, rejects 
concepts of emanation and therefore identification of God and the world. This 
world did not flow smoothly out of God’s being, it comes ‘out of nothing’. This 
does not mean that ‘nothing’ is now suddenly the father and source of all 
being: ex nihilo in fact means post nihilum, Bavinck states. The world is called 
from non-existence to existence ‘by God’s almighty power’, so that creatio ex 
nihilo is a confession that matter finds its cause not in itself, but in God.  
According to Bavinck, God’s will is the ultimate cause of all that exists. 
There is only one answer to the question why God created the world and why 
things are the way they are: Quia voluit, because he so willed it.111 When 
creation asks its creator why he created, it simply stands at a boundary. It 
cannot ascend higher than the will of God, and if it does, it runs the risk of 
searching for a ‘ground in God’s being’, which then necessitates and 
eternalises creation. Creation therefore can be defined as ‘the act of God 
through which, by his sovereign will, he brought the entire world out of 
nonbeing into being that is distinct from his own being’.112 When we listen 
carefully to the idiom Bavinck uses (‘act’, ‘sovereign will’, ‘distinct from his 
own being’), it is clear that any notion of emanation will be difficult to find in 
this definition. This world does not flow from God’s being unconsciously, but 
is caused by his will.  
Bavinck states that ‘God cannot be conceived without will, freedom and 
power’, but nonetheless God does not will something other than himself.113 
Granted, there is in God a ‘propensity towards creation’ which is traditionally 
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distinguished from his ‘propensity toward himself’, but also the things ‘other 
than himself’ he still wills ‘for himself’. God remains his own goal. Bavinck 
quotes the Reformed theologian Zanchi who wrote of God that ‘the things that 
he wills outside of himself are the very things that in a sense already exist in 
him in whom all things exist’.114 There is no lack, no need in God that prompts 
his desire for creation.  
Although he stresses God’s will as the ultimate cause for our created 
existence, Bavinck is careful not to speak about God’s will as an unchecked and 
arbitrary reality. God’s will ‘has its motives’ and should be kept as close as 
possible to the whole of his being, so as to prevent a voluntaristic or 
nominalistic position. Although the will of God is rightly called the ground of 
all things, it should not be separated from his nature. The interesting question 
is then which of the two prevails in Bavinck’s thought. Is the ultimate cause for 
this world to be found in God’s will or in God’s being? The best answer, 
according to Bavinck, would be ‘in both’, or ‘not purely in one of both, without 
the other’. It is clear in his discussion of the doctrine of God that God’s being is 
prior to his will. But it is also not so that God’s will functions as a filter or 
diaphragm that sorts out all the options taken from God’s being and then 
communicates this narrower stock of being to the world. The world is 
revelation of God’s knowledge, wisdom, love, goodness, glory and thus of his 
will.  
At some moments in Bavinck’s work, it seems as if he is drawing a clear 
picture of where we are to locate ‘being’ in God and where we are to locate 
‘will’: The Son is generated from the being of the Father and thus fully shares 
in God’s communication of being. Creation, on the other hand, needs God’s 
‘antecedent decreeing will’, such that ‘being’ would seem to be communicated 
in God’s inner processions and ‘will’ would appear to be the gate to the 
processions to the outside world. However, although Bavinck often associates 
being with God’s communication ad intra and will with his communication ad 
extra, this main framework does witness a certain necessary elasticity.115 On 
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the one hand even the eternal generation of the Son is no ‘unconscious, 
unwilled emanation’ and does not occur apart from the will and power of the 
Father.116 As such, even ‘emanation of being’ is not without will. On the other 
hand, although this world finds its ultimate cause in God’s will or ‘absolute 
sovereignty’, it is in the same breath called an ‘image of the eternal’ and a 
‘reflection of the divine being’. All that is and comes to pass ‘is the realization 
of God’s thought and will’; God’s Counsel or world-plan has to do with his will 
as well as his ideas, and thus relates both to willing and to being.117 In short, 
generation also involves God’s will, and creation also involves God’s being. 
Creation is no emanation, but it does require the notion of emanation so as to 
avoid a deistic alienation between God and the world.118  
In the end, in his discussion of the doctrine of God, the Trinity, God’s 
Counsel and Creation, Bavinck consciously remains standing before a mystery: 
why is there a world, when there is also God? This world seems so superfluous 
when it is compared with the fullness of God’s being, and Bavinck is absolutely 
clear about the fact that the world is in no way ‘needed’ by God. The existence 
of this world is pure givenness. God creating the world is like a bird which 
sings for no other reason than singing itself: ‘I pour out my heart like a little 
finch in the poplars; I sing and know no other goal’.119 
                                                                                                                                                   
read: ‘one out of [uit] the being and one through [door] the will of God’ – which is 
analogous to the difference between the Latin ex and per.  
116 GD 276. 
117 On the connection between God’s Counsel and the Platonic Ideas in Bavinck, see 
H.M. Yoo, Raad en daad: Infra- en supralapsarisme in de nederlandse gereformeerde 
theologie van de 19e en 20e eeuw (PhD Thesis, Kampen 1990), 77-79.  
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rooted particularly in the Spirit or the spiratio. Bavinck on the whole quite implicitly 
follows Augustine, who associated the Father with power, the Son with intellect and 
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point in the Dogmatics explicitly associated with God’s will: ‘The spiratio by which the 
Father and the Son are the principium of the Spirit also contains within itself the 
willing of that world, the idea of which is comprehended within the divine wisdom.’ 
Interestingly, Bavinck connects this information immediately with a comment about 
the exitus and reditus of creation: ‘The creation thus proceeds from the Father through 
the Son in the Spirit in order that, in the Spirit and through the Son, it may return to 
the Father’, RD2, 426 (GD2, 389).  
119 RD2, 435 (GD2, 398), a quote Bavinck takes from the Dutch poet Willem Bilderdijk. 
If we were to read too much into this quotation, we might conclude that creation 
according to Bavinck is simply all about emanation - which is not the case. Still, the 
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3.5 Man, Sin and Christ 
 
Our discussion of Bavinck could have ended here, since we now have a picture 
of ‘God and the world’ through our reading of his doctrine of God and creation. 
However, we would miss something of vital importance, if we were to fail to 
examine his view on humanity and the course of its history. All that can be 
said of God and the world, according to Bavinck, can be found concisely in the 
human being. With the creation of man a story starts that contains everything 
pertaining to the relation between God and the world. This story partly breaks 
with, but on the other hand in fact also continues Bavinck’s preceding, more 
‘ontological’ discourse. Nowhere does this appear more intensely than in his 
account of the incarnation. 
 
3.5.1 Adam and Christ  
In his discussion of creation, Bavinck devotes most of his attention to man. Not 
that he does not value the whole of creation, since ‘the entire world is a 
revelation of God, a mirror of his attributes and perfections. Every creature in 
its own way and degree is the embodiment of a divine thought’.120 Man, 
however, contains the sum of all creation, is a ‘mirror of the universe’, 
microcosmos and microtheos all at once. Bavinck speaks of human beings in a 
way analogous to christology: he seeks a balance between a ‘high’ and a ‘low’ 
anthropology. Man is a creature that stands ‘between angels and animals, 
related to but distinct from both. He unites and reconciles within himself both 
heaven and earth, things both invisible and visible’.121 Man thus has a 
mediatory character and is in this sense preparatory for the incarnation, 
‘amenable to and fit for the highest degree of conformity to God and for the 
most intimate indwelling of God’.122  
Man is according to Bavinck related to God as the ectype is related to its 
archetype: one cannot think the former without the latter. All that is in God 
finds its limited analogy in man. When it comes to the expression ‘image of 
God’, Bavinck therefore makes it clear that man is not the image of the Son, but 
                                                                                                                                                   
fact remains that Bavinck uncritically quotes this sentence, giving it the air of a poetic 
utterance that contains ‘all he really wants to say’. 
120 RD2, 531 (GD2, 491). 
121 RD2, 556 (GD2, 518).  
122 RD2, 560 (GD2, 522). 
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of the whole Trinity. Nor is the image of God related to the individual human 
being, but to humanity as a whole. In this sense, Adam cannot fully be called 
‘image of God’: As ‘man alone’ he was in need of a woman, but as man and 
woman together, they were still in need of the full development of humanity in 
the course of history, since the image of God implies something so rich that ‘it 
can only be somewhat unfolded in its depth and riches in a humanity counting 
billions of members.’123 The image of God is something that is to be unfolded 
in history, in the expanding dominion over the earth, in a progress of 
knowledge and art. The image of God was not perfectly and completely 
revealed in Adam, but will be realized in humanity ‘summarized under one 
head’, Christ. Thus ‘image of God’ is an eschatological term, a term that will 
only be fully revealed under the guidance of God’s providence.124 Creation 
exists in the ‘beginning of being’, but the course of history shows God’s 
progressive communication to creatures, which Bavinck even calls the 
‘progressive realization of the archetypal ideal of perfect wisdom and love’.125  
Although Bavinck objects to the contention of some that Adam was still in 
a state of ‘childish innocence’, he does admit that Adam mainly pointed ahead 
to a glory that was still to come. With Augustine, Bavinck ascribes to Adam the 
posse peccare (as opposed to the present state of non posse non peccare, and 
the future state of non posse peccare). Adam stood still at the beginning of a 
path that was to be followed and ‘had to pass on to higher glory – or to sin and 
death’.126 Adam was created as a being that had to cross a border, to gain a 
higher goal. Adam was a type of Christ and Christ was the fulfilment of Adam. 
Thus, Christ and Adam relate to each other as grace relates to nature: the 
former builds on and fulfils the latter. 
 
3.5.2 Sin 
Although Adam was created with Christ in view, this does not mean that 
Christ’s incarnation was simply the necessary consequence of the creation of 
                                                          
123 RD2, 577 (GD2, 538). 
124 The eschatological dimension of Bavinck’s account of creation has been correctly 
observed and developed in B. G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny as well as in Syd 
Hielema, Herman Bavinck’s Eschatological Understanding of Redemption (Th. D. Thesis, 
Wycliffe College, Toronto School of Theology, 1998).  
125 RD2, 608 (GD2, 568). The quote is from Samuel Harris, but Bavinck adopts it in his 
own argument. 
126 RD2, 564 (GD2, 526).  
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man. The Son of God did not become incarnate in order to elevate the nature 
of man, to divinise humanity, but as a result of sin.127 What then is Bavinck’s 
view on sin in the context of the divine being and work? In the first place, 
Bavinck steadfastly concurs with the privatio boni-tradition. Sin and evil are 
by no means powers in some sense equivalent to the good and to being. 
Although Bavinck carefully tries to describe something of sin’s ‘position’ 
within the divine world-plan, he insists that its existence remains an 
‘incomprehensible mystery’. It has no necessity or right of existence, but it still 
is there. We know nothing of whence it came or what it is, since it has no 
substance of itself. Bavinck describes the paradox of sin’s existence best when 
he states that ‘sin itself came into the world without motivation, yet it is the 
motivation for all human thought and action.’128 Although he clearly 
emphasises that sin does not belong to this world ontologically, he does go 
rather far when he recognises something ‘positive’ in the existence of evil. 
Bavinck cannot but confess that sin did not come into existence apart from 
God’s will and counsel. Therefore, although God is in no way the author of sin, 
it still has to fulfil some ‘role’ in his plan.  
Bavinck is very much impressed by the fact that in our world light and 
darkness seem to need each other: ‘What storms are in nature, (…) false notes 
in music, dark shadows on a painting: that is sin in the world.’ Although he 
sharply dismisses the view that these observations compel us to hypostasise 
evil – and thus render it as a good – he admits that he sees a deep truth in it.129 
Bavinck argues that ‘the idea of sin was first conceived in God’s mind’ – and 
not in Satan’s mind, nor in that of Adam or Eve.130 Therefore, God did will sin, 
albeit in a different way than he willed the good. God is so completely holy and 
almighty that ‘he can use sin as a means in his hand’. Furthermore, since 
humanity was created with the possibility of falling, it at the beginning lacked 
the donum perseverantiae. Human beings were, so to speak, not yet put to the 
test, and the image of God was therefore not yet fully unfolded in man. Sin had 
to be actualised to serve the glorification of God, in that he is victorious over 
sin. Bavinck says that God trusted his own and therefore the world’s goodness 
so deeply that he allowed evil to unleash its wickedness in his creation. For 
                                                          
127 RD2, 547-548 (GD2, 508-509); RD3, 278 (GD3, 258-259).  
128 RD3, 145 (GD3, 125-126).  
129 RD3, 56 (GD3, 33-34). 
130
 RD3, 66 (GD3, 44). 
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sin, in contrast to the good, ‘is of such a nature that it destroys itself by the 
very freedom granted it; it dies of its own diseases; it dooms itself to death.’131  
Therefore, although sin is in essence ‘nothing’, it still builds a horrifying 
(but apparently also self-defeating) kingdom of its own, and since it exists, it 
has to fulfil a ‘positive’ role in the unfolding of the divine glory. Bavinck can 
speak quite positively about sinful realities that play their role in the fallen 
world. The curse that lies over creation becomes in a sense a blessing: Because 
man was sent away to work ‘in the sweat of his face’, humanity was able to 
develop a culture, and death is not only a punishment, it is also mercy, since it 
prevents sin from being eternal.132 In a quote that says much about the link 
between his worldview and christology, Bavinck writes that this world is ‘a 
world full of humor, laughter mixed with tears, existing in the sign of the cross, 
and given immediately after the fall to Christ, the Man of sorrows, that he 
might save and subdue it.’133 Bavinck’s theology thus stands in the 
‘bittersweet’ reality of the fallen world. 
Yet how does God respond when man is fallen in sin? Bavinck follows the 
story in Genesis 3: God approaches man in the cool of the day and thus ‘gives 
people time to come to themselves and to consider how they will answer him’. 
Bavinck adds: ‘This approaching was grace’. And in the following conversation 
between God, Adam and Eve, the ‘fundamental law’ of all that will follow is 
made apparent: ‘the road for the human race will pass through suffering to 
glory, through struggle to victory, through the cross to a crown, through the 
state of humiliation to that of exaltation’. What is opened is a world of 
laughing through our tears, a humour that ‘stands under the sign of the cross’. 
This is the realm in which the covenant of grace operates.  
 
3.5.3 The covenant of grace 
Between his chapter on Sin and his chapter on Christ, Bavinck has a chapter 
on ‘the covenant of grace’. With the participatory tradition in mind, the reader 
might wonder why this chapter is necessary. Why does Bavinck suddenly need 
                                                          
131 RD3, 64-65 (GD3, 42). 
132 RD3, 200 (GD3, 178-179), the last statement referring to Irenaeus, Adversus 
Haereses III, 23, 6 (God removed man ‘far from the tree of life, not because He envied 
him the tree of life, as some venture to assert, but because He pitied him, [and did not 
desire] that he should continue to be a sinner for ever, nor that the sin which 
surrounded him should be immortal, and evil interminable and irremediable’). 
133 RD3, 200 (GD3, 179).  
121 
 
the conceptuality of the covenant? Bavinck is very insistent that the 
communion between God and man ‘can only be reestablished from the side of 
God and at a certain point in time. From the very first moment of its 
revelation, grace assumes the form of a covenant’.134  
From the Reformed tradition and its biblical-theological orientation, 
Bavinck adopts the conceptual language of the different ‘covenants’ between 
God and the world, and especially between God and man.135 Originally, Adam’s 
relationship with God had the character of a ‘covenant of works’, implying that 
eternal life was to be obtained by him by simple obedience to God’s 
commandments. After the fall, this covenant was replaced – and in fact 
fulfilled – by the covenant of grace, which follows the way of union with Christ. 
At first sight this covenantal language seems to be superfluous within his 
ontological framework, but Bavinck gives a typical colouring of both the 
covenant of works and the covenant of grace that is indispensable for 
obtaining a complete picture of his view on the relation between God and the 
world.  
When he describes the covenant of works, Bavinck gives important clues 
as to why he thinks ‘covenant’ is a fitting concept for describing the relation 
between God and the world. First, it emphasises the unbridgeable distance 
between creator and creature. In the second place, it emphasises that, if there 
is such a thing as a relation between God and the world, there must be 
condescension from the side of God. If there is to be a relation between God 
and man, Bavinck writes, ‘then God has to come down from his lofty position, 
condescend to his creatures, impart, reveal, and give himself away to human 
beings’.136 He refers in this context to Isaiah 57:15, according to which God 
‘who inhabits eternity and dwells in a high and holy place must also dwell 
with those who are of a humble spirit’.137 The covenant thus also functions 
within the context of the communicability of God.  
Rather than the covenant of works, however, the greater part of Bavinck’s 
attention in his work goes out to the covenant of grace, which in fact seems to 
                                                          
134 RD3, 196 (GD3, 175). 
135 Bavinck particularly mentions Zwingli and Bullinger as fathers of the covenantal 
tradition.  
136 RD2, 569 (GD2, 531).  
137 RD2, 569 (GD2, 531). 
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be the only covenant that really matters conceptually.138 Its importance is 
directly derived from what was noted in the former section regarding the 
world as it was newly ‘introduced’ after the fall. Bavinck pictures this world as 
‘unparticipatory’ as possible: ‘It is impossible to interpret life and history in 
the light of the love of God alone. At work throughout the creation is a 
principle of divine wrath that only a superficial person can deny. Not 
communion but separation prevails between God and humankind.’139 It is 
worth pointing out that there is no sign here of the original notion of privatio 
boni, that ‘hamartiological fellow’ of participation. Therefore ‘grace assumes 
the form of a covenant’. If there is to be union with God, it has to follow the 
way of redemption through Christ, and although Bavinck often speaks warmly 
about the ‘mystical union with Christ’, it is first and foremost the case that 
Christ gained ‘objective atonement’. The relationship between Christ and 
believers is therefore primarily covenantal (or ‘federal’) and not mystical.140 
When it comes to the role of Christ, Bavinck focuses more on the ‘objective 
side’ than the subjective or the ‘mystical’ side. Christ is head of the covenant in 
which the believers participate, and this covenant is marked by the struggle in 
which the fallen world finds itself, the world that is ‘given to Christ’.  
 
                                                          
138 Although the current study values the basic insights of Brian Mattson’s study on 
the eschatological character of Bavinck’s ontology, I disagree with its claims regarding 
the spectacular role played by the covenant of works in Bavinck. Mattson rightly 
observes that in Bavinck ‘anthropology requires eschatology’. Mattson has a keen eye 
for the telos of glory that was implied already in the beginning, and notices that the 
‘image of God’ is therefore something necessarily to be developed. In my view, 
however, he ties this character of Bavinck’s work much too exclusively to the covenant 
of works. Although Mattson does some ingenious work in demonstrating why the 
covenant of works was more important to Bavinck than its rather brief mention and 
late appearance in his work would seem to suggest, his conclusion that Bavinck’s 
emphasis on the organic relation between nature and grace ‘is identified explicitly and 
exclusively as the doctrine of the covenant of works’ (239) is too narrow. For a further 
discussion of this theme, see 5.3.4 of the current study.  
139 RD3, 172 (GD3, 153).  
140 Contra Ron Gleason who focusses entirely on the importance of the unio mystica in 
Bavinck. R.N. Gleason, The Centrality of the Unio Mystica in the Theology of Herman 
Bavinck (Th.D. dissertation, Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, 2001). 
Hans Burger is correct to emphasise that ‘Bavinck was anxious that emphasis on the 
mystical would obscure the objective, the juridical, the extra nos’. H. Burger, Being in 
Christ: A Biblical and Systematic Investigation in a Reformed Perspective (Eugene: Wipf 
& Stock, 2008), 116. 
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3.5.4 The contexts of the incarnation 
As Bavinck is keen to emphasise, the incarnation was not something that 
suddenly happened, without any connection with the rest of God’s workings in 
creation and history. The essence of Christ’s coming in the world is already 
there in the conversation in Genesis 3, and is then developed in the history of 
Israel. Prior to the incarnation, there needs to be preparation and nurture. The 
incarnation therefore stands within the broader context of God’s works. This 
preparation in the history of Israel is, however, only one of the three contexts 
which Bavinck discerns.141  
First, Bavinck mentions the trinitarian being of God. As we have seen, for 
Bavinck God’s trinitarian being expresses foremost his communicability. It is a 
trinitarian truth that God remains God and still communicates himself to 
others. The Trinity therefore opens up the possibility of a mediator who is 
both divine and human and thus connects God and man.142 Second, the 
incarnation is rooted and prepared in creation. As we saw, Bavinck calls the 
creation of man in particular a preparation for the incarnation. Now Bavinck 
even suggests that the creation of man already is ‘an antropomorphizing of 
God, and so in a sense and to that extent, an incarnation of God’.143 Therefore it 
was fitting for creation that the incarnation should occur. Although 
incarnation is different from God’s other workings in time, it is also akin to it: 
‘Generation, creation and incarnation are closely related, even if the latter 
ones do not necessarily flow from the preceding’. In the third place, Bavinck 
mentions the ‘preparation’ of the incarnation in the history of revelation after 
the fall, which we have already discussed above. With reference to the 
prologue of the Gospel of John, Bavinck mentions that the Logos from creation 
onwards ‘communicated his life and light to creatures’. ‘He came continually 
to his own in theophany, prophecy and miracle.’144 To be sure, Bavinck does 
not teach that the incarnation would have occurred even without sin. 
                                                          
141 These contexts of the incarnation can be found in RD3, 274-282 (GD3, 254-263). 
142 Not in this immediate context but elsewhere Bavinck expresses his appreciation of 
the Reformed concept of the pactum salutis (covenant of peace, covenant of 
redemption) because it connects the sending of the Son in time as mediator with the 
eternal counsel of the trinitarian God, RD3, 212-216  (GD3, 192-196).  
143 RD3, 277 (GD3, 258). I use ‘incarnation’ instead of ‘humanisation’. Bavinck uses the 
word ‘menschwording’, which is quite aptly translated as ‘humanisation’ although in 
Dutch theological language it is more literally associated with the incarnation.  
144 RD3, 280 (GD3, 261). 
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However, he focuses all the attention for the fittingness of the incarnation 
within the broad setting of God’s being and works. For if sin was the only 
reason for the incarnation, then sin would be greater than God. The 
incarnation stands in the ongoing story of God’s communication of life, light 
and being to creation, without which this world would cease to exist.  
 
 
3.6 Provisional Conclusions 
 
An extensive analysis and evaluation of Bavinck’s account of the relation 
between God and the world, and of how that account relates to the theme of 
participation, will be given in chapter five. Then it will also be contrasted with 
John Milbank’s views as described in the next chapter and placed within the 
perspective of the participatory tradition, as described in chapter two. 
However, while staying close to Bavinck’s own perspective as this chapter 
intends to do, we can nevertheless already distinguish a number of features in 
his outlook that will prove important in the ensuing discussion. 
This chapter has observed that Bavinck’s understanding of theology 
implies a significant emphasis on the movement ‘from God to God’. This 
movement is most notably articulated in terms of ‘knowing’. Theology is all 
about ‘the knowledge of God’, which is communicated by God, enters and 
penetrates the created and then returns to the divine in a movement of 
glorification. Knowledge, and in particular theological knowledge, ‘terminates 
in adoration’, and for Bavinck all knowing is a sharing in the divine Logos. 
Although Bavinck invests heavily in the dichotomy between subject and 
object, he constantly relaxes this emphasis somewhat by an undergirding 
theological account in terms of the ‘correspondence’ between them, their 
‘organic relation’ or, in most typically theological language, the Logos that 
connects them.   
Another, related vocabulary is that of revelation. As Jan Veenhof already 
noted in his thorough study, there is in Bavinck’s thought an important 
tension between the ‘general’ and the ‘special’. Although Bavinck intends to 
distinguish revelation from creation, his discourse on revelation constantly 
becomes much broader than he at other moments seems to intend. The reason 
why the different dichotomies (between subject and object, or between the 
general and the special) are kept so closely together in Bavinck (to the 
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consternation of commentators like Heideman and Veenhof), is that there is in 
Bavinck’s theology a pervasive discourse on divine being, even when it comes 
to the being of creation and to our knowledge of the divine. This divine 
communicability constantly works to disrupt the majority of the distinctions 
with which he superficially seems to work. The implications for Bavinck’s 
relationship to the theme of participation will be discussed below in chapter 
five.  
When he continues with the theme of sin and the coming of Christ, Bavinck 
seems to abandon his more ontologically coloured discourse which had 
pervaded the doctrine of God and creation. The reader now enters the story of 
salvation history, placed within the context of the ‘covenant’. However, the 
Christ that figures in this story is deeply embedded in the being of God and 
creation. Sin is not allowed to rewrite the agenda of theology, since God’s way 
to ‘deal’ with sin is to inscribe it in an ongoing communication of his own 










John Alasdair Milbank was born in 1952 in King’s Langley, Hertfordshire, 
England. In the 1970s he studied modern history at Queen’s College in Oxford 
and later theology at Westcott House in Cambridge, among others under 
Rowan Williams. Milbank then abandoned his initial pursuit of priestly 
ordination in the Anglican Church and obtained the title of doctor of 
philosophy with a dissertation on the thought of Giambattista Vico written 
under the supervision of Leon Pompa. From 1983 to 1991 he taught at 
Lancaster University, where he developed the ideas that would finally result in 
his best-known book Theology and Social Theory published in 1990. During 
the 1990s he held a variety of positions at the University of Cambridge, and 
until 2004 was active at the University of Virginia in the United States. 
Currently, he is professor of Religion, Politics and Ethics at the University of 
Nottingham, where he also serves as director to the Centre of Theology and 
Philosophy.  
Milbank was raised a Methodist but became Anglican at the age of 21. He 
describes himself as originally ‘a rather flaccid kind of Anglican with fairly 
liberal views’, which were even ‘somewhat pantheistic’.1 Under the influence 
of Rowan Williams he began to develop in a more Anglo-Catholic way. Of 
course, it would be interesting to attempt to interpret his development away 
from ‘Wesleyan’ Methodism towards a liberal version of Anglicanism and 
finally what he sees as his ‘conversion’ to orthodox Christianity. Undoubtedly, 
the different strands of this development still linger in his thought, and people 
often are most marked by the points where they depart from a certain 
tradition or current of thought, which in Milbank’s case could roughly be 
identified as Methodism and Liberalism.  
If any aspect of the influence of Milbank’s biography on his theology is to 
be mentioned, we might refer to his rootedness in what he himself, following 
Coleridge, calls ‘the old, spiritual, Platonic England’, which is ‘open to the 
                                                          
1 From an online interview with Simon Oliver: ‘Theologians in Conversation: Radical 
Orthodoxy’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRemJU5mTPc (01-02-2014).  
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arrival of the strange and the unexpected’.2 There is something particularly 
‘British’ and ‘Romantic’ in his thought that alludes to the seriousness of fairy 
tales, as described by Chesterton and closely related to the stories of Lewis 
and Tolkien. If it is true that we to a large extent are what we are because of 
the ‘stories we live by’, then there are two quest stories that are high on the 
list of the stories that ‘make’ John Milbank: the quest for the Ring in Tolkien’s 
Lord of the Rings and the quest for the Holy Grail in the King Arthur stories. 
Why this is so and what this implies for Milbank’s theology will be 
demonstrated more clearly over the course of this chapter.  
 
4.1.2 Reading Milbank 
In The Suspended Middle Milbank writes about Henri de Lubac that ‘some sort 
of spiritual failing rendered him incapable of expressing his views except 
through the interpretation of the views of others’.3 The present study does not 
want to claim exactly the same thing about Milbank, although part of his 
observation about de Lubac is indeed true for him as well. ‘Reading Milbank’ 
most of the time means ‘reading what Milbank is doing with others’. His books 
consist mainly of conversations with thinkers from the present and the past, 
with whom he either disagrees or agrees. In these many interpretative 
passages it is sometimes hard to find what Milbank himself thinks. Most of the 
time it is quite clear when he disagrees with a position, but it is often more 
difficult to discern exactly what his own position is. It is here that we face the 
same hermeneutical problem that Milbank himself has with de Lubac: where 
in the interpretation do we find his own position? Just like de Lubac, Milbank 
often (favourably) quotes or paraphrases some passage, highlighting an oft-
forgotten or overlooked theme in someone’s work, and thus pushing the 
interpretation of the thinker in question in a certain direction. In the following 
description of Milbank’s view, we will assume that also in his account of 
others, we often simply hear his own voice. This is not meant as an a priori 
critique on his work, but as a clarification of how this study as a systematic 
study will attempt to arrive at Milbank’s view on the relation between God and 
the world. This implies the risk that his position will be made more explicit 
                                                          
2 J. Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Eugene: Cascade Books, 
2009), ix.  
3 J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the 
Supernatural (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 7.  
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than he himself may intend, and a procedure that to some extent flies in the 
face of the postmodern tendency to wipe out ‘the person behind the text’. At 
least some clarity is needed on this point.  
Clarity of writing is not one of the things Milbank pursues: ‘the 
fragmentary, and not the systematic character of the literary pile should be 
explicitly foregrounded: one should exhibit and offer a ruin.’4 What his work 
purposely offers is thus a ruin of fragmentary theology. For this reason we 
also do not find in Milbank’s work one systematic exposition of the relation 
between God and the world, nor of ‘participation’. Instead, the necessary 
information must be collected from parts scattered throughout his entire 
oeuvre. The task of this study is then to obtain a picture of his work that is as 
complete as possible and to distil from this picture the pieces that are of 
particular importance for the main question of this study. However, in order 
to achieve this task, there is little in Milbank’s work that can be left aside, since 
one might well contend that the question of the relationship between God and 
the world is the central theme in all of his writings.  
 
4.1.3 Theological and philosophical context 
The most striking characteristic of Milbank’s work that will attract the 
attention of the reader is its postmodern sphere. The themes and language are 
heavily marked by the continental avant garde philosophical context of the 
1970s and 80s, especially in earlier works like Theology and Social Theory and 
The Word Made Strange. Many readers have complained about the 
impenetrable character of Milbank’s prose, which is connected with its 
postmodern sphere. This complaint has, in fact, been levelled against Radical 
Orthodoxy in general.5  
                                                          
4 J. Milbank, The Future of Love, 175-176. Gordon Michalson is right to compare 
Milbank’s fragmentary and eclectic writing with ‘Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect 
communication’. G.E. Michalson, ‘Re-reading the Post-Kantian tradition with John 
Milbank’, Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2004), 359.   
5 This complaint has been most eloquently articulated by Stephen Long: ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy’s labyrinthine prose tempts some to read it only as an academic parlour 
game used for inconsequential power struggles in highbrow university religion and 
philosophy departments.’ S. Long, ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ in K. Vanhoozer (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2003), 133. Cf. S. Shakespeare, Radical Orthodoxy: A critical introduction. 
(London: SPCK, 2007), 2-3. 
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Especially in the two works mentioned above, Milbank attempts to give a 
theological direction to the postmodern current, which, according to him, is 
not a new direction, but in fact an ancient Christian one. Milbank intends to 
show that different postmodern concerns and points of critique on modern 
thought are already contained in Christian thought from the outset. Themes 
like the ontological importance of difference, the fluidity of substances and the 
priority of language over thinking are very important to the Platonic-Christian 
tradition as Milbank understands it, although this tradition is in fact often 
criticised for lacking these insights.  
Milbank, however, does not just follow postmodern thought. In his work 
we find a critical theological engagement with the philosophical legacies of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, which were further developed by thinkers like 
Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida. It is therefore not a coincidence that the two 
greatest ‘villains’ in his work are nihilism and violence. Milbank usually does 
not simply oppose these thinkers, but follows them for a lengthy stretch, only 
to attempt to deconstruct their thought at some point – which is in fact a very 
postmodern approach.  
Milbank’s work stands in a tradition of criticism on modernity that 
developed over the course of the twentieth century and was most notably 
expressed in the Frankfurter Schule. Although representatives of this school do 
not appear very often in his work, their cultural criticism often sounds much 
like that of Milbank. As a more recent precursor to Milbank’s criticism on 
modernity, one must mention the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Although 
strictly speaking MacIntyre’s work is ‘philosophical’, the theological, 
‘Thomistic’ implications are clear. These implications are happily picked up by 
Milbank, and there is good reason to read his Theology and Social Theory as an 
attempt at a theological ‘fulfilment’ of MacIntyre’s work.6  
From a more theological perspective, Milbank’s work breathes an 
atmosphere quite similar to that of postliberal theology, which finds its roots 
in Karl Barth’s revival of the orthodox theological outlook over against a 
liberal mindset of accommodation. ‘Postliberal theology’ is a project that 
attempted to translate this Barthian position in a discourse on narrative and 
                                                          
6 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason. Second Edition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 328-333. Cf. A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory. Second Edition (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1984) and A. MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1988).  
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theological language.7 Stanley Hauerwas’ theology stands in this same 
postliberal current, combined with a strong ‘MacIntyrean’ focus on virtue 
ethics and the role of communities. Milbank’s work situates itself quite close 
to this current, although he is critical of George Lindbeck’s work and strongly 
distances himself from the theological project of Karl Barth.8 Milbank does not 
consider his theological project to be developing a postliberal variant of 
protestant theology, but would rather see it as the development of a proper 
‘catholic’ outlook, purged from modern and even early modern deviations – 
one of these deviations being protestantism itself. 
The most important theological current that Milbank is to be identified 
with is the twentieth-century French catholic nouvelle theologie-movement, 
which pled for a patristic ressourcement of catholic theology and tried to 
overcome the neothomistic dualism between nature and grace by emphasising 
their mutual relationship in what came to be known as the notion of 
‘integralism’.9 There is also a clear kinship between Milbank’s work and that of 
Jean-Luc Marion. Both propagate a ‘catholic move’ with much emphasis on the 
liturgical life of the church as a result of postmodern considerations, although 
there are differences, perhaps most notably concerning the role of 
metaphysics and the status of ‘being’ with regard to the divine.10  
                                                          
7 Particularly in the work of Hans Frei the Barthian focus fuses with the narratological. 
As Ronald Michener summarises this stance: ‘The Christian world consists of its own 
linguistic integrity and finds consistency within itself, similar to how a literary work of 
art is self-consistent within its own genre. It is not dependent on some pre-linguistic 
common understanding of reality.’ R. Michener, Postliberal Theology: A Guide for the 
Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 46.  
8 Cf. for example J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 28-29; also very concisely (and boldly) in ‘The theological 
critique of philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi’, in J. Milbank et al. (reds), Radical 
Orthodoxy: A new theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 22: ‘Therefore, while the 
Barthian claim is that post-Kantian philosophy liberates theology to be theological, the 
inner truth of his theology is that by allowing legitimacy to a methodologically atheist 
philosophy, he finishes by construing God on the model, ironically, of man without 
God’.  
9 For a very complete description of the figures and élan of nouvelle théologie, see H. 
Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie & Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
10 Marion, J.L. God without Being: Hors-Texte (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 




Although there are some strong affinities and clear similarities with other 
thinkers and currents, Milbank is, in fact quite like Herman Bavinck, more a 
lone ranger in the theological field than a clear representative of a school of 
thought. His style is eclectic and he uses a vast array of sources in a creative 
and independent manner. The most problematic aspect for his readers is that 
his work appears to be at home in almost every theological and philosophical 
discipline, and therefore oscillates constantly between discourses like 
patristics, modern and postmodern philosophy, medieval theology, politics, 
classical antiquity and so on.11 In fact, Milbank seems to promote the very 
fusion of these disciplines in order to keep them alive. The drawback of this 
characteristic is, for many readers (and especially experts in these different 




4.2 Beyond the Secular 
 
In this study Milbank’s work will be interpreted as a theological ‘narrative 
beyond secular reason’, with a deconstructive as well as a constructive side. 
All the necessary information about Milbank’s view on the divine in relation to 
the created has to be considered within the framework of his project to tell the 
story of an ‘alternative modernity’, as we will see. This project began most 
famously with the appearance of his Theology and Social Theory, which 
therefore presents itself as a suitable starting point for this chapter as well.13 
                                                          
11 Milbank’s work, which he deems to be ‘underwritten by uncommonly broad 
readings that few could hope to match’, reminded Gordon Michalson of Hegel, of 
whom it was commented that ‘he chose “omniscience” as his field of philosophical 
specialisation’. Further on, he supplements this comment by observing that Milbank 
(again like Hegel) ‘understands the past better than it understands itself’, which in the 
end of course becomes quite a problematic notion in his work. G.E. Michalson, ‘Re-
reading the Post-Kantian tradition’, 359, 366.  
12 The most firm and extensive critique of this kind was given in W.J. Hankey and D. 
Hedley (eds.), Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).  
13 Milbank’s Beyond Secular Order only appeared after the present chapter was 
completed. Particularly the first part of this book (‘Sequence of Modern Ontology’) is 
highly relevant for our study. Fortunately I discovered that Milbank’s analyses in this 
book never contradict but always confirm or clarify the analysis of his thought as it is 
undertaken in the current chapter, as some incidental references to this latest work in 
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4.2.1 Theology and Social Theory  
The best place to begin an analysis of Milbank’s representation of the 
relationship between God and the world is what is considered to be his 
magnum opus, namely Theology and Social Theory. Better stated, perhaps, any 
analysis of Milbank’s work should in fact take its starting point in this work.14 
In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank tries to deconstruct the basic claims of 
social theory and provides an alternative theological outlook on the social. 
Although Milbank’s critique is directed against the social sciences and their 
history, the book has a wider scope than this subject alone. Social theory 
comes under attack because of its inherent secularity, and Theology and Social 
Theory represents an attempt to move ‘beyond secular reason’, as also the 
subtitle states. Behind the story of social theory which is unravelled here 
stands the story of the secular.15 The term ‘story’ is purposely chosen here, 
since one of the main goals of Milbank’s book is to show that the claims of 
social theory are stories, myths, and not the self-evident truths they contend to 
be. According to Milbank, the secular as a realm that is independent of the 
sacred is something that had to be actively imagined and constructed in 
history, and did not already exist latently, waiting to emerge when the time 
was ripe.16 
                                                                                                                                                   
what follows will show. J. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being 
and the Representation of the People (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).  
14 Theology and Social Theory is, however, not Milbank’s first work. Prior to 
completing this work, he had already written his doctoral dissertation on Giambattista 
Vico which was published a year after Theology and Social Theory. A good 
interpretation of Milbank’s motifs should also take this lesser known work into 
account, as the present study indeed intends to do; cf. particularly 4.4.3. However, 
Theology and Social Theory can still be said to contain all of Milbank’s theological 
motifs in a nutshell, although since its appearance he has developed some different 
emphases and nuances.  
15 This larger program is again confirmed in Milbank’s recent Beyond Secular Order, 
which is written as a ‘sequel’ to Theology and Social Theory.  
16 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 9. This view is almost literally resonated in 
Charles Taylor’s critique on what he calls ‘subtraction theories’ of secularisation, 
which explain modernity ‘by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated 
themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of 
knowledge. What emerges from this process is to be understood in terms of 
underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been 
impeded by what is now set aside.’ On the contrary, according to Taylor, ‘an 
acceptable form of exclusive humanism had to be imagined’ (my italics). C. Taylor, A 
Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 22, 27-28.  
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Mainly on the basis of a reading of Theology and Social Theory and its 
‘sequel’ The Word Made Strange, Milbank’s account of the secular can be 
defined as follows: The secular is an actively imagined, independent human 
realm which presupposes a reality of violence. This definition is composed of 
two main points which Milbank sees as failings in the notion of the secular. 
First, it presupposes an ‘ontology of violence’, as apparent in the necessity of 
violence or ‘alienation’ which secular thinkers tend to posit. Second, it 
supposes a rupture between the finite and the infinite. They are envisioned as 
two separate realms, of which only the former is relevant, whereas the latter is 
basically superfluous. Theology and Social Theory represents a major effort to 
deconstruct these two assumptions of the secular and to give an alternative 
theological outlook, which, according to Milbank, is in fact more original than 
the secular one.  
For the purposes of the present study it is necessary to reproduce 
Milbank’s analysis of the secular, since his account of the relationship between 
God and the world is highly sensitive to the historical developments that have 
shaped our current view on this relationship. The story of the secular is a 
story about God and the world which we inherited and in which we live in 
modernity. And if we want to see any perspective beyond this story, we will 
have to understand it better and see it more clearly. In what follows we will 
look more closely at the first characteristic of Milbank’s representation of the 
secular, its inherent violence (4.2.2). This analysis gives rise to a next section 
that expounds his view on the character of Sin and the Fall, which will be 
relevant for this study (4.2.3). After that, the second characteristic of the 
secular in Milbank’s description will be analysed, namely the rupture between 
the finite and the infinite (4.2.4).  
 
4.2.2 The necessity of evil 
According to Milbank, the secular outlook claims to have a ‘human face’ and 
wants to free humanity from its metaphysical chains. The space of the sacred 
had to decrease in order to create space for us, humans, to develop ourselves 
politically and technologically. Milbank contends that this view is self-deluded 
and points to the ‘agonistic’ side of the works of different modern thinkers, 
among them Hegel and Marx. Although Milbank praises Hegel for his efforts to 
overcome the dichotomies of the enlightenment in a theological philosophy, 
he is also very critical for him. According to Hegel, creation is primarily 
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negation and self-alienation, creation is itself a continuous Fall, for which 
reason Milbank qualifies his thought as ‘gnostic’. Hegel ‘sees a necessary 
beginning to self-conscious humanity in the merely self-seeking, self-
preserving and ‘evil’ will.’ In this way, ‘there remains for him a realm of 
finitude that is purely arbitrary and contingent.’17 In Hegel’s thought, reality is 
depicted in a hierarchical way, a constant upwards striving of the absolute 
Spirit, which leaves everyday life behind as an indifferent field of battle.18 In 
the same sense Milbank criticises Marx, who, intending to counter capitalism, 
ironically affirmed capitalism by calling it a necessary phase of human 
development. Milbank reads Marx’s work as a deconstruction of the secular 
which unfortunately does not go far enough because it leaves ‘the economic’ in 
place as the essential factor in history.19 Both Hegel and Marx basically fail at 
the same point: They posit a necessary realm of indifference, of negation and 
violence, and consider this an undeniable truth.  
Milbank perceives the same kind of thinking in the work of Jacques 
Derrida. Derrida contends that all language – and, in the same way, all culture 
– is full of ‘metaphysical mystification’: language necessarily conceals and 
obscures violence, like the Egyptian hieroglyphs which were (allegedly) 
wielded by the priests to pursue their political agenda. Since it necessarily 
conceals the absence of the speaker, writing in the end signifies only absence 
and death. It is not that Milbank denies the possibility of these processes, but 
it is the necessity and inevitability of such a scheme that he protests against. 
Unlike Derrida, Milbank sees the abundance of writing by which culture is 
constituted not as a closed circle waiting for a never fulfilled promise 
(‘presence’), but as a ‘non-identical repetition’, a never-ending exercise in 
abundance, always opening up for new future clarifications.20 Milbank for 
example refers to psalm 119, with its many different words and phrases for 
the law and the keeping of the law. The repetition in this psalm ‘does not 
result in confused obscurity, but in clarification, yet a process of clarification 
that is never foreclosed’.21  
                                                          
17 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 159.  
18 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 160.  
19 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 177-178; 191-197.  
20 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 55-83, esp. 60-61, 70-71.  
21 Milbank, The Word Made Strange , 71. Milbank derives these comments from 
William Warburton.    
135 
 
According to Milbank, we are in the end dealing with ‘ontologies of 
violence’. Derrida, Marx and Hegel are merely examples of secular thinkers 
who tend to ‘hypostasize’ or ‘transcendentalize’ death and violence, although 
they may have had the best intentions to act against these realities. As such, 
they do not simply describe the world as it really is, but they install or work 
within a malign mythos.22 Milbank calls Hegel as well as Derrida ‘gnostic’ 
because both identify creation with the fall, and he considers this tendency 
symptomatic of the secular.23 It is no coincidence then that he sees in 
Nietzsche’s story of the Wille sur Macht ‘the least self-deluded description of 
the secular’: this is the malign, agonistic face of the secular, which only fails at 
the point where it does not see itself as a story, guided by its own doubtful 
literary taste.24  
Milbank’s position and expressions are firm, and have not escaped 
opposition.25 It is clear that one of Milbank’s important moves is to point at the 
great extent to which our view of the world is constituted by the stories we 
live in, by myths. He therefore does not want to argue on the basis of a neutral 
reason, but to tell a better story. He intends to ‘outnarrate’ violent myths with 
the peaceful story of Christianity, as he calls it in Theology and Social Theory. 
That this strategy is not unproblematic has been argued by several 
commentators, most extensively by Gavin Hyman. Milbank simply turns the 
                                                          
22 This is, says Milbank, even true of a ‘peaceful thinker’ like René Girard. His only way 
to avoid violence is to refuse it, ‘like Jesus did’. Milbank asserts that there is for Girard 
only the negative gesture of refusal of desire, and not a positive, peaceful way of 
acting. Girard posits ‘a real pre-religious phase of unlimited and anarchic conflict’ and 
thus ‘falls victim to a component of the pagan mythos’. Girard unwillingly confirms 
that violence is all there is, Milbank contends (Theology and Social Theory, 397-398).   
23 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, XV-XVI; 158-160; The Word Made Strange, 62.  
24 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 278-280. 
25 This study only discusses accounts of criticism that really attempt to interpret 
Milbank’s work, as this study itself intends to do. Much criticism does not really enter 
into a discussion with Milbank but ends up in mud-slinging - to which his work, 
admittedly, does invite. Douglas Hedley, for example, simply makes his case by calling 
Milbank’s position ‘anti-liberal’, ‘anti-humanistic’ and ‘authoritarian’, and pushes 
Milbank’s thought into a dubious camp by pointing to what he sees as strong 
resemblances with the French catholic anti-revolutionary Joseph de Maistre. In the 
end, Hedley’s critique is an ingenious, academically acceptable way of calling Milbank 
a ‘fascist’. D. Hedley, ‘Radical Orthodoxy and Apocalyptic Difference: Cambridge 
Platonism, and Milbank’s Romantic Christian Cabbala’ in Hankey and Hedley, 
Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy, 99-115.  
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cannons around: in the past, it was secularism that shot at theology, but now 
theology ‘shoots back’. Milbank gives theology the task to ‘position’ other 
discourses, or else it will be positioned by others, as is the case in a more 
liberal, adapting mode. By doing so, Milbank installs a basic dualism that gives 
rise to a host of other dualisms, ‘between peace and violence, sacred and 
secular, nihilism and Christianity’.26 Furthermore, Milbank problematises his 
own position because he espouses literary genres of narrative, rhetoric and 
stories, and thus promotes a sense of lightness and play that is quite 
incongruous with his own style which is ‘rather heavy’: ‘the reality of his 
writing style seems rather to embody argument, reasons, and coercion.’27 
Milbank is, according to Hyman, therefore guilty of the same charge he 
levelled against secular thought: he tends to forget the fictive status of his own 
metanarrative. All this implies the serious critique that Milbank ironically, in 
opposing violence, himself embodies violence.28   
An interesting parallel to Hyman’s suggestion can be observed in the fact 
that Milbank writes poetry, which fits perfectly with the poetic kind of 
theology he envisages (as we will see further on). However, it has been rightly 
recognised that he does not fully trust poetry.29 For example, the poems in his 
book The Legend of Death are guided by a heavy theological-philosophical 
preface, since he wants to make clear that ‘this is what these poems mean, this 
is what they intend to say.’ Even the poems themselves are often heavily 
loaded with argument. We might randomly point to an example from a poem 
called via moderna: ‘For in reality it is the absolute trees / that are but 
shadowed / by the gusts of ‘little things’ / of our own nominal sad 
contriving’.30 Milbank’s poetry often tends more to theological prose than to 
poetry. Craig Hovey points to an important contradiction in Milbank’s work, 
which is parallel to Hyman’s criticism: ‘The speaker’s exaltation of place quite 
often paradoxically trades in the very abstraction he wants to leave behind.’ 
                                                          
26 G. Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist 
Textualism? (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 70-71.  
27 Hyman, Predicament, 80.  
28 For Hyman’s complete analysis, see Predicament, part. pages 65-94.   
29 C. Hovey, Review of J. Milbank, The Legend of Death: Two Poetic sequences (Eugene 
OR: Cascade Books 2008), Modern Theology 26 (2010), 152. 
30 Milbank, The Legend of Death: Two Poetic Sequences (Eugene OR: Cascade Books 
2008), 113.  
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The contradiction in his work lies in his ‘forceful, abstract defense of concrete 
realities.’31 
 
4.2.3 Sin: Enacting the Fall 
We now have a picture of the first main characteristic of the secular in 
Milbank’s description. The secular posits a ‘realm of indifference’, of 
primordial chaos: there may be some good, but there is evil. This positing of 
evil alongside the good is what Milbank calls ‘gnostic’ or ‘pagan’, a position he 
contrasts with the theological outlook that acts and thinks only out of the 
good. The Christian tradition has characterised evil as privatio boni, an 
interpretation that Milbank wants to defend against modern, secular 
conceptions of evil. He thus criticises the Kantian legacy of ‘radical evil’ which 
gives evil a ‘positive foothold in being’.32 If evil is not considered in the 
traditional way as negation of being, but is given a positive ontological status, 
then it is already on its way to being enacted.  
This is also the reason why Milbank largely describes what we call 
‘morality’ according to a Nietzschean mode: we usually do the good because 
there is evil, because we have to react to a prior evil situation. In a sense this 
implies that by our virtuous activity (or our intention to do so), we celebrate a 
prior necessary state of evil. This is a rationale Milbank observes in much 
                                                          
31 Hovey, Review of The Legend of Death, 152. To the observations of Hyman and 
Hovey should be added what G.E. Michalson writes about Milbank and particularly 
about Theology and Social Theory: ‘There is, in fact, a curious asymmetry between 
Milbank’s postmodernist attitude towards rationality and argument and his apparent 
confidence that his ambitious program of revisionist interpretation will carry 
argumentative force: his position on the former seems to undermine the authority in 
the latter’. Michalson interprets Milbank’s work as a postmodern effort to ‘imagine 
things differently’, but sees this task undermined by his use of the conceptual 
vocabulary of the modern outlook. Michalson, ‘Re-reading the Post-Kantian tradition’, 
368, 372.  
In the Dutch theological field, in a way similar to Hyman, Tom Jacobs has argued that 
post-secular epistemologies rooted in ‘local’ traditions and narratives (his examples 
being Alasdair MacIntyre and John Milbank) will necessarily result in a fruitless 
situation where we just shout out what our position is, as loudly as possible. In 
particular in Milbank’s work, this results in the paradoxical situation that he develops 
a violent rhetorical strategy in the name of an ontology of peace.  
T. Jacobs, ‘De postseculiere verleiding: De spanning tussen religie en moderniteit 
epistemologisch herzien.’ Tijdschrift voor Theologie (48) 2008, 282-301.  
32 Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Oxford: Routledge, 2003),1-4. 
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secular morality: ‘given death’ we do our best to make something of our lives, 
to fearfully build a temporary fortress against death.33  
With reference to Augustine, Milbank asserts that even the choice between 
good and evil is a fictional notion. According to Augustine, ‘willing’ in its 
natural created state can only be ‘willing the good’ and is guided by the vision 
of the good, as it was for Adam. When the notion of a choice between good and 
evil arises, this can only be understood as ‘Fall’: ‘the invention of a false 
simulacrum within the repleteness of reality.’34 What Adam lost above all was 
a vision of the Good, the vision of God. The core of Sin is therefore its self-
invention: ‘sin itself is sin, because it negates being, because it deals death, 
because it invents death.’ Sin does not promote evil alongside the good, sin 
promotes the idea of ‘good and evil’ itself. Therefore, sin is not something that 
has to be ‘acted against’, since this would be the enactment of what sin itself is, 
but it has to be ‘forgotten about’.35  
Thus, the invention of evil as something alongside the good is parallel to 
the imagination of the secular, since both envision human will as something 
autonomous. ‘Nothing’ is strangely made into ‘something’, a realm outside of 
God is imagined and given the status of something self-subsistent which is 
irreversibly enacted in history and in culture. The implication for the relation 
between God and the world is clear: Imagining a realm outside of God is not an 
option for Milbank, since doing so is in fact ‘enacting the Fall’ and has nothing 
to do with granting the world some positive, independent status.  
 
4.2.4 Fencing off the finite  
Closely connected to the first characteristic of the secular is a second one, that 
is, the sharp division between the finite and the infinite: ‘They suppose, 
wrongly, that one can ‘round upon’ society as a finite object, and give an 
exhaustive inventory, valid for all time, of the essential categorical 
determinants for human social existence.’36 This is in a nutshell Milbank’s 
                                                          
33 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 219-231, esp. 223-224. 
34 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 7-12, with reference to Augustine’s On Free Choice of the 
Will.  
35 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 23. Cf. Theology and Social Theory, 416-417: There 
is only one way to respond to the sin of others (and our own) ‘which would not itself 
be sinful and domineering, and that is to anticipate heaven, and act as if their sin was 
not there’.  
36 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 66.  
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main criticism of the fathers of sociology, Comte and Durkheim, and their 
predecessors. They deepen the Kantian critique of metaphysics, of a 
transcendent absolute, because we simply cannot have knowledge of such a 
thing. What we can know, however, is social reality, which comes to us as a 
system of empirical facts and laws. According to Comte and Durkheim, society 
is simply the most general and most given ‘thing’, over against the inaccessible 
realm of the transcendent. The social is even able to explain in full why we 
tend to be religious, since religion is ‘in essence nothing but a form of social 
bonding’, so that the finite is considered to be able to explain the infinite.37 In 
this way, Milbank sees them developing the Kantian tendency to ‘round upon 
finitude’, ‘to list once and for all the general a priori categories, both 
conceptual and sensory, into which the finite is organized.’38  
What is wrong with such a development? In the case of the sociological 
positivists, Milbank contends that a society is not a ‘given’, but that every 
particular society projects and enacts itself in an unfounded mythos. To know 
something, to know any finite thing, is to be mediated by language and is to be 
informed by the ungraspable infinite.39 Milbank contends that no finite thing 
can be known without any reference to the infinite and, as we saw, he 
criticises a Kantian legacy here, since it is the Kantian current which is unable 
to acknowledge any sphere of participatory mediation between the finite and 
the infinite. However, says Milbank, Kant does invoke an infinitude ‘in which 
our spirits are truly at home’. Yet this infinity exists for us just as a border: it 
                                                          
37 In Theology and Social Theory, 60-62, this mechanism is traced in the work of 
Auguste Comte, and on p. 101ff.  in the work of Peter Berger.  
38 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 66. Interestingly, in The Future of Love, 118, 
Milbank informs us that this critique of the Kantian legacy is inspired by what 
Foucault already called ‘the analytic of finitude’: ‘By this he meant a historicism in 
which it is supposed that one can somehow round upon finitude and “represent” the 
human subject in terms of its supposed intrinsic limits as what truly “underlies” 
history.’ Milbank contends that this analytic of finitude was ‘notably beloved by 
twentieth-century theology, which was so often confined in an anthropological 
episteme and the illusion of a once and for all “representation” of the finite human 
subject.’ The background of Milbank’s analysis in Foucault’s work renders Theology 
and Social Theory in the end highly ‘Foucaultian’, since the plot of this book is also 
caught up with the genealogies that constitute our current views. In this sense, 
Theology and Social Theory is fully on a par with Foucault’s views, except for the 
acceptance of ‘power’ as a necessary evil – which would, again, be an example of the 
‘analytic of finitude’.  
39 This claim will be considered more extensively in 4.3.1.  
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influences the finite ‘as the empty and incomprehensible formality of 
freedom’.40 The infinite is for Kant ‘sublime’, which is literally ‘across the 
border’, and our contact with this reality is not one of participation, but of 
rupture. In a lengthy list of articles Milbank shows that modernity and, in its 
tracks, modern theology has largely followed this Kantian path.  
However, Milbank’s genealogy of the secular goes back beyond Kant. 
Anyone who is familiar with the work of Milbank knows that especially Duns 
Scotus is regularly appointed as the one who opened up the space for the 
secular. We will have a closer look on what Duns Scotus has achieved 
according to Milbank and how this achievement marked all western thought. 
According to Milbank, the crucial part in Scotus’ thought is that he considered 
‘being’ univocally applicable to God and created things. The being referred to 
in the proposition ‘God is’, is exactly the same as it is in the proposition ‘this 
stone is’. Although Scotus insists on their difference, which is most 
prominently situated in the fact that God’s being is infinite whereas the being 
of creation is finite, their ‘being’ still denotes the very same thing.41 In this 
way, Milbank argues, Scotus develops the idea of one ‘arena of being’ in which 
both God and creation are placed.42 This makes possible the notion that we 
can have a theory of being (ontology) ‘which claims to be able fully to define 
the conditions of finite knowability’ and which approaches finite things as 
being grounded in themselves.43 In other words, Scotus created the idea of an 
autonomous, secular sphere of knowledge, and, not without some pathos, 
Milbank identifies this moment as ‘the turning point in the destiny of the 
West’.44 Being became an ‘unambiguous’ concept, which we are able to 
describe fully in an immanent way.  
                                                          
40 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 12. 
41 Richard Cross summarises the situation as follows: ‘The difference between God 
and creatures, at least with regard to God’s possession of the pure perfections, is 
ultimately one of degree’. He continues by remarking that ‘an uncharitable account 
would be that Scotus’ God is just a human person writ large’. R. Cross, Duns Scotus 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39, 45.  
42 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 40-45; J. Milbank and C. Pickstock, Truth in 
Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), 44-45: The early modern scholastics ‘were indeed 
forced to reduce the divine esse to the status of a thing, since the only conceptual 
resource left open to their theology was to conceive God as ‘a’ being, however 
supreme.’ 
43 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 44.  
44 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 44. 
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As such Duns Scotus opened the way for ontology as a discipline 
independent of theology, and thus separated philosophy from theology. Of 
course, there had always been a tension between ‘revelation’ and ‘reason’, not 
in the last place in the works of Thomas Aquinas, but Milbank claims that it 
was especially Duns Scotus who introduced such a definitive separation 
between them.45 Aquinas left ‘some ambiguity regarding how it was possible 
to speak of God by first speaking of finite beings’, but Scotus simply affirmed 
this possibility. Aquinas left the door to secular knowledge ajar, and Duns 
Scotus kicked it wide open.46 
                                                          
45 Although the separation between revelation and reason (or ‘grace’ and ‘nature’) has 
often been traced back to Thomas Aquinas, particularly in neo-Thomism, Milbank has 
a view on Aquinas which sees nature and grace more closely together (‘integral’), with 
the same attitude displayed by the twentieth-century current of nouvelle théologie. 
This view will be expounded in 4.4.1. 
46 In different critical discussions of Milbank’s (and generally Radical Orthodoxy’s) 
criticism on Scotus, Milbank’s analysis of Scotus’ conception of univocity remains in 
fact unchallenged. The only thing in which these commentators differ from Milbank et 
al. is that they simply do not see the problem of Scotus’ conception. Richard Cross 
stresses the fact that Duns Scotus’s theory is ‘purely semantic’ and does not ‘include 
any ontological commitments’, although one might question if this really is a comfort 
to Milbank considering his view on language – and its intrinsic relation with ontology 
– which will be extensively discussed in the following. R. Cross, ‘Scotus and Suárez at 
the Origins of Modernity’, in Hankey and Hedley (eds.), Deconstructing Radical 
Orthodoxy, 65-80.  
Cf. a concise rendering of Milbank’s view, Beyond Secular Order, 29-31 (on univocity): 
‘In Aquinas it was still the case that an exploration of the meaning of the word ‘good’ 
involved an existential journey towards an inaccessible plenitude of the perfect 
goodness in God. So to delve into the richness of the meaning of good was also to 
ascend towards a higher contemplation and practice of goodness (…). Semantic and 
logical exploration was, in consequence, also here an ontological one’. Beyond Secular 
order, 29.  
Robert Sweetman stresses the fact that Scotus, just like Henri of Ghent whose 
understanding of univocity he opposed, developed a question that Aquinas’ 
conception of analogy left unanswered. Both Duns Scotus and Henri of Ghent 
developed and elaborated Aquinas’ account, albeit in opposite directions. Like Cross, 
Sweetman stresses the fact that Scotus’ account of univocity implies a semantic 
strategy to speak humanly about the divine. Whereas Henri focuses on ‘the irreducible 
difference in proportion between creaturely circumscriptedness and the divine 
excess’, Scotus intends to ‘insist on terms and what they signify as abstracted from 
creaturely existence’. Again, Milbank’s uneasiness with the implications of the 
relationship between language and being (divine and creaturely) as construed by 
Scotus is in this way emphasised rather than contradicted or refuted. Sweetman 
interestingly continues by noting that Aquinas adopted from Avicenna the distinction 
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There are two consequences to this development, which in fact are two 
sides of the same coin. In the first place, Milbank contends that Scotus’ 
univocity of being created space for a secular theological discourse in which 
the traditional secondary causes and the first cause were collapsed into one 
final cause: God/Nature or ‘Providence’.47 After all, in this current of thought 
‘empirical facts’ as well as the divine all partake in one and the same being. In 
the second place, the idea that we can fully describe finite being turned the 
infinite or the transcendent into a superfluous and even interfering idea. In a 
world that sets off a secular space of knowledge, every reference to the infinite 
would break the bounds of the natural and would vexingly result in 
‘irresolvable antinomies preventing any certain, determinate knowledge.’48 In 
other words, pantheism and atheism are two sides of the same coin of 
univocal language about God. 
Against what he understands to be the Scotist-Kantian current Milbank 
contends that we do not know what ‘being’ is, nor do we know what ‘good’ is, 
unless we in some way participate in the perfection of these things and are 
somehow on our way to the perfect realisation of goodness and being, that is, 
God. In the following we will consider this assertion in greater detail, and, in 
doing so, we will move from a deconstructing to a more constructive aspect of 
John Milbank’s work.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
between God as esse (‘to be’) and creatures, which have a real distinction between 
their essence and their esse (cf. this study, 2.2.6). Scotus, on the other hand, picks up 
‘the essentialism of Avicennan metaphysics’, and hence his ontological focus is rather 
on ens, and our knowing of particular essences. Therefore ‘Scotus treats being as a 
common nature abstracted from this or that concrete being from God or creature’. 
Although Sweetman defends Scotus against all too harsh accusations that can be found 
e.g. in Milbank and points beautifully to the Franciscan social ontology that underlies 
his thought (‘every creature is a single mystery created by God and as such 
unspeakably precious’, 85), Milbank’s problems with Duns Scotus are far from solved. 
R. Sweetman, ‘Univocity, Analogy, and the Mystery of Being according to John Duns 
Scotus’ in Smith and Olthuis (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 73-
87. A concise and nuanced account of Duns Scotus view on univocity (in the context of 
the Reformed theologian Gisbertus Voetius’ reliance on his thought) can be found in A. 
J. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 218-223.  
47 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 4, 37-41, 55. Milbank derives this idea from A. 
Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the 
Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).   
48 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 105 
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4.3 Created being in relation to divine fullness 
 
Secular modernity has learned itself to think and act out of scarcity, Milbank 
asserts. ‘We fear that there will not be world enough, or time’.49 The Christian 
tradition, on the other hand, teaches that thinking and acting, or, in the 
broadest sense, ‘living’, is something that participates in a movement from 
fullness to fullness, which is the fullness of the divine being. This on the one 
hand opens up creation to an ultimate glory, but at the same time renders it 
aporetic and searching for its hidden source and end. In the following 
subsections we will examine how this notion is developed in Milbank’s work 
in the three areas that are most prominent: his view on knowledge (4.3.1), his 
account of acting as an inchoative enacting of eternity (4.3.2) and his view on 
the relation between created differences and the Trinity (4.3.3).  
 
4.3.1 Knowing: journeying in expectancy 
Milbank’s critique of the Scotist-Kantian current invokes what he calls the 
‘metacritical standpoint’, against the ‘critical’ standpoint of Kant. This position 
he derives from the works of Johann Georg Hamann, a contemporary and 
critic of Kant. If Kant wants to determine where the limits are of what we can 
and what we cannot know (which makes up his ‘critique’), then Hamann 
criticises this critique by arguing that we cannot know anything at all, that is, 
we cannot know anything with a supposed rational necessity, as Kant 
assumes. The rational gaze, Milbank claims in following Hamann, which seeks 
the objectively true, has to ‘fix’ the thing observed in a present instance, 
whereas every present moment is unmeasurable. If we want to ‘know 
objectively’ a tree, for example, we have to disconnect it from its context, from 
its constant development, from its relatedness with other organisms and even 
from all the stories the tree is embedded in.50 Trying to know something with 
a rational necessity, apart from the flux and the relations it gives itself in, is in 
fact the same as killing it, or, to phrase it more in terms of the vocabulary 
Milbank employs, to expose its nothingness.  
We are not able to know a thing in isolation, but only as ‘articulated’ 
together with other things, as part of a story that comes forth from a 
                                                          
49 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 225. 




mysterious source. We therefore need the notion of the relatedness of things, 
not as an extra, but as something constitutive of the thing itself. Milbank 
concurs with Hamann when he says that we have a sense of the depth of 
things: ‘we take the surface of things as signs disclosing or promising such a 
depth.’ When we see a tree, we also have to hear it being articulated in a story, 
like in Psalm 19: ‘one day tells another, and night makes known to the other’. 
Milbank writes: ‘There is a necessary ‘taking together’, or reading of the 
conjunction over and above what merely appears: for example, a tree does not 
appear to me as one tree, rather I construe this.’ Milbank underlines Hamann’s 
point of view that to know is basically to select, to desire and to construct 
‘aesthetically preferred patterns’ which we should not mistake for necessary 
logic.51  
The central word in the metacritical standpoint is language. According to 
Milbank, it is not possible to posit a thinking subject which ‘uses’ language. We 
think in language, so the ‘thinking I’ is not extricable from its having thoughts, 
using words, its continual self-expressing. This means that there is no extra-
linguistic reasoning subject that is able to understand the finite realm. In his 
criticism of the Kantian critique, says Milbank, Hamann ‘enmeshes us more 
deeply in physical finitude than even Kant would allow’, but nonetheless, by 
diffusing the limit between finite and infinite, he allows for an indefinite view 
on humanity and culture which is open to the transcendent.52  
In invoking, among others, the metacritical view of Hamann, Milbank 
attempts to deconstruct the secular presuppositions of ‘what it is to know’. 
Against secular security, he posits a theological indeterminacy or openness. 
For example, knowing the good is ‘journeying in expectancy’ and ‘to set off on 
an eschatological pilgrimage’. The preeminent symbol of knowing are the 
three magi in the bible, who were searching for a promised king, setting off 
into the unknown.53 What Milbank is saying to a host of thinkers working 
loyally within the Kantian legacy in theology and philosophy is this: we are not 
so sure about what we can know, and perhaps we ‘know’ more about the 
unknowable than we assume – that is, if we are prepared to abandon the idea 
                                                          
51 Milbank, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 24-31. 
52 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 150-153.  
53 Milbank, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 28. The same kind of language is 
used for example in The Future of Love, 176: ‘At the outset of the quest for knowledge 
lies a wonder and an astonishment inseparable from the lure of something revealed 
and grace-imbued – something one must love, trust, and have faith in.’ 
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that we are able to fully know the finite. Another way of putting it is to say that 
we are not ‘in charge’, not of what we know and not of what we do. What our 
actions mean lies ahead of us, no matter how earnestly we investigate our own 
intentions. 
One of the other thinkers who stress this point, according to Milbank, is 
Maurice Blondel, whose theory of action he approvingly discusses in Theology 
and Social Theory.54 According to Milbank, Blondel argues that the human will 
is never equal to itself, never at ease, but always strives forward, and desires a 
completion that goes beyond any goal it can obtain within its own power. 
What we accomplish, the products of our action, is never the same as what we 
will: ‘The significance of what we do, what we say, somehow permanently 
escapes us’.55 Blondel thus rejects the idea that action is the expression of a 
prior original in our thought. With regard to epistemology, Milbank claims 
that Blondel does not believe in fixed conditions under which things appear to 
us, and therefore even denies the existence of substances or essences 
underlying the series of appearances. ‘The event of knowledge is the reality of 
the thing, or rather its momentary reality’, Milbank writes. Blondel does not 
envision a closed, fixed circle of immanence, but rather sees the finite as 
radically open to the infinite. To think and to know is to be confronted with an 
infinite power of illumination outside of us.56  
Not only in his approval of Blondel, but also on a much broader level in his 
work, Milbank values this kind of dynamic, relational ontology. In his work 
one sees him trying to maintain a balance between modern essentialism on 
the one hand and postmodern fluctualism on the other: ‘While we must accept 
and embrace the revisability of the given world, this dynamism need not and 
should not refuse notions of nature and essence, not as what is exhaustively 
given, but as what may eventually be disclosed as valuable abiding gift with 
                                                          
54 Besides Maurice Blondel, we could choose a host of other thinkers in Milbank’s 
work who testify to this way of thinking. Here we have simply chosen some telling 
fragments of the ‘literary pile’, as Milbank describes his own work.  
55 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 211.  
56 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 212. A typical articulation of his 
epistemological view can also be found in Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, this time 
with Adorno (against Husserl): ‘It is because real things remain densely other and 
cannot be fully known that the mind registers them as proper objects of cognitive 
awareness; it is finally the very unknowability of things as things which gives them to 
us as things-to-be-known’, Beyond Secular Order, 68.  
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and through time, rather than despite it’.57 With this Milbank places himself in 
the classical debate about the relation between being and becoming which we 
already encountered in Bavinck’s work. Reality is not something of fixed 
essences, nor is it a pure flux, but it is about relations and proportions that are 
constitutive to what a thing is ‘essentially’ – the essence therefore being 
something ‘malleable’. Definitions of essences should be always open for the 
unexpected, because the most telling feature is necessarily still to come. 
According to Milbank, things therefore have an endless arriving or 
‘eschatological’ essence.  
Another vocabulary in Milbank’s work by which he articulates this 
ontological stance is the language of ‘the gift’. He asserts that God is not simply 
‘giver’ and we ‘recipients of a gift’, since this would render us in a position of 
self-possession. There is no recipient apart from the gift, but on the contrary a 
gift is what we are. All our knowing, willing and feeling is a constant gift and a 
giving on, such that Milbank can even state that the gift is giving. This opposes 
                                                          
57 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 201. Other examples where Milbank articulates his 
‘relational ontology’ can be found e.g. in The Word Made Strange, 20: ‘As things are, in 
fact, entirely constituted through networks of changing relationships and any 
distinction of ‘substance’ from ‘accident’ can only be pragmatic and temporary, the 
more one seeks to isolate them in their determinate finitude, the more their 
concreteness altogether escapes us, and their sheer particularity becomes 
paradoxically their only remaining property.’ And in Truth in Aquinas, interpreting 
Aquinas’ thought, Milbank observes: ‘relations entered into in time can be nonetheless 
included in the definition of what a thing essentially is.’ Goodness, for example, 
‘concerns the intrinsic proportionate ordering of one thing to another’ and truth 
‘concerns the presence of one thing in another’. Milbank calls this a ‘theological 
ontology of constitutive supernatural supplementation and ecstatic relationality’ 
which reveals a cosmos ‘already in a sense graced’ (Truth in Aquinas, 43-44). And, 
finally, the same point of view can also be found in ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox 
versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Zizek’. In Davis, C. (ed.), The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 
133: ‘A thing, in order to be a thing at all, must sustain a certain consistency and 
relative completeness, like a town that retains roughly the same centripetal 
configuration and defensible boundaries over many centuries. This consistency can be 
termed “substance”, however loosely this may be conceived, and without insisting on 
any priority of substance over event; indeed, for “event” as a category to be 
ontologically fundamental there must be an oscillating balance between the two, since 
an event is defined by its fusing of transformation with the establishment of a new 
relative habitual stability and the modification of preceding stabilities.’ 
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itself to any association of knowing with ‘commanding’; instead, it associates 
knowing with gratitude.58  
It is obvious that Milbank wishes to use much of the postmodern criticism 
on the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian positing of limits. However, he claims 
that these postmodern insights have always been a part of the Christian 
tradition, since they simply concur with the view of creatio ex nihilo: 
everything that is, is created out of nothing. This idea ‘radically rules out all 
representational realism in its regard – as the Cappadocians, Maximus and 
Augustine all realized. There are no things, no ultimate substances, only 
shifting relations and generations in time.’59 Elsewhere Milbank emphasises 
that ‘God is speaking the world out of a void’.60 What this involves is that no 
finite thing has any stability in itself, a position that he shares with 
postmodern nihilism – which is, according to Milbank, a position quite close to 
the truth, except that it is unable to link the nihil with a mysterious hidden 
source that is worthy of our reverence. In sum, Milbank criticises the project 
of modernity for seeking stability and certainty where it is not to be found, 
namely in an immanent, self-enclosed world.  
So what is knowing, according to Milbank? His position is perhaps best 
described using the expression above: ‘journeying in expectancy’. It is not that 
he asserts that all our constructions in time are simply wrong, but that we 
have to remember that they are provisional, temporal attempts. We strive ‘to 
set up, in hope, certain contingent structures of truth and justice – to set up 
Jerusalem and not Babylon.’61 To know is not to fence off finitude, but to open 
up to infinite illumination. Being able to think at all is to partially grasp God’s 
self-disclosure.62 There is in Milbank’s work a move from epistemology to 
ontology, since epistemology is not able to stand on its own, but stands in a 
wider, though diffuse ontology.63 Milbank follows the line he recognises in 
Blondel: ‘his philosophy does not claim to say where thought should begin, but 
                                                          
58 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 43-44. This logic of the gift is the focus of the entire 
book Being Reconciled. 
59 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 433. 
60 Milbank, again following Hamann, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 26.  
61 Milbank, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 29. 
62 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 24. 
63 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 433: ‘Knowledge itself is not ‘something else’ 




merely points, impotently, to where thought is already begun’ and thus has 
premises ‘which are beyond the reach of any critique’.64  
  
4.3.2 Acting: a glimpse of the eternal 
It is, however, clearly not Milbank’s intention to create a postmodern account 
of knowledge. On the one hand, his criticism on Kant does concur with 
postmodern criticism on the Cartesian cogito, and the possibility of a universal 
rationality. His position furthermore does leave us more uncertain than within 
the modernist framework, and in the midst of ‘physical finitude’ without any 
escape to a ‘clean’ rationality. This position, however, does not imply for 
Milbank a stance of ‘erring’ or lingering in meaninglessness, in the way some 
postmodern theologians have suggested.65  
One example of a sentence in which Milbank departs from such a position 
is: ‘The lesson here (…) is that God alone is good, alone true, alone being’.66 
According to Milbank, we can never find any sufficient stable goodness, truth 
or being in our world, since this world is one of dynamic, interrelated, open-
ended realities. The stability, unity and certainty we desire and search for is to 
be found in God alone. If there is to be peace, forgiveness, or whatever else we 
call ‘good’ in this world, it participates in this eternal source of peace and 
forgiveness, of all good things. So in a sense, God in Milbank’s work does 
function like a ‘standard’ for this world and for human acts: ‘A thing is ‘true’ to 
the degree that it participates in the divine standard for its own realization.’67 
Remarkably, although Milbank’s postmodern inclination is constantly present, 
we also have to face the fact that he is at the same time also a full-blooded 
Platonist.  
Milbank is not, however, a Platonist in the sense that he imagines an ideal 
world apart from our visible world, where the perfect ‘Ideas’ are to be found, 
and which we can only reach by giving up the prison of our bodily existence. 
                                                          
64 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 212. The same idea, derived from Jacobi: 
‘thinking always arrives on the scene too late to provide its own foundations’, Milbank, 
‘The Double Glory’, 160.  
65 Cf. M. C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984).   
66 Milbank, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 28. 
67 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 22. And elsewhere: ‘The only possible clue to how to 
search for the truth must be if truth itself offers one some advance glimmering of its 
own character’. Milbank, The Future of Love, 176. 
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The central word for Milbank is, not entirely surprisingly by now, 
‘participation’ or, in Plato’s idiom, methexis, particularly the way it was used 
by Neoplatonic thinkers like Proclus and Iamblichus.68 The idea in this current 
that appeals to Milbank is that the divine, through emanation, is in some way 
present in the finite world, and can be participated in. Through a liturgical 
encounter with the material, culminating in worship, we can partake in the 
divine. The Christian tradition adopted this notion and radicalised it, says 
Milbank, because it did not leave any material residue of chaos which does not 
participate, as was indeed the case in Plato. Furthermore, the Christian 
tradition did not conceive of God simply as ‘the One’, which renders 
participation impossible, since if we approach the One, ‘it tends to dissolve the 
thinker who approaches’.69 Christianity had a different conception of God (as 
Triune), and thus valued the material quite differently (as radically positive) 
than the Neoplatonists did.70  
 Milbank’s thought presupposes that there is a perfect realisation of being, 
of goodness, truth and beauty, and that to have any notion of these realities at 
all is to partially share in them.71 Aside from the word participation, Milbank 
uses also the word ‘anticipation’. To act truthfully, or for something to be true, 
is to anticipate the perfection of truth that lies beyond our comprehension. In 
Theology and Social Theory, Milbank calls the Church’s acting ‘to anticipate 
heaven’. Referring to Augustine, Milbank says that there is a ‘subordination of 
the passing to the abiding’ and, for example, the city is ‘first and foremost a 
heavenly reality’.72 So what we call the city, or, to choose another example, 
what we call ‘human’, is not grounded in itself, but in its ‘increasing imitation 
of divine goodness and of divine being’.73 Any view on the city or on humanity 
has to be theological from the outset. Accordingly, there is in Milbank’s 
thought a necessary priority of the heavenly or eschatological reality over 
                                                          
68 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 114-115. 
69 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 115. 
70 Milbank’s conception of the Trinity will be elaborated in the next paragraph, 4.3.3. 
71 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 22-23 (already quoted above) and 29: ‘the only thing that 
authenticates perfection (and indeed, the only thing that defines it), must be some sort 
of experience of its actuality. And this is indeed implied by Aquinas’s repeated 
insistence on God’s partial communication of his good to creatures, in such a way that 
their goods can only be understood as good in their pointing away from themselves to 
the perfection they hint at’.  
72 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 408, 414, 417.   
73 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 15. 
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against the secular, sinful status quo – only the first is real, the second is a 
stubborn illusion. To define what, for example, ‘truth’, ‘peace’ or ‘human’ is, is 
not to summarise what counts immanently as ‘true’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘human’, but 
to point to a dimly anticipated divine perfection of these realities, and 
paradoxically this pointing away is the only way to know them at all.  
A postmodern objection might be that Milbank in this way is installing a 
Neoplatonic ‘unity beyond being’, that, although he is aware of the endless flux 
of reality, he simply does away with difference by suddenly crossing over to an 
eternal realm of stability, unity and identity. In the following subsection one 
part of this objection will be encountered, demonstrating that God for Milbank 
is not ‘unity beyond being’, but ‘difference in harmony’. Another part of the 
objection has perhaps already been answered, although to many postmodern 
minds it may not be convincing. If Milbank claims that everything we 
encounter in the flux of reality flows from a divine source, he does not say that 
we have some simple access to this source, or that we can contemplatively 
plug into it. As source of the finite, the infinite remains mysterious, hidden, 
and can only be glimpsed, but by no means possessed. For example, once more 
in his discussion of the peaceful community of the Church, Milbank writes: ‘In 
heaven it is perfect, but on earth, its sway is not utopian; for now we glimpse 
dimly its perfection within a process of reconciliation that is but fragmentarily 
realized.’74 He compares redemption with a ray of light that God has shown us. 
Just like in the stories about the Philosopher’s Stone or the Holy Grail, there is 
just a rumour that the stone or grail once was found, and if it is found again, it 
will be lost again immediately. Redemption is therefore always the object of a 
quest, and ‘only those possessed by a true light-hearted folly will dare to 
abandon everything else in order to pursue it’. Milbank goes on to state that 
‘The Church is the brotherhood and sisterhood of the Grail: of those 
ceaselessly questing for the Eucharist which is the source of the Church, and 
so perpetually questing for the Church itself. The latter is not a given, but 
                                                          
74 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 105. Elsewhere Milbank, following Vico, writes: ‘The 
point is not that one should shelter in God alone in the face of a total doubt of all 
finitude. Rather (…) only when things are thought of in connection with God, or from 
‘God’s point of view’, (to the degree that this is possible) will they appear in their most 
adequate degree of truth’. Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the thought of 
Giambattista Vico, 1668-1744. Part 1, The early metaphysics (Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1991), 240-241 
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arrives endlessly, in passing.’75 Redemption is a gift of God that we never 
possess, but nonetheless do pass on. 
Then again, why do we need this idea of perfection and why can we not 
stay near to our familiar world full of mixtures, differences and imperfection? 
According to Milbank the answer must be, in the first place, that we have to 
stay in a world full of mixtures and differences, since it is not possible to fence 
off the finite, and since we know that every interpretation of the world is 
always opened up by new ones, even if we try very hard to describe 
‘essentials’. In the second place, however, we need a vision of the good to guide 
our action. Since we are ‘locked in a world of deep-seated conflict’ it helps to 
imagine a state of total peace, because it ‘allows us to unthink the necessity of 
violence’, to replace the evil mythos by a good one.76 As we have seen, Milbank 
writes that what Adam lost was primarily a vision of God. However, human 
beings are created with a certain foretaste of the vision of God and they have 
to pursue this vision if they want to be what they creaturely are. If they did not 
act out of this beatific vision, they would resign themselves to sinfulness, 
which is, as we have also seen, to follow the illusory notion of a choice 
between good and evil and not to acknowledge God as the repleteness of 
being.77   
 
4.3.3 Participating in divine difference  
Milbank does not want to posit a Godhead that coincides with Neoplatonic 
‘unity beyond Being’ as a fixed point that ends all differences. On the contrary, 
if we think in a fully Trinitarian way, Milbank contends, we are able to situate 
an ‘infinite emanation of difference within the Godhead itself’, a way of 
thinking that dissolves the antinomy in ancient reason between unity and 
difference.78 It is not so that we find in God the unifying solution for all earthly 
differences, but rather the Trinity deconstructs any dialectics between unity 
and difference. The Trinitarian God, says Milbank, does not possess the ‘unity 
of a bare simplicity’ over against the created order, since he would then stand 
indifferent towards the created world. On the contrary, ‘God’s love for what he 
creates implies that the creation is generated within a harmonious order 
                                                          
75 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 105. 
76 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 416. 
77 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 7-8, in reference to Augustine. Cf 4.2.3. 
78 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 435.  
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intrinsic to God’s own being.’ There must be ‘some analogous exchange of 
predicates’ between God and created being if we want to conceive God as an 
absolute that is itself difference, and that includes all differences. In this 
conception of the relation between God and creation, Milbank wants to 
preclude both nihilism, which regards difference as the only transcendental 
reality, as well as a voluntaristic theology, which regards God as a ‘naked will’ 
over against his creation.79  
The Trinitarian God is ‘the God who differentiates’ and the created world 
participates in this differentiation, or even is this differentiation, Milbank 
states. He speculatively describes the Trinity as a concept that is able to create 
space for something ‘outside’ of God to participate in God, so that we must 
prevent the creation of a sharp division between generation ad intra and 
creation ad extra. In fact, creation is already given with the differences in God. 
The first difference in God is the relation between the Father and the Son: ‘God 
in his creation ad intra in the Logos ‘incorporates’ within himself the creation 
ad extra, including human history.’80 However, this is not a difference that 
differentiates, but rather constitutes unity: the Son ‘causes backwards’ the 
Father, so that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father.  
The two poles are what they are through their relating, so they ‘might 
appear to be locked within this relation’ and ‘can appear to be enclosed within 
a totality’.81 It is only when we discern the second difference, the Holy Spirit, 
that we are able to see a difference, which, after constituting unity, becomes a 
response to unity that is more than unity. The Spirit opens up the divine life to 
an endless realm of response and interpretation. However, the Spirit does not 
create or represent a realm outside of God, since it is an equally pure relation 
                                                          
79 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 437.  
80 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 80; Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 189: ‘God simply 
is the going outside himself’ and ‘creation, in its coming to be, is the divine Son’, 
referring to Meister Eckhart. Although Eckhart ‘expresses himself in extreme terms’, 
Milbank considers him nonetheless in accordance with orthodox Christianity, since 
e.g. Aquinas already asserted basically the same thing: ‘God, being simple, possesses 
only one eternal act, such that his decision to create and performance of creation are 
included in the outgoing of the Son and the Spirit’ and therefore ‘the distinction 
between God and not-God is aporetic’, ‘The Double Glory’, 190.  
81 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 430-431. See also The Word Made Strange, 
chapter 7 (‘The Second Difference’), and Being Reconciled, Preface, x: The Holy Spirit is 




to the Father, but ‘through’ the Son; therefore, the Son truly becomes a 
mediator because of the Spirit.82  
It is particularly Milbank’s preference for a linguistic approach to the 
Trinity that implies the end of a definite distinction between processions ad 
intra and ad extra: ‘God speaks the entire human text in the eternal Word and 
interprets it in the Holy Spirit.’83 Humanity is not something over against God, 
but is already ‘spoken’ with the Logos, and is given the possibility of a free 
creative response in the Spirit. So the Son is ‘speech’ or ‘plenitude of 
expression’ and the Spirit is ‘creative response’ or ‘endless interpretation’, 
which Milbank associates with the Church. The Son and the Spirit are not 
separately available, and the former is even irreversibly dependent on the 
latter, just like Christ was dependent on the consent of Mary to the angel 
Gabriel, with Mary herself being the pre-eminent symbol of the Church.84  
In his conception of the Trinity, Milbank relativises the distinction 
between an immanent and an economic Trinity. But contrary to the 
theological trend of the past decades to purely emphasise the economic 
against the immanent Trinity, there is according to Milbank in fact only an 
immanent Trinity, in which creation participates.85 But does this really imply 
that there is no ‘outside’ to God whatsoever? Indeed, we do not have to look 
‘outside God’ to find creation, since ‘outside’ or otherness is already ‘in’ God. 
As we saw in the preceding subsection, there is no goodness or truth apart 
from God and our participating in this divine reality, so strictly there is 
‘nothing extra alongside God’.86 Creation depends on a constant flow of 
                                                          
82 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 186-188.  
83 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 78.  
84 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 185-186.   
85 See e.g. ‘The Double Glory’, 201: ‘The finite, like the Son and the Spirit, is only 
emanated participation (…). But emanated participation is also absolute relationality 
(…), in which God is not “really related” to his creation but the creation is only its 
relatedness to God, its creative source, in its very independence from God and even its 
native capacity for spontaneity.’   
86 Milbank, ‘The theological critique of philosophy’, 28; ‘The Double Glory’, 191. Cf. in 
similarly clear fashion ‘Sophiology and Theurgy: The New Theological Horizon’ in 
Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World 
through the Word (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 62: ‘In the case of the whole of Creation, 
how can it possibly exist at all? There is nothing but God, in his ubiquity. If there is 
also the Creation as well as God, then the Creation must lie within God. The internally 




gratuitous being from God, and not on some granted independence, and if we 
do call creation ‘independent’, this independence is fully situated in its 
reception of the gift of being. In Milbank’s conception, it is strictly the fall – 
and not creation itself – which necessitates an economic presence of the 
Trinity, ‘since the fall ‘entraps’ the divine glory which is Trinitarian’. The fall 
turns ‘a positive ontological distance between God and humanity into a tragic 
distance of distortion and confusion’.87 
The conclusion seems to be that in Milbank’s thought it is impossible that 
there is anything over against God, since this very idea would create a secular 
space. This view is parallel to his idea of the invention of evil alongside the 
good, which itself embodies the fall. Creation is in any case for Milbank not the 
same as God ‘making space outside himself’, making a world that stands over 
against him and is free to choose for or against him, since this would produce 
a gnostic Hegelian story of necessary negation and (perhaps) final 
reconciliation. Milbank’s conception of God significantly deconstructs the idea 
that there is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ to God. Since God is difference, we do not 
have to determine in the first place what he exactly is ‘in himself’ and then to 
consider how he ‘relates’ to things other than his own being. In line with his 
epistemology/ontology Milbank can say that God is not a substance, just as 
creation does not consist of absolute autonomous substances.88 Concomitantly 
with his view on the divine, Milbank emphasises that there are no stable, 
discrete ‘things’ apart from God who continually gives them being. The 
question whether or not these views have pantheistic or panentheistic 
implications, which is of central importance for the discussion between 
Bavinck and Milbank (and, on a broader scale, for the discussion between the 
Reformed tradition and Radical Orthodoxy) will be discussed below in chapter 
5.    
 
  
                                                          
87 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 182. In ‘The Double Glory’, 188-189, Milbank 
maintains against Slavoj Zizek, who discards the immanent Trinity in a ‘Hegelian’ 
move of divine becoming which purely values divine presence as an economic activity, 
that clinging to the notion of an immanent Trinity is ‘much more interesting, because 
then one has declared, not that the ordinary and disappointing is after all the All, but 
rather that the ordinary is after all not ordinary, and so is not after all disappointing’.    
88 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 431.  
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4.4 God and the world: guiding principles 
 
At this point the present study finds itself in the middle of a dangerous 
endeavour: to systematise, albeit roughly, an oeuvre that constantly resists 
systematisation. Since we insist on our intention not to impress  on the work 
described a scheme that violates its content, the degree of systematization for 
Milbank will have to be modest. For this reason, we have chosen three themes 
that are closely related to what has already been put forward in the preceding 
sections which articulate the most important things that Milbank wants to say 
about the relation between God and the world. They function as ‘guiding 
principles’ or constantly present ‘motifs’ throughout his work, to accompany 
the main picture described above. This must not be taken to mean, however, 
that in the foregoing the ‘foundation’ of Milbank’s theology was laid, upon 
which the three main ‘pillars’ are now to be erected. His work cannot be 
interpreted as a building, but is rather a labyrinth without beginning or end, 
or, as he himself contends, a ruin, an accumulation of fragments, itself 
constituting a ‘stuttering argument’. All of the following subsections therefore 
provide hermeneutical keys which will allow the reader to re-interpret 
Milbank’s work in different terms.  
 
4.4.1 Thinking the impossible middle 
In section 4.3.1 above we discussed the question ‘what is knowing?’ There 
knowing proved for Milbank to be inextricably bound up with being. He claims 
that on their own, appearances are nothing. They can only come to us as 
appearances if we perceive them flowing from the mysterious source that 
gives them their inherent depth, a source that contains both unity and 
difference, forming a harmony of unity through difference, which Milbank 
conceives in the Trinity. We cannot know where our knowing begins, nor are 
we in a position to decide what the conditions of possibility for our knowing 
are, but can only point out that our knowing has somehow already begun, that 
it finds itself in a larger field of ‘theontology’, as it might be called, which is 
strictly neither a theology nor an ontology, but something that works ‘in the 
between’ of those two.89  
                                                          
89 Cf. Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 35, where Milbank calls Aquinas’ 
account of being ‘theoontology’ instead of ‘ontotheology’. He also calls it a ‘non-
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There is in Milbank’s work no doubt about the fact that an independent 
ontology, apart from theology, is impossible. We already saw that he accuses 
Duns Scotus and Suárez in particular of such a separation, since they gave 
birth to the possibility of pre-theological metaphysics. As we noted above, it is, 
according to Milbank, impossible to speak of being apart from God. He 
emphasises the distinction in Aquinas’ work between the divine esse and the 
ens commune of creatures.90 We can talk of ‘our being’ but we hardly know 
what it is, since only God is being, such that there is just a ‘hidden 
manifestness of Being in beings’.91 All that ‘is’ ‘derives from Being as a 
donating source’, and so our being is always something borrowed.  
We can go so far as to state that ‘esse est Deus’, as Milbank quotes Meister 
Eckhart. At first sight this might seem to imply a full-blooded pantheistic 
statement, but what it in fact does, says Milbank, is to claim that only God is 
perfect, realised being, and that we do not have any grasp of esse as an 
univocal term. The creature is only a ‘share’ in the divine being, which of 
course is given with the language of ‘participation’.92 This share, however, is 
not a real ‘part of God’. We do not have any direct access to the mind of God, as 
Nicolas Malebranche later imagined, since this would presuppose a univocal 
being, shared by God and creation.93 In Malebranche’s conception, we know a 
finite part of God’s knowledge of himself, ‘just as we might know Paris, but not 
the rest of France’. Milbank calls this ‘semi-pantheism’.94 The Eckhartian view, 
which Milbank supports, never treats God as an ens on the same level as 
created entia, but it rather states that God is the ‘eminent reality of all entia’.95 
Our being is just to be on our way to Being, and we partially grasp it, but do 
not possess it. Everything derives ‘from a distant inaccessible source, (…) 
                                                                                                                                                   
ontology’, ‘articulated between the discourses of philosophy and theology’, like the 
ontological endeavours of Henri de Lubac, The Suspended Middle, 5.   
90 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, chapter 2: ‘Only Theology overcomes 
Metaphysics’. Cf. this study, 2.2.6.  
91 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 41.  
92 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 201. 
93 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 55, 58. Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) was 
a French priest and philosopher who sought to synthesize Augustine and Descartes 
epistemologically.  
94 Milbank, The Religious Dimension vol. 1, 59-60.  




rendering all finite beings entirely accidental’. In this way, Eckhart ‘evacuated 
the metaphysical site in favour of theology’.96  
However, in this conclusion Milbank places himself in a difficult position. 
In a superficial reading, his theology seems to claim that there is no real place 
for nature or humanity, and that everything is subsumed under God. Yet his 
theology does not imply that God’s being is in fact taking over created being, 
or that created beings are suppressed by God’s being. On the contrary, 
following Henri de Lubac he states that ‘Christianity is a humanism, else it is 
misunderstood’.97 Another part of the difficulty of Milbank’s self-positioning is 
the same difficult space he sees De Lubac moving in, namely the ‘suspended 
middle’ between philosophy and theology, or, for example, nature and grace. 
The problem is that there simply is no such place, especially not if we look for 
it in everyday ‘secular’ reality in the university faculties. Up to now, it is clear 
that Milbank does not want to do ontology in a purely existential human way. 
It is also clear that he does not want to do doctrinal theology in the sense that 
he does not want to talk about the reality of God separated from creation, 
human making and development. In his book The Suspended Middle he gives a 
lively description of how this quest for ‘the impossible middle’ haunted De 
Lubac’s career. But how does Milbank himself search for a conceptualisation 
of it?  
In line with the nouvelle théologie, Milbank wants to overcome the 
dichotomy between nature and grace by seeing grace not as something 
extrinsically added to nature but as intrinsically completing it, thereby seeing 
nature as being ‘in a sense already graced’. Milbank, with De Lubac, considers 
creation as the natural desire for the supernatural, which implies that there is 
a ‘dynamic link between the two orders’, being ‘at once entirely an aspect of 
the Creation and entirely also the work, in advance of itself, of grace’. The 
natural desire is by no means purely natural, but is itself a gift, so that our 
natural desire for the supernatural is something at once wholly divine and 
wholly natural.98 In the end, the classic language of nature and grace seems to 
reach its conceptual limits here.  
Here we reach the apex of Milbank’s discussion of the relationship 
between God and creation, which he calls ‘analogy’, or ‘paradox’ in more 
                                                          
96 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 44-45. 
97 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 9. 
98 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 38-40. 
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recent works. An important consequence of the Eckhartian stance that esse est 
Deus is that we can say that God is ‘more stone in the stone than the stone’ or 
that God is more our self than we are ourselves.99 As giving source he must be 
‘the inner reality of everything’; however, at the same time, God is ‘infinitely 
more unlike creatures than he is like them’. Milbank speaks of this analogy 
between the Creator and creation in the same way as Erich Przywara 
interpreted the analogia entis, faithful to the teaching of the fourth Lateran 
Council: ‘there is greater similarity between creator and creature only within 
an ever greater dissimilarity’.100 
Milbank is very careful not to allow this analogical language to slide into 
dialectics. Hegel, says Milbank, defines a thing in contradictory fashion, that is, 
in relation to what it is not. For example, the north is the not-south, and for the 
north to be defined it needs the south, so that in the end we can conclude that 
the north is in a sense what it is not, namely the south.101 The same applies to 
the infinite and the finite in Hegel: there is a continuous tension or struggle 
between them, and the one always seeks to become the other, for the basic 
contradiction to be resolved – which is in fact their mutual abolition. So in 
Hegel’s thought, God is the world in an endless becoming. Instead of an 
impossible contradiction that must be endlessly and conflictually overcome, 
Milbank pleads for what he calls a paradoxical ‘coincidence of opposites’ that 
can be persisted with.102  
                                                          
99 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 192, 202.  
100 Cf. this study, 2.2.6. In Beyond Secular Order, Milbank criticises what he considers a 
post-Scotist account of causation which he calls the concursus model, ‘which involves 
the notion that God and creatures can contribute different shares to a causal upshot, 
like two horses pulling the same barge’ (or ‘like a man pushing along a supermarket 
trolley, but being slightly assisted by his toddler son’). Milbank instead favours the 
more Platonising influentia-model, in which a higher cause does not merely act 
externally upon a lower one, but ‘flows into’ it, so that in the workings of the lower 
causes it is in fact the higher form that shows its influence, which renders the lower 
one a ‘response’. With Proclus and Aquinas, Milbank asserts that ‘higher causes are 
always, in a covert fashion, more powerfully at work, even at lower levels’. Beyond 
Secular Order, 42-49; 99-105.  
101 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 136-137. In Beyond Secular Reason Milbank repeats 
this criticism on Hegel: ‘the mark of a thing’s being is that it instantiates a ‘can be this’ 
in such a way that the fate of ‘there will not be a this’ always hovers over it as the 
shadow of death, and fundamentally defines it’. This is what Milbank had earlier called 
Hegel’s ‘gnosticism’. Beyond Secular Order, 50-56.  
102 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 163-164.  
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Milbank refuses to speak of God and creation as two contrasted univocal 
‘poles’ that can be related and have certain things in common and others not. 
Instead, ‘what is like the other is like the other precisely in respect of its 
difference; while that which is different is different from the other in respect 
of its likeness’.103 Milbank contends that if this notion violates the principle of 
non-contradiction, it is because relations between the finite and the infinite 
simply require such a violation. If we ask in what we do actually participate 
when we speak of ‘participation in God’s being’, the answer should be ‘the 
imparticipable’. Milbank’s view on the heart of what participation is can also 
be illustrated with a longer quotation: ‘The entire point of the Neoplatonic 
idea of participation (…), is that the ultimate shares itself without reserve, 
while nonetheless entirely reserving itself in its unsoundable mystery. What it 
gives in a measure is the ungivable, and it is only the ungivable that can be 
given. Hence it is precisely the imparticipable that can be participated and 
actually because it is imparticipable, an inexhaustible fountain.’104 It is not that 
the divine is divine because it ‘holds something back’, but because it is so 
‘giving’ that it at once completely surpasses our being and understanding.105    
Milbank’s theology is in search of mediation between God and creation, but 
this is not a mediation of univocal identities which collapses into an equivocal 
process of differentiation. In Milbank’s conception, there is no ‘between’ 
between God and creation. The mediation he looks for ‘does not lie between 
the poles, but rather remains simultaneously at both poles at once’ – which is 
what gives it its paradoxical character.106 There is therefore not a third term, 
like being, which includes both God and creation, since this would turn being 
into an idol, standing higher than creation and even higher than God. On the 
contrary, God is in creation, while simultaneously creation is in God, without 
                                                          
103 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 164.  
104 Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 101n196.  
105 Although a full analysis and evaluation will be given in the next chapter, one cannot 
but notice already here the similarity to the current study’s analysis of divine actuality 
in 2.2.2 and 2.2.6 and Bavinck’s notion of divine fecundity in the Trinity, 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2.   
106 Aside from ‘The Double Glory’, see for this view also ‘Sophiology and Theurgy’, 70: 
‘Mediation does not lie between, but at once on one side and the other through an 
obscure but crucial echo or attunement’.  
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the two being univocally identical.107 In trying to overcome the dichotomy 
between nature and grace, Milbank’s thought seems to be in search of a 
language to speak about God and creation ‘in one (Divine-human) word’, 
which actually coincides with the ‘word made flesh’, but he is always aware 
that this can only be an analogical or paradoxical possibility, so that it is at the 
same time fully human and fully divine. This, of course, brings us to Milbank’s 
thought on the incarnation.  
 
4.4.2 Incarnation  
There is in Milbank’s work a ‘spirit of blurring’. Rules and boundaries, so 
firmly set out by modernity, are transgressed and relativised with pleasure, in 
typically postmodern fashion.108 One might simply be irritated or amused by 
this aspect of Milbank’s work, and yet it reaches its greatest significance 
theologically when this boundary-crossing reaches the point of the mother of 
all boundaries: the boundary between God and the world. This boundary 
immediately comes into sight in theology when we speak of the being of God 
and creation, but also, and perhaps even more emphatically, when we talk 
about Christ, the God-man. How does Milbank envision Christology, and, in 
particular, what light does Christ shed on the relationship between God and 
creation? We will reflect further on this question, beginning with Milbank’s 
view on the incarnation as it stems from his interpretations of Thomas 
Aquinas.  
With Aquinas, Milbank contends that the incarnation was conveniens to 
God, that is, ‘fitting’ and most suitable for its goal. Milbank claims that this is 
an aesthetic term which hovers between the view that the incarnation was 
strictly necessary (as with Anselm) and that is completely arbitrary according 
to God’s potentia absoluta (as with the nominalists).109 One of the reasons 
Aquinas mentions for the convenientia of the incarnation was that humanity 
had always been predestined to deification. ‘Humanity has a natural kinship 
with the supernatural’, Milbank writes, which is already given with its being 
created in the image of God. There is, therefore, already from the beginning a 
                                                          
107 ‘Sophiology and Theurgy’, 64-65. In this article, Milbank explores the concept of 
sophia not as ‘hovering between God and creation’, but as simultaneously on both 
sides.  
108 Milbank himself writes about the postmodern characteristic of ‘boundary 
confusion’ in Being Reconciled, chapter 10 (‘Culture: The gospel of affinity’). 
109 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 60-61; Being Reconciled, 64-68. 
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remote kinship between humanity and the Son who bears the image of the 
Father.110  
It is clear that for Milbank the Incarnation was more than a remedy for sin. 
That is to say, the occasion for the incarnation was indeed the fallen state of 
creation, but the incarnation ‘exceeded its occasion’ and it brought about ‘a 
new ontological state for the Creation: the causing of a human creature 
directly to subsist in a divine hypostasis.’111 Milbank calls this ‘a mode of 
divine self-sharing more absolute than the most absolute giving of the infinite 
to the finite according to its capacity for reception’, resulting in ‘the utter 
fusion of the finite with the infinite (though not the other way around)’.112 In 
Christ, even his strictly human qualities show his divine nature, which he 
passes on especially in the Eucharistic elements. What this means is that 
through our senses – in the Eucharist, and from there in all of our lives – we 
are reinstructed for our spiritual ascent towards God. As Milbank says after 
Aquinas, we need to have a certain foretaste of our true end in order to attain 
it. There is thus a surplus of the Incarnation, exceeding redemption, which 
renders the cosmos sacramental.113 This is, however, grounded in the 
hypostatic union in Christ.  
In terms of the classical christological battles over the natures of Christ, 
Milbank is more careful not to be Nestorian (separating the two natures of 
Christ) than not to be Cyrillic (‘monophysite’, fusing the two natures together 
                                                          
110 Being on the one hand capable of ‘rational articulation’ while remaining on the 
other hand ‘material and animal’, humanity is a synthesis of creation, in itself a 
microcosm, for which it is so ‘appropriate’ that it receives the goal of creation, Aquinas 
writes, because it has kinship with the Logos, since ‘all creatures are nothing but a 
kind of real expression and representation of those things which are comprehended in 
the conception of the divine word’ (Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 62-63, esp. note 13). 
Humanity as well as the Logos are ‘comprehensions’ of the whole of creation. 
111 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 63. Also in Being Reconciled Milbank stresses that 
reconciliation should not be seen as a purely negative gesture, of God looking over or 
forgetting our sins, but instead as a positive giving. That God becomes incarnate is not 
‘God putting things straight again’ but ‘God not stopping to give’ and installing an 
economy of giving (Being Reconciled, 44-49). And in another chapter Milbank writes: 
‘Real, positive Christological forgiveness is (…) not reactive, since it is only the 
sustained giving of the original gift, despite its refusal’ (Being Reconciled, 68).   
112 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 63.  
113 Milbank refers to Aquinas’ invocation of the felix culpa which was pronounced at 
the lighting of the Easter candle, because human nature was raised to something 
greater after sin (ST III q1 a3).  
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in one divine hypostasis). Milbank again follows Aquinas when he states that 
‘there is only one esse in Christ, which is the divine esse ipsum’. There is also an 
assumed humanity, but this is so unified with the divine that it does not ‘add’ 
anything to it, which would anyhow be impossible given the repleteness of 
God’s being, which is already in excess of itself.114 There is in Christ no 
‘accidental exteriority’ of the human nature to the divine hypostasis, since that 
would attribute to the former some kind of independent existence. What we 
call Christ’s individual human nature is only held together by the eternal 
hypostasis of the Son, and this renders his divine-human nature not as 
something individualistic, incommunicable, as a ‘locatable human idol’. The 
Incarnation does not sacralise only one site, but it produces a ‘proliferation of 
sacred sites’.115 For human beings this means that they can participate in 
Christ’s humanity which is enhypostasised by the Logos.  
Milbank is not afraid to speak of a ‘fusion’, ‘blending’ or ‘synergy’ between 
the human and the divine through Christ.116 Again, as in the previous 
subsection, we can see his theology as being in search of mediation. Milbank’s 
quest is to prevent any separation of the divine and the human in Christ, quite 
parallel with his anti-secular stance: there is no way that the human can be 
something of itself. He writes: ‘Christianity is the religion of the obliteration of 
boundaries’.117 Above all, with the doctrine of the Incarnation, ‘Christianity 
violates the boundary between created and creator, immanence and 
transcendence, humanity and God’; in this way, the ‘arch taboo grounding all 
the others is broken’. Although Milbank may speak in somewhat exaggerated 
fashion here, his work seems at times to be in serious tension with the 
orthodox Chalcedonian creed and especially with one of the four negations 
                                                          
114 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 66-67. 
115 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 69. 
116 For example, speaking about the concept of sophia, Milbank states “Sophia’ names 
the synergic fusion of human and divine work which is brought about through the 
Incarnation and Pentecost and sustained by liturgical activity’ (‘Sophiology and 
Theurgy’, 66). And later on he adds: ‘Christ as in two natures has finally blended the 
divine and the created Sophia’. However, Milbank confirms that Christ ‘sustains 
through his concretely realized character the separation of human and divine nature.’  
117 Examples of the limits that Christianity explodes are, according to Milbank, limits 
‘between nations, between races, between the sexes, between the household and the 
city, between ritual purity and impurity, between work and leisure, between days of 
the week, between sign and reality (in the Sacraments), between the end of time and 
living in time’ (Being Reconciled, 196).   
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concerning the two natures of Christ, which states that they are 
‘unconfused’.118  
Milbank, however, wants to give a ‘full retrieval’ of the Chalcedonian 
position. It is not as if he has some well-defined doctrine of the person of 
Christ which states that in him God and man are ‘blurred’ – his analogical or 
paradoxical approach towards the relation between God and the world would 
clearly prevent such a strict identification. Nothing can be ‘mixed’ with God, 
since nothing can be added to the replete divine being. It seems rather to be 
his intention to approach Christ through the church, or in other words, to 
approach Christ as a reality in which we participate.119 Just as it is impossible 
in Milbank’s theology to talk about God without creation, so it is impossible to 
talk about the person of Christ without the church, his body. What Christ 
brought about in this world, according to Milbank, was not a ‘fetishizable’ 
divine-human object whose identity we can discuss forever, but is primarily ‘a 
mode of being’.120 It was his character of affinity with God that Jesus passed on 
to his disciples.121 Milbank wants to prevent any description of Christ that 
presupposes an underlying essence or closed-off idea of personhood. Christ is 
not a well-defined subject to whom we as different subjects can relate, or with 
whom we can identify, as with a character in a novel, but his entire 
‘personality’ is made up of his words and works, and there is not a single one 
of his words and works that the ‘body of Christ’ cannot participate in.122 On the 
one hand Milbank’s Christ is thus to a great extent a secret – ‘who Jesus Christ 
                                                          
118 According to Chalcedon, ‘this one and the same Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son 
must be confessed to be in two natures, unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, 
inseparably [united]’. It must be conceded that the context of this quotation 
particularly stresses the unity of Christ: one hypostasis, one and the same Son, one 
Logos, one Lord Jesus Christ.  
119 For this emphasis, see particularly The Word Made Strange, chapters 5 and 6 and 
Being Reconciled, chapter 10.  
120 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, chapter 6, esp. 148. In Beyond Secular Order, 
Milbank summarises his ‘broad’ Christology, over against what he calls an 
‘instrumentalized’ Christology, which ensures a ‘fetishistic, over-pious and too literally 
mimetic devotion to Christ’s life and death, reduced to literal terms and shorn of its 
allegorical links with the intrinsic shape of every human destiny’. This 
instrumentalised Christology forgets ‘the narrative dimension of his life in favour of a 
neat set of propositions about his saving significance which in fact obliterates the 
saving mystery’. Beyond Secular Order, 79-80.   
121 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 203.  
122 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 149-150. 
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was’ is not to be speculated about; but on the other hand he ‘breaks’ Christ 
open for his followers, considering Christ as the ‘narration’ and the church, his 
body, as the ‘re-narration’ and ‘re-realization’. In this way, the Church can be 
called an ongoing Incarnation of Christ.123 In sum, when Milbank speaks of the 
blurring of finite and infinite in Christ, he is not ‘defining’ the person of Christ, 
but he wants to characterise the way of being that Christ installed, and he 
wants to emphasise that Christ is God’s continuous self-giving to creation. 
 
4.4.3 The priority of the made 
Milbank’s work throughout witnesses a quest for new ‘theological 
transcendentals’ which function in a theology ‘beyond secular reason’. Like the 
medieval thinkers who discerned such transcendentalia as esse, unum, bonum, 
verum and pulchrum, Milbank is also in search of ‘a word or idea which is such 
that it may be predicated of anything whatsoever, but that no predicans can be 
adequate to the full meaning which the word suggests.’124 This implies that the 
transcendental is just as much about God as it is about creation, although God 
contains the transcendental in an absolute sense, and creation only by 
participation. Milbank tries to extend the transcendentalia-tradition in his 
work by seeking for concepts, for language, that transcends the different 
categories and boundaries we usually discern. This does not, however, imply a 
pure retrieval of the medieval scholastic tradition, but an extension towards 
modernity, and its attention for human making. Milbank also wishes to give 
these new transcendentals a fully theological – that is trinitarian – character, 
since the classic transcendentals tend to give rise to the idea that they are 
informed by a sphere of ‘autonomous philosophy’.  
In Theology and Social Theory Milbank is eager to show that the social is 
not something ‘purely human’, but that theology itself is ‘sociology’, since God 
is a social God of difference in harmony. Therefore, the social can be called a 
transcendental, transcending the border between God and creation, speaking 
in one word about God as well as the created order – though not univocally, 
but analogically or paradoxically, as described in 4.4.1 above. In other places, 
and specifically in Being Reconciled, Milbank describes the ‘gift’ or donum as a 
                                                          
123 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 156-157. 
124 This is Milbank’s description of the scholastic term ‘transcendental’ in The Religious 
Dimension, 133.  
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theological transcendental.125 ‘God gives’ is not only a statement about God, it 
is also a statement about what creation is: gift, and further giving, an infinite 
economy of exchange.  
However, the most prominent transcendental in Milbank’s work is Verbum 
or Logos, the Word that is God and simultaneously constitutive for creation. 
Milbank elaborates this theme particularly in The Word Made Strange and his 
earlier The religious dimension in the thought of Giambattista Vico.126 God is 
not an essence that is in itself strictly separated from creation, but God is 
divine utterance and in this sense already ‘the world’. Thus, what we call 
language or culture or history is not in any way a ‘problem, external to faith’, 
Milbank writes.127 The idea to accord Verbum the status of a transcendental is 
not Milbank’s own, but is derived from the work of Giambattista Vico, who in 
turn derived it from Nicholas of Cusa. Here we will analyse this transcendental 
as the concept that stands at the beginning and end of Milbank’s account of the 
relationship between God and the world.  
In the first place, we need to be aware that Verbum is not strictly speaking 
what we usually understand with ‘word’ or ‘speech’, but that it has the 
character of ‘making’. That this world is, is because it is made by God which is 
exactly the same as to say that the world exists solely through the ‘Word of 
God’. Everything that is, is made, since God’s speaking has the character of 
making. Therefore, ‘the made’ or factum or Verbum can be called a 
transcendental.  
‘Making’, ‘production’ or poiesis have been central themes in Milbank’s 
work from the very beginning of his academic career. Even before he wrote 
Theology and Social Theory, the theological meaning of making was already the 
central subject of his study on Vico. Up to now, the present study perhaps still 
gives the impression that Milbank wants to do away with modernity and the 
endeavours of humanity, to reinstall a medieval theocentric metaphysical 
vision. His vision of how we ‘connect with God’ would then perhaps be that of 
contemplation. Such an understanding would, however, be the very opposite 
                                                          
125 From the Preface of Being Reconciled, I derive the idea that Milbank’s work is an 
ongoing quest for theological transcendentals. Being Reconciled, ix.  
126 Another example of a ‘transcendental’ in Milbank’s work could be the concept of 
Sophia, given his description of this divine-human reality in ‘Sophiology and Theurgy’. 
This article, however, remains the only place in which he develops this particularly 
‘sophiological’ vocabulary.  
127 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 79. 
166 
 
of what Milbank is actually trying to do. We already saw that he favourably 
repeats De Lubac’s statement that ‘Christianity is a humanism, else it is 
misunderstood’.128 His theological concern is not to construe the human as 
something finished and closed-off within itself, nor to envision God as a reality 
that is enclosed in its own substance. We can see in his work a tendency to 
connect the ‘metaphysical’ Middle Ages with the ‘humanistic’ and ‘poetic’ 
Renaissance, and therefore a heavy stress on human activity and production. 
However, the realm of human making is not something that can only exist by 
leaving behind the theological; instead, it is made possible and sustained by 
the theological alone. This project, which seeks to hold together the human 
and the divine through the transcendental of ‘making’, is what makes up 
Milbank’s vision of an ‘alternative modernity’, which runs throughout his 
entire oeuvre.129  
The concept of verbum or factum is of paramount importance for the 
present study, since it in fact contains everything that Milbank wants to say 
about the relationship between God and creation. How do we conceive of God? 
How do we conceive of the relation between God and the world? One way to 
imagine God and his relation to ‘other things’ could be that God in the first 
place is, that he in the second place knows or wills (himself and ‘other things’) 
and in the third place makes, or ‘undertakes action outside himself’. An 
important – if not the most important – feature of Milbank’s account of this 
relation is his deconstruction of this tripartite image. From Vico he adopts the 
idea that making is not something secondary (or even tertiary), but that there 
is a priority of the made. When we look at a product, at something made, we 
tend to separate it from the ‘idea that the maker had’. Milbank is eager to show 
that there is no knowledge that is separate from the product. If we want to 
point to the knowledge that the maker has of the product, we realise it is 
always ‘maker’s knowledge’. The real knowledge of the artistic product is the 
finished product itself.130 Milbank’s view on the priority of the made is closely 
                                                          
128 4.4.1; The Suspended Middle, 9. 
129 Already programmatically as a conclusion to the first volume of his Vico study: ‘An 
alternative version of modernity’, The Religious Dimension, 327-335.  
130 In several places in his work, Milbank tries to deconstruct the Aristotelian 
distinction between poiesis and praxis, or at least to point to their constant interaction. 
For Aristotle, praxis is an act which remains with the subject (intransitive, ‘doing’), 
whereas poiesis passes over into something external (transitive, ‘making’). Praxis is 
the activity most favoured by Aristotle and is connected with the realm of ethics. This, 
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connected with his view on the ‘indefinite’ character of our knowing and 
acting: ‘We do not really know what we are going to do until we have decided 
what to do and therefore have already done the thing. To decide is but to 
mime the action in advance.’131 An act is not a sheer product of a prior thought, 
but is ‘equiprimordial with knowing and being’ and thus in itself ‘embodied 
thought’, participating in the wider embodied thought of creation.  
By speaking in this way, Milbank launches a critique on a strict duality 
between cause and effect. If we call God ‘cause’ we must realise that to be the 
cause is simultaneously to be entirely in the effects, as Milbank maintains with 
the Neoplatonist notion of influentia.132 In lower causes, the ‘higher causes are 
always, in a covert fashion, more powerfully at work’. Likewise, God can be 
called ‘architect’ of the universe only if we consider that he not only 
constitutes the ‘formal ground plan’ of the world but is also ‘the 
comprehensive esse of the entire construction’.133  
An important expression that Milbank often uses in this context is ‘always 
already’. For example, God is not first unity and then difference, but since he is 
trinitarian, he is ‘always already difference’, he is always already emanating or 
going beyond himself. Another example derived from Milbank’s thought is the 
following. It is not so that we first think and then use language to express our 
thoughts, but thinking is ‘always already language’. In the same way, cultural 
mediation and making are not secondary activities, but are always already 
there, and not preceded by any passive state of ‘being’.134 
                                                                                                                                                   
says Milbank, is because for Aristotle it is hard to conceive of a ‘gain of being’ in the 
departure from pure reasoning towards an external goal. Milbank’s problem with this 
conception is that it presupposes that ‘the made’ is dependent on ‘pre-existing 
speculative knowledge’, whereas he himself would emphasise with Vico that every 
knowledge is ‘maker’s knowledge’, which is not to say that poesis ‘swallows’ theoria 
and praxis, but that they are ‘never free from some involvement with making’, The 
religious dimension, 95-96. Cf. The Word Made Strange, 123-124.  
131 Milbank, The Future of Love, 177.  
132 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 31-32; Beyond Secular Order, 42-49; 99-105. 
133 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 40-41, arguing that Aquinas thus ‘breaks with Aristotle’s 
psycho-political paradigm for metaphysics’.  
134 The expression ‘always already’ can be traced back to the works of Heidegger, 
Ricoeur and Derrida. Milbank mainly refers to Derrida’s On Grammatology, where he 
discusses the ‘Supplement of the Origin’. Milbank writes about this that ‘any ‘first’ 
thing for Derrida has consequently already manifested itself through something else’ 
(the most prominent example in Derrida’s work is that language is ‘always already’ 
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This is why Milbank is so strongly opposed to what he describes as the 
Kantian notion of knowing which allows for the finite realm no interruption of 
the infinite or transcendent. For human beings, making – and thus knowing – 
has an important element of uncertainty. If we complete a product it means 
that we finally have knowledge of it, but we simultaneously realise that this is 
not ‘it’, since our product is incomplete and only a partial realisation of ‘truth’. 
We realise that our works are located in an infinite work, that our works are 
parts of God’s continuous creation. Since our knowing is making, we know 
nothing definitively, but are constantly striving ahead to the completion of our 
knowledge, which ultimately lies in God. Our making and knowing is a 
successive and gradual becoming, but in God this is all realised ‘in a 
moment.’135 
As we have already seen, this implies that there is no distinction to be 
made in God between intra and extra. His ‘making’ does not come into view 
only in relation to creation, but God is creative in his very being. The Word of 
God, which he utters eternally, is not prior to reality, but is more like the sum 
of all reality. With a reference to Aquinas, Milbank states that ‘Creation takes 
place entirely in virtue of God’s activity ad intra’, and that creation is nothing 
but ‘reception of the fullness of the divine act’.136 Again, Milbank seeks to hold 
on to this paradox: ‘the world owes its entire continuing reality to God, yet is 
independent of God’. This does not imply that God is tied to the finite world, 
but creation is seen as an excessive effect of an ‘infinite inner creation’. As a 
consequence of this, we can say that for Milbank creation participates in the 
divine creation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
text), The Word Made Strange, 61. In fact, the Logos, the second person of the Trinity, 
functions in Milbank’s work as this ‘original supplement’.   
135 See e.g. The religious dimension, 130, where Milbank paraphrases Vico: ‘Whereas 
God is infinitum, humanity is quod tendit ad infinitum. Explicatio certainly implies a 
constant uncertainty as to our proper substance, but in escaping from our 
incompletion towards the divine comprehensio, we travel towards an unreachable 
point where our exact substance is known and realised (…). Createdness properly 
belongs to us as becoming, as facere, but our full particularity is sustained by the 
completion of this createdness, within the godhead itself.’ 
136 The religious dimension, 125. 
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4.5 Provisional Conclusions 
 
Although the reader may already have drawn some lines of connection 
between Milbank and Bavinck, that task will as such be postponed until the 
next and final chapter. Just as chapter three did for Bavinck, so this discussion 
of Milbank attempted to keep as close as possible to his own voice and 
discourse. The present chapter thus entered the specific ‘narration’ in which 
his theology is embedded, and sought to listen to its own vocabulary and 
illuminate it ‘from the inside out’. 
Why is it still so difficult to describe Milbank’s view on the relation 
between God and the world? Probably because his account of this relation 
does not have a clear linear development, starting a discussion of revelation, 
continuing with a doctrine of God which is again followed by an account of 
creation, and so on. His participatory view implies that it is always everything 
at once and that his work therefore has no clear starting point, but is, as he 
would himself say, ‘always already begun’. This does not mean, however, that 
a number of clear main points cannot be discerned. 
This study chose to read Milbank’s work as a ‘narration beyond secular 
reason’ and for that reason started with his views on the secular in Theology 
and Social Theory. To arrive at Milbank’s constructive side, one first has to 
follow his deconstructive work. In his account of the relation between God and 
the world, Milbank wants to reach ‘imaginatively’ beyond the secular position, 
in which he discerns two problematic areas. In the first place, the secular 
position is caught up within a sphere of necessary evil. The secular in fact 
‘redoes the fall’, since it imagines evil as something that exists necessarily 
alongside the good. Milbank seeks to avoid this position and wants to imagine 
the relationship between God and the world as a relation of the giving and 
receiving of God’s fullness of love, goodness and life.  
In the second place, the secular ‘fences off the finite’ since it claims to 
know what there is to know and permits no intermingling of the immanent 
with the transcendent.  
Although Milbank thinks that the secular in this way all too neatly separates 
the divine and the created, he nonetheless points to the idea of ‘univocity of 
being’ that in his mind underlies this outlook. In this way of thinking, the 
ontological stress is rather on discrete beings with their shared ‘univocal’ 
being, than it is on the divine esse (‘to be’) in which all beings ‘dimly share’. It 
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presupposes that our human concepts are unambiguously the same when we 
apply them to God. Not surprisingly, Milbank understands pantheism to be a 
possible consequence of this position: our goodness or our thinking is literally 
just a small ‘part of’ the divine goodness or thinking, which amounts to a much 
too literal view on ‘participation’, the very thing  Milbank wants to avoid. The 
other, most prominent consequence of univocity, however, is an unbridgeable 
rupture between God and the world. As such, God tends to become ‘a being’ – 
albeit ‘infinite’ – over against created beings.  
The path Milbank prefers is that of analogy: what we call ‘our being’ is just 
something borrowed of the divine being and is thus never finished, closed off 
and clearly knowable. Milbank’s treatment of our human knowing and acting 
therefore has a very open and uncertain character. This ‘postmodern’ 
emphasis on human ‘erring’ is connected with a rather ‘premodern’ stress on 
the fullness of God’s being, in which it nonetheless participates. Our knowing 
and being constantly points away from itself to God’s being. Knowing is the 
catching of a glimpse of the full, eternal and harmonious being of the triune 
God.  
In Milbank’s thought there is no ‘purity’. God and creation are not neatly 
set apart, and there is no way we can discuss either one of them separately. 
This appears most strikingly in Milbank’s account of the incarnation. Strictly 
speaking, there is nothing over against God, but on the other hand, we do 
speak and must speak, Milbank says, about the ‘independence of creation’. He 
sees this problem resolved in the Trinity: the world exists in the 
differentiation between the persons of the Trinity. The Trinity deconstructs 
any sharp distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’: ‘God’s decision to create 
and the performance of creation are included in the outgoing of the Son and 
the Spirit’.137 In this way, the world owes its independence of God to its 
dependence on God.  
Milbank’s Trinitarian undermining of the distinction between ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’ is consequently translated into a discourse on language as well as on 
making, which may be called a ‘constructivist’ view on the relation between 
God and the world. Since God’s being is in itself creative, emanative and 
utterly giving, there is no way to consider creation as something over against 
the divine being. The very word ‘and’ in the phrase ‘God and the world’ is a 
                                                          
137 ‘The Double Glory’, 190.  
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necessary one, but can also have disastrous connotations within a secular 
framework. The central ‘apologetic’ point of Theology and Social Theory fully 
marks Milbank’s participatory view: Human culture and development is not 
something that flourishes when we withdraw it from the divine being, but 









As was noted in the first chapter, this study attempts to make a contribution to 
the field of theology on several levels. In the first place, it takes its starting 
point and develops itself consciously in the sphere of wonder. Since it occupies 
itself with the relation between God and the world, it does not primarily aim at 
the development of knowledge, but at the deepening of mystery. It intends to 
be a way of speaking that searches for reverential silence. This level is the 
encompassing context within which the present study moves. 
In the second place, this study seeks to contribute to an existing 
theological discourse. It adds to and tries to deepen the discussion between 
Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed tradition. A discussion of this kind was 
held in 2003, but the issues that were under discussion are still relevant now. 
Considered within a wider scope, a deepening of this discussion also relates to 
the dialogue between Catholic and Protestant theology and church practices.  
Third, since the core of the discussion between RO and the Reformed 
tradition clearly lies in the concept of participation – ‘is it or is it not at home 
in Reformed theology?’ – the present study focuses on this concept. It chose 
Herman Bavinck as the representative for Reformed theology and John 
Milbank as the representative for RO. By now, it should have become clearer 
what participation implies for Milbank and in what sense Bavinck’s theology, 
consciously or unconsciously, is participatory. This chapter will continue the 
analysis and discussion of their theologies and consider how this analysis adds 
to the discussion between RO and the Reformed tradition. 
Taking up again the methodological comments in chapter 1, we recall that 
this study intends to work within the interplay between ‘belongingness’ and 
‘critical distance’.1 Instead of purely assessing positions from without, 
chapters 3 and 4 functioned to really ‘enter’ the thought of Bavinck and 
Milbank without allowing an imposed scheme to decide what is going to be 
found. It leaves intact what we in chapter 1 called the ‘event of being’ that 
                                                          
1 1.3, and esp. 1.3.5.  
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their works reveal. In these chapters, therefore, it was belongingness that 
stood at the forefront.  
Without altogether abandoning this emphasis, the fifth and final chapter 
does attempt to ‘position’ Bavinck and Milbank and to assess their positions. 
Although ‘judgement’ in the first place constitutes a wider task than that 
which is achieved in a single particular study, it remains true, as John Webster 
once remarked, that ‘any work in constructive systematic theology (…) 
requires the articulation of judgements’.2 This judging task is here considered 
in the way David Tracy describes the task of systematic theology: ‘to enter into 
a disciplined and responsive conversation with the subject matter – the 
responses and, above all, the fundamental questions – of the tradition’.3  
How then do Bavinck and Milbank contribute to what has been called the 
shared intention of RO and the Reformed tradition, namely ‘to keep God and 
creation in intimate connection, while honouring their difference’?4 In section 
1.2.3 we saw that Reformed theologians have been concerned that RO’s pre-
occupation with God and creation in terms of participation and analogy leads 
to the downplaying of their respective integrity. Meanwhile, the RO 
theologians have been concerned that the Reformed tradition allows too great 
a distance between God and creation and thus creates room for the secular. 
How does this in fact function in Bavinck and Milbank? By comparing and 
evaluating their  thought in the context of the concept of participation, this 
chapter hopes to provide answers to this question and therefore to deepen the 
discussion.  
A guiding principle in the discussion will be the question if Bavinck’s and 
Milbank’s conceptions are, what Vincent Brümmer called, ‘consonant with the 
tradition’. For Brümmer, consonance with the tradition is the first of four 
criteria for evaluating if some particular conceptual model is capable of 
functioning as a key-model (or ‘root metaphor’) which produces a coherent 
and integrating way of ‘understanding life and the world in relation to God’.5 
This study chooses to work with this first ‘criterion’ alone, which is then 
                                                          
2 J. Webster, ‘Theologies of Retrieval’, in J. Webster et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 583. 
3 Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 100.  
4 Olthuis in Smith and Olthuis (eds.) Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, 
284. Cf. 1.2.3. 
5 V. Brümmer, ‘Metaphorical thinking and systematic theology’, Nederlands 
Theologisch Tijdschrift 43 (1989), 222-228. 
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allowed to ‘absorb’ and reinterpret the elements of truth inherent in 
Brümmer’s remaining criteria: b) comprehensive coherence; c) adequacy for 
the demands of life and d) personal authenticity.6 He elucidates the factor of 
                                                          
6 As to Brümmer’s second criterion, the question will at least be relevant whether 
Bavinck’s or Milbank’s conceptions are nuanced, that is, whether they do not tend to 
overlook important aspects that are present in the broadness of the wisdom of the 
tradition.  
As to his third criterion, it is true that theologians cannot simply repeat the same 
considerations over and over again. Time has its own dynamics, which asks for 
flexibility and changing articulations of the tradition and even for changing 
conceptualities. It can also be necessary to criticise certain positions within the 
tradition. It is therefore a task that is as necessary as it is difficult for the theologian to 
ask constantly: ‘is this theological position or expression the right one today?’ Does it 
appeal to the present cultural and ecclesial situation? Does it articulate an answer to a 
‘need’, no matter how ‘traditional’? At this point, however, the present study intends 
to be more careful than Brümmer is. It agrees to some extent with his statement that 
‘changes in the demands of life bring about changes in the aspects of faith which are 
relevant and necessary in order to make sense of life and cope meaningfully with our 
experience of the world’. However, it is often so that precisely those parts of the 
tradition that are offensive, hard to digest or apparently outdated that you need most 
(as has been realised in recent decades with the once ‘outdated’ concept of the 
Trinity). One just has to look better, think more or often simply wait longer to 
understand why a certain aspect of the tradition or an articulation of it is in the end 
good and useful. The symbols of faith that have been handed down to us do not open 
themselves instantaneously, but have to be treated with patience, and are too rich to 
be easily put aside on the pretext of being outdated. Referring to one of the mottos of 
this study, we might say that they are ‘like closed chambers and books that are written 
in a very strange language’. Brümmer’s example in this respect is very revealing. He 
favourably quotes Sallie McFague who claims that the metaphor of  ‘Christ as the 
victorious king and lord’ in our present situation is irrelevant and harmful, since, as 
she claims, it considers evil as something ‘separate from human beings rather than as 
the outcome of human decisions and actions’. A new metaphor should do justice to our 
new sensibility, which is ‘the need for human responsibility in a nuclear age’. My 
problem with this approach is not the fact that this ‘new sensibility’ already sounds 
outdated (since being outdated within five years is part of the game in this way of 
considering theology), but the fact that a symbol, so rich and filled with expectation to 
be revealed and filled with new meaning, is put aside all too easily. There is no 
patience, no expectation for new meanings, and in short, no sense of tradition in 
McFague’s outlook.  
The fourth criterion is what Brümmer calls the ‘final court’ of personal integrity. This 
stance of personal freedom (although one might ask if we are actually ‘free’ to choose 
the path we want) seems so obvious that it does not warrant special attention in a 
criterion.  
In general, this study is unable to use all of Brümmer’s criteria since I do not support 
his view on theology which consciously makes it analogous to scientific research. 
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‘consonance with the tradition’ by stating that no matter how innovative 
theologians intend to be, they always receive their models and ways of 
speaking from the religious tradition in which they stand. The question that 
matters for this study is of course: ‘Which tradition do you mean?’ Otherwise 
stated, which tradition is decisive? Is it the Reformed tradition or the Catholic 
tradition or a particular current within these traditions? This study is written 
from the perspective of the Neo-Calvinist Reformed tradition, but it considers 
this tradition a very open one, also open to ways of thinking that might 
typically be undervalued within this tradition. As Bavinck realised and 
emphasised in his work, to stand in the Reformed tradition is to be connected 
with a catholic Christian identity. Milbank and Bavinck are therefore 
considered as working within one ‘catholic Christian’ space, with very 
different colourings, but dedicated to the same theological standards for 
which they can also be held responsible.7 Chapter 2 provided the conceptual 
tools and the theological virtues that make up the catholic space that will be 
used in this chapter.  
Moreover, Brümmer speaks of ‘consonance with’, not ‘submission to’ the 
tradition or some part of it. There is a lot of space for creative interpretation 
and the question of doing justice to ‘the tradition’ is an endless one. The 
tradition is far from a monolithic unity, but has many different voices and 
emphases. But the idea of ‘consonance’ expresses that a theological discourse 
has to be recognisable for those who consider themselves as part of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Although Brümmer is very cautious and careful about the use of models, and although 
he emphasises their provisional character and their necessary connection with 
metaphoric language, he depicts the theologian as constantly developing and probing 
models or key-models to see which one ‘works best’. This study does not adopt the 
notion that a theologian is someone who ‘works with a key model’. I would rather 
depict the theologian as someone who receives, interprets, translates and passes on 
what tradition hands down to him or her, constantly realising how open for creative 
interpretation the received symbols actually are (and, admittedly, Brümmer himself 
clearly articulates this stance in his description of the first criterion). As a theologian, 
you like any believer inhabit a story that is older and bigger than you are. If your 
current (‘modern’) view of the world does not ‘fit’ one or more aspects of the 
theological tradition, then perhaps you should listen longer and harder, instead of 
constantly changing and adapting your theological conceptuality. For a very concise 
articulation of the position assumed also in the present study over against Brümmer, 
cf. Webster, ‘Theologies of Retrieval’, 583-585, and the rest of the article.  
7 For a larger methodological discussion on the possibility to bring Bavinck and 
Milbank into one discussion, see 1.3. 
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Christian tradition and, moreover, that it is firmly rooted in the biblical and 
patristic sources. If, for example, one of the theologians under discussion is 
deemed to be seriously compromising God’s transcendence or immanence, 
this will be considered problematic.  
However, in considering the notion of ‘consonance with the tradition’, 
more important than the question whether Bavinck or Milbank cross some 
‘dangerous’ conceptual line is the question whether their views are developed 
carefully, with humble respect for that which is greater, namely the voice of 
tradition, the voice of Scripture. Because it would be hard to ‘probe the hearts’ 
of these theologians, we must approach that question mostly as a matter of 
tone, voice and attitude. Therefore, we will have to give serious consideration 
to the question if they move modestly and carefully into the very mysteries 
they describe. And although it is a difficult task, there is no way to discuss the 
consonance with the tradition without this layer of interpretation. Therefore, 
this fifth chapter intends to move within the ethos articulated by John 
Webster: ‘what is required are, once again, skills of theological judgement 
schooled by the Christian past, alert to present opportunity, and enacted with 
deference and hope.’8 The discussion in this chapter is foremost a matter of 
theological virtue.  
 
5.2 God and the world 
5.2.1 Pantheism? Panentheism?  
The central question that hovers over the conversation between Radical 
Orthodoxy and the Reformed tradition is if the concept of participation, as it 
was presented by Radical Orthodoxy, sufficiently honours the difference 
between the creator and creation. Does it not imply or at least tend to some 
form of pantheism if we say that the created being participates in the divine? 
Or should we rather call it panentheism – as has been suggested in a recent 
interpretation of John Milbank’s work?9 From an orthodox Reformed 
perspective, both implications seem to be unacceptable, since they would 
diminish the transcendence of God.10  
                                                          
8 Webster, ‘Theologies of Retrieval’, 596.  
9 A. Mir, ‘A panentheist reading of John Milbank’, Modern Theology 28 (2012), 526-560.  
10 Cf. B. Kamphuis, who on the one hand praises the position of panentheism for its 
emphasis on the intimate connection between God and the world and its vision of 
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However, one needs to ask what is meant by pantheism and panentheism, 
and to consider whether these terms are suitable for the discussion. To frame 
a theological discussion in terms of pantheism or panentheism (just like 
framing it in terms of transcendence and immanence) is to try to provide 
some clarity as to where a particular theology stands. Perhaps this is a clarity 
that is misleading, since the terms are of quite recent date and therefore 
anachronistic when they are related to a discussion of a premodern 
theological concept. To shed some light on the history and implications of 
these terms, this section will therefore begin with a brief overview on what 
pantheism and panentheism are taken to mean.  
Although it is often used as a name to ‘judge’ positions that identify God 
and the world too much, pantheism is in fact a position that strictly speaking is 
almost never taken in western theological positions. The word pantheism, 
coined by John Toland, gained popularity in the eighteenth century through 
the writings of Benedict Spinoza, and was linked closely with such words as 
deism, atheism and materialism, and is often simply synonymous with 
‘Spinozism’. Spinoza, in attempting to overcome Descartes’ spirit-matter 
dualism, applied the concept of substance exclusively to God. He therefore 
claimed that everything that is, is in fact a part of the divine.11  
The criticism often implied in the use of the word pantheism is not that the 
world is made ‘too divine’, but that the divine is made ‘too worldly’. It 
therefore empties God of meaning. However, even Spinoza was not, strictly 
speaking, a ‘pantheist’. Although he famously identified God and nature 
(aeternum (…) illud et infinitum Ens, quod Deum, seu Naturam appelamus), and 
although he rejected the idea of creation and assumed that this world emerged 
‘necessarily’ from God, his views on God and on nature were quite 
differentiated and do not imply a pure and unqualified pantheism, which 
                                                                                                                                                   
unity, but who on the other hand is also worried that God is so deeply pulled down 
into the world that ‘the horizon of our world has become decisive for speaking about 
God’. Is there still a ‘beyond’? B. Kamphuis, ‘Alles in alles: rehabilitatie van het 
panentheisme?’, Theologia Reformata 48 (2005), 194-206.  
11 C. Jamme, ‘Pantheismus’, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol. 25 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1995), 630-635; M. Wolfes, ‘Pantheismus’, Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, vol. 6 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 853-858; W. Schröder, 
‘Pantheismus’, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 7 (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 59-62.  
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Hegel took to mean that ‘everything, the particular things together, in their 
particularity, their accidentality, are God’.12  
A point of criticism on Spinoza’s conception that is of importance for this 
study is, in the words of F.H. Jacobi, that ‘he rejected any transition from the 
infinite to the finite’. Spinoza’s system lacked ‘the existence of a living God’. 
According to F. Schlegel, pantheism was a form of nihilism, since it denied the 
substantial autonomous existence of the finite (which sounds like the critique 
levelled against Radical Orthodoxy that it does not do justice to the ‘integrity of 
creation’). However, many Romantic thinkers and poets, who searched for a 
way to reach beyond the dualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment, felt a 
strong desire for a vision of unity and were attracted to the idea of a divine 
force in nature, which drove them to defend some form of Spinozism or 
pantheism.13  
If Spinoza’s pantheism is best labelled as ‘substantial’, in the sense that the 
world is divine as being literally a part of the divine substance, then the later 
Romantic references to pantheism are more ‘dynamic’ in character: God’s 
being unfolds itself in the development of history, in the world’s ‘becoming’. 
The pantheistic view was thus more historicised. However, thinkers who can 
be counted as part of this current, like Hegel and Schelling for example, never 
wanted to be identified with pantheism because they missed in it the 
fundamental notion of human freedom.  
In sum, pantheism usually denotes the view that does not wish to 
distinguish between God and the world, that does not believe in a 
supernatural or transcendent God nor in a personal God, but does consider the 
natural world as something inherently ‘divine’. The common thread running 
through the different discussions about pantheism was the question how the 
worldview that spawned from the natural sciences corresponded with an ‘all-
besouled’ cosmos. The ‘pantheistic option’ was to relate those two views as 
closely as possible, a standpoint that by the end of the nineteenth century 
became known as ‘monism’, as represented by E. Haeckel, W. Ostwald and 
                                                          
12 Jamme, ‘Pantheismus’, 630-631; Schröder, ‘Pantheismus’, 61.   
13 Jamme mentions (at least in some moment of their careers) Herder, Goethe, 
Schelling, Böhme, Novalis, Hölderlin (and to a lesser degree Hegel). E. Quapp expands 
this list by discussing Lessing and Schleiermacher in his part of the article 
(‘Pantheismus’, III. Theologiegeschichtlich, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, 635-641).  
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others. Pantheism and materialism appeared to be two sides of the same 
coin.14  
The other word that often appears in the discussion, ‘panentheism’, came 
into use in the nineteenth century as a criticism on (what was called) classical 
theism on the one hand, and pantheism on the other. As a term it was first 
introduced by K. F. Krause, a student of Hegel and Fichte. Panentheism sees 
the world as immanent in God, but still emphasises God’s transcendence, so 
that the world does not coincide with God. Usually, panentheism continues the 
Hegelian line of thought in which the world’s becoming is seen as a 
development within God.  
As John Macquarrie describes it, panentheism is in fact closer to a theistic 
than a pantheistic position, but has serious problems with a number of classic 
theistic views. Theism is thus thought to leave God and the world too much in 
isolation, to have an image of God that is not touched by the suffering and evil 
in the world (as in the classical divine attributes of eternity, immutability and 
impassibility). According to the panentheist position, the problem with 
‘classical theism’ is that the existence and development of the world do not 
add something to God’s being and plenitude.15 In a recent and nuanced 
account of panentheism, Philip Clayton emphasizes that the crucial notion of 
‘in’ (the ‘en’) of panentheism works in both directions, and therefore contains 
a metaphorical tension. The ‘in’ works in both directions since the world is ‘in’ 
God and at the same time God is ‘in’ the world. ‘God depends on the world 
because the nature of God’s actual experience depends on the interactions 
with finite creatures like ourselves’, Clayton has it.16 Therefore, he emphasizes 
that the notion of the interdependence of God and the world is central to the 
concept of panentheism. The current study follows Clayton in considering this 
notion crucial for the panentheistic position.   
According to Macquarrie, the concept of the Trinity, according to which the 
Son and the Spirit are as equally ‘God’ as the Father is, connected God and the 
world so closely that it can already be called ‘panentheistic’. However, only 
those views are called explicitly panentheistic a) that are influenced by 
                                                          
14 Jamme, ‘Pantheismus’, 634. 
15 J. Macquarrie, ‘Panentheismus’, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol 25 (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 611-615.  
16 P. Clayton, ‘Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective’, P. Clayton and 
A. Peacocke (eds.), In whom we live and move and have our being: Panentheistic 
Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 83. 
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philosophical conceptions with panentheistic implications, such as 
Neoplatonism or Hegelianism; or b) that focus on the biblical witnesses of 
God’s involvement with human history, including the cosmological 
speculations in the letters to the Ephesians and the Colossians.17  
The lines between theism, panentheism and pantheism are in practice 
rather diffuse. Here the terms in question are considered not as timeless 
conceptual positions, but as historically evolved articulations of a desire ‘to 
keep God and the world in intimate connection’ that more or less fail to 
effectively articulate the difference between them.18 Panentheism, with its 
crucial notion of ‘in’ at least distinguishes God and the world more than the 
view that ‘everything is God’. In contrast to pantheism, which is usually just a 
label one wants to avoid, panentheism is a more ‘respectable stance’ within 
the Christian tradition, although it considers itself a break with classical, 
traditional positions. Pantheism presupposes an identification of God and the 
world, whereas panentheism sees God as ‘more than the world’. The 
panentheistic view also sees God as more ‘personal’ and ‘relational’ than 
pantheism does. However, although different accounts reach high levels of 
sophistication, it seems that particularly in its dominant Hegelian guise, 
panentheism involves God being in some way ‘dependent’ on the becoming of 
                                                          
17 Macquarrie, ‘Panentheismus’, 613. Also based on the Pauline cosmological 
speculations (particularly the expression panta en pasin in 1 Cor. 15), G.H. van Kooten 
concludes that ‘Hegel’s panentheism cannot necessarily be considered heterodox’. G. 
H. van Kooten, The Pauline Debate on the Cosmos: Graeco-Roman Cosmology and Jewish 
Eschatology in Paul and in the Pseudo-Pauline Letters to the Collosians and the 
Ephesians (Ph. D. diss., Leiden University, 2001), thesis VIII of the added theses, cf. 93-
97. 
18 Considering these terms as ‘historically evolved articulations of a desire’ is a way to 
depart from e.g. Charles Hartshorne’s position, which discusses different expressions 
of pan(en)theism in a ‘modal table’. By using modal concepts of necessity and 
contingency he indeed manages to classify different ideas about the relation between 
God and the created world, and this ‘with a precision not customary in the past’, as he 
himself claims. Unfortunately, the precision an overview of this kind delivers is false 
and self-deluded. A way of speaking or ‘discourse’ about God and the world should be 
and remain what it is: a way of speaking, a discourse. Something of the necessary 
ambiguity of language is betrayed when a discourse is translated into a clearly 
delineated ‘logical position’. C. Hartshorne, ‘Pantheism and Panentheism’, The 
Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 11 (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 
165-171.   
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the world, which implies a break with the theological tradition and thus an 
important lack of ‘consonance with’ it.19  
In the following sections, the analysis of Bavinck’s and Milbank’s positions 
on the relation between God and the world will be continued and the 
conceptual implications of their views will be clarified. Since the discussion 
between Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed tradition is often framed within 
the terms pantheism and/or panentheism, these terms will here function as 
interpretive tools. It should be kept in mind, however, that these terms, as 
modern philosophical conceptions, are not necessarily the best to interpret 
theological positions that are based on a premodern participatory theology.   
 
5.2.2 Bavinck: between pantheism and deism 
In his discussion of the doctrine of God and creation, Bavinck describes 
himself as attempting to steer a middle course between pantheism on the one 
hand and deism on the other.20 These two terms in fact ‘frame’ the discussion 
about God and the world for Bavinck: pantheism confuses them, whereas 
deism strictly opposes them.  The concept of panentheism, it should be noted, 
is absent in his work. Superficially read, Bavinck’s theology seems to posit 
pantheism and deism as the extremes that he wants to find a nuanced middle 
                                                          
19 This continues to be the case in sophisticated, sensible accounts of panentheism, 
like those of John Macquarrie and Philip Clayton. The world must ‘add’ something to 
God, otherwise he is not touched by our suffering. It is a matter of interdependence, as 
Clayton emphasises. Macquarrie, ‘Panentheismus’; P. Clayton, ‘Panentheism’, 81-84. 
20 See RD2, 331 (GD2, 298), discussing the Trinity: ‘The church fathers already 
observed that this doctrine rejects the errors of, while absorbing the elements of truth 
inherent in, Deism and pantheism, monism and polytheism. Deism creates a vast gulf 
between God and his creatures, cancels out their mutual relatedness, and reduces God 
to an abstract entity (…). Pantheism, though it brings God nearer to us, equates him 
with the created world, erases the boundary line between the Creator and the 
creature, robs God of any being or life of his own, thus totally undermining religion. 
But the Christian doctrine of the Trinity makes God known as essentially distinct from 
the world, yet having a blessed life of his own.’ See also RD2, 382 (GD2, 420), where 
Bavinck discusses the notion of creatio ex nihilo: ‘The doctrine of creation out of 
nothing, in fact, gives to Christian theology a place between Gnosticism and Arianism, 
that is, between pantheism and Deism’. And lastly RD2, 598-604 (GD2, 558-563), 
where Bavinck explicitly discusses pantheism and deism: ‘Pantheism knows of no 
distinction between the being of God and the being of the world and – idealistically – 
lets the world be swallowed up in God or – materialistically – lets God be swallowed 
up in the world.’ Clearly, pantheism and deism do not denote for Bavinck historical, 
modern concepts, but ‘eternal’ enemies of true Christianity.  
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to, which he considers the only truly Christian way of speaking. This is, 
however, not a completely accurate picture of what Bavinck is doing. The 
deistic view that strictly opposes God and the world on an ontological level is 
never an interesting option for him. The pantheistic view, however, which 
emphasises the divine presence in the created world, does function as an 
interesting conversation partner for him.21 Bavinck’s work can therefore be 
read as a great effort to posit Christianity against pantheism, while absorbing 
what he in fact considers to be its good and healthy intuitions. Just as Bavinck 
repeatedly asserts that Christianity does not believe that ‘grace destroys 
nature’ but that ‘grace fulfils nature’, he can analogously be said to assert that 
Christianity does not destroy the pantheistic view, but fulfils its desires.  
Although, as we saw throughout chapter 3, Bavinck’s theology witnesses a 
great pursuit for unity and harmony by which he is connected with the 
Romantic thinkers of the nineteenth century, he argues that the pantheistic 
urge for ‘identity’, ‘to see the whole as governed by a single principle’, simply 
leads to a dry, abstract view on the world which does not do justice to its 
richness and diversity.22 Particularly in The Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck 
criticises the ‘monistic’ view on the world as he observes its articulation in the 
natural sciences as well as in pantheistic theological proposals, according to 
which ‘the divine revelation must be co-extensive with all that exists’.23 In 
                                                          
21 For example, Bavinck accuses the pantheistic position of ‘arrogance’, but he also 
notes that it ‘testifies of deeper thought and warmer feeling’ than deism. 
Notwithstanding the strong dismissal, these expressions are for Bavinck important 
articulations of appreciation; articulations that are always absent when he discusses 
deism. H. Bavinck, De wetenschap der h. godgeleerdheid , 14.  
22 Bavinck gives the core of his argument against pantheism a strong rhetorical and 
aesthetic force: ‘The pantheistic identity of thought and being proved to be in error, all 
the more because “Substance”, the “Idea”, the “All”, or however pantheism may 
designate the Absolute, is not a fullness of being but pure potentiality, an abstraction 
without content, a mere nothing. And this is supposed to be the explanation of the 
riches of the world, the multiplicity of the existent! Let those believe it who can!’, RD2, 
413 (GD2, 376). Cf. RD2, 435 (GD2, 399), which claims that pantheism and its ‘sister’ 
materialism ‘fail to appreciate the richness and diversity of the world; erase the 
boundaries between heaven and earth, matter and spirit, soul and body, man and 
animal, intellect and will, time and eternity, Creator and creature, being and nonbeing 
and dissolve all distinctions in a bath of deadly uniformity’. 
23 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, 14-15. Bavinck refers to the proponents of a so-
called ‘New Theology’ which in his days tried to ‘identify revelation and evolution’ and 
asserted that God is ‘that which is implied in all being, the reality behind all 
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3.3.1 we saw that Bavinck accuses Schelling of the same habit: to fully equate 
the world and God’s revelation. What is significant for this study is that 
Bavinck criticises the ‘Romantic pantheists’ in one breath with Neoplatonic 
Christian thinkers who likewise diffuse the divine and the created.24 The 
Romantic pantheists are equated with the representatives of ‘Neoplatonic 
mysticism’ who speak of the divinisation of man and obliterate the boundary 
between the Creator and creation. Bavinck criticises these thinkers because 
they do not distinguish between God’s being and this world’s becoming. They 
include the becoming of the world in God’s Trinitarian life and therefore their 
view on ‘cosmogony’ (the becoming of the world) turns into ‘theogony’ (the 
becoming of God). Bavinck, on the other hand, explicitly considers it his task 
as a Reformed theologian to maintain the difference between Creator and 
creation.25  
Notwithstanding his strong demarcation from pantheism, however, 
Bavinck still wants to develop his theology along the way that ‘absorbs the 
elements of truth’ inherent in pantheism. This way is indicated by the doctrine 
of the Trinity, which Bavinck considers to be the very heart of Christian 
theology and therefore of any articulation of the relation between God and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
phenomena, the sum of the forces of the universe’, cf. Campbell, R.J. The New Theology 
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1907).  
24 See 3.2.2 of this study, which refers to RD1, 112 (GD1, 89) and RD1, 167 (GD1, 142). 
Bavinck mentions e.g. Philo, Scotus Eriugena, Pseudo-Dionysius and Eckhart together 
with thinkers like Böhme, Baader, Schelling and Hegel. To these two references we can 
add RD1, 148 (GD1, 123), where Bavinck criticises Roman Catholic mysticism, and an 
interesting section in RD 372-373 (GD1, 343), in which he discusses different views on 
miracles, and where he discusses the particular view that sees the miracle as 
something inherently belonging to human nature – in this sense opposing 
enlightenment rationalism. Bavinck summarises his critique on this view as follows: ‘It 
confuses the natural with the supernatural, the supernatural with the 
religious/ethical, and erases the boundaries between prophecy and divination, 
miracle and magic, inspiration and illumination’. Clear as this may seem, however, the 
discussion on Bavinck’s view on revelation offered in this study (3.3.2) attempted to 
show how great Bavinck’s ambiguities are in this respect. At least one part of Bavinck 
does proclaim the ‘supernaturalizing of the natural’.  
25 Bavinck took this stance also in his criticism on the Dutch current of the so-called 
‘ethical theology’ of Chantepie de la Saussaye and others. Notwithstanding his high 
estimation of their work, he sees their thought as developing a basically ‘pantheistic’ 
line, associated with Schelling, Hegel and Schleiermacher. In their work, ‘the ground 
error is of course the wiping out of the distinction between the Creator and creation’. 
H. Bavinck, De theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye: Bijdrage tot de 
kennis der ethische theologie (Leiden: Donner, 1884), 88.   
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world. In chapter 3 we saw how Bavinck’s emphasis on the Trinity coincides 
with his emphasis on God’s communicability. Renouncing the Trinity is for 
Bavinck the heart of any heresy, since it does not honour the mystery that he 
considers to be the very backbone of Christian theology: that God 
communicates himself while remaining the same.26 For that reason, he 
sketches the divine as being full of life, ‘capable of expansion, unfolding and 
communication’. Bavinck stresses the ancient Christian notion of God’s 
fecundity to emphasise the productivity at the heart of the godhead. The 
processions in God are not identical with, but nonetheless indispensable for, 
God’s workings in time. Bavinck in this context often uses the language of 
‘archetype’ and ‘ectype’. For example, the eternal generation of the Son is said 
to be the archetype of the creation of man. God’s internal communication is 
the archetype of his communication ad extra.27 God’s triunity, expressing 
God’s communicability, has led Christianity throughout the ages on a road 
between the deviations represented by pantheism and deism, since it keeps a 
close connection between God and the world ‘while honouring their 
difference’. As we will argue below, it is his emphasis on God’s 
communicability that connects Bavinck’s work with the tradition of 
participation.  
A remaining difficult question in Bavinck’s conception is if there is strictly 
speaking an ‘outside’ to God. His repeated emphasis on the distinction 
between the internal and the external processions seems to confirm that this 
is indeed the case. However, in 3.4.2 of this study it was pointed out that 
Bavinck in fact asserts both that there is and that there is not an outside to 
God. Although it is the former assertion that stands in the forefront of his 
conception, he does clearly articulate also the latter: ‘The creation does not 
exist as a result of a passage of the world from being in God to being outside of 
God (…). The world is certainly no anti-God; it has no independent existence, 
and remains in God as its ongoing immanent cause’. Such a statement clearly 
echoes the Neoplaonic view that ‘the effect remains in the cause’.28 Bavinck 
writes this in the context of the doctrine of creation. There is, from the 
perspective of God’s being, no real ‘boundary’ that is crossed when the world 
is created. There is no literal ‘distance’ between God and the world, as there is 
                                                          
26 See 3.4.2 of this study. 
27 See 3.4.2; RD2, 333 (GD2, 299-300). 
28 RD2, 419 (GD2, 382). 
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between a king and his realm.29  The created world ‘does not exist apart from 
him or in opposition to him, but continues to rest in his spirit’.30  
If we try to clarify theological language in terms of the ‘boundary’ between 
Creator and creation, in Bavinck’s theology the ‘boundary’ seems only to exist 
from the perspective of creation. The ‘outside’ of the world is not strictly 
speaking an outside to God. On the one hand Bavinck can state that immutable 
being ‘posits’ the mutable world of becoming outside of itself ‘as on a stage’, 
and that there is no ‘transition’ between the two, nor something that mediates 
between them. And, to be sure, ‘there is a deep gulf between the being of God 
and that of all creatures’.31 In this way Bavinck emphasises the ‘externality’ of 
the world in relation to God, but on the other hand he also stresses that in the 
world God in fact ‘sees his own image reflected’. God does not see the world 
for its own sake, but for himself. In God’s ‘willing’ of the world he in fact wills 
himself. In the world, God reveals himself ‘to delight in the glorification of his 
own excellences’.32  
We saw in chapter 3 that creation for Bavinck is characterised as a 
movement from God to God, and that anything created has to be seen in the 
light of this all-important movement. Dogmatics according to Bavinck 
describes ‘God, always God, from beginning to end – God in his being, God in 
his creation, God against sin, God in Christ, God (…) guiding the whole of 
creation back to the objective he decreed for it: the glory of his name.’33 No 
matter how deeply we enter into the story of creation, its fall and its 
redemption, it remains a story about God in everything.  
 
5.2.3 Participation in Bavinck 
If we interpret Bavinck’s theology as a quest for an orthodox Christian path 
between pantheism and deism (where the former is actually the only 
interesting conversation partner to him), what is then the key concept guiding 
his view? Among the many possible answers, this study emphasised Bavinck’s 
use of the image of God’s communicability. It started with the suggestion 
articulated by Barend Kamphuis and Gerrit Riemer that Bavinck’s idea of 
                                                          
29 GD2, 139.  
30 RD2, 262 (GD2, 227). 
31 RD2, 158-159 (GD2, 128-129). 




God’s communicability might lead to an interpretation of his theology which 
comes close to the notion of participation.34 The survey of the concept of 
participation provided in this study, combined with its reading of Bavinck’s 
work, cannot but confirm this hypothesis. His extensive use of the concept as it 
became apparent in chapter 3 is in fact the way his theology unconsciously 
moves itself into the orbit of participation. Bavinck’s stress on God’s 
communicability reveals his openness to the concept of participation. This will 
be demonstrated more clearly in section 4.2.4 below.35  
It ought to be clear that Bavinck himself, at least if we simply look at the 
surface of his text, is not fond of the concept of participation. For him it has too 
much a ‘flavour’ of emanation, which he considers an overly pantheistic notion 
for viewing the relation between God and the world. However, it should be 
noted in the first place that Bavinck formally does agree with the concept of 
participation, as will be demonstrated in what follows. In the second place, in 
section 4.2.4 it will be argued that participation occupies a greater place in his 
thought than his purely formal assent to the concept together with his 
hesitancy actually to use the word would seem to suggest. Here the emphasis 
Bavinck places on God’s communicability will be the guiding principle.   
In line with the tradition, Bavinck is not averse to denoting God with the 
word ‘being’. He does not consider this term as an abstractum, but as ‘the 
richest, most perfect, most intensive, most determinate and concrete, absolute 
and simple Being’.36 With the tradition, Bavinck reserves the word esse for 
God. God is ‘the real, true being, the fullness of being, the sum total of all 
reality and perfection, the totality of being, that grants all other beings 
existence, an immeasurable and unbounded ocean of being’.37 Speaking in this 
vein, Bavinck even claims (unconsciously pace Schelling) that the whole world 
                                                          
34 1.2.4. 
35 Bavinck’s reliance on (Neo-)Platonic conceptuality has been observed by Veenhof 
and Bremmer: ‘Bavinck is (…) more in line with Platonism and Neoplatonism than 
with Aristotelianism’ (Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 126); ‘In the great systems of 
Plato, Augustine and Thomas, Bavinck found the answers to the questions that 
modern times and modernism posed for dogmatics’ (Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als 
Dogmaticus, 331). To my knowledge, a discussion of the specific theme of 
‘participation’ in Bavinck (closely linked with a discussion of Thomas Aquinas) can 
only be found in H. Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God (Amsterdam: Ph.D. 
Thesis, Free University, 1995), 40-61. 
36 3.4.1, RD2, 121 (GD2, 90). 
37 3.4.1, RD2, 123 (GD2, 93). 
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is therefore a revelation of God. Notably, he asserts that ‘God, the source and 
archetype of man, is himself all that in which creatures share: being and life and 
spirit, knowledge, holiness and righteousness.’38 Bavinck even seems to 
propagate a position that, taken literally, is panentheistic, when he claims that, 
‘instead of saying that God is in all things, it would be better to say that all 
things are in him’.39  
However, rather than panentheism, Bavinck’s rendering of the relation 
between God and the world can instead be interpreted in terms of 
participation. The preceding quotes were taken from Bavinck’s discussion of 
the divine attributes. In this discussion he makes it clear that they all say both 
‘is’ and ‘is not’ about God. Bavinck contends that God’s being which he has, ‘so 
to speak, in common with all creatures’, does not pertain to him ‘in the same 
sense as it does to them, univocally, but only in an analogical sense’.40 When 
Bavinck points out that God’s being is at the same time the complete 
surpassing of all our created being (the via eminentiae) as well as the complete 
negation of all our created being (the via negationis) he refers to the use that 
has been made in the Christian tradition of the ‘analogy’ between the creator 
and the created, which, according to him, finds its roots in Plato’s idea that 
‘only God is good by himself, but the creatures only by metoche’ 
(participation).41 In this way, Bavinck connects his preference for the 
analogical way of speaking about the relation between God and the world with 
the notion of participation, a connection which this study also observed in 
chapter 2 above.  
When we move to his discussion of the doctrine of creation, we find 
Bavinck mentioning participation also here, albeit more hesitatingly. Bavinck 
is averse to any notion of ‘emanation’ in the doctrine of creation – this in his 
eyes implies pantheism. For this reason he is also hesitant towards the notion 
of ‘participation’ as it was used in the tradition. However, when the Scholastics 
spoke of ‘the creature’s participation in the being and life of God’, Bavinck 
claims that they did not mean ‘emanation in the strict sense, as if God’s own 
being flowed out into his creatures and so unfolded in them.’ They only meant 
to say ‘that God is ens per essentiam, but the creature ens per 
                                                          
38 RD2, 135 (GD2, 106), my italics. See 3.4.1.  
39 RD2, 167 (GD2, 138).  
40 RD2, 121 (GD2, 91). 
41 RD2, 131 (GD2, 101). 
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participationem’.42 Bavinck time and again emphasises that God and creation 
have a being ‘of their own’, but that the being of creation finds its source and 
end in God’s being. Purged from the notion of emanation, participation is a 
useful and welcome concept to express the relation between God and the 
world.  
Now and then, however, Bavinck seems simply to oppose God and the 
world as two different principles, without any participatory relation at all. For 
example, contra Hegel who took God and the world together in one movement 
of ‘becoming’, Bavinck emphasises that ‘becoming’ belongs to the world and 
not to God. To God, on the other hand, belongs the word ‘being’. Again, Bavinck 
takes the traditional path according to which God does not become or change. 
But how are we to understand that? Do God and the world suddenly live in 
separate domains, perhaps only interrupted by Jesus Christ who uniquely did 
unite these two principles? The picture is more subtle than that, since Bavinck 
makes it clear that the becoming of this world only exists because of the being 
of God. This world only becomes, develops, moves in a certain direction, 
because God’s being is its ‘motor’. Without God’s being, the world would not 
become in any way whatsoever; it would simply float around in nothingness 
with a ‘monotonous tumult in the ocean of being’.43 Bavinck assumes that 
God’s being somehow penetrates everything that makes this world what it is.44 
Paraphrasing Bavinck, we could say that this world becomes, since it 
participates in God’s being. God’s esse does not denote the separation with 
creation, but denotes his utter communicability as well as creation’s 
dependence on and participation in this esse.45  
                                                          
42 RD2, 419 (GD2, 382).  
43 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 59. Cf. W. Huttinga, ‘Een eentonig 
golfgeklots in den oceaan van het zijn’, in A. Flipse and G. Harinck (eds.) Waar komen 
we vandaan? Anderhalve eeuw evolutiedebat in protestants-christelijk Nederland (Ter 
Lezing vol. 8, Historisch Documentatiecentrum voor het Nederlands Protestantisme, 
2011), 20.  
44 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing 57: ‘There is divine dynamis, divine 
energeia at work in the world, and because of them the things are and work. The 
divine energy is the source of all powers and energies in created beings, and since this 
divine energy is not a blind power, but is led by divine wisdom, the powers and 
workings in the world also show direction and course.’ 
45 This could have been emphasised more in the (generally very correct) rendering of 
Bavinck’s ontology in J. Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That Is the Question: Locating 
the Actualistic in Bavinck’s Ontology’, J. Bowlin (ed.) The Kuyper Center Review. Vol 2: 
Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 109-121. Eglinton is 
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This participatory view characterises Bavinck’s entire discussion of God’s 
attributes. God’s eternity is to Bavinck on the one hand something that places 
us at the ultimate boundary: ‘As living, thinking beings in time, we stand 
before the mystery of eternal uncreated being and marvel.’ But this does not 
put us strictly over against God, since Bavinck also contends that in every 
moment in time beats the ‘pulse of eternity’. Or, to give another example, God 
is immutable, but ‘he nevertheless, as it were, lives the life of his creatures and 
participates in all their changing states’.46 And to conclude the series, Bavinck 
adds that God’s omnipresence, his not being confined by space, on the one 
hand precludes attributing any locality to God, but on the other hand he claims 
that ‘the relation of God to space is such that as the infinite One, existing 
within himself, God fills to repletion every point of space and sustains it by his 
immensity.’ Although Bavinck does not actually mention the concept of 
participation, he in fact claims about all of these attributes that creation is 
because it participates in God’s being, a view which is necessarily 
accompanied by an analogical and non-univocal way of viewing this relation.47  
                                                                                                                                                   
right to see Bavinck’s emphasis on the ontological distance between God and the 
world, which indeed can be summarized as the difference between ‘being and 
becoming’. He is also right in focusing on the organic, which he interprets through a 
Trinitarian lens, as a principle that still holds them closely together. Nevertheless, 
Eglinton remains overly defensive when he states that ‘this becoming  (of the world, 
wh) occurs separately from true being (of God, wh); God’s being is the cause of the 
universe’s becoming’. According to Eglinton this last sentence is supposed to mean 
that ‘being the cause’ is ‘being separate’ from the thing caused, an implication which is 
not only contradicted by the Platonic-Christian tradition on causation, but also by 
Bavinck, who, borrowing intensely from this tradition, never pictures God and the 
world simply as standing over against each other. Furthermore, Eglinton too easily 
pictures Christ in Bavinck’s work as the unique ‘unity of being and becoming’, 
although he correctly demonstrates the relatedness of Christ with Bavinck’s 
conception of man as imago dei, and therefore the interrelatedness between 
Christology and anthropology in Bavinck’s theology. These small but significant 
comments on Eglinton’s article show that, as the present study also hopes to show, the 
last word has not yet been spoken on Bavinck’s ontology.  
46 A remarkable expression, since in the Platonic tradition, the lower can participate in 
the higher, but not the other way around. If Bavinck were to follow through the 
implications of this statement, he would end up in a Hegelian position.  
47 Although Henry Jansen performs a thorough analysis of Bavinck’s account of the 
divine being (which he considers to be closely related to Thomas Aquinas’ account), I 
cannot agree with the contrast he draws between the ‘philosophical language of being’ 
and the ‘personal, biblical and more relational’ way of speaking that he himself 
prefers. Jansen does well to observe that both these ‘idioms’ are present in Bavinck, 
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Bavinck’s primary concern is not to make this relation between God and 
the world transparent, but to reveal its mystery: ‘it is a mystery that God can 
reveal himself and to some extent make himself known in created beings: 
eternity in time, immensity in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in 
change, being in becoming, the all, as it were, in that which is nothing.’48 This 
respect for mystery once again connects Bavinck with the Christian thinkers of 
the participatory tradition, for example with Gregory of Nyssa, who respected 
the mystery of the fact that spatial and temporal things come forth from God, 
while Plotinus saw the explaining of this ‘forthcoming’ as the very task of 
philosophy.49 
The strange ambiguity in Bavinck’s work, namely that the created world in 
some way is and in some way is not ‘outside God’, can be explained by his 
participatory outlook. Bavinck thinks along the same lines we discerned in 
Thomas Aquinas: God, defined as esse, has the character of an abundant 
fountain of all that is good, life, beauty and so on. God contains all that we find 
good in creation, since the only reason creation exists is its sharing in the 
divine being. This is the participatory view that Bavinck shares with Thomas 
and the rest of the participatory tradition as discussed in chapter 2 above.  
As such, the divine in creation seems to be pulled down, or perhaps 
creation is elevated to the level of the divine. Interestingly, however, when 
Bavinck notices that his (often implicit) use of participatory language seems to 
connect the being of God and of creation so intimately, he does not have to 
withdraw from the participatory tradition to emphasise the difference 
between creator and creation. He simply expresses its double outcome, just 
like Thomas Aquinas did: God’s knowability, the communicability of his 
goodness, his abundance of life is so extreme to created being that it at the 
same time surpasses all that we can know, comprehend or are capable of 
receiving. It is, to Thomas as well as to Bavinck, God’s very communicability 
                                                                                                                                                   
but he does not honour the fact that a classical theological discourse contains and 
transcends but does not deny a personal and even ‘relational’ account of the divine. 
The language of God as esse does not make him ‘less a person’ but rather transcends 
and fulfils everything we consider as personhood. Jansen, Relationality and the 
Concept of God. 
48 3.4.1 
49 2.2.3; von Ivánka, Plato Christianus, 177.  
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that makes him so inconceivable.50 As always in the participatory tradition, 
Bavinck adduces the image of the sun: we see by the grace of the light of the 
sun, but we cannot stand to look into the sun itself, since it overwhelms us 
with our limited capacity to receive. This is fully in line with Bavinck’s 
insistence on the interrelatedness of God’s communicable and 
incommunicable attributes. God is both polynomos and anonymos, so we can 
say that in a sense he is everything we love, but at the same time none of that. 
Bavinck’s preference for analogy, between pure univocity and equivocity, 
leads him with Thomas into the participatory sphere: Naming God is naming 
‘the excelling principle of whose form the effect falls short.’ 
 
5.2.4 Participation as communicability 
Bavinck therefore sometimes explicitly, often implicitly, but always carefully 
concurs with the traditional Christian notion of participation. Much more than 
his hesitant use of the word itself, his account of the relation between God and 
the world, as was already evident in the former section, is full of participatory 
language and conceptuality. 
The way Bavinck speaks of the way God’s being is related to the beings of 
creatures is simply an affirmation of the traditional participatory idea that 
creatures are inasmuch as they participate in the being of God. He therefore 
adopts participatory metaphors, like the sun with its rays or God as the ‘ocean 
of being’.51 God as the unbounded ocean of being refers to the views on God as 
energein katharon (2.2.2) and Thomas’ colouring of God’s esse as actus purus 
(2.2.6). Therefore, Bavinck falls in with the traditional view that nothing can 
be added to the divine being as well as the view, so typical of the participatory 
stance, that God in fact does not ‘relate’ to the world, but that the situation is 
simply the other way around: this world exists in its relatedness to and its 
sharing in the divine esse.52 Bavinck, in accordance with the participatory 
view, describes the divine as fully actualized being, full of life; God is ‘capable 
of expansion, unfolding and communication’. Although Bavinck is careful to 
avoid connotations of emanation, God’s being for him has the character of a 
                                                          
50 For this conception in Thomas, see 2.2.6 of this study, particularly the end of the 
section. 
51 2.2.2 and 2.2.8 
52 See 2.2.2 on the appearance of this idea in the Commentary on the Parmenides, 2.2.6 
for its development in Thomas Aquinas and 2.2.8 in the conclusions.  
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flowing fountain, a source of productivity and fertility. And although Bavinck 
is keen to emphasise that creation is not a necessary outflow of God’s being 
but a product of his will (as discussed in 3.4.3), he still ‘naively’ adopts the 
poetic language of Willem Bilderdijk, comparing God with a little finch in the 
poplars which cannot but pour out its heart, which ‘sings and knows no other 
goal’. 
It is, however, foremost the central concept of God’s communicability that 
connects Bavinck with the participatory tradition. Gregory of Nyssa 
considered the susceptibility of the gracious communication of the divine as 
the very core of what it is to be created, as we saw in 2.2.3. Finite being is itself 
nothing but the openness for divine communication. Bavinck agrees and 
works with this traditional image of God as fecund, productive, communicative 
being and creation as the openness for this communication. This is the same 
image that was also preferred by a thinker like Jonathan Edwards: God’s 
nature, which is to him foremost characterised by beauty, cannot but ‘appear, 
shine forth, manifest and communicate itself’ (although Bavinck would be 
worried by Edwards’ all too easy ‘emanative’ picture and the language of the 
‘enlargement’ of God’s being in this process).53  
God’s communicability, expressed first and foremost in the Trinity, can be 
considered as the ontological cornerstone of Bavinck’s theology, as chapter 3 
made clear. ‘Communicability’, however, is not the only concept that for 
Bavinck expresses how the being of the Triune God relates to the being of the 
world. Bavinck frequently uses typical nineteenth-century language and 
concepts of the ‘organic’ to express this relation, as well as the word 
‘correspondence’ which occurs repeatedly in his writings. Bavinck perceives 
God’s communicability, through his Trinitarian being, in all the world: in the 
organic relation between subject and object, the inside and the outside, the 
harmony between unity and plurality, the correspondence between ‘general’ 
and ‘special’ revelation, in the fact that things are different and have a being of 
their own, but that they are nonetheless still connected and cannot be 
considered separate from each other.  
It is therefore no surprise that Bavinck is not averse to the tradition that 
sees vestigia trinitatis in creation, although he warns against speculative 
                                                          
53 See 2.2.7. For the theme of divine communicability in Edwards, cf. the study of W. M. 
Schweitzer, God is a Communicative Being: Divine Communicativeness and Harmony in 
the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (London: T&T Clark, 2012).   
193 
 
excrescenses on this point. Here the correctness of James Eglinton’s study 
must be emphasised: Bavinck’s use of organic language seems to be primarily 
connected with his Trinitarian standpoint, and must not be seen purely as an 
adaptation of nineteenth-century philosophy and seem even to compromise 
his ‘orthodoxy’.54 To Bavinck organic language clearly articulates what is 
primarily an orthodox Trinitarian truth: ‘There is the most profuse diversity 
[in the cosmos] and yet, in that diversity, there is also a superlative kind of 
unity. The foundation of both diversity and unity is in God. (…) Here is a unity 
that does not destroy but rather maintains diversity, and a diversity that does 
not come at the expense of unity, but rather unfolds it in its riches. In virtue of 
this unity the world can, metaphorically, be called an organism, in which all 
parts are connected with each other and influence each other reciprocally.’55 
Not only in Bavinck’s discussion of God’s being and creation, but also 
throughout his entire theology the centrality of God’s communicability is 
apparent. In chapter 3 we discerned the movement from God to God as the all-
important movement that underlies Bavinck’s theology, which is in fact an 
adoption of the Platonic-Christian exitus-reditus-movement. In this movement 
we then ‘find’ everything else: creation, humanity, Christ, Scripture – all are 
moments that belong in God’s story in order to move ‘from God to God’. It does 
not strike us as strange then when all the theologoumena stand within the 
framework of God’s communicability, since they all attribute to God’s ‘delight 
in the glorification of his own excellences’. In this study a number of different 
moments were identified in Bavinck’s Dogmatics where this framework was 
seen to function.  
First, already in the prolegomena, it appeared that to Bavinck any act of 
knowing participates in God’s knowing.56 With Thomas, Bavinck explicitly 
contends that our reason can be called the ‘divine light’ within us: ‘it is not 
itself the divine logos, but it participates in it.’57 Second, when Bavinck 
throughout his Dogmatics expounds on language in general or Scripture in 
particular, he often takes a stance that fits within the participatory tradition. A 
discussion of God’s attributes opens up for Bavinck a discussion on what 
human language is per se. Language is not something we just ‘have’, ‘use’ and 
                                                          
54 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism. 
55 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 71, referring to RD2, 435-436 (GD2, 399-400). 
56 See 3.2 of this study; cf. also W. Huttinga, ‘Marie Antoinette’.  
57 RD1, 232 (GD1, 206).  
194 
 
can apply at some point to God. It is the other way around: all language, 
figures and symbols presuppose a ‘penetration of the visible by the invisible 
world’ and therefore Bavinck states that ‘real poetry is truth’.58 Language is 
not simply used by God for revelation, but itself has a revelatory character. 
This world, and therefore also language, is made capable of resonating the 
divine. The Platonic-Christian heritage that lies hidden beneath this vision 
emerges when Bavinck goes on to quote Paul who ‘platonically’ stated that ‘all 
fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named after the Father’.59 Human 
language therefore participates in God’s communicability. Not only naming 
God, but any naming whatsoever presupposes ‘God, who has put his splendid 
names in our mouth’. Similarly, when he discusses the authority of Scripture, 
Bavinck considers it ‘fitting’ within God’s workings that he reveals himself in 
human language, that there is something ‘natural’ that has a supernatural 
origin and is therefore fully capable of revealing God. Bavinck accordingly sees 
a close parallel between the word becoming Scripture and the Logos becoming 
flesh.60  
In the third place, God’s communicability forms a constant undercurrent 
which unites (‘organically’) all the differences and distinctions Bavinck 
sketches out in his work – and it is this habit that has worried Reformed 
commentators most in Bavinck. The apex of this habit can be found in his 
discussion of the incarnation. Bavinck emphasises that the incarnation of the 
Son of God was not something that happened without a context, as we noted 
above in 3.5.4. The incarnation was identified as something that fits within the 
broader workings of God in general. Bavinck therefore connects the 
incarnation with God’s Trinitarian being, God’s act of creation (particularly the 
creation of man) and the history of revelation. The continuous thread that 
runs throughout this context is God’s communicability, since the Logos, so 
Bavinck paraphrases the prologue of John, has always ‘communicated his life 
and light to creatures’. God becoming man is the culmination of something 
that goes to the heart of who God is. When Bavinck connects Christ with all of 
God’s workings in the world, this is parallel to the heavy emphasis he places 
on the relation between ‘general’ and ‘special’ revelation.61 Although Bavinck 
                                                          
58 RD2, 106 (GD2, 75). 
59 3.4.1.  
60 3.3.4.  
61 3.3.2.  
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clearly argues that the difference between them ought to be maintained, the 
emphasis in his work is always on their unity, continuity, or their ‘organic 
correspondence’, as leading commentators like Jan Veenhof and Eugene 
Heideman have critically observed. The core of their criticism seems to be that 
Bavinck in this way does not account sufficiently for the magnitude of the 
incarnation. How is Christ still unique within such a vision? This question is of 
the highest importance, but the discussion of it will be postponed until section 
5.3 below.  
 
5.2.5 Again: how to read John Milbank 
In the preceding sections this study took some time to argue why and how 
Bavinck’s rendering of the relation between God and the world is, perhaps 
surprisingly, highly participatory. In John Milbank’s case, there is no need to 
argue for the presence of the concept of participation in his work, since he 
himself declares that the concept is central to his theology. We do, however, 
still have to deal with the implications of the concept in his work. Does the 
way Milbank deals with participation resemble the account of participation 
which this study gave in chapter 2, and which we encountered again in the 
analysis of Bavinck’s work in the preceding sections? And does his account in 
some way imply pantheism or panentheism? The latter has, in fact, been 
argued extensively by Amene Mir, who offers several reasons for the 
plausibility of a ‘panentheistic reading of John Milbank’. In moving to Milbank 
again, this chapter will use an assessment of Mir’s article as a way to open up 
his work to the current discussion. But first some remarks have to be made 
(and partly repeated) on how the present study reads Milbank.  
This study interpreted John Milbank’s work in general and his insistence 
on the central role of participation in theology in particular within the 
framework of his anti- or post-secular agenda. Behind almost everything he 
writes lies a critique on what he considers to be the Kantian habit of limiting, 
of setting the boundaries in our perception of the world. A significant point in 
Milbank’s work is his identification of the roots of this habit in Duns Scotus’ 
univocal predication of being to God and creation, since it provided space for 
the modern idea that we can have a ‘secular’ sphere of ontology and 
knowability which we may exhaustively describe without being bothered by 
the disturbing interference of something that lies behind these ‘borders’. The 
pivotal point in Milbank’s thought is always that the very existence of these 
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borders is something completely ‘made up’. The existence of a ‘border’ 
between the finite and the infinite was a contingent, historical invention, 
something that we should not reconcile ourselves to.62 This counter-narrative 
is understood to be the backbone of all of Milbank’s theological claims. His 
provocative genealogy, which we outlined above in chapter 4, provides the 
main interpretive framework for his theological positions.  
This is important to note, since it precludes a reading of Milbank’s work 
that reads him in a sense ‘too seriously’ and too strictly as a dogmatician, as a 
typical spokesman of (orthodox) Christian doctrine. Although any Dogmatics 
or Systematic Theology will allow itself to be read as a narrative – that is, not 
as a set of timeless expositions of the Christian faith, but as a creative 
encounter with its time and context – Milbank’s ‘dogmatics’ has this character 
par excellence. Therefore participation, together with its accompanying 
conceptual articulations, should in Milbank’s work not be interpreted 
primarily as ways of (timeless, purely conceptual) dogmatic positioning, but 
first and foremost as rhetorical strategies in his anti-secular narrative.63 In this 
way, Milbank’s work, as he himself would be happy to acknowledge, 
transcends the borders of the way Systematic Theology is often dealt with. In 
spite of this, a decision was made in this study still to treat Milbank as a 
systematic theologian. After all, although his work is extremely unsystematic 
in its nature, it remains possible to discuss it in a systematic theological way.64 
What sets the evaluation of the present study apart from others is its 
awareness of the rhetorical, narratological character of Milbank’s work and its 
implications.  
 
5.2.6 John Milbank: Panentheism?  
Amene Mir makes a compelling case for labelling John Milbank’s work as 
panentheistic. In a thorough reading of his work, Mir found dozens of phrases 
and conceptualities that might be called ‘panentheist’. By way of summary, Mir 
states that in Milbank’s work ‘creation is embraced and contained within the 
life of the divine, such that creation and the divine can be said to be in dipolar 
                                                          
62 See 4.2.4. for Milbank’s critique on the Scotistic-Kantian current.  
63 This is how Milbank’s work was analysed in 4.1.2, and the problematic sides to this 
character of his theology were noted at the end of 4.2.2.   
64 For this ‘decision’ see 4.1.2.  
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asymmetrical relation’.65 This dipolar asymmetrical relation is important for 
his definition of what counts as panentheism. It on the one hand stands 
opposed to pantheism, which Mir describes as viewing the relation between 
God and the world as ‘symmetrical’ so as to turn ‘relation’ into ‘identification’. 
On the other hand it differs from ‘classical theism’ which according to Mir 
views creation as ‘external’ to the divine.66  
Mir highlights statements in Milbank’s work that are clearly open for 
panentheistic interpretation. In Truth in Aquinas, Milbank for example claims 
in Neoplatonic fashion that God as cause does not ‘precede’ the effects of 
creation, but is cause ‘as realised in the event of the giving the effects’, which 
resembles Proclus’ saying that the ‘effect remains in the cause’. Therefore 
creation can be said to be ‘included in the uttering of the Logos’.67 Particularly 
on the basis of his reading of Theology and Social Theory, Mir gives an 
extensive discussion of Milbank’s Trinitarian speculations which imply that 
creation is a ‘harmonious order intrinsic to God’s own being’.68 Mir points out 
the consequences of such speculations: The generation of the Son is for 
Milbank not really separated from the creation of the world, which would 
imply that Milbank, although he claims the opposite, in reality sees the divine 
as the ‘world soul’. Mir is particularly focused on the language of ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’. In his quotations from Milbank as well as his own renderings of the 
latter’s work, Mir constantly italicises words that emphasise that this world 
lies literally within God: ‘creatures are included in the eternal uttering’, 
creation should not be considered as outside the divine but as internal to it, 
‘God’s love for what he creates implies that creation is generated within a 
harmonious order intrinsic to God’s own being’.  
Although he is correct to draw attention to how closely God’s being and the 
being of the world are related in Milbank’s work (as similarly noted in chapter 
4 above), Mir’s framing of Milbank’s work is overly one-sided. He overlooks 
what this study considers a pre-eminent characteristic of the participatory 
tradition and what clearly functions in Milbank, namely its analogical and non-
univocal way of speaking about God. Despite the phrases found in Milbank’s 
work as also highlighted by Mir, there is no way that this world for Milbank 
                                                          
65 Mir, ‘A Panentheist Reading’, 526. 
66 Mir, ‘A Panentheist Reading’, 529. 
67
 Mir, ‘A Panentheist Reading’, 531; cf. Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 31. 
68 Mir, ‘A Panentheist Reading’, 534; cf. Milbank, Theology, 437.  
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literally lies ‘within God’. Mir does not have sufficient attention for the fact 
that for Milbank ‘withinnes’ or ‘outsideness’ to God must always be placed 
between quotation marks, since, as Mir himself rightly observes, the character 
of God’s esse for Milbank transcends the boundary between inside and outside. 
God’s trinitarian being goes beyond pure self-containment, and is not a purely 
external relating to something ‘other’. 
Although Milbank is much less careful than Bavinck, this study suggests 
that the ways they speak belong to the same conceptual, that is participatory, 
space. As we saw, we managed also to ‘catch’ Bavinck on statements that, 
taken literally, are panentheistic. Yet it hardly makes sense to call him a 
panentheist, given that he shows himself to be painstakingly faithful to any 
position that is considered ‘classical theist’. The only way one might possibly 
call both Bavinck and Milbank (along with the participatory tradition) 
‘panentheist’ is to insist on their claim that this world lies within God as in its 
always eminent, transcendent cause, emphasising that this cause is in fact so 
eminent that it does not make any sense at all to claim that something lies 
‘within’ it. This way of speaking at least precludes the literal character of any 
‘within’ in this relation. It both claims and cancels the ‘withinness’. Since Mir 
misses the point of the analogical language for the participatory relation 
between God and the world, he overestimates the language of ‘withinness’ in 
Milbank.69  
                                                          
69 An account of panentheism that is more sensible to the notion of analogy can be 
found in the work of Philip Clayton, who, although he stresses the importance of the 
central ‘in’ metaphor in panentheism, states that the word ‘in’, like all metaphors, 
creates too much tension to be taken literally. Nevertheless, the main reason he gives 
for this tension, namely that the ‘in’ in panentheism works in both directions (the 
world is in God, and God is in the world), would be problematic for both Milbank and 
Bavinck. That the world is fully dependent on God is not the problem, but that ‘God 
depends on the world because the nature of God’s actual experience depends on the 
interactions with finite creatures like ourselves’ would indeed be problematic for both 
of them – although, as we will see in 5.2.7, in his account of the ‘priority of the made’ 
Milbank does adopt something of the idea of the ‘surprise’ that creation and its 
creativity evokes, even to God. For both Milbank and Bavinck, following Aquinas, God 
is not really related to the world, but this world is its relatedness to God – a way of 
speaking that is fully at home in a participatory, but not a panentheistic vocabulary. 
What is fundamentally lacking in their view, therefore, – and this is consistent with the 
Platonic-Christian view on participation – is Clayton’s notion of the interdependence 
of God and the world (his italics). Clayton, ‘Panentheism’, 73-91, esp. 81-84.   
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Particularly in more recent writings, such as The Monstrosity of Christ and 
his article on Sophiology and Theurgy, Milbank explains his own position in 
terms of ‘paradox’. Here he rejects a ‘Hegelian’ account of the relation between 
God and the world, which, with its dialectical character, always works towards 
the absorption of the one by the other, or, as Milbank calls it, their ‘mutual 
abolition’. It is exactly this dynamics which is at work in the logic of pantheism 
as well as panentheism. It is important to note that Milbank is very well aware 
that he is distancing his theological position from such ‘Hegelianism’. Instead 
he chooses for analogy, or, as he calls it in these articles, ‘paradox’. Milbank 
follows Meister Eckhart who contended that God (as esse) is more ourselves 
than we are ourselves: ‘The God who is the giving source of everything must 
be the inner reality of everything – more each thing than each thing is itself, 
more stone in the stone than the stone, and more man in the man than the 
man’. Milbank is right to argue that this is something altogether different from 
pantheism, since such a position does not conceive of God as the sum of all 
things, or simply as the ‘highest being’, but sees God’s esse as ‘inconceivably 
beyond any whole’ – which echoes the Neoplatonic view on the divine as 
discussed in section 2.2.2.  
Therefore, although God is more like creatures than they are themselves, 
God is nonetheless even ‘more unlike creatures than he is like them’, where 
opposites are held together in a way similar to what we observed also in 
Aquinas, which way indeed deserves to be called ‘paradoxical’.70 It is 
interesting to see that Milbank and Bavinck work within the same conceptual 
space here, since both argue – in fact, following Aquinas – for the connection 
between God’s communicability and his incommunicability. As communicating 
source he is so absolute that he is beyond everything we can ‘eminently’ claim 
about him, so that the via negativa and the via eminentiae imply and intensify 
each other.  
 
5.2.7 Beyond the tradition: Milbank’s anti-secular agenda 
There is, however, an important aspect of Milbank’s work that does position 
him beyond the traditional participatory way of speaking about the relation 
between creation and the divine, and, so this study contends, also beyond the 
‘modesty’ of this tradition. The chapter on Milbank concluded by stressing the 
                                                          
70 Cf. the end of 2.2.6.  
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all-important presence of ‘the made’ in his work. All of Milbank’s expositions 
on metaphysical issues, no matter how closely they relate to the views of 
premodern Christianity, have an ‘innovative’ character as to their concern for 
‘the made’. Milbank’s metaphysics has a linguistic and constructivist character, 
and although he contends that these characteristics have deep roots within 
the Christian tradition itself, he also admits that, in emphasising the linguistic 
and fabricated character of what we call being and thinking, he is moving 
beyond the tradition. Or, at least, he tries to follow an ‘alternative’ and often 
overlooked pattern in the tradition that is connected with names like 
Eriugena, Cusanus, Vico, and later Romantic thinkers like Herder and Hamann. 
These names belong to the tradition Milbank would like to represent, which 
emphasises the ‘poetic’ or ‘the priority of the made’.  
The most important implication of this current is that there is in fact no 
difference between ‘being’ and ‘making’. God’s being and knowing cannot be 
said to be there ‘in the first place’, a reality to which his ability (or his 
decision) to create can only be added in the second place. Making is 
‘equiprimordial’ with being and knowing. Indeed, as such there is an emphasis 
on the traditional notion that creating the world in no way ‘changes’ God, since 
creating somehow belongs to what God ‘essentially’ is. Interestingly, this is 
also in line with Bavinck’s (equally traditional) stress on God’s 
communicability, fecundity and even ‘productivity’. Just like Milbank, Bavinck 
closely connects generation and creation, since, if we were to disconnect them, 
we would lose the heart of what creation is all about: God.  
However, Milbank’s emphasis on the creative character of the divine also 
leads him to expressions that are at the very least less careful. In chapter four 
above, this study noted that, because of the creative character of God’s being, 
of his being ‘in excess of himself’, there is according to Milbank no distinction 
to be made in God between intra and extra (as also Amene Mir, of course, aptly 
notices).71 Unlike Bavinck, Milbank seems to be prepared not only to connect 
generation and creation closely, but also to identify them. The Word of God 
which God utters eternally is not prior to reality, but is to Milbank ‘the sum of 
all reality’. This becomes alarmingly univocal, particularly when he exhibits 
the language of ‘explication’ and ‘unfolding’. Milbank now and then calls the 
world ‘the explication’ of what is ‘implied’ in God. The world is a finite 
                                                          
71 4.3.3 and 4.4.3. 
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‘unfolding’ of the infinite, and so creation participates, as co-creating, in the 
divine act of creating. There is a parallel of this way of speaking in 
Neoplatonism, which also saw the multitude of the world ‘folded up in the 
One’, and which used the image of the point and the circle, the former being 
the divine and the latter being the world, again, as an explication of what was 
ultimately contained in the divine. This way of thinking can be traced 
throughout Milbank’s work from the very start, since it already formed the 
cornerstone of his study on Vico.  
As has already been observed in chapter 2, the traditional stress on creatio 
ex nihilo prevents the relation between God and the world from becoming in 
any way perspicuous.72 As we saw, Bavinck realised – and this seems to 
connect him with Eastern, negative theology – that ‘it is a mystery that God 
can reveal himself and to some extent make himself known in created beings: 
eternity in time, immensity in space, infinity in the finite, immutability in 
change, being in becoming, the all, as it were, in that which is nothing.’73 The 
modesty of this perspective also appears in the fact that Bavinck does and 
Milbank does not have a proper account of the divine will. To the perspective 
of creatio ex nihilo also belongs, as Bavinck repeatedly emphasises, that God 
actively willed the existence of creation. This study found Bavinck claiming 
that the ultimate boundary for creation, when it asks of God what his reasons 
for creating were, is to be situated at the divine will. One should not look for 
these reasons at a higher level, searching for a ‘ground in God’s being’ which 
necessitates and eternalises creation.74 Quia voluit is according to Bavinck the 
ultimate answer to the question why there is God and the world. Instead of an 
account of the famously criticised, arbitrary and ‘naked’ divine will, for 
Bavinck we have here a reality of wonder. The existence of the world is a 
mystery of superfluous givenness, which produces an even greater glory than 
the glory which is itself already complete in God. 
This emphasis on mystery does not move Bavinck away from a 
participatory framework, but, as this study contends, is fully part of his 
participatory framework. Remarkably, also Milbank is very clear about the 
fact that this mystery belongs to any participatory outlook, and yet he is all too 
often prepared to make statements that render the relation between God and 
                                                          
72 2.2.3.  
73 3.4.1 
74 3.4.3.  
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the world rather perspicuous, in a way that tends to univocity, and even to 
such a degree that it is sometimes hard to see why the world is not ‘necessary’ 
to God. These are notions which Milbank vehemently rejects, but to which his 
thought nonetheless gives rise. 
To go beyond Mir, some implications of Milbank’s work do not tend just to 
panentheism, but even simply to pantheism. Mir interprets Milbank’s 
understanding of the act of creation as something ‘completely internal to 
God’.75 However, once again Mir’s obsession with the language of ‘external’ 
versus ‘internal’ proves problematic, since it leads him to conclude that for 
Milbank creation is not outside the divine, but internal to it, ‘rather as not 
identical with the divine’. In this last supposition, Mir misses the point. For 
Milbank, to be divine is to create. There is no divinity ‘before’ creation but only 
in creating. Therefore, since creation exists in its being creative, in its 
emanative character, it reflects the divine in a disturbingly univocal way.76 To 
be fair to Milbank, his entire work opposes a univocal view on the relation 
between God and the world. In Duns Scotus he sees ‘being’ turning into 
something that can be univocally predicated of God and creation, which 
renders it something beyond God and thus an ‘idol’. Accordingly, it would be 
interesting to hear how Milbank’s own theology precludes ‘making’ from being 
a similar, univocal idol.  
In an article on the distinction between theoria and poesis and in 
conversation with John Milbank (among others), Wayne Hankey summarises 
Aquinas’ view as follows: ‘For Aquinas, the self-differentiation of God, his 
internal emanation, which is the return of the divine being upon itself in 
knowledge and love, is the origin and ratio of the divine emanation ad extra, 
creation. But in Thomas’ view, for creation to be free, to be a genuine act of 
love, a gift, the process of the divine life must be complete in itself.’77 If this is 
                                                          
75 Mir, ‘Panentheist Reading’, 532. 
76 In an interesting remark on Pseudo-Dionysius, A.N. Williams claims that there is in 
some moments of his work ‘an apparent lack of concern to maintain the divide 
between the Giver and recipients of perfection’. Milbank, deeply influenced as he is by 
Pseudo-Dionysius, seems to have inherited this ‘lack of concern’. It is important to 
note that this does not necessarily mean that Milbank does not ‘honour the difference’, 
but that it is something that often simply does not have his immediate attention. 
Williams, The Ground of Union, 30. 
77 W.J. Hankey, ‘Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in 
Aquinas, John Milbank, Jean-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas’, Modern Theology 15 
(1999), 407.  
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an accurate picture of Thomas’ teaching, and perhaps even in a more general 
sense of the classical traditional understanding of the relation between God 
and the world, then it is clearly recognisable in everything Bavinck contends 
about this relation. Particularly the last part of the quotation from Hankey, 
however, sounds at odds with Milbank’s work. Since he holds that being is 
equiprimordial with making, God is not ‘complete’ without reference to his 
creating and the world already seems to be given with the ‘idea of God’. 
However, this study would miss the point if it were simply to sum up 
Milbank’s seemingly heterodox expressions, lift them out of their context and 
make a case for his deviation from the tradition, as is so often done. We have 
to take seriously the creative project in which his work is embedded and its 
search for post-secular language. As this study has argued, Milbank’s work is 
not to be treated primarily as a site of dogmatic content. It is rather a site of 
post-secular theological narration in which the dogmatic content functions 
within a rhetorical strategy. Milbank constantly highlights those aspects of the 
tradition (and sometimes rather marginal parts of that tradition as it is 
received in the West) that emphasise the things he needs in his post-secular 
story. His theology weaves together different ‘non-secular’ conceptualities in a 
way of ‘imagining otherwise’. He challenges his readers to imagine a 
modernity that did not put God and the world, eternity and time, God’s being 
and our making, in competing positions.78 This challenge gives his theology a 
certain one-sidedness, but particularly when we are aware of the strong anti-
univocal tendency of his work, there can be no substantial theological reasons 
for dismissing a theological position that affirms so strongly the affinity 
between God and his creation.  
 
5.2.8 Conclusions  
Pantheism and panentheism are not the best labels to use when discussing a 
participatory view. This study considers pantheism and panentheism to be 
                                                          
78 This view on interpreting Milbank, as has been stated before, was eloquently put 
forward by Gordon Michalson, who reminds us that Milbank’s work is ‘deployed for 
the sake of altering our sensibility, of jarring us into an awareness of a road not taken’. 
Therefore, ‘his is not a mere “methodological” debate with theological opponents over, 
say, the possibility of a “point of contact” between humanity and God for theology – an 
alteration in sensibility runs deeper than any methodological debate and is far more 
subtle, as well as much more difficult to argue for.’ Michalson, ‘Re-reading the post-
Kantian tradition’, 371.  
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modern philosophical conceptions about the relation between God and the 
world. They are historically evolved articulations of a desire to keep God and 
the world in intimate connection that nevertheless more or less fail to 
articulate the difference between them effectively.79 Both Bavinck and Milbank 
stress the non-univocal or analogical character of the way they wish to speak 
about the relation between the world and God. Therefore, any literal 
identification of God and the world (as in pantheism) or any view that literally 
considers this world as lying or developing ‘in God’ or that stresses their 
interdependence (as in panentheism) is precluded in their views, although the 
language they use sometimes gives rise to the suspicion that they do indeed 
hold to one of these positions – and in Milbank’s work this is much more often 
the case than it is in Bavinck’s.  
The analogical view on the relation between God and the world claims at 
once both ever greater distance and ever greater intimacy. This study 
supports the interpretation offered by John Milbank of this way of speaking 
when he identified it as ‘paradoxical’. This is comparable with Bavinck’s idea 
that God’s communicability does not compromise but reinforces his 
incommunicability. God is so much our being that he is at the same time more 
different from us than we can imagine. Conversely, God’s eternity, although it 
is completely incommunicable, is still the ‘heartbeat’ of every moment in time. 
The emphasis both Bavinck and Milbank put on the liveliness and productivity 
of God and therefore his deep connection with the life of the created confirms 
the idea that so-called ‘classical theism’, seen from the perspective of 
participation, cannot be further removed from the oft-criticised notions of 
being static and bereft of life and of placing God and creation over against each 
other.  
In the end, this study renders a rather mild verdict on Milbank’s seemingly 
‘panentheist’ or ‘pantheist’ expressions. In the first place, his stress on analogy 
safeguards him from literal panentheism or pantheism. In the second place, it 
has to be considered that he uses this language in telling a story ‘beyond 
secular reason’. The creative strategy in which his theology is involved must 
                                                          
79 Of course, particularly theologians who hold to some version of panentheism have 
tried to do justice to both God’s immanence and his transcendence. Yet it seems that 
the point of the interdependence of God and the world (the expression is borrowed 
from Philip Clayton), which is pivotal in panentheism, departs from the participatory 
view which renders only the world dependent on God’s being, and not vice versa.  
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be taken into account. Bavinck is much more careful in his expressions, since 
he understands his theological task to be to give an exposition of the Catholic-
Reformed tradition. Although in executing this task he of course also uses a lot 
of typical nineteenth-century colourings and emphases, and although he tends 
to forget that certain Reformed peculiarities are not as ‘traditional’ as he 
thinks, his work is more ‘conservative’ than Milbank’s. Surprisingly, although 
‘participation’ is the word that pertains primarily to Milbank’s theology, 
Bavinck’s theology in fact develops itself as faithfully to the participatory 
tradition as Milbank’s. In a sense his position is even closer to that tradition as 
it is understood in this study than Milbank’s position is, since Bavinck speaks 
with the same modesty about the relation between God and the world.   
Radical Orthodoxy in general, and John Milbank in particular, have been 
accused of not fully honouring the difference between God and the world. 
Even before it attempted to assess this judgement, this study demanded 
attention for the postmodern, postsecular narratological strategy which 
characterises Milbank’s theology. This character involves a certain one-
sidedness, since his preference for concepts and metaphors focuses more on 
the unity between the divine and the created than on their difference, which 
culminates in his discourse on ‘making’. Milbank emphasises that making is 
pre-eminently divine and that any human making (and culture and language) 
therefore shares in this divine reality and is not something that purely belongs 
to a supposed emancipated-from-the-divine human realm. In what he sees as 
an ‘alternative modernity’, Milbank tries to harmonise the contemplative and 
the active, the metaphysical and the humanistic – which is the ultimate 
theological ‘dream’ that runs throughout his entire oeuvre.80  
However, in deploying this strategy, Milbank sometimes seems to forget 
that the participatory tradition, which involves analogical discourse on the 
divine, tends always more to the apophatic than to the kataphatic. Considering 
humanity to share in the divine life is no license for free-floating divine-human 
speculations about art, culture and politics, but gives rise to humility, along 
the line of the words of the apostle Paul: ‘what do you have, that you did not 
receive?’81 Existing in the receiving and passing on of divine life, human beings 
                                                          
80 In Milbank’s own words, with reference to Coleridge, Newman and Ruskin: ‘a 
particular insular blending of ‘the empirical’ with ‘the Platonic’. Milbank, Future of 
Love, x.  
81 1 Corinthians 4:7.  
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are never in a position to boast in their ‘ontological situation’, since they do 
not know exactly where and even who they are, since their being ultimately 
lies in God, as Milbank never tires of explaining. Although this emphasis 
should lead to a stance of (epistemological and ontological) humility, such 
humility is often hard to find in Milbank’s work. There is often a sphere of 
certainty, of ‘explaining’ the divine-human situation that does not correspond 
with the modesty of the participatory stance. 
Nevertheless, in their stress on the ever eminent being of God in which 
created being nonetheless participates, both Bavinck and Milbank in their 
theologies ‘keep God and creation in intimate connection, while honouring 
their difference’. Milbank effectively develops the view that God’s being 
transcends the border between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and that there is 
therefore no literal ‘distance’ between God and creation, which in no way 
compromises the unbridgeable difference between them. Bavinck in the same 
way has it that there is in creation no literal transition from being in God to 
being outside of God. Both Bavinck and Milbank emphasise, therefore, that 
difference is not the same as distance.82 In this way, both theologians are able 
to insist that the classical theist account of God, with its participatory 
implications, is about the ‘ever greater’ being of God as well as about his being 
more intimate to us than we can imagine.  
Bavinck in his work attaches much more value to the distinction between 
the inside and the outside of God, since to emphasise this difference is for him 
one of the ‘strongholds’ against pantheism. Unconsciously, however, Bavinck – 
as we saw throughout chapter 3 – in this way heavily invests in the modern 
dichotomy between inside (the subjective) and outside (the objective), a 
dichotomy that is only held together by his theological stress on the Trinity 
(often in the language of ‘the organic’) which comes with a participatory 
ontology. Therefore, we can conclude that the theological voice of 
participation which is so prominent in Milbank is more of an ‘undercurrent’ in 
Bavinck. But as is typical for an undercurrent, although it is often not 
immediately there at the surface of Bavinck’s argument, particularly through 
the language of God’s communicability it still is present everywhere. It is to 
the merit of Milbank’s perspective that this study was able to perceive and 
value this current in Bavinck.  
                                                          
82 Cf. Brian Mattson on Bavinck, Restored to our Destiny, 20.  
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5.3 Ontology and soteriology 
 
5.3.1 Reformed uneasiness with ontological participation  
Reformed theologians clearly share an uneasiness towards the theme of 
participation. This uneasiness takes on different forms and leads to different 
levels of rejection of participation as a central theological concept. A general 
point of concern is if and how participation should be considered as an 
‘ontological’ concept. It is not so that Reformed theologians these days shy 
away from ontology or metaphysics altogether (as was sometimes the case in 
earlier times, as noted above in 1.3.1), but they consider ontology to have a 
more secondary, relative importance. Since this study intends to develop the 
discussion if and how participation can function as an ontological concept in 
the Reformed tradition, it is useful to listen to these critical voices. The present 
section (5.3.1) will therefore identify and discuss different Reformed voices 
that witness caution and uneasiness with participation as an ontological 
theme.  
 John Webster, for example, confesses that he remains uneasy ‘with at least 
some uses of the idiom of participation in the theology of creation and 
salvation’, and pleads for a more classical Calvinist view in which the 
demarcations between Creator and creature are ‘rather strictly drawn’.83 
However, although Webster is strongly opposed to any view of emanationism, 
he also wants to avoid the other extreme, that of ‘extrinsicism’ (which sounds 
similar to Bavinck’s way to avoid the two poles of pantheism and deism). 
Interestingly, although Webster is opposed to the notion of participation (or 
perhaps what he considers its emanationist ‘excesses’), he turns to a 
theological vocabulary that this study considers to be moving itself into the 
orbit of participation. Again, like Bavinck, Webster calls God an abundance of 
life, an inexhaustible ocean and fountain of being, metaphors which he puts 
rightly on a par with the notion of God’s actuality (and therefore the absence 
of potentiality), by which God is described as actus purus.84  
Webster then contrasts ontological, philosophical speculations about the 
exact nature of deitas with God’s self-communicative energy, which can simply 
                                                          
83 Webster, ‘Perfection and Participation’ in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the 
Antichrist or the Wisdom of God? T.J. White, O.P. (ed.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 
380.   
84 Webster, ‘Perfection and Participation’, 381.  
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be called ‘revelation’. Webster makes exactly the same move as Bavinck: The 
pivotal point of theology is not our human ‘abstract’ considerations about 
what can be counted as divine being, but what God communicates about 
himself (in Scripture, in the history of salvation, and supremely by his 
Trinitarian being). This study considers that Webster – precisely in making 
this move – finds himself, like Bavinck, in a very participatory framework. Not 
our metaphysical speculations, but God’s self-manifestation, his shining forth, 
his communication in creation is what matters. Webster emphasises divine 
perfection and therefore also aseity and apatheia as necessary starting-points 
for any discourse about God and the world.85 Again, this study observed 
Bavinck and Milbank emphasising this very same thing, in concordance with 
the participatory tradition. Divine perfection does contrast with the ‘Hegelian’ 
kind of view that Webster opposes, according to which God in order to be 
perfect also must be involved with change and historical contingency. In light 
of chapters 3 and 4 of this study, it should be abundantly clear that on this 
matter Webster’s voice forms a harmonious chorus together with Bavinck and 
Milbank.  
Webster is not strictly against the idea of adopting participation in a 
Reformed framework, but he mentions an important condition. He is 
sympathetic towards the participatory notions in Calvin’s work, which are tied 
to soteriology and sacramental theology, such that participation is confined to 
‘being in Christ’.86 Reformed theologians did not ‘extend’ participation into a 
metaphysics or into a ‘theology of created being as such’. Although he seems to 
be content with this modesty, Webster leaves open the question if such a 
movement in his view is possible or not.  
At the same time, this study’s findings suggest that it is hard to see 
participation ‘extended’ from soteriology to creation, since to confine 
participation to a purely soteriological context would already be to narrow its 
original scope. The overview offered in chapter 2 of this study observed how 
in the participatory tradition the soteriological finds its place in a creational 
account of God shining forth his goodness – an account, therefore, of divine 
being – and of the world as a receiving and passing on of divine glory. 
                                                          
85 Webster, ‘Perfection and Participation’, 384-385.  
86 Webster, ‘Perfection and Participation’, 386. ‘Being in Christ’ is also the subject of 
Hans Burger’s dissertation, which seeks to produce building blocks for a theological 
ontology by developing this theme. 
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Soteriology and ontology should therefore not be placed over against each 
other, but both belong to God’s communicable being. Bavinck’s work testifies 
profoundly to the fact that participation is at home within the doctrines of God 
and creation, and exactly for that reason belongs to soteriology as well – and 
not ‘perhaps’ the other way around, as Webster suggests. In view of the rest of 
Webster’s article, it does not seem that he opposes such an idea, but it is 
rather the case that he is uneasy about adopting the notion of participation in 
his theology because of the all too easy emanationist connotations – again, as 
the case was with Bavinck.  
Another example of such uneasiness can be found in the work of Colin 
Gunton. Although his theological work testifies of an enduring emphasis on 
the importance of trinitarian theology, he seems at times to wonder what kind 
of a ‘Pandora’s box’ this renewed trinitarian fashion in theology has opened. 
Gunton observes that different forms of social trinitarianism, eager as they are 
to emphasise the relation between creation and the divine processiones, fall 
prey to some form of Hegelianism ‘which itself has deep roots in neoplatonic 
emanationism’. Once again, Bavinck’s enemies arrive on the scene, and it is not 
long before also the word ‘pantheism’ makes its appearance. Gunton’s fear is 
that in some of these social-trinitarian views there is in the end ‘ultimately 
only one reality, the divine-worldly emanation, which constitutes the world 
and then swallows it up’. These views do not acknowledge that God is a 
communion of love prior to and independent of the creation, and so some of 
them suppose that for example ‘suffering and tragedy are incorporated into 
the divine life’.87  
However, Gunton goes further than Webster in developing a participatory 
account of the relation between God and the world. Gunton’s deep interest in 
the systematic implications of the divine workings of Father, Son and Spirit 
leads him to a real ontological discourse about God and the world. He rarely if 
ever uses the word participation, but his analogical account of perichoresis as 
                                                          
87 C. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Second Edition; Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1997), Preface to the Second Edition, xv-xxi. Gunton refers to the work of Ted 
Peters, Catherine Mowry LaCugna and Peter Hodgson.   
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an ‘implication of the unity-in-variety of the divine economic involvement in 
the world’ in fact functions in a completely participatory way.88 
Maarten Wisse, on the contrary, is from the Reformed side the most 
outspoken and vehement critic of participation. He published a book in which 
he fully framed his interpretation of Augustine’s De Trinitate within an anti-
participatory argument. His biggest problem with participatory outlooks, 
among which Radical Orthodoxy plays the key role, is that they turn 
christology into a ‘repetition of ontology’.89 Even more explicitly than we 
observed in Webster, in Wisse’s monograph, ontology and soteriology 
function as two different ‘worlds’, and he accuses several Augustine 
interpreters of pushing Christ into the ontological rather than the 
soteriological realm. In this way, they create what he calls ‘christologies of 
manifestation’. Christ is turned into something of an ontological ‘device’ which 
only manifests and confirms what was in fact already completely laid out in 
creation, namely that humanity is made to be united with God and therefore to 
be deified.90 Using Augustine, Wisse makes a strong plea for taking the 
difference between the world and God seriously and emphasising the gravity 
of sin.91  
                                                          
88 Cf. C. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of 
Modernity. The Bampton Lectures 1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), particularly chapter 6. 
89 Wisse, Trinitarian Theology, 44. 
90 A clear example of opposing ontology and soteriology can also be found in the 
Christelijke Dogmatiek of G. van den Brink and C. van der Kooi, which has become a 
new standard volume on dogmatics in Dutch theology. The authors emphatically 
discuss participation within a soteriological and pneumatological context. Although 
they criticise Maarten Wisse for arguing against any form of participatory thinking, 
they simply state that participation ‘is a pneumatological and not an ontological 
category; it does not belong to the way things are, but it is brought about by the Spirit’ 
(615). G. van den Brink and C. van der Kooi, Christelijke dogmatiek (Zoetermeer: 
Boekencentrum, 2012). 
91 Wisse opposes the two theological worlds as follows: ‘The one (the ontological-
participatory, wh) is a world in which it seems only important to know, to have the 
right view of how the world is related to God. (…) We can know this truth even if our 
life is not in accordance with it. Beauty, eros, love, a dazzling intellectual dynamics is 
said to be our source of joy and happiness. The other (soteriological, wh) world is one 
of fear and trembling, one in which intellectual attempts to unravel the ontological 
structure of God and world will be dealt with in a very sceptical if not sharply negative 
way. Knowing God is no intellectual achievement; it is the eschatological destiny of the 
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Lastly, Todd Billings, whose discourse on participation in the work of John 
Calvin was already discussed in chapter 2, and who confesses to have learnt a 
lot from Milbank’s emphasis on participation, articulates an important 
Reformed hesitation towards the ontological, or, as he has it, ‘unclear’ use of 
the theme in Milbank’s work. Calvin, Billings says, is clear about the difference 
between justification and sanctification. In the sphere of justification, which 
comes first, grace is something from outside of ourselves, but only in the 
sphere of sanctification is grace ‘a participatory regeneration by the Spirit’ and 
can it also be articulated in the language of adopting, engrafting and union. 
Therefore, Billings, with Calvin, is clear about the realm in which participation 
exclusively plays a role: in the second sphere of grace, in nobis.  
Billings accordingly has a serious problem with the emphasis on the 
necessary reception of grace in Milbank’s work: by Israel, by Mary, by the 
church, in short, by human receptive agency. Here Billings touches upon the 
very heart of the Reformed uneasiness with participation. Is grace something 
primarily and fundamentally ‘from the outside’, extra nos, or is human nature 
itself something fundamentally ‘graced’ – or otherwise no human nature at all? 
To abandon the first position, so Billings implies, is to leave the ultimate 
Reformed position. We are caught up then with the Platonic principle that ‘like 
can only be known by like’, so that there is a fundamental ‘capacity to receive’ 
in human beings. The point Billings touches upon is the same as that which 
was articulated in strong terms by Wisse: if participation (in an ontological, 
broad sense) in fact implies that nature is fundamentally graced, why did 
Christ come at all? Only to manifest that everything is ontologically ‘all right’? 
Indeed, Scripture would have to be put aside completely to assert such a thing.  
What the Reformed commentators noted in this section articulates not so 
much an aversion against ontology, but an impression of the relative use of 
ontology in theology. The voice that connects these thinkers claims that 
theology is not primarily about ontology, but about ‘something else’. This 
‘something else’ is considered in terms of a more soteriological, christological 
position, which requires a much stronger focus on human sinfulness, and it is 
                                                                                                                                                   
pure of heart, paving their way with humility and putting their trust in Christ.’ 
Trinitarian Theology, 147.  
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articulated as listening to the specific language of Scripture and making the 
logic of that language decisive for our speaking about God and the world.92 
Interestingly, however, the critical questions are not only to be asked of 
Milbank, but they can be and have been asked of Bavinck as well, as we will 
see further on. Since the present study found Bavinck fundamentally to be 
moving within an ontological participatory space, it no longer considers it a 
surprise that Bavinck evokes the same questions. The following will therefore 
address the question how a participatory standpoint discusses the notions of 
sin and incarnation (5.3.3 and 5.3.4). Here Bavinck’s and Milbank’s positions 
on these notions will be recaptured and brought into conversation with the 
participatory tradition as discussed in chapter 2. Before we embark on this 
endeavour, however, we will begin with a discussion about ‘knowing and 
salvation’. If it is true that theology in a Reformed perspective is first of all 
about salvation, then why do Milbank and Bavinck need to have such 
developed accounts of what ‘knowing’ is in the first place? Is it because they 
are indulging in misguided philosophical hobbies and have forgotten about 
their main tasks as theologians, or does epistemology have something to do 
with soteriology?  
 
5.3.2 Knowing and salvation 
One of the biggest points of criticism from the Reformed standpoint against 
the notion of participation, as found in Milbank, is that it seems only to circle 
around the ‘right way of knowing’. Reformed commentators find his work 
lacking of the seriousness of the situation of fallen humanity and its need for 
redemption. As we saw in chapter 4 (particularly in 4.3.1), Milbank’s theology 
indeed invests a lot of energy in an account of knowledge. He criticises what 
he identifies as the Kantian-Scotistic current for delimiting – and so 
‘secularising’ – the realm of what we can know. He is not interested in 
outlining where thought begins and what it can think, since thinking has 
                                                          
92 For the sake of space, there has to be an end to the list of Reformed critics of 
participation and/or Radical Orthodoxy here, but at least the name of Michael Horton 
should also be mentioned. His recent works all contain critical discussions with 
Milbank and Graham Ward, which articulate the same concerns as those developed in 
this section (and are particularly close to the critique of Wisse). Very concise and to 
the point is Horton’s criticism on participation (and his favouring of the concept of the 
covenant instead) in J. Smith and J. H. Olthuis (eds.) Radical Orthodoxy and the 
Reformed Tradition, 107-132.  
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‘always already begun’ and cannot point to its own premises: ‘Thinking always 
arrives on the scene too late to provide its own foundations’, Milbank notes, 
with a reference to Jacobi.93 His epistemology therefore does not stand on its 
own but is moved consciously into the orbit of ontology, into the wider context 
where it just seems to find itself. Some Reformed commentators, however, 
seem to be begging the question: ‘But why should a theologian bother so much 
about these questions?’ And is one justified to claim that the theological 
tradition articulates this same point? In order to bring the matter closer to the 
Reformed mind, Bavinck might perhaps be added to the following discussion 
as well.  
As we have seen, ‘knowing’ is for Milbank something that cannot be seen 
as separate. It is necessarily connected with words like ‘desiring’, ‘willing’ and 
‘loving’. It is even connected with ‘grace’. Since knowing involves the 
instability of identities and essences, it is directed towards something 
fundamentally ‘to come’, and therefore can be said to have an eschatological 
moment. Knowing is moved away from its modern association with power and 
commanding, towards the sphere and stance of gratitude, Milbank states. We 
depend on God granting knowledge to us, and it is not something which is 
‘ours’. Although Milbank’s view is deeply inspired by late twentieth-century 
postmodern thought, an important account of knowing that is comparable to it 
can be found in Bavinck as well.  
There is an encompassing ‘divine movement’ discernable in Bavinck’s 
thought, which develops along the lines of a Platonic-Christian exitus-reditus-
movement according to which this world stands in a movement from God, to 
God. Just like in Milbank’s thought, so also in Bavinck the world loses 
something of its ‘fixed identity’. Although this is not strictly speaking a theme 
for Bavinck, the different theologoumena in his dogmatics are consciously 
considered as standing in this encompassing movement and therefore cannot 
be looked upon independently. Theology becomes a story with interrelated 
topics in a divine ‘plot’. That is to say: even Scripture, even the covenant of 
grace and even Christ serve as ‘means’ within this movement and are not the 
goal of the theological enterprise. If a goal has to be articulated, for Bavinck it 
                                                          
93 Milbank, ‘The Double Glory’, 160 
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is the glory of God’s being in the fullness of its riches. In theology it is therefore 
‘God’s being all along’.94 
The all-important character of God’s being is the main reason for Bavinck 
to attribute a central theological place of importance to his account of 
knowledge. He even sounds ‘Milbankian’ in his criticism of modern accounts of 
knowing: ‘the human mind does not let itself be constrained by boundaries, 
not even those set by Kant and Comte’.95 Although Bavinck is clear about the 
fact that being and knowing are separated, his view on knowing, just like 
Milbank’s, moves him into the wider orbit of being, even the being of God 
himself.96 For Bavinck, creation exists in an embodiment of divine ideas – 
which again shows how deeply Bavinck is rooted within the Christian Platonic 
tradition. Thinking, and emphatically theological thinking, is tracing the unity 
and coherence of these divine ideas. With our human thinking, we ‘think after’ 
God’s ideas, we try to trace and follow the divine thoughts.97 Therefore, he 
relates the notions of ‘knowing’ and ‘salvation’ very closely to each other, a 
move which he discerns also in one of his favourite passages from Scripture in 
this context: ‘This is eternal life, that they may know you’ (John 17:3). 
‘Knowing God’ is not a first step of connecting with the divine, but it is an 
articulation of our participation in the divine being. Epistemology is for 
Bavinck not some difficult gate you must pass through in order to take your 
place around the theological table and to start the meal, as is indeed the case 
in a typical modern philosophical framework. Knowledge is the meal itself, it 
is to eat, and this is the reason why the prolegomena in Bavinck’s Dogmatics 
are already so deeply theological.  
Since knowing is about the heart of theology, it of course cannot be for 
Bavinck a detached intellectual ‘game’. In Bavinck, again following the Platonic 
Christian tradition, we find a strong notion of the participatory 
epistemological rule that ‘like can only be known by like’. For example, if you 
want to know truth, you have to be truthful. ‘Someone only knows the truth 
                                                          
94 Cf. Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 94-95.  
95 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 31. 
96 Bavinck discusses this issue concisely in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing. E.g. with a 
reference to Augustine, Bavinck argues that ‘we know things, because they are, but 
they are, because God has known them’, 28. And: ‘both being and knowing have their 
ratio in the Word by which God created everything’, 33. 
97 See 3.2 of this study. On the relationship between theological knowledge and 
‘knowledge in general’, cf. also W. Huttinga, ‘Marie Antoinette’.  
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inasmuch as he is it’.98 If you want to know goodness, you have to be a good 
person, and if you want to know God, you have to be ‘godly’, pious. This 
emphasis on the ‘virtuous knower’, the attuning of the knower to that which is 
known, can be traced throughout Bavinck’s work, and is conceptually coined 
in his idea of the necessary correspondence between subject and object.99  
It is exactly at this point that not only Milbank, but apparently also 
Bavinck, at least according to some interpretations of the Reformed tradition, 
seems to cross a border of what is acceptable. They do not see salvation as 
something that is purely extra nos, but there is something in our createdness 
that already consists in our sharing in the divine life and has to be addressed 
and intensified. In both Milbank and Bavinck, nature has to be already ‘graced’ 
so as to be what it is. Although Bavinck also uses concepts and metaphors that 
point in a different direction, he can simply state that even in this sinful, fallen 
world, to experience the correspondence between subject and object is in fact 
to experience ‘the normal situation’ of ‘rest, joy, blessedness’. In this situation 
‘the truth has found us, and we have found it. There is immediate contact.’100  
Although they live philosophically and theologically in altogether different 
eras, Bavinck and Milbank highly concur in their accounts of knowledge. Both 
to a large degree attach knowing to ‘knowing God’ and see knowing as 
something that refers in the first place to its divine source, the being of God, 
and in the second place to its divine end, the eschatological moment when we 
will know all things in God and God in all things. And although this may be an 
‘eschatological vision’ on knowing, our present state of knowing would be 
empty if it did not somehow participate in this vision. Therefore, ‘knowledge 
as such is a good’, as Bavinck contends. Not only ‘theological knowledge’ but 
any act of knowing is on its way to the knowing and seeing of God.101  
                                                          
98 Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, 29.  
99 See 3.3.5 above. Bavinck’s and Milbank’s insistence on knowledge as something 
quite different from a detached intellectual game is not purely part of their christian 
heritage. As Pierre Hadot has shown, already in pre-Socratic Greece, Sophia was 
‘knowing how to’ and in particular ‘knowing how to live’. Socrates (or Plato) even 
turned the idea of wisdom towards a discourse on ‘knowing how to be’. Already in 
Platonic thought there was a great stress on knowing as something morally relevant, 
leading one into a certain way of ‘being’. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 9-51.     
100 See 3.3.5.  
101 In an important discussion of Milbank’s view on knowledge, connected with his 
interpretation of Aquinas’ epistemology/ontology, Paul DeHart suggests that Milbank 
interprets Aquinas falsely as stating that our knowing is an inchoative experience of 
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This study therefore argues that both these theologians in occupying 
themselves with knowledge and knowing are not asking ‘preliminary’ 
questions for theology, but in doing so are entering the heart of the relation of 
the created with the divine. For Bavinck no less than for Milbank, ‘knowing’ is 
considered as being on its way to ‘know God’. Furthermore, the views of 
Bavinck and Milbank on knowledge, in concordance with the participatory 
tradition, do not offer haughty conceptions which intend to lift up human 
beings by the ‘right way of knowing’ to a super-human, divine level. They 
instead invoke a humble, receptive attitude. It is not that they point strictly to 
a human capacity which functions as the foundation for our salvation, to 
articulate their intentions in terms of the Reformed abhorrence for this theme. 
Just like ‘deification’ is not a way to elevate human beings to a level that they 
do not belong to but is more a confession that ‘we are nothing and God is 
everything’, so Bavinck’s and Milbank’s views on knowledge testify of 
creation’s ‘empty hands’ and point to the divine and ultimately unknown 
giving source in which our knowing and thinking participates.  
 
5.3.3 Sin and evil 
With this, the question of Bavinck’s and Milbank’s accounts of sin becomes an 
acute one. To what extent is human being destroyed by sin, particularly in its 
ability to know? How can the knower be ‘attuned to’ that which is known if the 
                                                                                                                                                   
God’s perfect knowledge. Although this study is quite content not to enter the 
interpretive debate on Aquinas’ account of analogy (a ‘grammatical/linguistic’ versus 
an ‘ontological’ one, or an ‘apophatic’ versus a ‘kataphatic’ one), some comments can 
be made.  
In the first place, this study admits the critique that Milbank sometimes speaks ‘too 
optimistically’ about the participation of the created in the divine. That Milbank’s 
notion of ‘analogy as paradox’ is in fact much more nuanced (both kataphatic and 
apophatic at once) can unfortunately not be derived from the limited discussion of 
Aquinas on which DeHart builds.  
Second, what this study misses in DeHart’s discussion is the broader perspective of 
the tradition, which did emphasise this participatory relation by means of the logos 
(and is adopted by both Bavinck and Milbank). This study sees no problem in reading 
ST I q13 (on the relationship between our naming and the naming of the divine) 
against the much broader traditional metaphysical background of how creation and 
creator relate by way of participation which does indeed function in Aquinas, as 
discussed above in 2.2.6. In fact, this seems to be the more plausible thing to do. 
Whether this renders a reading of Aquinas that is ‘too platonising’ to be plausible is a 
subject open to debate. See P. J. DeHart, ‘On being heard but not seen: Milbank and 
Lash on Aquinas, analogy and agnosticism’, Modern Theology 26 (2010), 243-277. 
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knower is bound to control, damage, distort or even hate that which is known? 
Can we, in our relation with God, somehow rely on God’s being and our 
createdness, on our ‘participation in the divine being’, or is this ‘route’ 
destroyed by sin and is any way of relating with God therefore blocked, except 
the way that is called ‘Christ’? Of course, in the context of this study these 
questions cannot be answered in their fullness and breadth, but the work of 
Milbank and Bavinck, as well as the overview of the participatory tradition 
offered in chapter 2, provide some important clues for these questions.  
From a Reformed perspective, the account of knowledge that Milbank and 
Bavinck share seems to be problematic. Both hold to some version of the 
position that human knowledge participates in God’s knowledge. To Milbank, 
any act of knowing is in fact an inchoative participation in God’s knowing, and 
Bavinck considers human reason not as identical with but still as participating 
in the divine Logos. But does this not contradict the idea that our knowing is 
deeply affected by sin?102 In working towards an answer, we will first 
recapitulate the pivotal points in Bavinck’s and Milbank’s discussions of sin 
and evil (5.3.3) and then concomitantly their views on incarnation (5.3.4).  
Both Bavinck and Milbank strongly insist on privatio boni as the pre-
eminent character of sin. Since for them ‘being’ and ‘the good’ stand in 
forefront, evil is not something considered ontologically equal to the good. Sin 
and evil can therefore never set the agenda for theology, since that can only be 
done by God’s very being. Yet how is sin then to be taken seriously, given the 
fact that it nonetheless ‘is there’?   
The last sentence, in its unconsciously ‘naïve’ formulation, would already 
have problematic connotations for Milbank. For him, sin is not simply ‘there’, 
and is definitively not there as a ‘given fact’. Sin and evil are realities that are 
brought about in the realm of imagination and narration. In his mind the 
problem with secular views on the world is that they simply posit evil as a fact, 
as a given which is necessarily there and which forms the only secure ground 
on which we build our worldviews, ethics and so on. But just like the secular, 
so too evil had to be ‘invented’ and, before it was enacted, it had to be 
                                                          
102 Eugene Heideman is quite clear when he articulates his concerns about Bavinck’s 
theology. He is worried by the necessary correspondence between subject and object 
which for Bavinck ultimately occurs in the Logos: ‘There is the suspicion that the 
subject and the object have been so closely related that Bavinck has not been able to 
escape completely the pantheism which he fears and criticizes’. Heideman, The 
relation of revelation and reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck, 144.  
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‘imagined’ as a ‘false simulacrum within the repleteness of reality’.103 
Therefore, human action ought not to involve an ‘acting against evil’, since 
such a reaction would involve a re-enactment of sin itself and confirm its very 
existence. Sin is therefore ‘something to be forgotten about’. Milbank’s project 
is again one of ‘imagining otherwise’, of telling a story of the fullness of life, 
and hoping that this is the story that will be enacted.   
In Bavinck’s Dogmatics, however, notwithstanding its substantial 
‘nothingness’, sin does play a role in the theological story.104 It even fulfils a 
role in God’s world plan. When humanity is fallen in sin, God hands the world 
over into the economy of the Mediator, which is called the ‘covenant of grace’. 
The path that is to be followed is the path of the cross, which passes ‘through 
suffering to glory, through struggle to victory, through the cross to a crown, 
through the state of humiliation to that of exaltation’. Therefore, although 
Bavinck speaks very carefully here, there is in the end something of a ‘positive 
role’ for sin in the divine story. It enables humanity to obtain the donum 
perseverantiae, which in the end even contributes to the glorification of God, 
being victorious over sin. 
From both sides, there emerges then a question for the other. For Milbank, 
it would be the question if sin in Bavinck’s Reformed perspective is not 
actively engendered. If sin is allowed to play a ‘role’ in the theological plot, is 
this not, to put it bluntly, to do the devil’s will? What does sin become if it is 
allowed to set the agenda for what can be theologically (and therefore 
ontologically and epistemologically) said after Adam’s fall? It comes 
dangerously close to being ‘bigger than God’. From the other side, one might 
ask of Milbank if he in fact does not ignore the seriousness of fallen reality. If 
sin has to be ‘imagined away’, then what do we make of the undeniable reality 
of our broken lives? Although Milbank in several parts of his oeuvre has a keen 
eye for the reality of sin and evil as an ephemeral fabric we are woven into, 
there is a clear tendency in his thought to pass over the earthly to the 
heavenly, eternal state of things, the clearest example of which already 
appears in Theology and Social Theory: to overcome secular violence, we have 
to imagine heavenly peace. Of course, we should not contrast Bavinck’s and 
Milbank’s views more than is necessary. In both their views, sin and evil are 
considered as ambiguous but nonetheless very ‘real’ realities that, although 
                                                          
103 For a more extended discussion, see 4.2.3.  
104 See 3.5. 
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they strictly have no ‘being’ and are purely parasitic, still are interwoven into 
our world text. The question is, however: how are we to deal with this 
ambiguous reality?  
With his focus on the role of imagination, Milbank has a valuable point. 
Reformed theology should be careful not to put ‘sin, and what God does with 
it’ at the centre of theological reflection. That would be giving evil too much 
honour. It is God’s triune being, which gives and does not stop giving even 
after humanity has turned away from Him, that should be at the centre of the 
attention. Milbank’s emphasis rightly points to the eschatology of our acting. 
Every act is a projection, an ‘imagination’ of the good life, pointing to the 
goodness which is hidden in God, but still proleptically present. But Milbank’s 
emphasis on the theological task of ‘re-imagining the good’ has an equally 
deep pitfall, which becomes painstakingly clear for example in his 
introduction to The Word Made Strange. There he complains that the complete 
ecclesial task seems to fall on the shoulders of the individual theologian. Since 
the church lacks a real practice of hope and love, it is the theologian who first 
has to imagine the virtuous life in order that it can be lived again. Although 
there is much to say in favour of the role of ‘imagining the good’ in hoping and 
aiming for a new and good practice, in Milbank’s theological framework it in 
fact means that the individual theologian has to ‘undo the fall’. Since the fall 
existed first and foremost in Adam’s imagining of the ‘secular’, of something 
alongside the good, theology’s task is to re-imagine the good and hope that 
this will open up the possibility for a good practice again. The present study 
considers this to be a serious overestimation of what theology, or at least the 
‘individual theologian’, can do. To give the theologian the task of ‘redeeming 
estrangement’ is to give him or her a role that functions too much as a 
soteriological task.  
Bavinck’s account of sin, however, is again not so far removed from 
Milbank’s. At least in an important undercurrent of his argument as we 
followed it in chapter 3, he ‘imagines sin away’ just like Milbank does. Like 
Milbank, Bavinck argues for the fundamental nothingness of sin. Therefore 
God trusted the situation of giving the world over to sin, and let it have the 
world, and even his beloved son. This trust has to do with the nothingness of 
sin, since it is ‘of such a nature that it destroys itself by the very freedom 
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granted it; it dies of its own diseases; it dooms itself to death’.105 The views of 
Bavinck and Milbank on sin and evil both sound much like what the main 
character Pi Patel in the novel The life of Pi brings forward about death: ‘The 
reason death sticks so closely to life isn’t biological necessity; it’s envy. Life is 
so beautiful that death has fallen in love with it, a jealous, possessive love that 
grabs at what it can. But life leaps over oblivion lightly, losing only a thing or 
two of no importance, and gloom is but the passing shadow of a cloud...’106 But 
if this is the case, if sin builds indeed an automatically self-defeating kingdom, 
then ‘why did Christ have to come?’ is a question that bothers at least some 
Reformed minds in this discussion. The question concerning Christ’s coming is 
most clearly felt within the realm of the discussion of the incarnation, with 
which this study therefore continues – and finishes.  
 
5.3.4 Incarnation 
In his Revelatie en inspiratie, Jan Veenhof rightly observes that in Bavinck’s 
work incarnation is deeply connected with the rest of God’s revelation. Like 
the present study, Veenhof observes how in Bavinck general and special 
revelation, nature and grace are distinguished, but also have an important 
continuity. He adds: ‘It is difficult to decide which has greater importance for 
Bavinck: the affinity or the difference?’107 Because of Bavinck’s imprecise 
formulations, Veenhof continues, it is impossible to interpret his theology as a 
‘creational’ or ‘grace’-theology. In Bavinck’s discourse about God’s 
communicability, which moves him into the orbit of participation, this study 
identified an important rationale for both the continuity and the discontinuity 
Veenhof observes. It is therefore not, as Veenhof has it, simply a matter of 
unclarity or insecurity on Bavinck’s side, but the ever tense outcome of how 
the Trinitarian God communicates his life and being to this world – before and 
after sin breaks into it. Contrary to Veenhof’s claim, this study in fact finds the 
impossibility to choose in Bavinck’s work strictly between ‘creation’ and 
‘grace’ a very fortunate one. As noted above in 5.3.1, any diffusing of ontology 
and soteriology belongs to the harmony of the workings of the Triune God and 
is therefore not a theological vice, but rather a virtue.    
                                                          
105 RD3, 64-65 (GD3, 42).  
106 Y. Martel, Life of Pi (New York: Mariner Books, 2001), 6. 
107 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 409. For the whole discussion, cf. 406-416.  
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As we saw, Bavinck places great emphasis on the broader context of the 
incarnation, which can be characterised briefly in terms of God’s 
communicative being. The incarnation then forms ‘the crown’ on this divine 
working. Since Bavinck so deeply correlates incarnation with creation, 
Veenhof asks whether he does not ‘take away from the incarnation its final 
and most profound seriousness’.108 Veenhof thus points to an important 
characteristic in Bavinck’s work. He even omits some statements that would 
really be worrying for him, where Bavinck argues that humankind, even in its 
original creation, ‘unites and reconciles within himself both heaven and earth, 
things both invisible and visible’, an expression which even in its very 
vocabulary is ‘unclear’ about the difference between being and salvation.109 
Not only ‘the person of Christ’, but already humankind itself as at once 
microcosmos and microtheos has a mediatory character for Bavinck. Is this not 
an underestimation of the radical novelty of God’s redeeming act in Christ, and 
does this not degrade special revelation to simply a special form of general 
revelation? Veenhof refers to the work of G. C. Berkouwer, who also insisted 
on the purely soteriological motif of the incarnation and resisted the idea 
suggested in the tradition that God would also have become man ‘without sin’. 
Berkouwer therefore pleads strongly for an interpretation of the incarnation 
exclusively in terms of reparation and not of elevation.110  
This study, however, persists in its conviction that the idea that the 
incarnation ‘exceeds its occasion’ as articulated by Milbank would at least in 
its formulation be accepted by Bavinck as well. Both Veenhof and Berkouwer 
are sensitive to the fact that purely focusing on the ‘reparatory’ motif of the 
incarnation, although this motif obviously has strong biblical and patristic 
roots, denies something of its broadness and of the divine freedom expressed 
                                                          
108 Veenhof, Revelatie en inspiratie, 411. Cf. Hans Burger in Being in Christ: ‘The 
Christological teleology of creation is in tension with the contingent, soteriological 
character of the incarnation. As a result the unique character of the incarnation as an 
answer to sin and guilt seems to disappear, although Bavinck does not want this.’ 
Being in Christ, 93.  
109 RD2, 556 (GD2, 518), italics added. Cf. 3.5.1.  
110 G.C. Berkouwer, Het Werk van Christus. Dogmatische Studien (Kampen: Kok, 1953), 
17-33. Berkouwer’s dismissal of the idea of ‘incarnation without sin’ is closely tied to 
the type of theologians he observed defending the notion. He refers to H. Martensen 
and J. J. van Oosterzee, who seem to have defended the idea within a more or less 
optimistic ‘nineteenth-century’ evolutionary scheme of human development, not 
really hindered by a strong account of human sinfulness.   
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in it. The glorious divine communication in the incarnation would be 
compromised, if God were to be supposed to be purely ‘reacting’ against sin. 
Nonetheless, Veenhof and Berkouwer are unwilling to develop this theme any 
further. This study, however, pointed in chapter 2 to the ‘double sign’ under 
which the incarnation functioned for the fathers of the church, which could 
rightly be articulated in terms of reparation and elevation.111 Bavinck’s 
account of the creation of man, which focuses on the higher goal that still lies 
in the future and is only fulfilled in Christ, the true image of God, is not 
necessarily a typical nineteenth-century image of development and growth in 
Hegelian style (which Berkouwer and apparently also Veenhof fear), but can 
also for example be found in Athanasius’ account of the incarnation. He too 
considers the incarnation as standing in the course of God’s ongoing unfolding 
towards human beings and thus as the gift of what is utterly human: a stable 
union with the divine.112 All this is not to deny that the occasion for the 
incarnation is God’s condescension to a world fallen deeply in sin. This is the 
truth of the felix culpa-tradition Milbank carefully refers to, according to which 
humanity, by falling into sin, was able to receive a saviour who provided a 
glory that reached even beyond the original creation.113  
Notwithstanding the similarities between Bavinck and Milbank, there are 
also strong differences between their approaches to the incarnation. For 
Bavinck, the reason why the incarnation exceeds its occasion is quite another 
one than it is for Milbank. For Bavinck, the occasion for the incarnation, 
namely that humanity is fallen in sin, stands far more at the forefront than it 
does for Milbank. As was observed in chapter 4, Bavinck’s christology is 
preceded by a chapter on the covenant of grace. This covenant is the name of 
the ‘new order’ that was established after the fall. This fact alone already 
indicates that Bavinck, with the Reformed tradition he draws on, gives sin 
quite a pivotal and even ‘constructive’ role. Since the chapter on the covenant 
of grace precedes his christology, Bavinck’s account of Christ functions mainly 
within this covenantal framework. For Bavinck, what stands in the forefront is 
the fact that the Son of God became incarnate because of sin, rather than that 
he became flesh in order to elevate the nature of man. However, we have 
already seen how important the broader context of the incarnation is for 
                                                          
111 Cf. 2.2.5.  
112 Cf. 2.2.5.  
113 Cf. 4.4.2.  
223 
 
Bavinck. The incarnation stands in the context of a) God’s very Trinitarian 
being; b) the creation and particularly the creation of man and c) the history of 
revelation. Therefore the incarnation functions in the broader context of God’s 
communicability. In this sense it ‘exceeds its occasion’, since it does not only 
refer to man’s guilt, but primarily to God’s glorious and giving being, which 
surrounds the fallen situation of humankind. In this sense, even Bavinck does 
have an account of elevation through the incarnation, although he opposes the 
term. The only reason why he opposes that term is in fact that it reminds him 
of the extrinsicist view (which he himself refers to as ‘Roman’) that something 
‘supernatural’ is added to a supposedly natural account of humanity, while he 
wishes to emphasise the ongoing and increasing communication of God in 
nature and history – which again comes very close to Milbank’s integralist 
motifs.114  
                                                          
114 Syd Hielema has a keen eye for this elevatory character in Bavinck’s work. Like the 
current study, he stresses the fact that the incarnation for Bavinck exceeds its 
occasion (he calls it ‘the eschatological character of redemption’), since it functions 
within the framework of God’s triune being. S. Hielema, Herman Bavinck’s 
Eschatological Understanding of Redemption (Th. D. Thesis, Wycliffe College, Toronto 
School of Theology, 1998), 89-90 and particularly chapter 4, 120-199. Hielema 
challenges the dominant interpretations of Bavinck by Eugene Heideman, Cornelis 
Veenhof and John Bolt, which consider ‘grace restores nature’ to be the central theme 
in Bavinck’s work. Although I would still be quite content with the old description, I 
value Hielema’s observation of the exceeding character of redemption, albeit that this 
excess should not be considered exclusively forwards (‘eschatological’), but also 
backwards, and therefore, in fact ‘upwards’. The current study also emphasises the 
connecting principle of the triune divine being, which is communicated both in nature 
and grace, and it therefore builds on and develops the observations already made by 
commentators like Hielema in Eschatological Understanding and Eglinton in Trinity 
and Organism.  
Likewise, this study values Brian Mattson’s emphasis on the eschatological character 
of Bavinck’s anthropology. With Mattson, I see a deep and important ‘connective logic’ 
between nature and grace which lies in a discourse of elevation and glorification. We 
seem to differ, however, on where the most basic dimension of this logic must be 
located in Bavinck. In my view, Mattson sees the covenant of works too exclusively as 
the factor that keeps nature and grace together. In my reading, this role is rather 
fulfilled by Bavinck’s classical theological discourse of the all-encompassing unifying 
view of  ‘divine being’ that is communicated in nature as well as in grace. For this 
reason, I referred to the language of the covenant of works as being rather 
‘superfluous’ in chapter 3 above. B. G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny.  
What is the ‘most basic rationale’ of Bavinck’s theology? In distinguishing a ‘central 
theme’ in Bavinck’s work, one must mention also the contribution of Ron Gleason, 
who has suggested that it is the mystical union with Christ. Without detracting from 
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The uneasiness felt by some of Bavinck’s interpreters lies in the fact that 
he uses these two ‘languages’ in his Dogmatics: on the one hand the 
incarnation functions within the classic Reformed framework of the covenant 
of grace, which is unproblematic for them, and on the other hand it functions 
in an ontological participatory framework, which they find – unsurprisingly – 
disturbing. Bavinck’s supplementing of the participatory starting point with 
the more biblically oriented framework of the covenant is entirely in line with 
a more general tendency of his work: for Bavinck, metaphysical conceptuality 
is always on speaking terms with biblical imagery. In this respect there is an 
important difference over against Milbank. Although he too now and then tries 
to connect biblical-theological lines with metaphysical discussions, this has a 
different character. For him, the bible in fact often only ‘illustrates’ what was 
already contained in his ontological speculations.115 
It is therefore no surprise that Milbank’s account of the incarnation – 
which can be found scattered throughout his work – stands in a somewhat 
different context than it does in Bavinck. For Milbank, Christ is in fact an 
‘answer’ to a ‘different question’. Again, Milbank’s theological narration is a 
different story than the one Bavinck wants to tell. In his anti-Kantian and anti-
Scotistic post-secular project, he happily welcomes in Christ a site of the 
‘obliteration of boundaries’. Christ brings about a new ontological state for the 
Creation: ‘the causing of a human creature directly to subsist in a divine 
hypostasis’, which results in ‘the utter fusion of the finite with the infinite 
                                                                                                                                                   
the importance of this theme in Bavinck’s christology, I would suggest that it can 
hardly count as the central theme in his work, since it is always surrounded by 
Bavinck’s trinitarian ontology, which is in fact much more concisely articulated in his 
repeated emphasis that ‘grace renews and restores nature’. Christology and even 
‘union with Christ’ is not the place where Bavinck’s theology finds its rest. In the end, 
the whole quest for a ‘central motif’ – analogous to the misguided nineteenth-century 
search for a ‘central dogma’, most notably in John Calvin’s theology – should be kept at 
bay and is of relative importance for interpreting a theological oeuvre. R. N. Gleason, 
The Centrality of the Unio Mystica.  
115 In Milbank’s work we sometimes encounter phrases like ‘The New Testament is for 
this reason right to view…’, which indicate that the bible for him does not speak as a 
natural authority and norm (which is ‘beyond right or wrong’ and simply to be 
accepted), but expresses something of a very respectable and important opinion. Even 
the voice and the teaching of the apostles can be ‘assessed’. For this quote see The 
Word Made Strange, 223-224.   
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(though not the other way around)’.116 In this way, Christ seems to come close 
to an ‘ontological device’, a danger that his theology does not manage to avoid 
altogether. Milbank somewhere describes the incarnation as producing a 
‘proliferation of sacred sites’, which almost sounds as if Christ is a divine-
human ‘plant’ that produces the sacred. Christ functions as ‘the answer’ to our 
current problem of divine-human mediation.117  
In the end, however, such a judgement would miss the point Milbank 
wants to make. The focus of his argument is that Christ is not a ‘fetishizable 
object’, but primarily a ‘mode of being’ in which we participate.118 Milbank 
does not give a pure description of ‘who Christ is’, but is aware that any 
description of Christ is linked to the practice of the church, his body, and 
therefore of the constellation of signs that Christ brings into this world.119 
Typically postmodern as it may sound, this emphasis is clearly rooted in the 
New Testament writings with their account of the ongoing work and 
‘presence’ of Christ in and through the early Christian community.  
As was made clear in chapter 4, Milbank’s account of Christ constantly 
inclines more to a monophysite than a duophysite standpoint. Although he 
usually quickly corrects his own language when he realises that he stands on 
dangerous ground (at least within Christian orthodoxy), his preference is 
clear.120 This is quite understandable, since Milbank’s quest is not for a 
nuanced christology, but for a post-secular theological language. Separating 
the two natures of Christ all too strictly sounds to Milbank as giving in to a 
secular standpoint concerning what we can say about a supposedly pure 
human nature, without any relation with the divine. In his quest for imagining 
a position beyond the secular, Milbank as we have seen finds different 
symbols in the Christian tradition, which he exploits. In his oeuvre he 
‘experiments’ with what he calls theological transcendentals which in one 
                                                          
116 Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 63. That this at least sounds at odds with the 
Chalcedonian creed was observed above in 4.4.2.  
117 For the ‘proliferation’ quote, see Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, 69; for Christ as the 
answer to divine-human mediation in the context of the history of Israel, see Milbank, 
The Word Made Strange, chapter 5, ‘A Christological Poetics’.  
118 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 148. Cf. 4.4.2.  
119 Although commentators tend to contrast Milbank’s work with that of ‘fellow RO-
theologian’ Graham Ward, his emphasis on Christ as a mode of being is highly similar 
to Ward’s ‘postmodern’ christology in Christ and Culture. G. Ward, Christ and Culture 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).  
120 An example of this is given in 4.4.2.  
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word articulate a divine-human reality.121 This is the case with ‘the social’ as 
an ecclesial reality, ‘the gift’ as the divine-human economy of exchange, with 
the Word (as verbum or factum) that is God and that is simultaneously 
constitutive for creation, and also with the Eastern Christian concept of Sophia 
as a uniting principle of divine-human wisdom. Christ, with his two natures 
united in one person, in fact also ‘functions’ along the theoretical lines of 
Milbank’s quest.  
In this context as well the creative force of Milbank’s work has to be taken 
seriously and kept in honour. Milbank really does manage to allow Christ to 
figure in a postmodern context in which the search for an embodied 
experience of the divine is a deep and widespread cultural longing.122 
However, once more this study finds that Bavinck’s account – and this seems 
to be a repeating pattern in the discussion – represents the most nuanced 
voice. At least, it is Bavinck’s view that captures all of the decisive elements 
within the patristic tradition as described in chapter 2. When we consider how 
the Christian tradition wrote its biblical narratives of Israel, Christ and the 
Church within a participatory framework, Bavinck works within the same 
cross-shaped tension which Andrew Louth suggests the fathers to have been 
moving in. As we saw, Louth speaks of an unresolved tension between ascent 
and descent in the patristic writings.123 On the one hand humanity as image of 
God is made for union with the divine and therefore finds itself  in a constant 
longing to return to God. Yet on the other hand the incarnation, God’s descent 
into the humble fallen state of mankind, offers the route we all have to follow. 
The double movement therefore consists in an ascent of the soul through the 
descent of the incarnate Word.  
This takes us back to the discussion of sin. Neither in Scripture nor in the 
church fathers is sin simply ‘something to be forgotten about’. The reality we 
are invited to enter in the incarnation does not consist of somehow escaping 
our bodily and sinful existence, but of going with Christ into the depths of this 
fallen state. Rather than something to be forgotten about, sin is something that 
has to be gone through, faced and confessed as a reality that is bigger than us. 
Bavinck’s statements about the ‘new rule’ that is installed after the world is 
fallen in sin and given over to the Mediator is perhaps best and most famously 
                                                          
121 See 4.4.3.  
122 For the same christological approach, cf. Ward, Christ and Culture.  
123 See 2.2.5. 
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articulated by Leonard Cohen: ‘There is a crack in everything, that is how the 
light gets in.’124 As fallen creatures, we need to face our ‘crack’. With Christ, as 
Augustine would say, we follow the way of humility within the realm of sin 
and death. And even the risen Lord, being victorious over death, still bears the 
wounds of the cross.125  
Bavinck and Milbank differ when it comes to the role of sin and therefore 
the context in which the incarnation functions. However, they are united in the 
view that Christ brought a mode of being that is neither purely described by 
restoration from sin nor purely by elevation, but which is both. It ‘exceeds its 
occasion’ (Milbank) since it stands in the broader framework of God’s 
communicability (Bavinck). For both theologians, the incarnation is ‘fitting’ 
within the broader realm of God’s workings in creation and revelation. God’s 
answer to sin in the incarnation, although it bears the marks of sin, is not 
determined by sin. It is determined by life, eternal life, which is God’s very 
being.  
The incarnation therefore welcomes the human being into the divine life, 
not by moving away from the realm of the body, but by entering it with all its 
                                                          
124 Leonard Cohen in his song Anthem. The entire chorus of the song runs as follows: 
‘Ring the bells that still can ring, forget your perfect offering. There is a crack in 
everything, that’s how the light gets in’. In an interview, Cohen importantly comments: 
‘‘Ring the bells that still can ring’: they’re few and far between, but you can find them. 
‘Forget your perfect offering’, that is the hang-up that you’re gonna work this thing 
out. Because we confuse this idea and we’ve forgotten the central myth of our culture 
which is the expulsion from the garden of Eden. This situation does not admit of 
solution of perfection. This is not the place where you make things perfect, neither in 
your marriage, nor in your work, nor anything, nor your love of God, nor your love of 
family or country. The thing is imperfect. And worse, there is a crack in everything 
that you can put together, physical objects, mental objects, constructions of any kind. 
But that’s where the light gets in, and that’s where the resurrection is and that’s where 
the return, that’s where the repentance is. It is with the confrontation, with the 
brokenness of things.’ http://www.leonardcohen-prologues.com/anthem.htm (last 
accessed 1 February 2014).  
125 John 20:24-27; cf. the image of Christ and the Lamb in Rev. 1:18, 5:6. To be sure, 
this notion is not overlooked by Milbank, who even mentions it explicitly in The Word 
made Strange, 139. In construing a Christology in linguistic terms, he says about Christ 
that ‘to be a sign for us all, he must pass through death, since our signs speak only 
death; but to signify absolutely for us he must also re-define the sign of language as 
life, as eternal logos in the resurrection.’ Therefore, Christ, as a constellation of signs, 
‘allows to be incorporated into his own person ugly constructions which in their new 
context assume a different appearance’. Christ, the crucified and risen, signifies a 
reality of death within the context of resurrection.  
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pain, hardships and struggle. It has to bear its cross and die. It reaches heaven 
by staying consequently on earth. This is also the case for the idiom of scientia 
and sapientia which we encountered in Augustine in chapter 2. Scientia, the 
worldly and temporary realm of knowledge, is united in Christ with sapientia, 
the eternal unchanging realm of wisdom. By clinging to Christ we progress 
from scientia to sapientia, but not by leaving the bodily behind somewhere. 
Since God chose to reveal himself in the flesh, this is the realm that we must 
adhere to faithfully. As Augustine says, Christ is the right that is the bodily 
mediation with the divine, from which we must not withdraw, in which we 
have to remain.  
 
5.3.5 Conclusions 
This section began by noting the Reformed uneasiness with ontological 
participation. One of the Reformed tradition’s  main problems with 
participation is the fusing of ontology and soteriology, which it considers to be 
diminishing the seriousness of God’s saving act in Jesus Christ. Interestingly, 
the fact that this criticism is felt by Reformed commentators of not only 
Milbank’s but also Bavinck’s work makes the suggestion that their ‘ontological 
participatory’ ways of speaking are closely related even more compelling.  
This study, however, cannot but conclude that both Bavinck and Milbank in 
this way develop the patristic discourse in which soteriology and ontology are 
deeply connected, as it is consistently rendered by Bavinck with his focus on 
the unity of the being of God which is communicated. It therefore does not find 
it theologically disturbing, but in fact a fortunate outcome when theological 
language is ‘not clear’ about the distinction between ontology and soteriology, 
or about the difference between nature and grace. It keeps any discourse of 
‘being’ filled dynamic and relational, and it keeps salvation (literally) 
grounded and therefore ‘earthed’.  
Not only Milbank, but also Bavinck has an account of the incarnation in 
which it ‘exceeds its occasion’. It points not only towards sin, but primarily 
towards its context of the divine unfolding of glory from creation to eschaton. 
As we saw, an important difference between Bavinck and Milbank is that in 
Bavinck the participatory language is supplemented – though not eliminated – 
by covenantal language. This gives his theological story, and particularly the 
context of the incarnation, a more ‘biblical’ character. It takes his account of 
the incarnation out of the sphere of ontological speculation (in which it mainly 
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functions in Milbank) and into the biblical and patristic way of speaking – 
which, admittedly, does provide space for ontological speculation. 
Much comes down to the differences in terms of where sin functions in 
their theologies. For Milbank, the incarnation functions mainly along the lines 
of a post-secular narration, which is a creative task of his theology that this 
study wishes to honour. His account is not simply ‘untraditional’, but it 
underemphasises something of the tradition that is more prominent in 
Bavinck. Theologically, more must be said than that sin is ‘to be forgotten 
about’. The truth of the double biblical account of ‘dying and living with Christ’ 
has been felt in the experience of the Church throughout the ages. The way of 
the body, of suffering, the way of humility has been acknowledged as 
conformity with the incarnated Christ as well as unification with the divine life 
through him. The language of both ‘reparation’ and ‘elevation’ (and thus both 




5.4 Participation as humble ontology 
 
5.4.1 The adoration of the Mystic Lamb 
A visit to the Belgian city of Ghent offers one the opportunity to behold the 
majestic, world-famous work of the van Eyck brothers, The Adoration of the 
Mystic Lamb, finished in 1432 (see front cover). For safety reasons it has been 
removed from its original liturgical setting as an altarpiece in the Vijd-chapel 
and is now located in a cramped corner of the church, safely protected by 
bullet-proof glass. Even though this multi-panelled work is nowadays 
exhibited like a prisoner, it still communicates its overwhelming, deeply 
religious vision to the visitor.  
The work tells the story of salvation history and focuses on Christ as its 
centre. The upper level of panels contains the heavenly realm and the lower 
one the earthly. Above in the middle we find the elevated Christ (or God the 
Father, or even the Trinity, since the van Eyck brothers left an interesting 
ambiguity here), flanked by Mary and John the Baptist. They are in turn 
flanked by angels, singing and playing music. On the far left and right corners 
of the upper level we then find Adam and Eve, as our fallen ancestors. The 
centre of the work to which all the attention is attracted is located on the large 
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middle panel of the lower register, which shows the adoration of the lamb that 
is slain, a reference to the Book of Revelation. This image is surrounded by 
different groups of saints: apostles, martyrs, prophets and, on the further 
panels, knights, pilgrims, judges and hermits. Right through the middle runs a 
vertical ‘line’ from the divine heavenly centre (the deësis) through the dove 
(the Spirit) and the Lamb (Christ) to the bottom of the middle piece, which 
contains a picture of the fountain of life, from which the water runs ‘out of the 
image’.  
In this way, the work contains a vision that resonates with the patristic 
participatory vision of unity with the divine through Christ, a story of 
elevation through restoration which does not exclude human history, but 
interprets it as tending towards it. It contains a story that stands emphatically 
in the context of the Fall of Adam and Eve, but is still all about the 
communication of divine glory which overwhelms the power of evil. However, 
the pivotal feature of the work has been lost since it was removed from its 
liturgical setting. The work is not meant as a spectacle, as ‘something to watch 
and think about’, but as something to participate in. The very central line 
which represents the divine life that runs from the heavenly realm through 
Christ has to spill over the border of the painting onto the very altar that is 
missing as its necessary context. It is the daily celebration of the eucharist, and 
therefore it is also we who are missing from the painting. We are nowadays 
confined to watch it and not to participate in it, as it was clearly meant to be. 
Participation is about heavenly realities, communicated in the created, as 
is clear even from a first glance at the Mystic Lamb, with its beautiful bright 
colours, robes and particularly its overwhelmingly green pastures and hills. 
But this painting also clearly articulates how participation in this heavenly 
reality involves an earthly history of pain, martyrdom and struggle. It involves 
a pilgrimage and a quest for redemption and veneration, which finds its centre 
in the Lamb of God. 
 
5.4.2 Humble ontology 
What does this study render? It is hardly a surprise by now that implicitly or 
explicitly it has moved towards an argument in favour of a nuanced account of 
participation to be cherished also in the Reformed tradition. If this perhaps 
renders the Reformed tradition less typically ‘Reformed’ and more ‘Catholic’, 
this is an outcome that is warmly welcomed.   
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As Richard Muller’s analysis of the Reformed Scholastic sources already makes 
clear, there is no clear ontological direction in which Reformed theology 
typically steered, but more a metaphysical eclecticism.126 Bavinck 
interestingly fits within this scheme, since he too does not adhere clearly to a 
school of metaphysical thought, although he in particular leans heavily on 
Augustine’s and Thomas’ views on the way created being is analogically 
related to the divine. Univocity of being is not only Milbank’s ‘enemy’, but is 
also clearly denounced by Bavinck. That Bavinck’s theology has been found to 
be so highly participatory is at least an interesting and suggestive observation 
for the question as to whether or not some form of participation can have a 
place in Reformed theology.  
We have seen how similarly and how differently Bavinck and Milbank in 
practice enflesh their theologies, both rooted in an ontological, participatory 
discourse. Bavinck is always the weighing, careful and nuanced one, and 
Milbank the visionary, daring and speculative one. And although Milbank is 
more complicated as to the style and content of his thought, Bavinck with the 
constant and predominant voice which nevertheless has important ‘subtler 
voices’ beneath the surface is in fact far more difficult to interpret. Both 
approaches and styles are needed and have their value in the Christian 
tradition. The hope I treasure is that this sense has been kept alive in my 
study, even though in this final chapter, particularly Milbank was subjected to 
some critical remarks. The reason probably is that this chapter explicitly 
honoured ‘consonance with the tradition’ as a criterion that cannot completely 
avoid giving a somewhat greater value to the most nuanced and careful voice 
than to the creative and speculative voice. In the end, however, my conviction 
is that both voices need each other dearly.  
Why is it possible and even desirable for participation to have a place in 
Reformed theology? What already struck us in chapter 2 is that the concept of 
participation and its reception in the Christian tradition does not denote 
human elevation to a ‘superhuman’ level, and therefore does not function as 
an arrogant way of speaking which seeks ‘the things that are too high for me’ 
                                                          
126 See 2.2.7. Muller does, however, stress the Scotistic, univocal tendency which was 
derived through the adoption of Suárez’ work as a standard text of metaphysics. This 
study leaves the discussion of the ‘analogical’ versus a ‘univocal’ tendency amongst 
the Reformed sources to others, but follows Muller’s general observation of a 
Reformed ‘eclecticism’.  
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(Psalm 131). It was, analogous with the concept of deification, observed as an 
expression of deepest humility and gratitude. This notion is especially 
emphasised in the work of Milbank, and to a lesser degree in Bavinck, as it was 
focussed on our knowing. With our knowing, we do not ‘own’ something, we 
are in no way ‘in command’, but we just point vaguely towards a promise 
which lies in the divine source and end of everything. As Milbank often 
emphasises: we exist in receiving and passing on. I cannot see why such a 
notion should not be fully embraced by Reformed theology, with its similarly 
theocentric and therefore also humble attitude.  
Furthermore, particularly the traditional participatory emphasis on the 
incarnation seems to open up a way of thinking and of spiritual life that fits the 
Reformed attitude with its christological focus. It takes the reality of the fall, of 
sin and evil, seriously and instead of pushing them out of sight, it embraces 
them in a divine movement of descent and ascent. But the incarnation should 
not be narrowed to nothing more than an action of divine repair occasioned 
by sin. Bavinck and Milbank are fully consonant with the tradition when they 
stress that the context of the incarnation is the glorious unfolding of divine 
being.  
Occupying yourself as a theologian with the theme of participation is a 
humbling experience. It is, of course, an ultimate topic which implies that you 
‘practice what you preach’. As Bavinck would say: if you want to have truth, 
you have to be truthful. To express consonance here with especially the 
Reformed tradition, fearful as it is to place any salvatory act or ground in the 
human person (and thus uneasy as it is with the notion of co-working with the 
divine), this study found a striking and humbling account of participation in 
the fathers of the church, and particularly in Augustine: we are not able to fly 
out of the sinful reality, and especially not on our own wings. We need the 
mediator to cling to, to hold fast onto him and never let him go. We need the 
strength and the stability of the divine-human mediator because we ourselves 
are so feeble and weak.  
Therefore, occupying yourself as a theologian with participation is not 
developing an astonishing ontology that solves all the intellectual problems 
that may ever exist between our conception of God and of the world. It is 
primarily being absorbed by the mystery, the beauty and the joy of the divine 
life, and therefore being humbled, since you do not possess anything of these 










Participatie en mededeelbaarheid: Herman Bavinck en John Milbank 
over de relatie tussen God en de wereld 
 
1. Introductie  
De aanleiding om het over de relatie tussen God en de wereld te hebben is de 
recente agendering van het concept ‘participatie’ door de Britse theologische 
stroming Radical Orthodoxy. Theologen binnen deze stroming zijn van mening 
dat alleen een theologie die denkt in de lijn van het Platoons-Christelijke 
concept van de ‘participatie van het geschapene in God’ voorbij het seculiere 
denken kan komen. Participatie is volgens hen een onmisbare manier om alle 
dingen in relatie tot God te kunnen denken.  
Verschillende gereformeerde theologen gingen in gesprek met Radical 
Orthodoxy, waarbij het centrale concept participatie zowel weerklank vond als 
tegenspraak opriep. De centrale vraag was steeds: doet het denken over de 
relatie tussen God en de wereld in termen van participatie wel recht aan het 
fundamentele onderscheid tussen schepper en schepsel? Kortom, is 
participatie een welkom concept in de gereformeerde theologische traditie of 
zou je daarmee iets gevaarlijks binnenhalen dat wezensvreemd is aan de 
gereformeerde voorzichtigheid met betrekking tot het spreken over God? 
Deze studie wil dit gesprek verder en dieper voeren. Daartoe worden twee 
representanten van beide ‘tradities’ gekozen: John Milbank als voorman van 
Radical Orthodoxy en Herman Bavinck als een geschikte representant van de 
gereformeerde, specifiek neo-calvinistische traditie. Ook wordt een apart 
hoofdstuk gewijd aan de vraag wat participatie precies betekent en hoe het 
functioneerde in de theologische traditie.  
Daarmee stelt deze studie ontologische vragen. Het is de visie van deze 
studie dat ook de protestantse traditie, hoewel vaak wars van metafysica, 
impliciet of expliciet ontologische belangen heeft en ontologische concepten 
hanteert en dat het dus zinvol is deze vragen te stellen. Omdat veel van wat er 
in dit boek gebeurt neerkomt op een ‘vergelijking’ dan wel een ‘gesprek’ 
tussen Herman Bavinck en John Milbank, is het van belang om te beseffen dat 
dit hermeneutisch geen eenvoudige zaak is. Milbank is met een heel ander 
‘project’ bezig dan Bavinck destijds. Zijn werk is een tamelijk chaotische, 
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postmoderne berg van essayistische fragmenten, terwijl Bavinck een nette 
geordende klassieke Dogmatiek schreef. De twintigste eeuw met al z’n 
historische en filosofische verschuivingen die tussen hen in ligt, creëert een 
zeer verschillende context van denken over ‘God en de wereld’. In de lijn van 
met name Gadamer betoogt deze studie dat juist het verschil tussen beiden 
gemunt moet worden. De verschillen en de afstand moeten niet weggepoetst, 
maar juist voelbaar worden gemaakt. Tegelijk speelt het theologisch spreken 
van beiden zich af in een grotere en gedeelde verstaanshorizon, namelijk die 
van de klassieke christelijke theologische traditie. Er zullen genoeg momenten 
zijn waarop hun vragen én hun antwoorden met elkaar resoneren of 
dissoneren om een eerlijk en zinvol gesprek op te leveren. 
 
2. Participatie 
Om een zinvol gesprek over participatie te voeren aan de hand van Bavinck en 
Milbank geeft deze studie eerst een overzicht van de geschiedenis en 
implicaties van het concept. Het gaat daarbij om veel meer dan een helder 
afgebakende definitie. Waar dit hoofdstuk naar zoekt is vooral een weergave 
van de ‘taalfamilie’ waartoe participatie behoort.  
De geschiedenis van het concept participatie begint bij Plato. Plato is vaak 
dualistisch geïnterpreteerd, als denker die een wig creëerde tussen de wereld 
van de Ideeën en de zichtbare, materiële wereld. Zijn denken kan echter heel 
goed geïnterpreteerd worden als een vorm van verlangen naar het hoogste. 
Aangezien alle dingen meer of minder participeren in de Ideeën, zetten ze ons 
op het spoor van hun meest zuivere en intense manifestatie. Plato is dan ook 
veelal niet zozeer gelezen als iemand die een afkeer van de gewone 
werkelijkheid verkondigde, maar als iemand die vanuit verliefdheid op het 
alledaagse de ziel op het spoor van het hoogste zet.  
Belangrijke veranderingen onderging de receptie van Plato onder andere 
via het werk van Plotinus. Plato’s ideeënleer wordt in zijn denken sterk gevat 
in de dynamiek van het ‘uitgaan van’ en ‘terugkeren tot’ het Ene. Het Ene 
kenmerkt zich vooral door ultieme productiviteit en is sterk gekleurd door de 
Aristotelische begrippen energeia en energein, die later weer in Thomas’ 
opvatting van Gods zijn als actus purus zullen terugkeren. Belangrijk zowel 
voor Plotinus als voor latere christelijke interpreten is zijn onderscheid tussen 
energeia tes ousias en energeia ek tes ousias. Dit zorgde voor een beeld van het 
goddelijke dat bestaat uit één grote stroom aan productiviteit, maar waarin 
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tegelijk wel een onderscheid tussen het goddelijke en de wereld gecreëerd 
wordt. God is ultiem ‘gevend’, maar wel ‘onveranderlijk’. Vanuit het 
neoplatonisme ontwikkelde zich een theurgisch Platonisme, dat met name in 
het Oosterse christendom invloedrijk werd. Het religieuze leven wordt hier 
beschouwd als participatie in de goddelijke energeiai, ‘werkingen’. Deze 
energeiai zijn de noodzakelijke manifestaties van de goddelijke ousia, het 
wezen van God, dat onzegbaar en onkenbaar is en waaraan de gelovige geen 
deel heeft. Een belangrijk en invloedrijk onderscheid dat verder gemaakt werd 
in het neoplatonisme is het onderscheid tussen ‘puur zijn’ (to einai) en 
‘afgeleid zijn’ (to on), dat ook terugkeerde in Thomas’ denken over God en de 
wereld.   
Dit participatorische denken vormde het vaarwater van de kerkvaders. 
Veel christelijke theologie sloot naadloos aan bij de Platoonse inzichten: de 
mens is als beeld van God gemaakt om God te zoeken en te vinden en deel te 
hebben aan zijn goddelijk leven. Er zijn echter verschillende punten te noemen 
waarin christelijke denkers radicaal verschilden van heidense Platonisten. In 
de eerste plaats zorgde de voorstelling dat deze wereld is ‘geschapen uit niets’ 
(creatio ex nihilo) voor een breuk met het Platoonse denken. De wereld is geen 
noodzakelijke emanatie van het goddelijke, maar een wereld die gegeven en 
gewild is door een Ander. Deze wereld bestaat bij de gratie van communicatie 
van goddelijk zijn, maar wie of wat communiceert en ook het waarom van de 
communicatie blijft een ondoordringbaar mysterie. In de tweede plaats was 
het de triniteit die zorgde voor een christelijke grammatica die fundamenteel 
verschilde van de Platoonse. Niet ‘eenheid’ is het ultieme woord voor God, 
maar iets ‘voorbij eenheid’ en daarmee ‘onkenbaarheid’. Dit zorgde voor een 
sterk negatieve theologie: wil je God leren kennen, dan moet je ont-kennen. 
Tegelijk is het schepsel, via het geschapene, op het spoor van God gezet. ‘Als je 
liefhebt, participeer je in God, want God is liefde’. Zonder de bron te kennen 
hebben we er wel deel aan. In de derde plaats wijst deze studie op de rol van 
de incarnatie. Met name via een kijkje in het werk van Augustinus wordt 
duidelijk hoezeer de incarnatie een breuklijn met het Platonisme betekende. 
In zijn denken functioneert een participatorische ontologie, waarin al het 
tijdelijke zich uitstrekt naar het eeuwige. De incarnatie is echter het punt dat 
de Platonisten missen: ‘Ze zien het vaderland wel in de verte liggen, maar 
weten niet hoe het moet worden bereikt’. De noodzaak van de Middelaar, de 
noodzaak van Christus betekent voor Augustinus de noodzaak om hem te 
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volgen in de weg van de lichamelijkheid, de weg van nederigheid en lijden en 
via deze weg rust en stabiliteit voor de ziel te vinden. Deze studie volgt de 
analyse van Andrew Louth, die het denken van de kerkvaders in een spanning 
ziet staan tussen ‘opklimming tot God via de ziel’ en ‘afdaling en nederigheid 
via de incarnatie’. Zo is ook de incarnatie zelf een teken met twee kanten: Gods 
weg om het probleem van de zonde te ‘repareren’ staat in de grotere context 
van de communicatie van zijn glorie, waartoe de mens van meet af aan 
bestemd was.  
Bij Thomas van Aquino is participatie van het geschapene in het goddelijke 
zijn een belangrijk gegeven, al is er veel discussie over de precieze implicaties. 
Als Thomas verschillende vormen van participatie bespreekt, blijkt de 
belangrijkste vorm voor de relatie tussen schepper en schepsel de participatie 
van een effect in zijn oorzaak te zijn. Het effect ligt, op neo-platoonse wijze, 
dus niet buiten de oorzaak. Allerlei onderscheidingen en samenstellingen die 
voor het creatuurlijke zijn gelden, moeten bij Thomas worden doorgestreept 
om over goddelijk zijn te kunnen spreken. Geschapen wezens bestaan altijd uit 
een compositie van geactualiseerd zijn en zijn in potentie, esse en essentia, 
terwijl dat bij God samenvalt. Zijn zijn is volledig geactualiseerd: actus purus. 
Strikt genomen komt het zijn (esse) alleen God toe, en schepselen kunnen daar 
alleen maar nederig en op afgeleide wijze in delen. Thomas’ denken in termen 
van participatie gaat gelijk op met zijn denken over God in termen van 
analogie. Als we een eigenschap aan God toekennen is het nog maar de vraag 
of we begrijpen wat we daarmee bedoelen. Als we God eigenschappen 
toekennen, benoemen we zijn volmaaktheden die slechts op beperkte wijze in 
de schepping uitvloeien. Godskennis is heel dubbel bij Thomas: je kent een 
bron die zozeer zichzelf communiceert dat hij daarmee tegelijk volstrekt 
voorbij onze mogelijkheden tot kennen reikt. God is zo kenbaar dat hij 
onkenbaar is.  
Ook al wordt Thomas vaak als eindpunt van de Platoons-Christelijke 
participatorische traditie besproken, toch lopen de lijnen nog verder door, zij 
het marginaler en gefragmenteerder. In dit hoofdstuk worden twee figuren uit 
de Protestantse traditie voor het voetlicht gehaald, om te laten zien dat het 
participatie-denken ook daar niet definitief verdwenen is na de 
middeleeuwen. Johannes Calvijn gebruikt een sterk participatorisch gekleurde 
taal als hij spreekt over de eenheid tussen mensen en God in Christus. Met 
name wanneer hij het avondmaal bespreekt neigt hij naar een discours van 
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mystieke eenheid, geënt op de eucharistische theologie van de kerkvaders. 
Anders echter dan bijvoorbeeld bij Augustinus en Bernard van Clairvaux staat 
niet de eros, het actieve verlangen naar God centraal, maar Gods liefde voor 
ons en onze ‘passiviteit’ in dat proces. Een heel ander voorbeeld van 
participatiedenken in een Protestantse context is Jonathan Edwards. Bij hem 
wordt dit denken ingezet in een theologie die zich verweert tegen het 
rationalisme en atomisme van de Verlichting. Edwards’ ontologie wordt 
gekenmerkt door schoonheid en harmonie, waarbij hij de relaties waaruit de 
geschapen werkelijkheid bestaat ziet als een afspiegeling van goddelijk zijn. 
Edwards’ denken is ervan doortrokken dat de mysterieuze pracht van de 
schepping iets zegt over hoe God in zijn wezen is. ‘Goddelijke communicatie’ 
vormt het hart van alles wat Edwards wil zeggen over de schepping.  
Door een - uiteraard beperkt - overzicht te geven hoopt deze studie in dit 
hoofdstuk meer helderheid te hebben gegeven over waar participatie in de 
traditie voor staat. Het concept heeft geen heldere afgebakende betekenis die 
overal hetzelfde is. Belangrijker is het te zien dat participatie tot een 
taalfamilie behoort. Participatie kan niet zonder zusterconcepten als deificatie 
als het gaat om het doel van de mens, privatio boni als het gaat om de aard van 
de zonde en analogie als het gaat om de relatie tussen het schepsel en God. De 
wereld wordt geplaatst in de dynamiek van een exitus uit en een reditus tot 
God. Favoriete beelden zijn die van de zon en haar stralen en God als een 
overvloeiende bron van goedheid en zijn. Als het gaat om kennisleer wordt de 
nadruk gelegd op het verlangen van het menselijk subject naar het gekende. 
Sterker nog: er moet een bepaalde afstemming zijn van de kenner op het 
gekende. De participatorische ontologie kan gerust ‘theocentrisch’ genoemd 
worden. Als je tot een beschrijving van geschapen zijnden wilt komen zul je 
altijd terechtkomen bij de constatering dat in God hun eigenlijke zijn gelegen 
is. Participatie staat altijd in het teken van een nederig spreken over het 
schepsel en een groots spreken over God die er de bron en de gever van is.  
 
3. Herman Bavinck 
Om Bavincks visie op de relatie tussen God en de wereld te verhelderen 
benaderen we hem aan de hand van de volgorde van thema’s zoals hij die 
geordend heeft in zijn Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. Om te beginnen bevatten 
Bavincks prolegomena, tegen de Kantiaanse trend van zijn tijd in, een pleidooi 
voor metafysica, waarin ‘godskennis’ en ‘waarheid’ centraal staan in de 
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theologie. Dit duidt direct op een Platoonse trek in zijn denken: theologie 
behelst het ‘na-denken der gedachten Gods’. Ook ‘eenheid’ staat bij hem hoog 
in het vaandel. De pluraliteit in deze wereld is afkomstig van God en heeft in 
Hem haar doel. In God vinden de dingen hun harmonie en integratie.  
Epistemologisch maakt Bavinck gebruik van drie theologische principia: 
het principium essendi (God), het principium cognoscendi externum (Christus, 
de Schrift) en het principium cognoscendi internum (de Geest, het geloof). Deze 
studie wijst erop dat deze onderscheidingen, die er helder uitzien, in de 
praktijk soms belangrijk genoeg door elkaar lopen. Hoewel Bavinck 
bijvoorbeeld helder wil onderscheiden tussen Gods zijn en onze kennis van 
God, blijken de manieren waarop godskennis tot ons komt toch vooral 
‘voorlopig’ en ‘incidenteel’ te zijn. Wat voorop staat is de ontologische 
beweging ‘van God tot God’ waarin al ons kennen is opgenomen. Gods zijn 
omvat ook ons kennen.  
De kennis van God, die Hij via zijn openbaring verspreidt, moet niet buiten 
de mens blijven staan, maar moet tot in alle vezels van de werkelijkheid 
doordringen. Zo investeert Bavinck veel energie in het werken met de 
verhouding tussen object en subject, tussen ‘buiten’ en ‘binnen’. Het is voor 
hem een wonder dat innerlijk en het uiterlijk zo goed met elkaar 
corresponderen. Een wonder dat gelegen is in de Logos van God die beide 
‘werelden’ schiep en zo de organische verbinding tussen beide garandeert. 
Bavinck gaat zover om onze rede te beschouwen als een goddelijk licht, dat 
weliswaar niet gelijk is aan de Logos van God, maar er wel in participeert. Net 
als bij het onderscheid tussen de drie principia wordt ook het onderscheid 
tussen subject en object voortdurend theologisch gedeconstrueerd: het 
verbindende principe van de Logos relativeert een te strikt onderscheid. Hat 
gaat Bavinck om de dieperliggende harmonie tussen beide. Ze moeten op 
elkaar betrokken zijn.   
Ook in Bavincks opvatting van wat openbaring is laat hij verschillende 
benaderingen naast elkaar staan. Enerzijds is het heel belangrijk dat Gods 
openbaring van buitenaf krachtens Gods wil tot ons komt en dat het geen 
immanente kracht in de kosmos is, zoals de denkers van de Romantiek 
meenden. De grens tussen het natuurlijke en het bovennatuurlijke moet niet 
worden uitgewist en in een vorm van monisme eindigen. Anderzijds strijdt 
Bavinck tegen het dualisme dat natuurlijk en bovennatuurlijk te scherp 
scheidt. Het bovennatuurlijke is volgens Bavinck zelfs de essentie van alles 
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wat wij natuurlijk noemen. Zo deconstrueert hij, redenerend vanuit de 
alomtegenwoordigheid van God, wederom een onderscheid waar hij tegelijk 
wel mee werkt. Of het nu om ‘natuurlijke’ of ‘bovennatuurlijke’ openbaring, 
dan wel ‘algemene’ of ‘bijzondere’ openbaring gaat: altijd zoekt Bavinck de 
eenheid van Gods zijn die wordt gecommuniceerd in de onderscheidenheid 
der dingen.  
Bavincks spreken over de Schrift lijkt soms een wereld op zichzelf te 
worden, een baken van autoriteit en zekerheid binnen de kaders van het 
principium externum. Toch worden ook daar de gestelde grenzen 
overschreden: ten eerste moet je als gelovige ‘in de Schrift leven’ om hem als 
autoriteit te kunnen aanvaarden. Ten tweede staat de Schrift principieel in de 
grotere stroom van de beweging ‘van God, tot God’ en vervult zo een rol in 
Gods mededeelbaarheid. Overal spoelt zo ‘het zijn van God’ over de grenzen 
van de gebruikte onderscheidingen.  
Als Bavinck aan de godsleer begint, valt het al snel op dat hij een grote en 
constitutieve rol toekent aan de onkenbaarheid van God. Dit is voor hem geen 
lastig obstakel, maar juist een positief kenmerk dat alle godskennis bepaalt. 
Juist die onkenbare God is de bron van alles wat is. Ook al werkt Bavinck met 
het onderscheid tussen mededeelbare en onmededeelbare eigenschappen, 
toch legt hij zich niet neer bij een strikte scheiding van die twee categorieën. 
Volstrekt onmededeelbaar kan een eigenschap als ‘eeuwigheid’ toch niet zijn? 
Waar hebben we het anders over? En een mededeelbare eigenschap als 
‘goedheid’ zal iets heel anders betekenen wanneer hij op God wordt toegepast 
dan wanneer we het over een schepsel zeggen. Ondanks de fundamentele kern 
van onkenbaarheid die ligt in al ons spreken over God is Hij toch ‘zelf dat alles 
wat schepselen aan zijn en leven en geest, aan kennis, heiligheid en 
gerechtigheid deelachtig zijn.’ Instemmend met de Platoons-Christelijke 
traditie meent Bavinck dat God zelf ‘het zijn’ is, de volheid van zijn en leven die 
dus ook niets nodig heeft of begeert of aan verandering onderhevig is.  
De triniteit is misschien wel het meest wezenlijke onderdeel van heel 
Bavincks theologie. Daar komen vrijwel al zijn theologische belangen samen. 
De triniteit waarborgt het feit dat God niet tegenover de wereld staat als een 
compleet ‘vreemde’. De generatie van de Zoon en de processie van de Geest 
zijn bron en voorwaarde voor Gods communicatie in de schepping. Bavinck 
wil niet zover gaan om te stellen dat de wereld met het idee ‘God’ gegeven is, 
maar de triniteit drukt wel uit dat God een overvloeiende bron van leven is, 
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productief, in staat om iets te creëren dat niet puur tegenover hem staat, maar 
‘in zijn Geest blijft rusten’. Waarom er ‘God’ is én ‘de wereld’ (die immers strikt 
genomen niets toevoegt aan Gods zijn) is voor Bavinck een aanbiddelijk 
mysterie. Bij de vraag hoe en waarom eeuwigheid overgaat in tijd kunnen we 
alleen maar verwonderd stilstaan. En om zijn positie haarscherp te 
onderscheiden van elke notie van ‘emanatie uit Gods wezen’ benadrukt 
Bavinck dat schepping alles te maken heeft met de soevereine wil van God – 
als dan maar duidelijk blijft dat zijn wil alles te maken heeft met zijn ‘zijn’.  
Theologisch gezien is voor Bavinck de mens het meest fascinerende wezen 
op aarde: volledig aards en volledig hemels tegelijk, een bemiddelend wezen 
en daarom op zichzelf al een vooruitwijzing naar de incarnatie. Niet zozeer 
Adam zelf, maar de mensheid in z’n complete ontvouwing in de geschiedenis 
vormt volgens hem het ‘beeld van God’. Adam wees vooruit en stond aan het 
begin van een pad dat nog gevolgd moest worden. De incarnatie van het 
Woord van God staat dan ook in de bredere verbanden: in de eerste plaats van 
de triniteit, die de mogelijkheid van een god-menselijke middelaar opent, in de 
tweede plaats is er dus de mens, die zelf al in zekere zin een ‘vleeswording van 
God’ betekent en in de derde plaats communiceerde God zichzelf in de loop 
van de geschiedenis van Israël voortdurend aan zijn volk.  
Dat betekent niet dat de incarnatie er ook wel gekomen zou zijn ‘zonder 
zonde’. Bavinck legt zonde uit in de klassieke lijn van privatio boni, maar kent 
er wel een zekere constitutieve status aan toe voor de wereld zoals wij die 
kennen. God wilde de zonde en gebruikt haar om tot een uiteindelijk diepere 
glorie van zijn naam te komen. Al direct na de zondeval wordt de weg ‘door 
lijden tot heerlijkheid’, de weg van Christus, geopenbaard. Ook komt op dit 
moment in Bavincks theologie pas de notie van het verbond ter sprake. Met 
name het genadeverbond speelt een grote rol als het gaat om de relatie tussen 
God en de wereld na de zondeval.  
  
4. John Milbank 
Deze studie vat Milbanks werk op als het vertellen van een verhaal van een 
alternatieve moderniteit, voorbij het seculiere. Een logische plek om te 
beginnen is dan zijn magnum opus, Theology and Social Theory. In dat boek 
valt Milbank ‘het seculiere’ aan dat volgens hem a) een ontologie van geweld 
predikt en b) werkt met de idee van een menselijke (‘seculiere’) ruimte , los 
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van het goddelijke. Dit is echter geen ‘eeuwige waarheid’, maar een actief 
verbeeld verhaal dat we graag over onszelf vertellen.  
Met betrekking tot de eerste karakteristiek bespreekt Milbank tal van 
denkers die, hoewel ze veelal het beste met de mensheid voorhebben, in hun 
denken een primair domein van chaos en geweld aannemen dat uiteindelijk de 
enige ontologische basis van ons bestaan vormt. Wat zij daarmee doen is het 
vertellen en versterken van de kwaadaardige mythe dat oorlog de ‘vader van 
alle dingen’ is. Dit is wat Milbank de ‘heidense’ of ook wel ‘gnostische’ trek van 
de moderniteit noemt: zij verwart de schepping met de zondeval. De 
christelijke traditie stelt zich daarentegen een wereld voor die gave is van de 
volheid van goddelijk zijn. Zonde en kwaad zijn niet ‘iets’ maar slechts 
beroving van het goede (privatio boni). Door het kwaad een ontologische 
status te geven ben je al op weg de zondeval keer op keer opnieuw uit te 
voeren.   
De andere karakteristiek van het seculiere is dat het ten onrechte doet 
alsof je voor eens en voor altijd een volledige beschrijving van het eindige 
kunt geven. Het meent daarbij het oneindige niet nodig te hebben, en houdt 
zich daarmee aan de grenzen tussen eindig en oneindig die Immanuël Kant 
stelde. De genealogie van deze karaktertrek van het seculiere gaat echter 
verder terug. Het was volgens Milbank Duns Scotus die voor het eerst expliciet 
afstand nam van een participatorische relatie tussen goddelijk zijn en 
geschapen zijn. Volgens hem was het zijn op dezelfde wijze (univook) van 
toepassing op God en mens, dus beiden kunnen een plaats toebedeeld krijgen 
in één univoke ‘ontologie’. Op deze manier creëerde hij ruimte voor een 
kenbaarheid van het eindige die zich liever niet meer wil laten storen door 
inmenging met het oneindige. De weg van het seculiere denken met zijn 
inherente essentialisme (dingen hebben een eeuwig vaststaande kenbare 
‘kern’) werd zo geopend. 
Over verscheidene lijnen werkt Milbank zijn alternatieve theologische 
visie uit. In de eerste plaats valt die te vinden in zijn opvattingen over kennis. 
Daarvoor werkt hij met een visie die een veel belangrijkere plek voor de 
creativiteit van taal inruimt dan in seculiere epistemologie gebruikelijk is. We 
kunnen dingen niet objectief kennen, los van de stroom, de context waarin zij 
zich geven en de constitutieve relaties en proporties waarin zij staan. Kennen 
is een proces van selecteren, verlangen en ‘esthetisch geprefereerde patronen’ 
construeren. Het kennende subject wordt bij Milbank van zijn centrale troon 
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gestoten en verwachtingsvol en nederig geopend naar steeds nieuwe 
openbaringen van ‘betekenis’. In plaats van ‘zeker weten’ is kennen bij 
Milbank zo ‘verwachtingsvol reizen’.   
Verder ontwikkelt Milbank een visie op handelen die verder gaat dan dat 
we maar wat in onzekerheid aanmodderen. Er is volgens hem wel degelijk 
zoiets als waarheid, zekerheid, stabiliteit en eenheid, maar die is er alleen in 
God. En al onze aardse goedheden zijn er voor zover ze participeren in die 
gevende bron. Niet chaos en geweld, maar eeuwige goedheid, waarheid en 
schoonheid zijn daarom de context van ons handelen. Strikt genomen weten 
we niet wat wij zijn en wat wij doen. We moeten ons handelen echter niet 
laten bepalen door de zondige status quo, maar leven vanuit een visioen van 
volmaaktheid, vrede en harmonie dat ons voortdrijft: God. 
Centraal staat in dit denken voor Milbank de triniteit: Met de drie-eenheid 
weet het christendom voorbij de (Platoonse) gedachte te komen dat God pure 
‘eenheid’ voorbij de verscheidenheid van de wereld is en anderzijds voorbij de 
(heidense) gedachte dat chaos en versplintering de ontologische bron van de 
dingen is. Met de triniteit zijn we in staat iets ‘buiten’ God te denken dat toch 
in hem participeert. Een strikt, kraakhelder onderscheid tussen ‘binnen’ en 
‘buiten’ God kan zodoende niet meer getrokken worden. ‘Binnen’ God vinden 
we in de trinitarische relaties immers al een ‘buiten’ en we hebben volgens 
Milbank dan ook strikt genomen niet een aparte ‘oeconomische triniteit’ nodig 
om over de wereld te spreken. Schepping bestaat niet uit enige vorm van 
‘onafhankelijkheid’ van God, maar uit een voortdurende stroom van gegeven 
zijn van God.   
Op deze manier probeert Milbank een ‘midden’ te denken dat in de 
praktijk lastig te verbeelden is. Een midden tussen theologie en filosofie, 
tussen natuur en genade dat toch geen water bij de wijn van een van beide 
‘polen’ wil doen. Deze manier van denken noemt hij denken over God en de 
wereld in termen van ‘analogie’ of ‘paradox’. In tegenstelling tot Hegels 
dialectiek, waarin voortdurend de twee polen in elkaar opgaan, wil Milbank 
blijven staan bij een paradox: datgene waarin deze wereld participeert is het 
‘onparticipeerbare’, wat Thomas en Eckhart aanduidden met Gods esse. Juist 
omdat het onparticipeerbaar is (en niet een soort ‘univoke’ reuzentaart waar 




Het is begrijpelijk dat in Milbanks zoektocht naar een niet-seculiere taal 
om zowel over God als de mens te spreken grote aandacht uitgaat naar de 
incarnatie, waarin God en mens op ultieme wijze samenkomen. Voor Milbank 
betekent de incarnatie meer dan een ‘remedie voor de zonde’: ze ‘overstijgt 
haar aanleiding’. De incarnatie brengt een goddelijke doorschijning van het 
natuurlijke op gang die ervoor zorgt dat al het geschapene sacramenteel 
geladen wordt. Het is duidelijk dat Milbanks christologische aandacht minder 
uitgaat naar de onderscheidenheid van de twee naturen van Christus dan naar 
de eenheid, immers, een scheiding tussen beide opent maar wat gauw de weg 
naar een seculiere opvatting van wat ‘de mens’ of wat ‘het eindige’ is, zonder 
fundamentele inmenging met het goddelijke. Milbanks belangrijkste motief 
om de christologie zo te benaderen is dat hij Christus wil benaderen vanuit de 
kerk, vanuit zijn lichaam, vanuit de nieuwe ‘manier van zijn’ die zijn komst in 
gang gezet heeft.  
Milbanks werk is zo te beschouwen als een zoektocht naar theologische 
taal voorbij het seculiere en dus een taal die zowel over het goddelijke als het 
menselijke spreekt, zonder ze in elkaar over te laten lopen. Het belangrijkste 
woord waarin dat gebeurt is verbum of logos, waarin Milbank niet alleen de 
notie van spreken, maar ook van maken vindt (aangezien Gods ‘spreken’ het 
‘maken’ van deze wereld betekent). Milbanks werk wil geen theologie zijn die 
in abstracto over God denkt, maar die een visie biedt op wat menselijke 
culturele productie is in het licht van het goddelijk zijn. Milbank neemt het 
heel serieus dat God zelf primair productief is, dat Gods zijn bepaald wordt 
door zijn ‘maken’ en dat dit niet pas iets is dat in latere instantie bij zijn 
‘essentie’ gevoegd wordt. Zo is ook menselijk maken niet te scheiden van 
menselijk ‘kennen’ en ‘zijn’. ‘Maken is equiprimordiaal met zijn’. Op deze 
manier is ons maken en produceren dus een participeren in goddelijke 
creativiteit en zijn.   
 
5. Bespreking 
De vraag die in de discussie tussen gereformeerde theologen en RO in de lucht 
hing, was of het centrale begrip participatie pantheïstische dan wel 
panentheïstische implicaties heeft. Er was, kortom, zorg over de handhaving 
van het verschil tussen schepper en schepsel. Dit slothoofdstuk gaat in de 
eerste plaats in op deze vragen. Hoe gaan Bavinck en Milbank om met de 
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relatie tussen schepper en schepsel en hoe verhouden zij zich tot de 
historische implicaties van het begrip participatie?  
Eerst wordt verduidelijkt wat doorgaans verstaan wordt onder de 
gebruikte termen ‘pantheïsme’ en ‘panentheïsme’. Pantheïsme wenst geen 
onderscheid te maken tussen God en de wereld. Begrippen als ‘vrijheid’ en 
‘schepping’ en een ‘persoonlijke God’ zijn in deze visie niet mogelijk. Hoewel 
een strikt pantheïsme, waarin God en de wereld volstrekt samenvallen, vrijwel 
nooit aangehangen wordt, zijn er verschillende theologen en filosofen geweest 
die er min of meer mee geassocieerd kunnen worden. Vooral de Hegeliaanse, 
dynamische variant vond bijval: God wordt zichzelf in het worden van deze 
wereld. Anderen muntten de meer genuanceerde term panentheisme: een veel 
meer gerespecteerde (en loyale) positie binnen het christelijk theïsme. In deze 
visie ligt de wereld en de loop van haar geschiedenis uiteindelijk ‘in God’, maar 
is er wel meer ruimte voor Gods transcendentie. Een belangrijke notie is dat 
God en de wereld wederzijds van elkaar afhankelijk zijn. Ook wordt juist het 
‘persoonlijke’ en ‘relationele’ van God doorgaans hoog gewaardeerd in 
panentheïstische voorstellingen.   
In Bavincks werk valt het op dat hij steeds de uitersten van ‘pantheïsme’ 
enerzijds en ‘deïsme’ anderzijds probeert te vermijden. Voor deze studie is 
vooral zijn discussie met de ‘pantheïserende’ denkers van belang. Zij 
vertroebelen de grens tussen schepper en schepsel door het worden van deze 
wereld door te trekken tot een ‘worden van God’. Voor Bavinck is de triniteit 
de kern van het christelijk geloof die de ontologische tussenweg tussen 
pantheïsme en deïsme waarborgt. De drie-eenheid verkondigt het mysterie 
dat God zichzelf volop meedeelt in de schepping en toch hetzelfde blijft. Maar 
is de wereld nu wel of niet iets ‘buiten God’? Verschillende uitspraken van 
Bavinck leveren een ambivalent beeld, waarin wel degelijk gewerkt wordt met 
een onderscheid tussen ‘binnen’ en ‘buiten’ God. Uiteindelijk lijkt het er echter 
toch op neer te komen dat vanuit God geen strikte ‘grens’ gepasseerd wordt in 
zijn relatie tot de wereld. Deze ‘grens’ bestaat er alleen gezien vanuit de 
wereld ten opzichte van God.  
Als het gaat om de formele aanwezigheid van het concept participatie in 
Bavincks werk, moet in de eerste plaats opgemerkt worden dat Bavinck er 
huiverig voor is, aangezien het voor hem teveel riekt naar emanatie en dus 
naar pantheïsme. In de tweede plaats blijkt Bavinck op enkele plaatsen echter 
wel degelijk in te stemmen met formuleringen die de relatie tussen God en de 
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wereld in termen van participatie aanduiden. Zolang het niet de idee 
impliceert van een letterlijke (univoke) uitvloeiing van Gods zijn in de 
schepping, is het voor Bavinck geen probleem om van participatie te spreken. 
Bavinck ziet God als esse en dat betekent aan de ene kant een diep ontologisch 
verschil met de wereld, maar aan de andere kant een doordringing van al wat 
is met het goddelijke als gevende en stuwende kracht. Bavinck blijft staan bij 
de ‘dubbele uitkomst’ van Thomas’ participatie- en analogie-denken: Gods zijn 
is zo overvloedig, excessief en alomvattend dat het onze vermogens Hem te 
bevatten volkomen overstijgt en tegelijk is Hij op die manier wel de bron van 
alles wat wij zelf zijn. God is zo mededeelbaar dat Hij onbegrijpelijk is. 
Belangrijker echter dan de expliciete aanwezigheid van het woord participatie 
is de impliciete aanwezigheid van het concept in Bavincks complete ontologie, 
waar deze studie talloze voorbeelden van geeft. Bovenal is het Bavincks 
voortdurende nadruk op Gods mededeelbaarheid die hem verbindt met de 
participatorische traditie: deze wereld ‘is’ omdat zij een en al trinitarische 
mededeelbaarheid van Gods zijn is.  
Vervolgens wordt John Milbanks visie onder de loep gelegd. Deze studie is 
niet overtuigd door Amene Mirs betoog dat Milbanks denken over God en de 
wereld ‘panentheïstisch’ genoemd moet worden. Weliswaar zijn er vele zinnen 
in zijn werk te vinden die verklaren dat deze wereld ‘binnen’ het goddelijke, 
trinitarische zijn valt. Mir legt echter ten onrechte veel nadruk op het discours 
‘binnen-buiten’ dat Milbank nu juist met zijn betoog over Gods trinitarische 
zijn probeert te overstijgen. Milbank, zowel als Bavinck, beweegt zich in een 
klassiek theologisch discours dat voor onze moderne oren zo nu en dan 
verrassend ‘panentheïstisch’ kan aandoen, als dan maar helder blijft dat de 
wereld ‘in God’ ligt, als in haar altijd overstijgende oorzaak, die dus elk ‘in’ of 
‘buiten’ overstijgt. Nog minder kan Milbanks positie ‘pantheïstisch’ genoemd 
worden. Hoewel hij meegaat in de pantheïstisch klinkende uitspraak esse est 
deus van Eckhart, maakt hij goed duidelijk dat dit juist duidt op het ons 
oneindig overstijgende zijn van God waaraan wij tegelijk ons bestaan danken.  
Toch zitten er ook wel enkele dubieuze kanten aan Milbanks voorstelling. 
Vooral in zijn radicale interpretatie van Gods zijn als ‘maken’ gaat hij ten 
opzichte van de traditie een eigen weg, die vooral ingegeven is door zijn post-
seculiere agenda. Zijn visie dat menselijk maken participeert in goddelijk 
maken stempelde van meet af aan zijn denken en lijkt er soms voor te zorgen 
dat niet (zoals hij Duns Scotus verwijt) ‘zijn’, maar wel ‘maken’ iets wordt dat 
247 
 
groter is dan God zelf. Terwijl Bavinck met de traditie bij het aanbiddelijk 
mysterie blijft staan dat er ‘God’ is én ‘de wereld’, probeert Milbank het 
geheim vaak doorzichtig te maken.  
Al met al stemmen Bavinck en Milbank overeen in hun analogische 
discours over de relatie tussen God en de wereld waardoor pantheïsme, maar 
ook panentheïsme nooit een goed label zal zijn om op hun spreken te plakken. 
Vooral de ‘wederzijdse relatie van afhankelijkheid’ die binnen het 
panentheïsme van belang is, wordt daarvoor te ernstig door beiden 
weersproken. Beider discours over de relatie tussen God en de wereld 
verloopt langs de lijnen van de participatorische traditie. Bavinck lijkt hier 
soms zelfs nog dichter bij te staan dan Milbank als we bedenken hoezeer de 
nederigheid van het kennende subject en het aanvaarden van het mysterie van 
de schepping, die kenmerkend is voor deze traditie, aanwezig is in zijn 
denken. 
Het tweede deel van het slothoofdstuk gaat verder in op de precieze 
implicaties van participatie voor de soteriologie, de zondeleer en de incarnatie 
en onderzoekt of deze implicaties te verenigen zijn met de verschillende 
gevoeligheden en belangen van de gereformeerde traditie. Zo worden 
allereerst protestantse stemmen beluisterd die kritiek uitoefenen op 
(onderdelen van) het concept participatie. Een van de opvallendste dingen is 
dat zij participatie wel als een soteriologische categorie willen accepteren, 
maar niet als een ontologische. Door te werken met ontologische participatie 
zou de rol van Christus die het heil brengt extra nos vertroebeld worden en 
zou de mens met zijn capaciteit om genade te ontvangen teveel op de 
voorgrond komen te staan.  
Allereerst moet de aandacht echter uitgaan naar de nadruk op ‘kennen’ in 
de participatorische denklijn. ‘Op de juiste manier kennen’ lijkt bijna hetzelfde 
te zijn als ‘heil’ en dat geldt voor Bavinck net zo zeer als voor Milbank. Deze 
studie heeft uitvoerig laten zien hoe belangrijk het voor beiden is, dat kennen 
in de bredere kring getrokken wordt van ‘zijn’ dat uiteindelijk ‘Gods zijn’ is. 
Milbank en Bavinck verzetten zich allebei hevig tegen een seculier kennen, 
waarin de kenner zijn wereld dichttimmert en begrenst door zijn kennen. Het 
is voor beiden van het grootste belang dat juist ons menselijke kennen een 
weg opent naar transcendentie, naar ‘kennis van God’. Het is kennen dat geen 
aardse zekerheid biedt, maar wel hoop, vertrouwen, geborgenheid, vrede en 
heil. Daarmee is duidelijk dat kennisleer voor hen meer is dan een 
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intellectueel spel. Het is geen theologische voorvraag, maar het vormt het hart 
van de theologische onderneming. Kennen is een vorm van mystiek 
‘schouwen’ en daarmee is heel je bestaan en dus ook je gedrag in het geding. 
Kennen verwijst naar nederigheid en ontvankelijkheid.   
Maar zijn we in een gevallen wereld wel in de positie om zoveel 
soteriologische waarde te hechten aan ons kennen? Zijn we daarvoor niet te 
fundamenteel verblind door de zonde? Bavinck en Milbank stemmen weer 
beide in met de traditionele opvatting van zonde als privatio boni. Het goede, 
het zijn van God staat altijd voorop en zonde zal nooit een eigen 
concurrerende substantie worden met eigen ‘macht’. Milbank voert dit 
principe echter consequenter door dan Bavinck. Bavinck kent naast het 
ontologische discours ook een meer bijbels gekleurde, heilshistorische lijn 
waarin de zonde een daadwerkelijke ‘plek’ krijgt in het theologische plot. 
Zonde en dood vormen de markeringen op de weg van gebrokenheid die de 
mens te gaan heeft en die sinds de zondeval ook de weg van de Middelaar is. 
Deze studie is van mening dat Milbank een te grote, soteriologische taak 
toebedeelt aan de individuele theoloog die de zonde poëtisch ‘weg kan 
verbeelden’.   
Maar voor belangrijke interpreten staat de vraag nog steeds overeind - 
niet alleen aan Milbank, maar ook aan Bavinck: Hoe ernstig neem je de komst 
van Christus als de zonde zichzelf, vanwege haar eigen nietsheid, toch wel 
vernietigt? En maakt Bavinck de incarnatie niet veel te veel een gebeuren dat 
vrijwel al gegeven was met de schepping van de mens? Is zijn theologie nu een 
‘scheppings’- of een ‘genade-theologie’? Deze studie ziet, mede op grond van 
het overzicht van het denken van de kerkvaders over incarnatie, geen heil in 
dit scherpe onderscheid. De incarnatie staat in het dubbele teken van 
verlossing en groei, van ‘reparatie’ en ‘elevatie’. De reden hiervoor is dat Gods 
communicatieve zijn altijd de overhand heeft en niet het gegeven van de 
zonde. De incarnatie ook als elevatie opvatten is dus geen teken van een 
eenzijdig vooruitgangsgeloof dat de realiteit van de zonde niet serieus neemt. 
Het is een teken dat Gods communicatie van zijn ‘zijn’ de bepalende factor in 
de theologie is.  
Ook al stemmen de christologische visies van Bavinck en Milbank op dit 
punt overeen, toch is ‘Christus’ voor hen uiteindelijk een antwoord op een heel 
verschillende vraag. Voor Milbank is Christus vooral aan antwoord op zijn 
theologische, post-seculiere vraag naar de mogelijkheid van bemiddeling 
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tussen God en de wereld. Christus wordt zo vooral een plaats van ontologische 
speculatie. Iets wat deze studie juist bij Bavinck waardeert is dat hij zich 
beweegt in de spanning die Andrew Louth analyseerde bij de kerkvaders: de 
lijn van ‘verheffing’ via de ziel en de lijn van ‘nederdaling’ via de incarnatie. 
Participeren in het leven van God betekent niet dat je een weg gaat die je 
uittilt boven de aardse weg van lichamelijkheid, nederigheid, strijd en dood 
maar die je daardoorheen voert. Dit alles ziet deze studie op overrompelende 
wijze geïllustreerd in het majestueuze altaarstuk van de gebroeders van Eyck, 
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